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EPOCHS  OF  ANCIENT  HISTORY 

EDITED   BY 

REV.  G.  W.  COX,  M.A.  AND  CHARLES  SANKEY,  M.  A. 


THE  GREEKS  and  THE  PERSIANS. 


REV.  G.  W.  COX,  M.  A. 


EPOCHS  OF  ANCIENT  HISTORY. 

[Uniform  with  Epochs  of  Modern  History,] 


Just  published,  the  initial  Volume  with  four  colored  maps.     Price  $1.00. 

THE  GREEKS  AND  THE  PERSIANS.     By  the  Rev.  GEORGE  W.  Cox,  M.A., 

late  Scholar  of  Trinity  College,  Oxford. 

***   To  le  followed,  at  frequent  intervals,  by  the  following  Works  in  continua 
tion  of  the  same  Series  : — 

SPARTAN  AND  THEBAN  SUPREMACY.     By  CHARLES  SANKEY,  M.A.,  late 
Scholar  of  Queen's  College,  Oxford,  Joint-Editor  of  the  Series. 

MACEDONIAN  EMPIRE,  its  RISE  and  CULMINATION  to  the  DEATH  of 
ALEXANDER  the  GREAT.     By  A.  M.  CURTEIS,  M.A.,  Assistant-Master, 

Sherborne  School. 

ROME,   to   its   CAPTURE  by  the   GAULS.    By  WILHELM  IHNE,   Author  of 
"  History  of  Rome."     (Shortly.} 

ROME  AND  CARTHAGE,  the  PUNIC  WARS.    By  R.  BOSWORTH  SMITH,  M.A. 
Assistant-Master,  Harrow  School. 

THE  ATHENIAN  EMPIRE,  from  the  Flight  of  Xerxes  to  the  Fall  of  Athens. 
By  the  Rev.  G.  W.  Cox,  M.A.,  Joint-Editor  of  the  Series. 

THE  GRACCHI,  MARIUS,  AND  SULLA.     By  A.  H.  BEESLY,  M.A.,  Assistant- 
Master,  Marlborough  College. 

THE  ROMAN  TRIUMVIRATES.     By  the  Very  Rev.  CHARLES  MERIVALE,  D.D., 
Dean  of  Ely.    (Shortly.} 

THE  EARLIER  EMPIRE.     By  the  Rev.  W.  WOLFE  CAPES,  M.A.,  Reader  of 
Ancient  History  in  the  University  of  Oxford.     (Shortly} 

THE  AGE  OF  TRAJAN  AND  THE  ANTONINES-     By  the  Rev.  W  WOLFE 
CAPES,  M.A.,  Reader  of  Ancient  History  in  the  University  of  OxLrd. 


EACH    I    VOL.    l6MO.,    CLOTH,   UNIFORM.      TRICE,   $I.OO. 


SCRIBNER,  ARMSTRONG  &  CO., 

7VJ  &"  7-fj  Broadway,  New  I  rork. 


THE 


GREEKS  AND  THE  PERSIANS. 


BY  THE 

REV.   G.  W.  COX,  M.  A. 

JOINT-EDITOR   OF   THE   SERIES 


- 


L 1  B  R  A  It  Y 

UNIVEUOITY   OF 

CALIFORNIA 


NEW  YORK 

SCRIBNER,  ARMSTRONG  &  CO. 
1876 


// 


GRANT,  FAIRES  &  RODGERS, 

BOOK  AND  JOB  PRINTERS 

PHILADELPHIA. 


PREFACE. 


IN  the  pages  of  Herodotus  the  history  of  the  Per 
sian  Wars  becomes  the  history  of  the  world.  The 
fortunes  of  the  tribes  and  nations  which  were  absorbed 
successively  into  the  great  mass  of  the  Persian  Empire, 
before  it  came  into  collision  with  the  only  force  ca 
pable  of  withstanding  it,  are  traced  with  a  fulness  of 
detail  due  probably  to  the  fact  that  no  written  history 
either  of  the  Greek  tribes  or  of  their  Eastern  and 
Western  neighbors  was  yet  in  existence. 

In  the  present  volume  the  non-Hellenic  peoples 
are  noticed  only  in  so  far  as  their  history  bears  on 
that  of  the  Greek  tribes,  or  as  their  characteristics 
illustrate  the  relations  and  even  the  affinity  of  the 
latter  with  races  which  they  regarded  as  altogether 
alien  and  barbarous. 

In  relating  the  history  of  that  great  struggle  be 
tween  the  despotism  of  the  East  and  the  freedom  and 
law  of  the  West,  which  came  practically  to  an  end 
with  the  discomfiture  of  the  Persian  army  at  Plataia 
and  the  ruin  of  the  Persian  fleet  at  Mykale,  I  have 
striven  to  trace  the  lines  of  evidence,  sometimes 


VL 


Preface. 


faintly  marked,  but  seldom  broken,  which  enable  us 
to  test  the  traditional  stories  and  with  more  or  less 
clearness  to  ascertain  the  real  course  of  events.  In 
short,  my  effort  has  been  to  show  rather  how  far  the 
history  may  be  regarded  as  trustworthy  than  how 
much  of  it  must  be  put  aside  as  uncertain  or  ficti 
tious.  That  it  contains  some  traditions  which  are 
not  to  be  trusted  and  others  which  are  actually  false, 
is  beyond  question;  and  in  such  instances  I  have 
placed  before  the  reader  the  evidence  which  will 
enable  him  to  form  his  own  judgment  in  the  matter. 
But  it  is  more  satisfactory  to  note  that  with  little 
doubt  the  real  course  of  the  events  which  preceded 
and  followed  the  battle  of  Marathon  or  the  march 
of  Leonidas  to  Thermopylai  may  be  determined  by 
evidence  supplied  in  the  narrative  of  Herodotus  him 
self;  and  that  the  history  thus  recovered  throws  a 
singularly  full  and  clear  light  on  the  motives  of  all 
the  contending  parties,  and  on  the  origin  and  nature 
of  the  struggle  which  was  decided  chiefly  by  Athenian 
energy  and  heroism. 

The  history  of  this  struggle  forms  a  portion  of 
that  ground  which  I  have  had  to  traverse  in  the  first 
volume  of  my  "  History  of  Greece,"  But  although 
t'.ie  materials  have  been  necessarily  re-arranged  and 
much  of  the  history  is  presented  from  a  different 
point  of  view,  I  have  given,  much  as  I  gave  them  in 
.my  larger  volume,  the  descriptions  of  the  most  striking 
scenes  or  the  most  important  actors  in  the  great  strife 
which  carriecj.  Athens  to  imperial  dominion.  I  felt 
that  I  could  scarcely  hope  to  make  these  descriptions 


Preface.  vii 

more  clear  or  forcible  by  giving  them  in  different 
words,  and  that  any.  attempt  to  write  down  to  the 
capacities  of  young  readers  was  wholly  uncalled  for 
in  a  history  which  in  its  vivid  pictures  and  stirring 
interest  appeals  witli  equal  force  to  the  young  and 
to  the  old  alike. 


Note  on  the  Spelling  of  Greek  Names. 

No  attempt  has  been  made  in  this  volume  to  alter  the  spelling  of  Greek 
names  which  have  assumed  genuine  English  forms — e.  g.  Athens,  Thebes, 
Corinth,  Thrace.  It  would  be  well,  perhaps,  if  such  forms  had  been  more 
numerous. 

The  L.itin  form  has  been  kept,  where  it  has  become  so  familiar  to  English 
ears  that  a  change  would  be  disagreeable,  e.  g.  Thucydides,  Cyrus.  This 
last  name  is,  indeed,  neither  Latin  nor  Greek;  and  the  adoption  of  either, 
the  Greek  or  the  Latin  form  is  a  matter  of  comparative  indifference. 
Probably  it  would  be  to  the  benefit  of  historical  study  to  revert  to  the  true 
Persian  form,  and  to  write  Gustashp  for  Hystaspes. 

But  these  exceptrons  do  not  affect  the  general  rule  of  giving  the  Greek 
forms,  wherever  it  may  be  practicable  or  advisable  to  do  so.  This  rule  may 
be  followed  in  all  instances  in  which  either  the  name  or  the  person  are  un 
known  to  the  mass  of  English  readers.  Thus,  while  we  still  speak  of  Alex- 
auder  the  Great,  his  obscure  predecessor,  who  acts  a  subordinate  part  in 
the  drama  of  the  Persian  wars,  may  appear  as  Aleuandros. 

The  general  adoption  of  the  Greek  form  is,  indeed,  justified,  if  not  rendered 
necessary,  by  the  practice  of  most  of  the  recent  writers  on  Greek  History. 
It  is,  therefore,  unnecessary  perhaps  to  say  more  than  that  the  adoption  of 
the  Greek  form  may  help  on  the  change  in  twe  English  pronunciation  of 
Latin,  which  the  m  ist  eminent  schoolmasters  of  the  day  have  pronounced  to 
be  desirable.  So  long  as  the  Phrygian  town  is  mentioned  under  its  Lat;n 
form,  Celcence,  there  will  be  a  string  temptation  for  young  readers  to  pro 
nounce  it  as  if  it  were  the  Greek  name  for  the  moon,  Selene  It  is  well, 
therefore,  that  they  should  become  familiarized  with  the  Greek  form  Kclai- 
nai,  and  thus  learn  that  the  Greek  spelling  involves  practically  no  difference 
of  sound  from  that  of  the  true  Latin  pronunciation,  the  sound  of  the  C  and 
K  being  identical,  and  the  diphthong  ni being  pronounced  as  we  pronounce 
ai  in/a//,  while  oi  and  <?/have  the  sound  of  our  ee  in  sheen. 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  I. 

ORIGIN   AND    GROWTH    OF   GREEK    CIVILIZATION. 
.  C.  PAGE 

General  character  of  Oriental  history  .  .        I 

Rapid  extension  of  the  Roman  Empire         .  .       2 

Hindrances  to  the  extension  of  Persian  power  in  the 

West 2 

Political  growth  of  the  Greek  race  .  .  -4 

Isolation  of  the  Greek  cities  .  .  -4 

General  character  of  the  early  Greek  civilization      .       5 
Religious  character  of  the  Greek  state          .  ••      7 

Causes  retarding  the  growth  of  the  civil  power         .        8 
The  city  the  ultimate  unit  of  Greek  society  .  .       9 

National  characteristics  of  the  Greeks  .  .      10 

Comparison  between  the  Greeks  and  the  subjects  of 

Eastern  empires  .  .  .  .12 

Influence  of  the  great  festivals  on  the  education  of 

the  Greeks         .  .  .  .  .     13 

Rise  and  growth  of  Greek  philosophy  .  .     14 

CHAPTER  II. 

SETTLEMENTS    AND    GOVERNMENT   OF   THE   GREEKS. 

Extent  of  the  Hellenic  world  .  .  .16 

Geography  of  Northern  Greece         .  .  .18 

Geography  of  the  Peloponnesos        .  .  .     19 


x  Contents. 

B.  C.  PAGE 

The  coast-line  of  Greece       .             .             .  .20 

The  Thessalians        .             .             .             .  .21 

The  Boiotians           .             .             .             .  .22 

The  Spartans            .             .             .             .  .22 

The  Spartan  constitution      .              .             .  .25 

The  population  of  Lakonia                .              .  .24 

The  military  system  of  Sparta"         .              .  .     25 

Character  of  the  Greek  colonies       .              .  .26 

Greek  colonies  in  Italy  and  Sicily   .             .  .27 

Corinth  and  Korkyra             .              .              .  .28 

Epeirots  and  other  tribes  of  Northern  Hellas  .  29 
Greek  settlements  on  the  northern  coast  of  the 

Egean  sea          .              .              .              .  .32 

The  Asiatic  Greeks  .              .              .              .  32 

Physical  geography  of  Asia  Minor   .              .  -33 

The  Kingdom  of  Lydia        .             .             .  -35 

CHAPTER  III. 

THE   PERSIAN   EMPIRE   UNDER   CYRUS,    KAMBYSES, 
AND    DAREIOS. 

Cyrus  and  Astyages  .  .  .  .36 

The  Median  empire  .  .  .  •  37 
Connection  of  the  Median,  Lydian,  and  Assyrian 

Empires  .  .  .  .  •  38 

The  Median  people  .  .  .  -39 

Geography  of  Persia  .  .  .  -39 

The  Lydian  Kingdom  and  the  Asiatic  Greeks  .  41 

?  545  History  of  the  war  between  Kroisos  and  Cyrus  .  42 

Popular  stories  of  the  reign  and  fall  of  Kroisos  .  43 
Sources  of  the  popular  accounts  of  the  reign  of 

Kroisos"^  .  .  .  .  -47 

Events  in  Asia  Minor  after  the  fall  of  Kroisos  .  49 

Expedition  of  Cyrus  against  Babylon  .  -  49 

Siege  and  fall  of  Babylon  .  .  .  .52 


Contents.  xi 


B.C. 


PAGE 


Death  of  Cyrus,  and  invasion  of  Egypt  by  Kam- 

byses     ....  -53 

The  formation  of  Egypt       \             .             .  '54 

Character  of  the  Egyptian  people     .  .     56 

Opening  of  Egypt  to  the  Greeks      .  .     58 

Reigns  of  Nekos,  Amasis,  and  Psammenitos  .     59 

?  525     Conquest  of  Egypt  by  the  Persians  .             .  .61 
Failure  of  the    expedition   into    Ethiopia  and   the 

desert   .                                        .  .61 
Failure  of  the  proposed  expedition  against  Carthage     62 

The  last  days  of  Kambyses               .             .  .64 

The  record  of  Behistun         .             .             .  .66 

?52o    Revolt  of  the  Medes             .             .  .67 

Revolt  of  Babylon  .             .             .             .  -67 

Despotism  of  Polykrates  at  Samos  .             .  -68 
Organization  of  the  Persian  Empire  under  Dareios     69 

The  story  of  Demokedes     .  .     70 

?  516    Expedition  of  Dareios  to  Scythia     .             .  -73 

The  lonians  at  the  bridge  across  the  Danube  .     75 

Operations  of  Megabazos  in  Thrace             .  .     76 

CHAPTER  IV. 

HISTORY  OF  ATHENS  IN  THE  TIMES  OF  SOLON, 
PEISISTRATOS,   AND   KLEISTHENES. 

Growth  of  hereditary  sovereignty  among  the  Greeks  77 

Origin  of  Greek  tyrannies  .  .  .  -79 

Early  history  of  the  Athenian  people  .  .  So 

New  classification  of  the  citizens  by  Solon  .  .  82 

Results  of  the  legislation  of  Solon  .  .  .84 

560-525  Usurpation  of  Peisistratos  .  .  .85 

Subsequent  fortunes  of  Peisistratos  .  .  -85 

Despotism  of  his  sons,  Hippias  and  Hipparchos  .  86 

510  Expulsion  of  Hippias  from  Athens  .  .  .  88 

The  reforms  of  Klcisthenes  .  .  .  .  FQ 


xii  Contents. 

B.  c.  PAGE 

The  new  tribes         .  .  .  .  .91 

The  Ostracism  .  .  .  .  .91 

Opposition  of  Isagoras,  ending  in  the  triumph  of 

Kleisthenes  .  .  .  .  -93 

509       Embassy  from  the  Athenians  to  Artaphernes,  satrap 

ofSardeis  ...  .  .  •     94- 

Failure  of  the  efforts  of  the  Spartans  for  the  resto 
ration  of  Hippias  .  .  .  -94 
Discomfiture   of  the    Spartan  king,  Kleomenes,  at 

Eleoisis  .  .  .  .  -95 

Invitation  to  Hippias  to  attend  a  congress  of  Spar 
tan  allies  .  .  .  .  .96 
Return  of  Hippias  to  Sigeion  .                       .              -97 

CHAPTER  V. 

THE   IONIC   REVOLT. 

Intrigues  of  Hippias  at  Sardeis  .  .  -99 

Embassy  from  Athens  to  Artaphernes  .  .100 

?  502  Revolt  of  Aristagoras  against  the  Persian  king  .  100 
Mission  of  Aristagoras  to  Sparta  and  Athens  .  102 

The  burning  of  Sardeis  ....  105 
Extension  of  the  revolt  to  Byzantion  and  other  cities  106 
Causes  of  the  revolt  in  Kypros  (Cyprus)  and  Karia  107 
Defeat  of  the  Ionian  fleet  at  Lade  .  .  .  108 

Disunion  and  weakness  of  the  Asiatic  Greeks  .  1 10 

495  Siege  and  capture  of  Miletos  .  .  .ill 

Suppression  of  the  revolt  .  .  .  .ill 

Retreat  of  Miltiades  to  Athens  .  .  .in 

CHAPTER  VI. 

THE   INVASION   OF   DATIS   AND   ARTAPHERNES. 
Administration  of  Artaphernes  in  Ionia       .  .112 

?  493    Measures  of  Mardonios         .  .  .  .   113 


Contents.  xiii 

B.  c.  PAGE 

?  492    Discomfiture  of  Mardonios  in  Thrace  .  .   1 1  \ 

Mission  of  the  envoys  of  Dareios  to  the  Greek  cities  115 

?  496    War  between  Argos  and  Sparta        .  .  .   117 

Deposition  of  Demaratos     .  .  .  .   "8 

Expedition  of  Datis  and  Artaphernes  against  Naxos 

and  Eretria       .  .  .  .  .118 

490       Landing  of  the  Persians  at  Marathon  .  .120 

Early  career  and  character  of  Aristeides  and  The- 

mistokles  .  .  .  .  .121 

Preparations  of  the  Persians  at  Marathon     .  -123 

The  Plataians  and  the  Athenians      .  .  .125 

Real  designs  of  Hippias  and  the  Persians    .  -125 

March  of  the  Athenians  to  Marathon  .         .  .127 

The  plain  of  Marathon         .  .  .  .   1 28 

Victory  of  the  Athenians     .  .  .  .128 

Importance  of  the  battle  of  Marathon  .  .130 

Popular  traditions  of  the  fight  .  .  .130 

Closing  scenes  of  the  reign  of  Dareios  .         .131 

Charges  brought  at  Athens  against  the  Alkmaionidai  132 

489  Expedition  of  Miltiades  to  Paros  .  .  .  .  133 
Trial  and  death  of  Miltiades  .....  134 
Conduct  of  the  Athenians  in  the  case  of  Miltiades  .  135 


CHAPTER  VII. 

THE  INVASION   AND   FLIGHT   OF  XERXES. 
General  character  of  the  narratives  relating  to  the 

expedition  of  Xerxes        .....  140 

484       Preparations  for  the  invasion  of  Europe  .         .         .140 

481        Progress  of  Xerxes  from  Sousa  to  Sardeis          .         .   143 

Bridges  across  the  Hellespont         .         .         .         .  144 

480       March  of  Xerxes  from  Sardeis         ....   145 

Passage  of  the  Hellespont       .....   147 

Conversation  of  ^rerxes  with  Demaratos          .          .15° 


xiv  Contents. 

B.  C.  PAKE 

March  of  the  Persian  army  to  Therme  .  .  .  151 
Arrival  of  the  Persian  fleet  off  the  Magnesian  coast  .  153 
Development  of  the  Athenian  navy  .  .  -153 

483       Ostracism  of  Aristeides .154 

Growing  wealth  of  Athens      .         .         .         .         .154 
480       Congress  at  the  isthmus  of  Corinth  .          .          .   1^5 

Interpretation  of  the  Delphian  oracles  .  .  .156 
Neutrality  or  indifference  of  the  Argives,  Korky- 

raians,  and  Sicilian  Greeks  .  .  .  .158 
Abandonment  of  the  pass  of  Tempe  .  .  .  160 
Occupation  of  Thermopylai  by  the  Greeks  under 

Leonidas         .         .          .          .          .         .         .   161 

Importance  of  the  conflict  at  Thermopylai        .          .162 
Damage  of  the  Persian  fleet  by  a  storm  off  the  Mag 
nesian  coast 163 

The  struggle  in  Thermopylai  .         .         .         .164 

Value  of  the  traditional  history  of  the  struggle  .  1 68 
The  Greek  fleet  at  Artemision  .  .  .  .170 
Arrival  of  the  Persian  ships  at  Aphetai  .  .171 

Victory  of  the  Greeks  at  Artemision  .  .  .172 
Second  battle  off  Artemision  .  .  .  •  .172 
Victory  and  Retreat  of  the  Greeks  .  .  .173 

The  Greek  fleet  at  Salamis 173 

Building  of  the  Isthmian  wall         .         .         .         .174 

Depression  of  the  allies 174 

Migration  of  the  Athenians  to  Argolis,  Aigina,  and 

Salamis 175 

Success  of  Xerxes 175 

Ravages  of  Phokis          .         .         .         .         .         •   1 7  S 

Attack  on  Delphoi .176 

Traditions  relating  to  the  attack  on  Delphoi  .  .176 
Occupation  of  Athens  by  Xerxes  .  .  .  .  177 
Resolution  of  the  Peloponnesians  to  retreat  to  the 

Isthmus  .         .         .         .         .         .         .178 


Contents.  xv 

B.  C.  PAGE 

Opposition  of  Themistokles 179 

Message  of  Themistokles  to  Xerxes         .         .         .   180 

The  battle  of  Salamis 181 

Determination  of  Xerxes  to  retreat          .         .         .182 
Engagement  of  Mardonios  to  finish  the  conquest  of 

Greece 183 

Artemisia,  queen  of  Halikarnassos  .         .          .184 

The  pursuit  of  the  Persian  fleet  by  the  Greeks  aban 
doned  at  Andros     .          .          .          .         .         .   185 

The  retreat  of  Xerxes 187 

Operations  of  Artabazos  in  Chalkidike  .          .          .189 
Capture  of  Olynthos,  and  blockade  of  Potidaia        .   189 
Exactions  of  the  Greek  allies  at  Andros  and  else 
where     .         .         .  190 

Honors  paid  to  Themistokles  by  the  Spartans  .   190 

CHAPTER  VIII. 

THE   BATTLES  OF   PLATAIA  AND  MYKALE,  AND  THE  FORMATION 
OF   THE   ATHENIAN   CONFEDERACY. 

479       Efforts  of  Mardonios  to  win  the  friendship  of  the 

Athenians        .         .         .         .          .          .  .191 

Alarm  of  the  Spartans  .         .         .         .         .  .192 

Second  occupation  of  Athens  by  the  Persians  .   193 

Departure  of  the  Spartan  army  for  Attica          .  .194 

Faction  of  Mardonios  with  the  Argives   .         .  .   195 

Ravaging  of  Attica,  and  burning  of  Athens    .  .196 

Retreat  of  Mardonios  into  Boiotia  .          .         .  .196 

The  feast  of  Attaginos  .          .          .          .         .  .196 

March  of  the  allies  towards  Plataia         .         .  .   197 

Death  of  the  Persian  general  Masistios  .          .  .   198 

Inaction  of  both  armies  .         .          .         .         .  .198 

Athenian  traditions  relating  to  the  preparations  for 

battle 199 


xvi  Contents. 

B.  C.  PAGE 

The  battle  of  Plataia      ......  200 

Storming  of  the  Persian  camp         ....  203 

The  gathering  of  the  spoil       .....  203 

Privileges  granted  to  the  Plataians  .         .         .  204 

The  retreat  of  Artabazos 205 

Siege  of  Thebes 205 

Punishment  of  the  Thebans 206 

Voyage  of  the  Greek  fleet  to  Samos         .         .         .  206 
Retreat  of  the  Persian  fleet  to  My  kale"      .         .         .  207 

Battle  of  Mykale 207 

Burning  of  the  Persian  ships  .....  209 
Desire  of  the  Spartans  to  be  freed  from  further  con 
cern  in  the  war 209 

The  allies  at  the  Hellespont   .....  209 

The  siege  of  Lesbos 210 

Death  of  the  satrap  Artayktes         .         .         .         .211 

478  Expedition  of  the  allies  to  Kypros  (Cyprus)  .  .211 
Reduction  of  Byzantion  .  .  .  .  .211 
Formation  of  the  Athenian  Confederacy  .  .212 

Practical  end  of  the  struggle  with  Persia        .         .212 


MAPS. 

GREEK  AND  PHENICIAN  COLONIES    .        .  to  face  Title-page 

GREEK  SETTLEMENTS  IN  ASIA  MINOR      .  to  face  page    33 

THERMOPYLAI "            160 

BATTLE  OF  SALAMIS "            iSp 

BATTLE  OF  PLATAIA  ...                .  "   /&> 


L  I  li  R  A  Ii  Y 

rMVKRSITY   OF 

CALIFORNIA. 


CHRONOLOGICAL  TABLE. 


B.  C.      PAGE 


?63o 

93 

58 

Athens  . 
Egypt  .    . 

?57° 
?560 

59 
85 
36 

Athens  .     , 
Media  . 

? 

38 

Assyria 

? 

4i 

Asia  Minor 

?559 

85 
88 

Athens  . 

545 

42 

Asia  Minor 

544 

49 

? 

527 

?525 

52 
86 

53 
61 

Babylon 
Athens  .     . 
Egypt    .     . 

?522 

?  520 

69 
66 

Samos    .     . 
Persia   .     . 

67 

Babylon 

Conspiracy  of  Kylon. 

Founding  of  Naukratis  in  the  reign  of 
Psammitichos. 

Dethronement  of  Apries  by  Amasis. 

Seizure  of  the  Akropolis  by  Peisistratos. 

Defeat  and  dethronement  of  Astyages  (?) 
by  Cyrus,  who  establishes  the  Persian 
Empire. 

Conquest  of  Nineveh  by  Kyaxares  and 
Nabopolassar. 

Conquest    of    the     Asiatic    Hellenes    by 

Kroisos      (Croesus),      King     of      Lydia. 

(?)  First  conquest  of  Ionia. 

Death  of  Solon. 

Miltiades  sent  by  Hippias  as  governor  of 
the  Thrakian  Chersonesos. 

Fall  of  Kroisos.  The  Lydian  empire  ab 
sorbed  in  that  of  Persia.  (?)  Second 
conquest  of  Ionia. 

Revolt  of  Paktyas  against  Cyrus. 

Conquest  of  Lykia  by  the  Persians.  (?) 
Third  conquest  of  Ionia. 

Siege  and  capture  of  Babylon  by  Cyrus. 

Death  of  Peisistratos. 

Invasion  of  Kambyses,  King  of  Persia. 

Failure  of  the  Persian  Expedition  to 
Amoun  and  Ethiopia;  and  abandon 
ment  of  the  expedition  against  Car 
thage. 

Death  of  Polykrates,  tyrant  of  Samos. 

Election  or  accession  of  Dareios  to  the 
Persian  throne. 

Suppression  of  the  Magian  rebellion. 

Revolt  and  conquest  of  Babylon. 

xvii 


XV111 


Chronological  Table. 


13.    V,. 

516 

r/\A*ii 

73 
77 
86 

Scythia  .     . 
Lemnos  . 
Athens  . 

510 

28 

84 

Korkyra     . 

Athens  .     . 

509 

88 

93 

94 

125 
95 

Plataia  .     . 
Eleusis  .     . 

Boiotia  .     . 

96 

Sparta  .     . 

?502 

101 

Naxos  .     . 

102 

105 

Asia  Minor 

106 

?496 

108 
106 
108 
117 

Argos    .     . 

Scythian  expedition  to  Dareios. 

Conquest  of  Lemnos  by  Miltiades. 

Conspiracy  of  Aristogeiton,  and  death  of 
Hipparchos. 

Foundation  of  the  Colony  from  Corinth. 

Invasion  of  Kleomenes,  king  of  Sparta, 
who  expels  Hippias.  FALL  OF  THE 
PEISISTRATIDAI. 

Factions  between  the  Alkmaionid  Kleis- 
thenes,  and  Isagoras,  who  is  aided  by 
Kleomenes. 

Reforms  and  expulsion  of  Kleisthenes, 
followed  by  his  return. 

EMBASSY  FROM  ATHENS  TO  SARDEIS, 
to  ask  for  an  alliance  with  the  Persian 
king. 

Alliance  between  Plataia  and  Athens. 

Demaratos  deserts  Kleomenes,  who  is 
compelled  to  abandon  his  attempts 
against  Athens. 

Victories  of  the  Athenians  in  Boiotia  and 
Euboia. 

Hippias  pleads  his  cause  before  a  congress 
of  Peloponnesian  allies. 

The  Corinthians  protest  against  all  inter 
ference  with  the  internal  affairs  of  inde 
pendent  cities;  and  Hippias  returning 
to  Sigeion,  busies  himself  with  intrigues 
for  the  purpose  of  precipitating  the 
power  of  Persia  upon  Athens. 

Some  oligarchic  exiles  from  Naxos  ask 
help  from  Aristagoras  of  Miletos,  at 
whose  request  Artaphernes  sends  Mega- 
bates  to  reduce  the  island. 

IONIAN  REVOLT.  On  the  failure  of  the 
expedition,  Aristagoras  revolts  against 
Dareios,  and  seeks  help  first  at  Sparta, 
where  he  gets  nothing;  then  at  Athens, 
where  the  people  dispatch  twenty  ships 
in  his  service. 

Burning  of  Sardeis  by  the  lonians  and 
Athenians. 

Extension  of  the  Ionian  revolt  to  Byzan- 
tion  and  Karia. 

Defeat  and  death  of  Aristagoras. 

Capture  and  death  of  Histiaios. 

Defeat  of  the  Ionian  fleet  at  Lade. 

War  between  Sparta  and  Argos. 

a 


Chronological  Table. 


xix 


PAGE 

118 

Sparta,  .     . 

III 

Miletos  .     . 

TII 

Ionia     .     . 

114 

Thrace  .     . 

US 
119 

Athens      ") 
and            \ 
Sparta      ) 

Naxos   .     . 

Euboia  . 

120 

Marathon  . 

I30 

133 

Paros     .     . 

I32 

Persia   . 

140 

158 
141 
I42 

Sicily    .    . 

Egypt  •    • 

Persia,  .     . 

154 
155 

Athens  .     . 

159 
144 

Hellespont 

I48 
152 

160 

Thrace  .     . 
Thessaly    . 

161 

Sparta 

163 

Magnesia 

Deposition  and  exile  of  Demaratos. 

Death  of  Kleomenes. 

Fall  of  Miletos  in  the  sixth  year  of  the 

Ionian  Revolt. 
SUPPRESSION  OF  THE  IONIAN  REVOLT. 

Third  (?  fourth)  conquest  of  Ionia. 
Political    reforms     of     Artaphernes     and 

Mardonios. 
Destruction  of  the  fleet  of  Mardonios  by 

a  storm  on  the  coast  of  Athos. 
The  Persian  heralds  sent  by  Dareios  are 

said  to  be  thrown  into  the'  Barathron  at 

Athens  and  into  a  well  at  Sparta. 
Artaphernes  and  Datis,  the  latter  claiming 

to  be  king  of  Athens,  takes  Naxos. 
The   town   of   Eretria  is  betrayed  to  the 

Persians. 
Landing  of  Hippias  with  the  Persians  at 

MARATHON. 
Defeat  of  the  Persians  and  departure  of 

their  fleet. 
Expedition    of  Miltiades   to    Paros.      On 

its  failure  he  is  sentenced  to  a  fine  of 

fifty  talents,  but  dies  before  it  is  paid. 
Death  of  Dareios,  who  is   succeeded  by 

Xerxes. 

Xerxes  makes  preparations  for  the  inva 
sion  of  Egypt. 

Gelon  becomes  master  of  Syracuse. 
Re-conquest  of  Egypt  by  Xerxes. 
The  invasion  of  Hellas  resolved  upon  by 

Xerxes,  who  marches  to  Sardeis. 
Ostracism  of  Aristeides. 
Congress    of   allies    at    the    isthmus    of 

Corinth. 

Mission  to  Gelon,  .tyrant  of  Syracuse. 
Construction  of  the  bridges  of  boats  for 

the  passage  of  the  army. 
Review  of  the  Persian  army  at  Doriskos. 
Xerxes  at  the  Tempe. 
Abandonment  of  the  pass  by  the  Greeks, 

and  consequent   Medism  of  the  Thes- 

salians. 
June..    Departure  of  Leonidas  for  Ther- 

mopylai. 

Destruction  of  a  large  portion  of  the  Per 
sian  fleet  by  a  storm  on  the  Magnesian 

coast. 


XX 


Chronological  Table. 


170 

168 


171 


172 


174 
175 


177 

180 


181 
182 


187 
189 


190 
193 

195 


196 

197 

200 


Artemision    The  Greek  fleet   takes   up  its  station    on 

the  northern  coast  of  Euboia. 
Thermopylae  March  of  Hydarnes  over  Anopaia  for  the 

purpose  of  cutting  off  the  Greek  army. 
Victory   of    the    Persians,    and   death    of 

Leonidas. 
Euboia  .     .  A  Persian    squadron   sent  round  Euboia 

to  take  the  Greek  fleet  in  the  rear. 
Action  off  Artemision.      The  Greeks  take 

thirty  ships. 
A  second  storm  does  further  damage  to 

the  Persian  fleet. 

In  a  second  sea-fight  the  Greeks  have  the 
advantage,    but    resolve    to   retrea 
Salamis.  *•* 

Fortification  of  Jte  Corinthian   

Attica    .     .  Migration  of  tra  people  to  ArJBBflfcala- 

mis,  and  Aigirfa.  ,      ^ 

Phokis  .     .  Devastation    of  Phokis   by   the  Persians, 
who  are  defeated,  it  is  said,  at  Delphoi. 
Athens  .     .  Occupation  of  Athefts  by  Xerxes. 
Salamis      .  Themistokles,    by   sending  a  message   to 
Xerxes,  prevents  the  intended  retreat  of 
the  allies. 

BATTLE  OF  SALAMIS. 
Xerxes  determines  to   go   home,  leaving 

Mardonios  to  carry  on  the  war. 
Departure  of  the  Persian  fleet. 
March    of  Xerxes    through   Thessaly  and 

Thrace  to  the  Hellespont. 

Thrace  .  .  Siege  and  capture  of  Olynthos  by  Arta- 
bazos,  who  fails  in  his  attempt  on 
Potidaia. 

Andros .     .  Siege  of  Andros  by  Themistokles. 
Attica    .     .  Mardonios  offers  specially  favorable  terms 

to  Athens. 

On  their  rejection  he  occupies  Athens,  but**4 
abstains  from  doing  any  injury  to  the  city  ^ 
or  country,  until  he   learns,  from   the 
entrance  of  the  Spartan  army  into  Attica, 
that  there  was  no  hope  of  carrying  out 
his  plans  successfully. 
Boiotia  .     .  Retreat  of  Mardonios  to  Thebes  after  the 

burning  of  Athens. 
Advance  of  the  allies  into  the  territory  of 

Plataia. 

BATTLE  OF  PLATAIA.    Defeat  and  death 
of  Mardonios. 


Chronological  Table. 


xxi 


C.  I  PAGE 

205 
203 

205 

207 
207 

209 
210 


Retreat  of  Artabazos. 

The  Persian  camp  stormed. 

Siege  of  Thebes.     The  Theban  prisoners 

put  to  death  at  the  Corinthian  isthmus. 
Mykale       .  Probably  midsummer.      The   allied   fleet 

sails  first  to  Samos,  then  to  Mykale. 
BATTLE  OF  MYKALE.     Ruin  of  the  Per 
sian  fleet. 

Foundation  of  the  Athenian  empire. 
Lesbos  .     .  Siege    of    Lesbos.      Crucifixion    of    Ar- 

tayktes. 

Asia  Minor  Victories  of  Pausanias  at  Kypros  (Cy 
prus). 

Byzantion  .  Reduction  of  Byzantion.  Formation  of 
the  Athenian  confederacy.  Practical 
end  of  the  struggle  between  the  Greeks 
and  the  Persians. 


LIBRARY 

{UNIVERSITY  OF 


THE  PERSIAN   WARS, 


CHAPTER  I. 

ORIGIN   AND   GROWTH   OF  GREEK  CIVILIZATION. 

IN  all  ages  of  the  world's  history  Eastern  empires  have 
been  great  only  so  long  as  they  have  been  aggressive. 
In  every  instance  the  lust  of  conquest  has 
been  followed  by  satiety,  and  the  result  of  character  of 
luxurious  inaction  has  been  speedy  decay. 
No  other  result  seems  possible  where  there 
is,  in  strictness  of  speech,  no  national  life,  no  growth 
of  intellect,  no  spirit  of  personal  independence  in  the 
individual  citizen.  A  society  of  rude  and  hardy  warriors 
banded  together  under  a  fearless  leader  must  crush  the 
subjects  of  a  despot  who  can  look  back  only  to  the  con 
quests  of  his  forefathers  as  a  pledge  for  the  continuance 
of  his  prosperity ;  but  this  infusion  of  new  blood  brings 
with  it  no  change  in  the  essential  condition  of  things  so 
long  as  the  dominion  of  one  irresponsible  ruler  merely 
gives  way  to  that  of  another.  The  rugged  mountaineers 
who  lay  the  foundations  of  empire  for  their  chief  become 
the  contented  retainers  of  his  children  or  his  grand 
children,  and  in  their  turn  pass  under  the  yoke  of  some 
new  invader. 

B 


2  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  I. 

In  the  sixth  century  before  the  Christian  era  this  law 
of  growth  and  decay  had  made  the  Persians  -masters  of 
the  Eastern  world.  The  lords  of  Nineveh, 
teSoPndofex~  who  had  pulled  down  from  their  seat  the 
the  Persian  ancient  sovereigns  of  Babylon,  had  fallen 
beneath  the  sway  of  the  Median  monarch 
and  his  more  vigorous  clansmen,  and  these  again  had 
found  their  masters  in  the  hardy  followers  of  the  Persian 
Cyrus.  Bursting  with  the  force  of  a  winter's  torrent 
from  the  highlands  which  yielded  them  but  sorry  fare, 
the  warriors  of  Iran  had  overthrown  the  empires  of 
Media  and  Lydia,  and  added  the  wealth  of  Babylon  and 
Egypt  to  the  riches  which  their  fierce  enthusiasm  had 
won  for  their  kings. 

The    conquest    of  Lydia  brought   the   Persians  into 

contact  with    tribes  whose  kinsfolk  to  the  west  of  the 

Egean  Sea  were  to  read  a  stern  lesson  to  the 

Hindrances  haughtiest  of  earthly  potentates,  to  show 
tensionof  them  what  a  spirit  of  voluntary  obedience 
Persian  J-Q  jaw  can  achieve  against  the  armies  of  a 

power  in  the  .  . 

West.  despot  who  drives  his  slaves  to  battle  with 

a  scourge,  and  to  prove  that  the  force  of 
freedom  may  more  than  counterbalance  the  evils 
involved  in  a  confederation  of  cities  held  together  by 
the  laxest  of  bonds.  The  struggle  thus  brought  about 
between  Europe  and  Asia  was,  in  fact,  the  struggle  be 
tween  orderly  government  and  uncontrolled  despo 
tism,  between  law  which  insures  freedom  of  thought, 
speech,  and  action,  and  the  license  of  a  tyrant  whose 
iniquities  can  be  cut  short  only  by  the  dagger  of  the 
assassin.  Had  the  Persian  king  succeeded  here  as  he 
had  succeeded  before  the  walls  of  Agbatana  [Ecbatana], 
of  Babylon,  and  of  Memphis,  his  hordes  must  have 
spread  over  the  lands  lying  between  the  gates  of  the 


CH.  I.]        Character  of  Greek  Civilization.  3 

Euxine  and  the  Pillars  of  Herakles,  and  have  fastened 
on  all  Europe  the  yoke  which  has  now  for  more  than 
four  hundred  years  crushed  out  such  freedom  as  yet 
remained  to  the  subjects  of  the  Byzantine  Caesars.  The 
Persian  King  may  well  be  pardoned  if  he  failed  to  see 
that  any  obstacles  could  arrest  his  progress.  The  hin 
drances  which  first  checked  and  finally  foiled  him  came 
not  from  any  lord  of  armies  as  huge  as  his  own,  but  from 
the  citizens  of  an  insignificant  town,  who  were  rather 
hampered  than  aided  even  by  those  of  their  kinsfolk  in 
other  cities  who  professed  to  be  most  earnest  in  the  de'sire 
to  beat  off  the  invader.  The  approach  of  the  Persian 
hosts  had  caused  in  the  Greek  cities  generally  a  very 
paralysis  of  fear.  The  people  of  one  city  only  were  proof 
against  the  universal  panic,  and  that  city  was  Athens. 
That  the  issue  of  the  conflict  depended  wholly  on  the 
conduct  of  the  Athenians  is  the  emphatic  judgment  of 
the  only  historian  who  has  left  to  us  a  narrative  of  the 
struggle  which  may  almost  be  regarded  as  contemporary. 
Herodotus  was  about  six  years  old  when  the  fall  of  Sestos 
left  the  way  open  for  the  establishment  of  the  Athenian 
empire,  and  his  life  was  passed  in  the  disinterested  search 
for  the  evidence  which  should  enable  him  to  exhibit  in 
their  true  light  the  incidents  and  issues  of  the  Persian 
wars.  Hence  the  causes  of  these  wars  must,  it  is  mani 
fest,  be  sought  in  the  previous  history  of  Athens  ;  and 
this  history  makes  it  plain  that  the  incident  directly  lead 
ing  to  the  great  struggle'was  the  expulsion  of  the  dynasty 
of  the  Peisistratids,  whose  downfall  was  owing  to  the  blow 
struck  by  Solon  against  the  exclusiveness  of  the  nobles, 
who,  styling  themselves  Eupatridai,  had  secured  to  their 
order  the  whole  power  of  the  state. 

This  revolution,  the  most  momentous  which  the  world 
has  ever  yet  known,  had  long  been  going  on  among  not 


The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  i. 

a  few  of  the  tribes  which  gloried  in  the  title 

of  Hellenes  or  Greeks.  The  results  thus 
Greek  race.  ^  may  have  been  uncertain  ;  but  although 
the  flow  of  the  title  had  in  some  cases  been  followed  by 
an  ebb  which  left  them  further  from  the  goal  aimed  at, 
the  whole  movement  marked  an  uprising  of  the  human 
mind  which  no  other  age  or  country  had  ever  witnessed. 
It  was,  virtually,  the  protest  that  a  caste  which  formed  a 
mere  fraction  of  the  body  politic  had  no  right  to  usurp 
the  government  of  the  whole,  and  that  each  citizen  was 
entitled  to  have  a  share  in  the  making  of  the  laws  which 
he  was  to  obey.  If  the  Athenians  came  to  be  foremost 
in  carrying  out  this  great  change,  it  was  not  because  they 
had  been  the  first  to  begin  it,  still  less  because  they  pos 
sessed  a  power  capable  of  coercing  their  neighbors,  or 
because  they  were  recognized  as  leaders  of  the  Hellenic 
people  generally. 

In  truth,  the  Hellenic  or  Greek  world  existed  not  as 
one  of  the  organized  and  compact  societies  to  which  we 

give  the  name  of  nations,  but  as  a  set  of  in- 
th°  Greek  dependent  units,  animated  by  feelings  of 

constant  suspicion,  jealousy,  and  dislike  of 
all  except  the  members  of  their  own  city-community. 
Beyond  this  stage  which  made  the  city  the  final  unit  of 
society  the  Greeks,  as  a  whole,  never  advanced.  The 
result  of  the  Persian  Wars  forced  Athens  into  a  position 
which  compelled  her  to  carry  out  a  larger  and  a  wiser 
policy  :  but  the  history  of  her  empire  was  simply  the 
history  of  a  fierce  and  unwearied  opposition  by  the 
Spartan  confederacy  to  all  efforts  tending  to  substitute  a 
common  order  for  the  irregular  action  of  individual  cities. 
This  antagonism  brought  about  the  ruin  of  her  confe 
deracy,  and  from  that  time  onward  Greek  history  became 
little  more  than  a  record  of  wars  directed  against  each 


CH.  I.]        Character  of  Greek  Civilization.  5 

city  as  it  attained  a  degree  of  power  which  seemed  likely 
to  threaten  the  independence  of  its  neighbors.  It  had 
indeed  been  little  more  than  this  in  the  times  which  pre 
ceded  the  Persian  Wars ;  but  those  times  were  marked 
by  a  vigorous  intellectual  and  political  growth  which 
gave  promise  of  better  things  than  the  Greeks  themselves 
ever  realized,  and  which  has  yielded  its  largest  fruits  on 
the  soil  of  Britain. 

There  was,  then,  no  Greek  or  Hellenic  nation  ;  and  if 
we  take  into  account  the  conditions  under  which  the 
Hellenic  tribes  grew  up,  we  shall  see  that  it 
could  not  be  otherwise.  All  the  forms  of  character  of 
Aryan  society,  whether  these  have  assumed  q4ekrly 
the  shape  of  arbitrary  despotism  or  of  con-  civilization, 
stitutional  freedom,  had  one  starting  point,  and  that 
starting  point  was  the  absolute  isolation  which  cut  off 
the  owner  or  lord  of  one  house  from  the  owner  of  every 
other.  We  may,  if  we  please,  speak  of  this  state  as  little 
better  than  that  of  the  beast  in  his  den,  and  perhaps  in  so 
speaking  of  it  we  may  not  be  far  wrong.  At  the  least 
we  cannot  shut  our  eyes  to  the  evidence  which  traces 
back  the  polity  of  all  the  Aryan  tribes  or  nations  to  the 
form  of  village  communities,  in  which  each  house  is  not 
merely  a  fortress  but  an  inviolable  temple.  The  exclu- 
siveness  which  survived  as  a  barrier  between  one  Greek 
or  Latin  city  and  another  had  in  earlier  ages  cut  off  the 
individual  house  as  completely  from  every  other ;  and 
thus  we  are  carried  back  to  a  time  when  beyond  the 
limits  of  his  own  family  the  world  contained  for  a  man 
nothing  but  his  natural  and  necessary  enemies.  For 
these,  as  his  foes  by  birth,  he  would  have  no  pity,  nor 
could  he  show  them  mercy  in  war.  In  peace  he 
could  grant  them  no  right  of  intermarriage,  nor  regard 
even  the  lapse  of  generations  as  any  reason  for  relaxing 


6  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  i. 

these  conditions.  But  if  elsewhere  he  was  nothing,  in 
his  own  house  he  was  absolute  lord.  He  was  master  of 
the  lives  of  his  children,  and  his  wife  was  his  slave. 
Such  a  life  may  present  strong  points  of  likeness  to  that 
of  the  beast  in  his  den  ;  but  an  impulse  which  insured  a 
growth  to  better  things  came  from  the  belief  in  the  con 
tinuity  of  human  life,  a  belief  which  we  find  at  work  in 
the  earliest  dawn  of  human  history  as  read  not  from 
written  records  but  from  the  rudest  monuments  of 
primaeval  society.  If  the  owner  of  the  den  died,  he 
remained  not  merely  its  lord  as  he  had  been  ;  he  was 
now  the  object  of  its  worship,  its  god.  He  felt  all  the 
wants,  the  pains,  the  pleasures  of  his  former  life ;  and 
these  must  be  satisfied  by  food,  by  clothing,  and  by  the 
attendance  of  his  wife  or  his  slaves,  who  must  be  slaugh 
tered  to  bear  him  company  in  the  spirit  land.  But  in 
that  land  there  can  be  for  him  no  rest,  if  his  body  be 
not  duly  buried  ;  and  the  funeral  rites  can  be  performed 
only  by  his  legitimate  representative — in  other  words, 
by  his  son  born  in  lawful  wedlock  of  a  woman  initiated 
into  the  family  religion.  This  representative  exercised 
his  absolute  power  simply  as  the  vicegerent  of  the  man 
from  whom  he  inherited  his  authority,  and  it  was  con 
sequently  of  the  first  importance  that  the  line  of  descent 
should  be  unbroken  ;  hence  the  sacredness  and  the  duty 
of  marriage,  and  the  penalty  of  disfranchisement  in 
flicted  on  the  man  who  refused  to  comply  with  it.  Hence 
also  the  necessity  of  a  solemn  adoption  in  cases  where 
the  natural  succession  failed.  But  this  adoption,  we 
have  to  note,  was  essentially  religious.  The  subject  of 
it,  like  the  wife  on  her  marriage,  renounced  his  own 
family  and  the  worship  of  its  gods  to  pass  to  another 
hearth  and  the  worship  of  other  deities.  In  fact,  the 
master  or  father  of  each  house  or  temple  knew  nothing 


CH.  i.]        Character  of  Greek   Civilization.  7 

of  the  ritual  of  other  families,  and  acknowledged  no 
religious  bond  connecting  him  with  any  one  beyond  the 
limits  of  his  own  house.  But  with  the  growth  of  sons, 
and  with  their  marriage,  these  limits  were  necessarily  en 
larged,  and  thus  there  came  into  existence  groups  of 
houses,  the  members  of  each  having  the  same  blood 
in  their  veins  and  worshipping  according  to  the  same 
ritual.  These  groups  formed  the  clan, — or,  in  Greek 
phrase,  the  Phratria  or  brotherhood  with  its  subordinate 
Gene  or  families.  The  process  which  had  thus  developed 
the  clan  from  the  house  showed  the  possibility  of  form 
ing  an  alliance  with  other  clans  without  doing  violence 
to  the  religious  sentiment.  The  union  was  based  not  on 
the  admission  of  the  stranger  to  the  private  worship  of 
the  clan  or  the  house,  for  this  would  have  been  unpar 
donable  profanation,  but  in  adopting  a  common  ritual  to 
be  followed  by  the  confederates  in  their  character  as 
allies.  The  adoption  of  this  common  worship  converted 
the  group  of  clans  into  a  tribe  ; .  and  one  step  further,  tjie 
union  of  tribes  in  the  polis  or  city  on  precisely  the  same 
religious  and  therefore  exclusive  principle,  marked  the 
limit  of  political  growth  beyond  which  the  Greeks  per 
sistently  refused  to  advance. 

The  fabric  of  all  ancient  Aryan  society  was  thus  in 
tensely  religious.  The  sacred  fire,  not  to  be  tended  by 
aliens  or  foreigners,  was  maintained  perpet-  Rdi  iouschar. 
ually  in  the  Prytaneion,  or  holy  place  of  the  acterofthe 

.        '  .          .,     ,     Greek  state. 

city.  Each  tribe,  or,  as  the  Greek  called 
it,  each  Phyle,  had  likewise  its  own  altar,  its  own  ritual, 
and  its  own  priests.  The  same  rule  was  followed  by  the 
subordinate  phratries  or  clans,  while  in  each  house  the 
father  of  the  family  remained,  as  he  had  always  been, 
its  priest,  its  lord,  and  its  king.  Thus  for  strangers  or 
aliens  the  state  had  no  more  room  than  the  private  fam- 


8  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  i. 

ily.  The  foreigner  had,  in  strictness  of  speech,  no  right 
to  protection  whether  of  person  or  property  ;  and  of  real 
property  he  could  have  none.  His  very  presence  in  the 
city  was  merely  a  matter  of  sufferance  ;  his  enfranchise 
ment  would  be  an  insult  to  the  gods,  his  admission  to  a 
share  in  the  government  a  profanation. 

It  is  clear  that  these  conditions  are  not  likely  to  pro 
mote  the  rapid  growth  of  states,  and  that  the  latter  could 
not  grow  at  all  except  at  the  cost  of  constant  struggle 
and  conflict  between  the  possessors  of  power  and  those 
who  were  shut  out  from  it.  Nor  in  these  conditions 
could  the  state  find  the  materials  most  convenient  for 
establishing  its  own  authority.  All  states 
tardKgthe  are  necessarily  intolerant  of  independent 
jurisdictions  within  their  own  borders  ;  and 
the  absolute  authority  of  the  father  or  mas 
ter  over  all  the  members  of  his  household  was  as  much 
an  alien  jurisdiction  as  any  which  the  Popes  have  ever 
attempted  to  exercise  in  Christendom.  It  is  certain, 
therefore,  that  the  "  patria  potestas "  or  the  father's 
power,  in  the  old  Roman  law,  far  from  being  a  creation 
of  the  state,  was  one  of  those  earlier  social  conditions 
which  the  state  was  content  to  modify  only  because  it 
had  not  the  strength  to  do  away  with  it ;  and  thus  we 
see  that  two  contests  were  going  on  side  by  side — the  one 
in  which  the  civil  power  sought  to  rough-hew  to  its  own 
purposes  materials  by  no  means  promising, — the  other  in 
which  that  part  of  the  people  who  had  no  political  rights 
strove  to  secure  to  themselves  a  due  share  of  them.  It 
is  the  latter  struggle  which  distinguishes  Greek  History 
and  in  a  more  marked  degree  that  of  Rome  from  the 
monotony  of  Oriental  annals  in  which  even  rebellion 
against  intolerable  tyranny  ends  only  in  exchanging  one 
despot  for  another.  But  for  the  noble  families  who  were 


CH.  I.]        Character  of  Greek  Civilization.  9 

possessed  of  power  this  strife  was  essentially  one  of  re 
ligion.  The  sanction  which  constituted  the  authority  of 
the  magistrate  bearing  rule  over  a  city,  that  is  over  an 
aggregate  of  families,  was  precisely  the  sanction  by  which 
the  head  of  each  family  ruled  over  his  own  household. 
The  first  duty  of  both  was,  therefore,  to  the  gods,  whose 
priests  they  were  by  virtue  of  birth  and  blood  :  and  the 
plebeian  who  on  the  strength  of  votes  given  by  his  fellow- 
plebeians  claimed  to  share  their  power  was  in  their  eyes 
not  only  giving  strength  to  a  movement  which  might 
end  in  the  rule  of  the  mob,  but  offering  a  direct  insult  to 
the  majesty  of  the  gods. 

But  if  the  Polis,  or  City,  as  an  organized  society,  was 
of  slow  growth,  the  barriers  which  separated  one  city 
from  another  were  never  thrown  down  at 
all;  and  when  in  the  days  of  her  greatness  ultimate  unit 
Athens  established  or  sought  to  maintain  an 
empire  which  could  not,  if  it  lasted,  fail  to 
soften  and  remove  these  ancient  prejudices,  she  did  so 
at  the  cost  of  trampling  conventional  notions  under  foot 
and  setting  up  an  admitted  tyranny.  She  was  attempt 
ing  to  weld  in  some  sort  into  a  single  society  a  number 
of  units  for  whom  isolation  was  as  the  breath  of  life, 
and  to  extend  to  all  the  members  of  her  confederacy  the 
benefits  of  an  equal  law.  The  very  attempt  was  an 
offence  to  men  who  regarded  all  except  their  own  citizens 
as  beyond  the  pale  of  law,  and  for  whom  exile  became 
therefore  a  penalty  not  less  terrible  than  death.  Happily, 
even  the  worst  principles  of  action  become  modified  in 
the  course  of  ages ;  and  the  evils  of  this  religious  ex- 
clusiveness  were  in  some  degree  mitigated  by  the  union 
of  the  small  demoi,  or  boroughs,  in  the  immediate  neigh 
borhood  of  the  great  cities.  For  Attica  this  change  for 
the  better  was  effected  by  the  consolidation  ascribed  to 


io  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  I. 

Theseus,  and  Athens  thus  became  the  political  centre 
of  a  territory  occupying  a  space  equal  to  that  of  one  of 
the  smaller  English  counties.  But  the  general  condition 
of  the  country  remained  what  it  had  been  before.  Men 
as  closely  allied  in  blood  as  the  inhabitants  of  York  and 
Bristol,  Sheffield  and  Birmingham,  still  regarded  the 
power  of  making  war  upon  each  other  as  the  highest  of 
their  privileges,  and  looked  upon  the  exercise  of  this 
power  not  as  a  stern  necessity  but  as  a  common  incident 
in  the  ordinary  course  of  things.  The  mischief  lay 
wholly  in  the  theory  that  the  city  was  the  ultimate  unit 
of  society  ;  and  with  this  theory  it  was  inevitable,  for 
according  to  this  hypothesis  the  city  was  an  aggrega 
tion  of  men  each  one  of  whom  must  have  his  place  in 
the  great  council  and  take  his  share  in  the  work  of  legis 
lation  and  government.  Such  parliaments  are  known 
as  Primary  Assemblies ;  and  with  such  parliaments  the 
population  of  such  a  city  as  that  of  Liverpool  became  an 
unmanageable  multitude.  In  the  opinion  of  Aristotle 
ten  myriads  were  as  much  in  excess,  as  ten  men  were  in 
defect,  of  the  numbers  needed  for  the  fit  constitution  of  a 
city  ;  and  as  it  was  impossible  for  the  Greeks  to  conceive 
that  a  body  of  men  might  give  their  votes  through  a 
common  representative,  it  followed  that  those  who  had 
no  place  in  the  primary  assembly  had  no  political  rights, 
and  were  as  much  aliens,  though  they  might  not  be 
foreigners,  as  the  savage  who  wandered  with  his  wife 
and  children  over  the  Scythian  deserts. 

But  in  spite  of  this  exclusiveness  and  isolation  between 

city  and  city,  a  certain  feeling  of  kinship  had  sprung  up 

before  the  dawn   of  contemporary  history 

chaJacteris-       between  the  tribes  which  were  in  the  habit 

Gree°ksthe          of    calling  themselves   Greeks,    or    rather 

Hellenes  ;  and  in   the  customs  and  usages 


CH.  i.]        Character  of  Greek  Civilization.  u 

which  distinguished  them  from  other  tribes  we  have 
characteristics  which  may  broadly  be  regarded  as  na 
tional.  The  most  powerful  of  the  bonds  which  thus 
linked  them  together  was  probably  that  of  language.  It 
is  quite  possible  that  the  religion  of  any  given  tribe  might 
bear  the  closest  resemblance  to  that  of  the  Hellenes ; 
but  if  the  former  worshipped  the  same  gods  under  dif 
ferent  names,  it  is  certain  that  the  Greeks  would  fail  to 
see  and  would  refuse  to  admit  the  likeness.  Educated 
travelers  like  the  historian  Herodotus  might  feel  in 
terested  in  the  stories  of  Egyptian  priests  who  assured 
him  that  the  Greek  name  Athene  for  the  dawn-goddess 
was  but  their  Neith  read  backwards  ;  but  by  his  country 
men  generally  such  statements  would  be  received  with  a 
dull  incredulity.  If  neither  the  names  nor  the  language 
in  which  they  occurred  were  intelligible  to  them,  the 
Greek  would  at  once  assume  their  complete  diversity. 
Of  any  mode  of  determining  the  affinities  of  dialects  be 
yond  the  fact  that  he  either  could  or  could  not  under 
stand  them,  he  had,  of  course,  not  the  faintest  concep 
tion.  Those  who  spoke  A  tongue  which  had  for  him  no 
meaning  were  barbarous  speakers  of  barbarous  lan 
guages,  although  grammatically  their  dialect  might  be 
more  nearly  akin  to  the  Greek  than  were  some  of  those 
which  passed  as  Hellenic.  Knowing  nothing  of  the  laws 
which  regulate  phonetic  changes,  the  Greeks  were 
naturally  guided  wholly  by  sound  ;  and  as  identity  of 
sound  between  words  in  different  languages  is  in  general 
conclusive  evidence  of  their  diversity,  it  follows  that  their 
judgments  in  such  matters  were  of  extremely  little  worth. 
But  the  distinctions  thus  ignorantly  drawn  were  politically 
of  the  utmost  importance ;  and  the  conflict  of  the  Per 
sian  Wars  thus  becomes  a  struggle  of  the  Greeks  against 
barbarians,  or,  to  put  it  more  strictly,  of  men  speaking 


12  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  I. 

an  intelligible  language  against  shaggy  and  repulsive 
monsters  whose  speech  resembled  the  inarticulate  utter 
ances  of  brutes. 

Even  with  these  points  of  likeness  in  their  language 

and  their  religion,  it  might  be   thought  that  the  vast 

social  and  intellectual  differences  between 

Comparison 

i»etween  the  the  lowest  and  the  most  advanced  of  the 
the^subjits  Greek  tribes  rendered  all  general  compari- 
°f  ««**«*  sons  impossible.  Yet  if  we  contrast  them 
with  the  subjects  of  the  great  Asiatic  em 
pires,  we  must  at  once  mark  distinctions  which  fully  jus 
tify  us  in  speaking  of  a  Greek  national  character.  For 
the  Assyrian  or  the  Persian,  the  human  body  was  a  thing 
to  be  insulted  and  mutilated  at  his  will,  to  be  disgraced 
by  servile  prostrations,  or  to  be  offered  in  sacrifice  to 
wrathful  and  bloodthirsty  deities.  For  him  woman  was 
a  mere  chattel,  while  his  children  were  possessions  of 
which  he  might  make  profit  by  selling  them  into  slavery. 
Of  these  abominable  usages  the  Greek  practically  knew 
nothing ;  and  as  he  would  have  shrunk  from  the  goug 
ing  out  of  eyes  and  the  slitting,  of  ears  and  noses,  so  on 
the  other  hand  the  sight  of  the  unclothed  body  which 
carried  to  the  Oriental  a  sense  of  unseemliness  and 
shame  filled  him  with  delight,  and  the  exhibition  of  this 
form  in  games  of  strength  and  skill  became,  through 
the  great  festivals  of  the  separate  or  collected  tribes, 
bound  up  intimately  with  his  religion.  Yet  further  this 
respect  for  the  person  was  accompanied  by  a  moral  self- 
respect,  which  would  submit  to  no  unseemly  humilia 
tions.  The  Greek  despot  might  be  guarded  by  the 
spears  of  foreign  mercenaries,  but  his  subjects  would  as 
soon  have  thought  of  returning  to  primitive  cannibalism 
as  of  approaching  him  with  the  slavish  adoration  of 
Persian  nobles. 


CH.  I.]        Character  of  Greek  Civilization.  13 

When  we  turn  to  the  social  and  intellectual  education 
of  the  Greeks,  we  can  realize  better  the  vast  differences 
which  separated  them  from  their  non-  _ 

Influence  of 

Hellenic  neighbors.  In  the  earlier  ages  the  the  great 
hearth  and  altar  of  each  family  had  been  tng  education 
the  spots  where  its  members  had  met  to  ofthe Greeks- 
hold  their  common  festivals.  With  the  union  of  the 
clans  in  a  tribe  and  of  the  tribes  in  the  Polis  or  City, 
these  feasts  were  thrown  open  to  larger  numbers.  As 
these  gatherings  were  purely  religious,  there  were  no 
hindrances  to  the  union,  at  such  times,  of  all  clans  and 
tribes  recognized  as  sprang  from  the  same  stock ;  and 
thus  from  the  insignificant  celebrations  of  the  family  or 
the  clan  sprang  the  magnificent  assemblies  which  made 
the  names  of  Olympia  and  Pytho,  of  Delos  and  of 
Nemea  famous,  while  the  guardianship  of  the  great 
temples  reared  at  these  places,  furnished  yet  another 
bond  of  religious  union.  The  full  influence  of  these 
splendid  festivals  on  the  education  of  the  people  at 
large  cannot  easily  be  realized  ;  but  to  some  extent  we 
may  understand  the  charm  which  attracted  to  them,  all 
that  was  noble  and  generous  through  the  wide  range  of 
Greek  society,  as  we  read  the  stirring  strains  of  the  great 
Delian  Hymns,  and  throw  ourselves  into  the  feelings  of 
the  men  who  heard  from  the  lips  of  the  poets  them 
selves,  the  exquisite  music  of  lyric  songs,  such  as  no 
other  age  or  land  has  ever  equalled.  But  although  from 
these  great  religious  gatherings,  the  Greek  returned 
home  ennobled  by  the  stirring  associations  with  which 
these  festivals  were  surrounded,  he  was  brought  none 
the  nearer  to  that  English  feeling  which  would  regard  as 
treason  the  mere  thought  of  war  between  neighboring 
cities  or  villages.  He  took  pride  in  being  a  Hellen ;  but 
he  was  as  far  as  ever  from  wishing  to  merge  the  sover- 


14  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  I. 

eign  authority  of  his  city  under  a  central  government 
which  should  substitute  common  action  in  behalf  of  the 
general  good  for  incessant  faction,  rivalry,  and  open 
war.  Nor,  although  he  had  for  the  most  part  learnt  to 
look  with  contempt  on  anything  wider  and  narrower 
than  the  Polis,  can  we  say  that  all  relics  of  a  ruder  state 
of  society  had  wholly  passed  away.  In  various  portions 
of  Hellas  the  system  of  village  communities  still  held  its 
ground.  The  Spartan  boasted  that  his  city  had  no  walls, 
and  the  historian,  Thucydides,  pointed  to  the  four  ham 
lets  of  which  it  was  composed,  with  the  remark  that 
Sparta  in  ruins  would  never  tell  the  tale  of  its  former 
greatness.  This  life  of  villages  was  kept  up  not  merely 
throughout  Epeir.os,  where  it  has  continued  to  our  own 
day,  but  generally  throughout  the  northwestern  half  of 
the  peninsula  of  Peloponnesos. 

But  the  great  characteristic  which  distinguished  the 
most  advanced  of  the  Greeks  from  all  other  tribes  or 
peoples  was  their  assertion    of  intellectual 
growth* of  independence.     By  them  first  the  powers  of 

£ophyphi~  the  mmd  were  resolutely  used  for  the  dis 
covery  of  truth  ;  and  the  fact  that  any  such 
attempt  was  made  at  the  cost  of  whatever  failures  and 
delusions  marked  the  great  chasm  between  the  eastern 
and  western  Aryans,  and  insured  the  growth  of  the 
science  of  modern  Europe.  The  Greek  found  himself 
the  member  of  a  human  society  with  definite  duties 'and 
a  law  which  both  challenged  and  commended  itself  to 
his  allegiance.  But  if  the  thought  of  this  law  and  these 
duties  might  set  him  pondering  on  the  nature  and  source 
of  his  obligations,  he  was  surrounded  by  objects  which 
carried  his  mind  on  to  inquiries  of  a  wider  compass.  He 
found  himself  in  a  world  of  everlasting  change.  Dark 
ness  gave  place  to  light ;  winter  to  summer.  By  day  the 


CH.  I.]        Character  of  Greek  Civilization.  15 

sun  journeyed  alone  across  the  heaven  :  by  night  were 
seen  myriads  of  lights,  some  like  motionless  thrones, 
ether  moving  in  intricate   courses.      Sometimes   living 
fires  might  leap  with  a  deafening  roar  from  the  sky,  or 
the  earth  might  quake  beneath  their  feet  and  swallow 
man  and  his  works  in  its  yawning  jaws.     Whence  came 
all  these  wonderful  or  terrible  things  ?    What  was  the 
wind  which  crashed  among  the  trees  or  spoke  to  the 
heart  with  its  heavenly  music  ?    These  and  a  thousand 
other  questions  were  asked  again  and  again,  and  all  in 
one  stage  of  thought  received  an  adequate  answer.     All 
things  were  alive ;  most  things  were  conscious  beings ; 
and  all  the  phenomena  of  the  universe  were  but  the  ac 
tions  of  these  personal  agents.     If  in  autumn  the  leaves 
fell  and  the  earth  put  on  a  mourning  garb,  this  was  be 
cause  Persephone,  the  summer  child,  had  been  stolen 
from  the  Great  Mother,  and  because  her  sorrow  could 
not  be  lightened  until  the  maiden  could  be  brought  back 
to  the  joyous  trysting  place  of  Eleusis.     These  mytho 
logical  explanations  might  be  developed  to  any  extent ; 
but  they  amount  to  nothing  more  than  the  assertion  that 
all  phenomena  are  the  acts  of  individual  beings.     The 
weak  point  of  the  system  lay  in  the  forming  of  cosmo 
gonies.     It  might  be  easy  to  say  that  the  mountain  and 
the  sea,  that  Erebos  and  Night,  were  all  the  children  of 
Chaos:  but  whence   came   Chaos?      In    other    words, 
whence    came    all  things?      The  weakest  attempt  to 
answer  this  question  marked  a  revolution  in  thought ; 
and  the  Greek  who  first  nerved  himself  to  the  effort 
achieved  a  task  beyond  the  powers  of  Babylonian  and 
Egyptian  priests  with  all  their  wealth  of  astronomical 
observations.     He  began  a  new  work,  and  he  set  about 
its  accomplishment  by  the  application  of  a  new  method. 
Henceforth  the  object  to  be  aimed  at  was  a  knowledge 


1 6  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  n. 

of  things  in  themselves,  and  the  test  of  the  truth  or 
falsity  of  the  theory  must  be  the  measure  in  which  it  ex 
plained  or  disagreed  with  ascertained  facts.  The  first 
steps  might  be  like  the  painful  and  uncertain  totterings 
of  infants  :  but  the  human  mind  had  now  begun  the 
search  for  truth,  and  the  torch  thus  lit  was  to  be  handed 
down  from  one  Greek  thinker  to  another,  and  from  these 
to  Galileo,  Copernicus,  and  Newton. 


CHAPTER  II. 

SETTLEMENT  AND   GOVERNMENT   OF    THE   GREEKS. 

THE  Hellenic  tribes,  so  far  as  they  were  held  together  at 
all,  were  held  together  by  bonds  which  were  purely  re 
ligious  :  and  as  there  was  no  reason  why  this 
Extent  of       religious  bond  should  be  weakened  by  geo- 

the   Hellenic  *    6    , 

world.  graphical  distance,  so  there  was  absolutely 

none  why  geographical  nearness  should  give 
to  this  union  of  thought,  feeling,  and  worship  a  political 
character.  The  colonists  sent  out  from  Sparta,  Corinth, 
or  Athens  remained  as  strictly  Hellenes  as  those  who 
stayed  at  home  ;  and  the  spots  which  they  chose  for  their 
abode  became  as  much  (and  for  the  same  reason)  a  por 
tion  of  Hellas  as  the  soil  which  contained  the  sacred 
hearth  of  the  mother  city.  Hence  at  no  time  was  Hellas 
a  strictly  defined  geographical  term.  Its  bounds  might 
expand  or  contract  with  the  fortunes  of  the  race :  and 
although  the  whole  country  between  the  range  of  the 
Kambounian  (Cambunian)  mountains  and  the  south 
ernmost  promontories  of  the  Peloponnesos  was  in  the 
possession  of  Hellenic  tribes,  or  of  tribes  supposed  to 


CH.  ii.]  The  Hellenic  World.  17 

be  Hellenic,  the  southern  half  of  the  Peninsula  of  Italy 
boasted  even  a  prouder  designation,  and  the  splendid 
cities  which  studded  its  beautiful  shores  constituted  the 
Great  Greece,  (Megale  Hellas  or  Magna  Grsecia),  which 
in  its  magnificent  ruins  has  left  ample  evidence  of  its 
ancient  wealth  and  grandeur.     Not  less  rich  and  power 
ful  were  the  Greek  colonies  which  contested  with  Car 
thage  the  dominion  of  Sicily,  and  which  but  for  the 
political  disunion  which  was  the  bane  of  Greek  society 
must  have  raised  an  almost  insuperable  barrier  to  the 
growth  of  imperial  Rome.     But  far  beyond  these  limits 
the  Greeks  carried  with  them  both  their  name  and  their 
country,  in  some  places  compelled  to  content  themselves 
with  a  scanty  domain  on  the  coast,  in  others  inserting 
themselves  like  a  wedge  and  winning  a  large  extent  of 
territory,  yet  never  losing  the  consciousness  that,  not  less 
than  the  citizens  of  Athens  or  of  Sparta,  they  belonged 
to   a  race  which  stood  in  the  front  ranks  of  mankind. 
From  the  distant  banks  of  the  Tanais  on   the  north 
eastern  shore  of  the  Euxine,  from  Trapezous  and  Sinope 
on  its  southern  coast  to  the  island  of  Sardinia  and  the 
mouths  of  the  Rhone,  from   the   colonies    planted  on 
Iberian  territory,  which  we  now  call  Spain,  to  the  magnifi 
cent  cities  which  rose  on  the  coasts  of  northern  Africa, 
the   Greek  might  be  seen,  everywhere  presenting  the 
same  characteristics  with  his  near  or  his  distant  kinsmen, 
and   everywhere    marked    off   by    language,    religion, 
thought,  and  law  from  the  tribes  which  he  had  conquered 
or  driven  from  their  homes.    The  measure  of  this  affinity 
was  expressed  in  the  Greek  mythical  genealogies  whicli 
traced  the   several   tribes   to   Doros,    Ion,   and   Aiolos 
[yEolus],  and  through  these  to  their  father  or  grandsire 
Hellen ;  but  these  genealogies   assumed  many  shapes, 
and  most  of  the  names  occurring  in  them  tell  their  own 
C 


1 8  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  n. 

tale.  The  tribesmen  who  boasted  that  they  belonged 
to  the  Dorian,  Ionian,  or  Aiolian  races  believed  undoubt 
edly  in  the  historical  existence  of  these  mythical  pro 
genitors  ;  but  the  belief  of  one  tribe  or  race  contradicted 
more  or  less  the  belief  of  the  rest,  while  a  comparison 
of  the  traditions  makes  it  clear  that  the  Hellenes  are  by 
their  name  simply  the  children  of  the  light  and  the  sun, 
and  that  the  Hellespont  marks  their  pathway.  They 
who  claimed  for  themselves  this  title  would  naturally 
speak  of  their  westward  neighbors  as  the  grey  folk  or 
people  of  the  gloaming, — in  other  words  as  Graioi, 
Grseci,  or  Greeks.  With  these  western  tribes  the  Romans 
first  came  into  contact,  and  thus  the  name  became  a 
designation  for  the  whole  Hellenic  race. 

It  was  then  only  for  the  sake  of  convenience  that  geo 
graphers  spoke  of  the  country  lying  between  the  Kam- 
bounian  mountains  and  the  southern  pro- 

Ueography 

of  northern  montories  of  the  Peloponnesos  as  Continu 
ous  or  Continental  Hellas :  and  so  thoroughly 
were  the  scattered  Greek  settlements  regarded  as  parts 
of  Hellas  that  the  name  Hellas  Sporadike  (Dispersed 
Hellas),  to  denote  these  cities,  was  very  rarely  used. 
But  there  can  be  little  doubt  that  the  physical  features  of 
the  country  called  by  geographers  Continuous  or  Con 
tinental  Hellas,  as  being  their  earlier  home  in  Europe, 
had  very  much  to  do  with  determining  the  character  and 
shaping  the  history  of  the  Hellenic  tribes.  Throughout 
its  area,  the  whole  of  which  scarcely  exceeds  that  of 
Ireland,  the  geography  is  singularly  distinct  and  marked. 
In  the  extreme  north-east  the  stream  of  the  Peneios  car 
ries  through  the  far-famed  vale  of  Tempe,  which  sepa 
rates  mount  Ossa  from  Olympos  and  the  Kambounian 
range,  the  waters  of  the  great  Thessalian  plain,  a  square 
60  miles  in  length  and  breadth,  with  the  mighty  mass  of 


CH.  ii.]  The  Hellenic  World.  19 

Olympos,  nearly  10,000  feet  in  height,  for  its  northern 
wall,  with  the  huge  chain  of  Pindos  running   at  right 
angles  to  the  Kambounian  range  for  its  western  ram 
part,   and   shut   in   to   the   south  by  Tymphrestos  and 
Othrys,  which  jut  off  eastwards  from  Pindos  and  end  in 
thehighlandsbetween  the  Malian  and  Pagasaian  gulfs. 
From  the  latter  gulf  northwards,  the  eastern   wall   of 
Thessaly  is  formed  by  the  masses  of  Pelion  and  Ossa, 
to  the  east  of  which  lies  the  narrow  strip  of  Magnesia, 
terrible  for  its  rugg-ed  coast  and  the  storms  which  were 
to  bring  disaster  to  the  fleets  of  the  Persian  king.     Sepa 
rated  from  Thessaly  by  the  barrier  of  Tymphrestos  and 
Othrys,  the  fertile  valley  of  the  Spercheios  is  shut  in  on 
its  southern  side  by  the  great  chain  of  Oita,  which,  ex 
tending  to  the  Malian  gulf,  leaves  between  its  base  and 
the  sea  only  the  narrow  pass  of  Thermopylai.     To  the 
southwest  of  Oita  the  lands  to  the  north  of  the  Corinthian 
gulf  are  for  the  most  part  occupied  by  the  wilderness  of 
mountains  which  formed  the  fastnesses  of  Aitolian  and 
Akarnanian  tribes.     To  the  southeast  the  range  extends 
with  but  little  interruption  under  the  names  of  Parnas- 
sos,  Helikon,  and  Kithairon  (Cithseron),  leaving  to  the 
north  the  rugged  territory  of  Phokis  and  the  more  fertile 
region  of  Boiotia. 

With  the  chain  of  Fames  to  the  east,  from  which  it 
is  separated  by  the  pass  of  Phyle,  Kithairon  forms  the 
northern  wall  of  Attica,  which  stretches 

Ueo^raphv 

from  the  eastern  end  of  the  Corinthian  gulf  of  the  Peio- 
to  the  headland  of  Rhamnous  and  rises  up 
as  the  background  of  the  plain  of  Marathon.  To  the 
southwest  of  Kithairon  the  ridges  of  Aigiplanktos  and 
Geraneia,  forming  the  backbone  of  the  Corinthian  isth 
mus,  are  connected  by  the  Akrokorinthos  with  that 
labyrinth  of  mountains  which,  having  started  as  a  con- 


20  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  n. 

tinuation  of  the  Aitolian  highlands  from  the  western  end 
of  the  gulf,  rise  up  as  an  impregnable  fortress  in  the 
heart  of  the  Peloponnesos,  leaving  to  the  north  the  long 
and  narrow  region  known  as  the  historical  Achaia.  To 
the  south  of  this  mass  of  mountains  and  dividing  the 
southern  half  of  Peloponnesos  into  two  nearly  equal 
portions,  the  rugged  chain  of  Taygetos  runs  on  to  its  ab 
rupt  termination  in  cape  Tainaros.  Following  a  nearly 
parallel  course  about  30  miles  to  the  east,  another  range 
leaves  between  itself  and  the  sea  a  strip  of  land  not  un 
like  the  Thessalian  Magnesia,  and  ends  with  the  formida 
ble  cape  of  Maleai,  to  reappear  in  the  island  of  Kythera, 
and  again  as  the  backbone  of  mountains  running  along 
the  island  of  Krete. 

~  Of  all  this  country,  which  consists  generally  of  grey 

limestone,  less  than  half  is  capable  of  cultivation,  and 

even  at  the  best  of  times  a  large  portion  of 

The  coast-  i_-i        j  i        • -n          ,o,ri 

line  of  this  land  lay  idle.     Of  the  mountains  many 

are  altogether  barren :  others,  if  not  well 
wooded,  supply  pastures  for  flocks  when  the  lowlands 
are  burnt  up  in  summer.  Nor  are  the  difficulties  which 
the  multitude  of  mountains  raises  in  the  way  of  inter 
course  between  the  inhabitants  removed  by  the  presence 
of  any  considerable  rivers,  the  Greek  streams  being  for 
the  most  part  raging  torrents  in  winter  and  dry  beds  in 
the  summer.  There  was  in  fact  one  circumstance  only 
which  kept  the  Greeks  from  remaining  on  a  level  with 
the  half-civilized  or  wholly  savage  tribes  of  Thrace  or 
Epeiros  [Epirus].  Not  only  were  they  everywhere  within 
reach  of  the  sea,  but  in  a  country  less  in  area  than  Por 
tugal  they  had  a  seaboard  equal  in  extent  to  that  of  Por 
tugal  and  Spain  together.  The  island  of  Euboia,  with 
an  area  of  less  than  1,500  square  miles,  furnishes  with 
the  opposite  shores  of  Lokris,  Boiotia,  and  Attica,  a 


CH.  II.]  TJic  Hellenic  World.  21 

coast-line  of  not  less  than  300  miles.      Still  more  im 
portant  was  the  isthmus  which  separated  by  a  narrow 
neck,  only  three  miles  and  a  half  in  breadth,  the  waters 
of  the   Corinthian  from  those  of  the  Saronic  gulf,  thus 
affording  to  merchants  and  travelers  the  advantages  of  a 
transit  across  the  isthmus  of  Panama  as  compared  with 
the  voyage  round  Cape  Horn.     Pre-eminently   favored 
in  situation,  Attica  was  practically  an  island  from  which 
ships  could  issue  in  all  directions,  while  the  Athenians 
could  cut  off  access  through  the  narrow  strait  of  the  Euripos. 
Of  the  several  tribes  which   held   possession   of  this 
country  in  the  ages  immediately  preceding  the  Persian 
wars  we  need  notice  those  only  whose  his-      The  Thessa. 
tory  has  a  bearing  on  the  incidents  and  for-      Iians- 
tunes  of  that  great  struggle.     Foremost  geographically, 
and  formidable  unhappily  only  to  the  weaker  side  in  any 
contest,  came  the  Thessalians,  as  dwelling   in   a  land 
which  must  be  the  highway  for  all  invaders  of  southern 
Hellas.   Lords  of  the  rich  plains  watered  by  the  Peneios, 
the  Thessalian  nobles,  drawing  their  revenues  from  the 
lands  in  the  neighborhood  of  their  cities,  spent  their  time 
in   feuds   and  feasting  and  the   management  of  their 
splendid  breed  of  horses.     From  these  turbulent  oli 
garchs,   who  held  in   subjection,   under   the   name   of 
Penestai  or  working-men,  the  earlier  inhabitants  of  the 
country,   not  much  unity  of  action  was  to  be  expected. 
The  Thessalian  Tagos  answered  to  the  English   Bret- 
walda  or  to    the  dictator  chosen,  like  Lars  Porsena,  to 
head  the  Etruscan  clans  ;  but  fierce  feuds  often  made 
the   election   of  this   officer  impossible.     In  short,  the 
normal  condition  of  Thessaly  was  much  like  that  of  the 
savage  Thrakian  tribes  of  the  Balkan  islands  whom  in  the 
judgment  of  Herodotus  union  would  have  rendered  in 
vincible  but  who  for  lack  of  it  did  little  or  nothing. 


22  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  n. 

In  historical  importance  the  Thessalians  are  far  sur 
passed  by  the  Boiotians,  whose  theory  even  from  prehis 
toric  times  seems  to  have  been  that  the 
The  Boio-  whole  country  stretching  from  the  base  of 
the  Parnassos  to  the  Euboian  sea,  and  from 
the  lands  of  the  Opountian  Lokrians  to  the  Corinthian 
gulf  was  the  inalienable  possession  of  their  confederacy, 
of  which  during  the  historical  ages  Thebes  was  undoubt 
edly  the  head.  The  affairs  of  the  autonomous  or  inde 
pendent  cities  leagued  together  in  this  alliance  were  man 
aged  by  magistrates  annually  chosen  under  the  title  of 
Boiotarchs ;  but  the  tyrannical  oligarchies  which  ruled 
in  these  towns  were,  we  are  told,  like  the  Thessalian 
nobles,  the  leaders  of  an  indifferent,  if  not  of  an  actually 
hostile,  commonalty.  If  the  statement  be  true,  the  con 
duct  ascribed  to  the  Boiotians  during  the  struggle  with 
Persia  is  in  great  part  explained. 

If  from  these  communities  to  the  north  of  the  Corin 
thian  gulf  we  turn  to  the  Peloponnesos  at  the  beginning 
of  the  historical  age,  we  find  that  the  prepon- 
The  Spar-  derant  state  is  Sparta.  Her  territory  includes 
nearly  the  southern  half  of  the  peninsula. 
She  has  thus  swallowed  up  all  Messene  to  the  west  and 
no  small  portion  of  land  which  had  once  been  under  the 
dominion  of  Argos.  There  had  indeed  been  a  time  in 
which  the  name  Argos  had  denoted  not  merely  the  city 
which  held  aloof  from  the  struggle  with  Xerxes  but  the 
whole  of  the  Peloponnesos  and  many  a  district  lying  be 
yond  its  limits ;  and  therefore  the  power  of  Argos  was 
already  shrunk  when  she  was  deprived  of  that  strip  of 
land,  which  stretching  from  Thyrea  to  the  Malean  cape, 
is  cut  off,  like  Magnesia,  by  the  range  of  Thornax  and 
Zarex  from  the  valley  of  the  Eurotas.  Both  here  and  else~ 
where  the  fortune  of  war  had  favored  Sparta.  The  power 


CH.  ii.]  The  Hellenic  World.  23 

of  Argos  had  gone  down  before  her  arms  ;  two  wars  had 
sufficed  to  bring  ruin  on  Messene  and  the  conquerors, 
having  extended  their  borders  to  the  eastern  and 
western  seas,  not  merely  became  the  head  of  the  Dorian 
tribes,  but  acquired  a  power  which  made  itself  felt 
throughout  Hellas,  and  to  a  certain  extent  succeeded  in 
enforcing  a  common  law.  Forming  strictly  an  army  of 
occupation  in  a  conquered  country,  they  filled  a  position 
closely  analogous  to  that  of  William  the  Conqueror  and 
his  Normans  in  England,  and  maintained  it  with  an  as 
cetic  discipline  which  William  would  have  found  it  diffi 
cult  to  impose  upon  his  followers.  To  the  Spartan  citi 
zen  the  freedom  and  independence  of  home  life  were 
forbidden  privileges.  His  life  must  be  passed  under 
arms,  he  himself  must  be  ready  for  instant  battle,  his 
meals  must  be  taken  in  public  messes,  in  which  the 
quantity  and  quality  of  the  food  were  determined  by 
strict  rule,  and  to  which  he  must  contribute  his  yearly 
quota  on  pain  of  disfranchisement.  The  monastic  se 
verity  of  this  system  has  caused  Sparta  to  be  regarded 
by  some  as  the  type  and  model  of  a  Doric  state ;  but 
such  a  reputation  would  probably  have  carried  with  it  no 
compliment  to  the  Spartans  themselves.  Not  even  in 
Krete,  from  which  these  peculiar  institutions  are  said  to 
have  been  derived,  could  those  characteristics  be  seen 
which  made  Sparta  an  encampment  of  crusading  knights 
and  compelled  her  to  wage  war  not  only  against  luxury, 
but  generally  against  art,  refinement,  and  philosophy. 

The  internal  government  of  this  singular  people  was 
a  close  oligarchy,  at  the  head  of  which,  rather  in  nominal 
than  in  real  pre-eminence,  stood  the  two  co 
ordinate  kings,  both  professedly  having  in 
their  veins  the  blood  of  the  peerless  hero 
Herakles,  and  representing  severally  the  twin  sons  of 


24  ZJie  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  n. 

his  descendant  Aristodemos.  If  constant  jealousy  and 
opposition  be  an  evidence  of  lineage,  the  kings  were 
certainly  of  no  spurious  birth  ;  but  by  the  Spartans  these 
dissensions  were  cheerfully  tolerated,  as  a  security  against 
any  violent  usurpation  of  despotic  authority  by  either  of 
the  two.  Nor  were  other  checks  wanting  to  curb  a  power 
which  originally  had  been  great.  The  Gerosia,  or  senate 
of  twenty-eight  old  men,  was  entrusted  with  the  task  of 
preparing,  in  concert  with  the  kings,  the  measures  which 
were  to  be  submitted  for  the  acceptance  or  rejection  of 
the  popular  assemblies  held'periodically  in  the  open  air; 
but  the  executive  board  of  the  five  Ephors  or  overseers, 
elected  by  the  general  body  of  Spartiatai  or  full  Spartan 
citizens,  exercised  a  more  important  control  in  the  state. 
By  an  oath  interchanged  every  month,  the  kings  under 
took  to  exercise  their  functions  in  accordance  with  the 
established  laws,  while  on  this  condition  the  Ephors 
pledged  themselves  to  uphold  their  authority.  In  earlier 
ages  the  kings  had  had  the  right  of  declaring  war  at 
will ;  but  this  power  had  been  gradually  usurped  by  the 
Ephors,  two  of  whom  always  accompanied  the  kings  on 
military  expeditions,  thus  still  further  tying  their  hands, 
even  while  they  appeared  to  strengthen  them  by  giving 
effect  to  their  orders. 

The  population  of  the  Spartan  territories  was  marked 

off  into  three  classes,  the  Spartiatai,   the  Perioikoi,  or 

"near  dwellers,"  and  the  Helots.     Of  these 

The  popula-      the  first  jn  relation  to  the  other  inhabitants 

tion  of 

Lakonia.  were,   like  the   Thessalian   nobles,    feudal 

lords,  supported  entirely  from  their  lands, 
and  regarding  all  labor,  whether  agricultural  or  me 
chanical,  as  derogatory  to  their  dignity.  In  relation 
to  one  another  they  were  soldiers  whose  equality  was 
expressed  by  their  title  of  Homoioi  or  peers ;  but  the 


CH.  ii.]  The  Hellenic  World.  25 

penalty  which  inflicted  disfranchisement  on  those  who 
failed  to  pay  their  yearly  contributions  to  the  public 
messes  was  constantly  throwing  off  a  number  of  landless 
and  moneyless  men,  known  as  Hypomeiones  or  inferiors, 
and  answering  closely  to  the  "  mean  whites  "  of  the  late 
slave-holding  states  of  the  American  union.  These 
degraded  citizens  were  thus  placed  on  the  same  level 
with  the  Perioikoi  who,  like  the  Helots,  had  fallen  under 
the  dominion  of  the  Dorian  invaders,  and  who  retained 
their  personal  freedom  while  they  forfeited  all  political 
power.  Less  fortunate  than  the  Perioikoi,  their  former 
masters,  the  Helots  sank  a  step  lower  still,  and  became 
serfs  attached  to  the  soil,  their  lot  being  in  some  measure 
lightened  by  the  fact  that  they  were  the  property  not  of 
individual  owners  but  of  the  state,  which  could  at  any 
time  call  upon  them  for  military  service  and  which  they 
served  sometimes  as  heavy-armed  but  most  commonly 
as  light-armed  troops.  Of  these  two  classes,  the  Perioi 
koi  acquired  wealth  through  the  various  trades  on  which 
the  Spartan  looked  down  with  contempt ;  the  Helots,  as 
cultivators  of  the  soil,  gained  strength  with  the  increase 
of  their  numbers,  while  the  degraded  Spartan  citizens 
formed  a  body  more  discontented  perhaps  and  more 
dangerous  than  either. 

Such  a  state  of  things  was  not  one  to  justify  any  strong 
feeling  of  security  on  the  part  of  the  rulers ;  and  thus 
we  find  that  the  Spartans  regarded  the  sub 
ject  population  with  constant  anxiety.     The      The  military 
ephors  could  put  Perioikoi  to  death  without       Sparta.° 
trial;    crowds    of    Helots,    it    is    said,    dis 
appeared  for  ever  when  their  lives  seemed  to  endanger 
the  supremacy  of  their  masters;  and  in  the  police  insti 
tution   called  the  Krypteia,   the    young    citizens  were 
employed  to  carry  out  a  system  of  espionage  throughout 


26  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  n. 

Lakonia.  But  with  all  its  faults  the  Spartan  constitu 
tion  fairly  answered  its  purpose  and  challenged  the 
respect  of  the  Hellenic  world,  while  the  geographical 
position  of  the  four  hamlets  which  according  to  the  old 
system  of  village  communities  made  up  the  unwalled 
city  of  Sparta  secured  it  practically  against  all  attacks 
from  foreign  enemies.  Built  on  a  plain  girt  by  a  rampart  of 
mountains  broken  only  by  the  two  converging  passes 
of  the  Eurotas  and  the  Oinos,  Sparta  could,  in  fact,  afford 
to  dispense  with  walls,  while  the  retention  of  unfortified 
villages  was  the  best  guarantee  for  the  maintenance  of  a 
drill  and  discipline  more  strict  than  that  of  any  other 
Hellenic  state.  Bringing  obedience  to  perfection,  this 
system  at  the  same  time  so  exercised  the  sagacity  of  the 
individual  citizen  that  no  disaster  in  the  field  could 
prevent  the  Spartan  companies  from  returning,  if  broken 
to  their  proper  order.  The  Athenian  fought  among  the 
men  of  his  tribe,  an  unwieldy  mass  imperfectly  under 
the  control  of  their  Taxiarchos  or  captain :  the  Spartan 
system,  caring  nothing  for  social  or  political  distinctions, 
distributed  the  citizens  into  small  groups  in  which  every 
man  knew  his  place  and  his  duty.  With  these  conditions 
there  is  nothing  to  surprise  us  if  in  the  earliest  historical 
age  we  find  Sparta  not  merely  supreme  in  the  Pelopon- 
nesos  but  tacitly  or  openly  recognised  as  the  head  of  the 
communities  which  bore  the  Hellenic  name.  Her 
marked  superiority  was  of  benefit  to  the  Greek  tribes 
generally  so  far  as  it  supplied  a  bond  of  union  to  societies 
which  would  never  have  coalesced  with  or  submitted 
themselves  to  one  another. 

To  the  refinements  of  art  Sparta  made  no  pretension, 

and   the   splendor  which    afterwards   made    Athens    a 

wonder  of  the  world  was  still  a  thing  of  the 

Character  of 

the  Greek  future  when  Greek  colonies  in  Italy,  Sicily, 

colonies. 


CH.  ii.]  The  Hellenic  World.  27 

and  Africa  had  risen  to  magnificence,  and  were 
already  declining  or  had  fallen  into  ruin.  Regarded 
thus,  the  history  of  the  Persian  wars  is,  it  might  be 
urged,  the  history  of  Greece  in  its  decline  ;  but  riches  and 
prosperity  constitute  of  themselves  but  a  poor  title  to 
the  memory  of  after  ages,  and  there  is  by  comparison 
little  to  instruct  or  to  interest  us  in  the  fortunes  of  a 
number  of  independent  and  isolated  societies  which 
might  go  on  for  ever  without  adding  a  jot  to  the  sum"  of 
a  common  experience.  Yet  it  is  impossible  to  re 
gard  without  admiration  that  wonderful  energy  and  bold 
ness  which  encompassed  the  Mediterranean  with  a  gir 
dle  of  Hellenic  colonies,  and  raised  up  cities  rich  with  the 
grandest  works  of  art  and  graced  with  the  refinements 
of  a  luxurious  civilization  in  the  midst  of  savage  or  half- 
barbarous  tribes  destitute  for  the  most  part  of  all  powers 
of  self-discipline  and  lacking  all  faculties  for  political 
growth. 

But  in  reference  to  the  great  conflict  between  the 
Greeks  and  the  Persians  it  is  especially  remarkable  that 
in  this  golden  age  of  Hellenic  colonization  t 

Greek  colo- 

Athens  is  altogether  in  the  background,  and  metin Italy 
but  for  the  foundation  of  one  or  two  settle 
ments,  as  of  Amphipolis  on  the  north  of  the  Strymon, 
might  almost  be  regarded  as  invisible.  Chalkis  and 
Corinth,  Eretria  and  Megara  outstrip  her  in  the  race 
whether  in  Italy  or  Sicily,  or  on  the  coasts  of  Thrace 
and  the  Propontis.  It  might  almost  seem  that  these 
states,  which  had  reached  their  maturity  before  Athe 
nian  citizens  had  awakened  to  a  sense  of  their  political 
duties,  exhausted  themselves  in  the  multiplication  of  iso 
lated  units,  while  the  strength  of  Athens  was  reserved 
for  the  great  conflict  which  determined  the  future  course 
of  European  history.  But  isolated  though  these  units 


28  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  n. 

may  have  been,  of  their  astonishing  splendor  and  wealth 
there  can  be  no  question  whatever.  In  Sicily  the  Greeks 
found  a  land  of  singular  fertility,  the  resources  of  which, 
especially  in  its  eastern  and  southern  portions,  had  never 
been  systematically  drawn  out.  The  neighboring  Italian 
peninsula  had  for  them  even  greater  attractions.  On 
•  either  side  of  the  mountain  range  which  forms  its  back 
bone  magnificent  forests  rose  above  valleys  of  marvel 
ous' fertility,  and  pastures  green  in  the  depth  of  summer 
sloped  down  to  plains  which  received  the  flocks  and 
herds  on  the  approach  of  winter.  The  exuberance  of 
this  teeming  soil  in  wine,  oil,  and  grain,  veiled  the  perils 
involved  in  a  region  of  great  volcanic  activity.  This 
mighty  force  has  in  recent  ages  done  much  towards 
changing  the  face  of  the  land,  while  many  parts  have 
become  unhealthy  and  noxious  which  five-and-twenty 
centuries  ago  had  no  such  evil  reputation.  When  we 
allow  for  the  effects  of  these  causes,  and  subtract  further 
the  results  of  misgovernment,  if  not  of  anarchy,  ex 
tended  over  centuries,  we  may  form  some  idea  of  the 
wealth  and  splendor  of  the  land  in  the  palmy  days  of 
Kroton  and  Sybaris,  of  Thourioi  [Thurii],  Siris,  Taras 
[Tarentum],  and  Metapontion.  Possessing  the  only  per 
fect  harbor  in  southern  Italy,  Taras  not  merely  grew  into 
a  democracy  as  pronounced  as  that  of  Athens,  but  fur 
thered,  in  a  greater  degree  perhaps  than  any  other  Greek 
colony,  that  spreading  of  the  new  element  into  the  in 
terior  which  obtained  for  this  portion  of  the  Italian  pe 
ninsula  the  name  of  Megale  Hellas  (Magna  Graecia,  Great 
Greece). 

Nearer  to  the  old  country  was  planted  the  Corinthian 
colony  which  converted  the  beautiful  island  of  Korkyra 
Corinth  and  (Corcyra)  into  a  battle-ground  of  blood- 
Korkyra.  thirsty  and  vindictive  factions.  Severed  from 


CH.  ii.]  The  Hellenic  World.  29 

the  mainland  by  a  strait  at  its  northern  end,  scarcely 
wider  than  that  of  Euripos,  it  had  the  advantage  of  an 
insular  position  against  attack  from  without,  while  its 
moderate  size,  not  exceeding  forty  miles  in  length,  by 
half  that  distance  in  width,  involved  none  of  the  diffi 
culties  and  dangers  of  settlement  on  a  coast-line  with 
barbarous  and  perhaps  hostile  tribes  in  the  rear.  No 
where  rising  to  a  greater  height  than  3,000  feet,  the  high 
lands  of  the  northern  end,  which  give  to  the  island  its 
modern  name  of  Korupho  (Corfu),  subside  into  a  broken 
and  plain  country,  now  covered  in  great  part  with  olive 
woods  planted  under  Venetian  rule,  but  capable  of  yield 
ing  everywhere  abundant  harvests  of  grain  and  wine. 
Here,  it  might  be  thought,  a  colony  would  have  sprung 
up  to  be  classed  among  the  most  peaceful  of  Hellenic 
communities :  here,  in  fact,  grew  up  perhaps  the  most 
turbulent  and  ferocious  of  Greek  societies.  Alliance 
with  Athens  did  little  to  soften  the  violence  of  their  pas 
sions  ;  and  the  rapid  development  of  the  feud  between 
the  Korkyraian  colony  and  the  mother  city  of  Corinth, 
may  be  attested  by  the  tradition  that  the  first  naval  battle 
of  the  Greeks  was  fought  by  the  fleets  of  these  two  cities. 
The  mainland  facing  Korkyra  was  the  habitation  of  a 
number  of  tribes,  some  of  which  were  regarded  as  be 
longing  in  some  sort  to  the  Hellenic  stock,  Epeirotsand 
while  others  were  looked  upon  as  mere  bar-  JjfeSEl! 
barians.  Nay,  their  claim  to  be  considered  Hellas. 
Hellenes  was  admitted  by  some  and  rejected  by  others, 
a  fact  sufficiently  proving  the  looseness  of  the  theories 
which  sought  to  define  the  limits  of  the  Hellenic  world. 
Socially  and  morally  these  tribes  stood  much  on  the 
same  level.  The  physical  features  of  the  country, 
broken  up  throughout  by  hills  and  mountains,  made  the 
growth  of  cities  impossible  ;  and  even  the  village  com- 


30  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  n. 

munities  scattered  over  this  wild  region  were  linked  to 
gether,  if  joined  at  all,  by  the  slenderest  of  bonds.  Of 
these  tribes  the  most  reputable  were  the  Akarnanians, 
whose  lack  of  cunning  gave  to  their  brutal  Aitolian 
neighbors  a  decided  advantage  over  them.  The  tribes 
to  the  north,  known  to  the  southern  Greeks  under  the 
common  name  of  Epeirotai,.  or  people  of  the  mainland, 
were  distinguished  among  themselves  as  Chaonians, 
Thesprotians,  Molossians,  or  by  other  names;  and  to 
some  of  these  also,  we  find  one  historian  denying  the 
Hellenic  character  which  is  conceded  to  them  by 
another.  Still  further  to  the  north  and  the  east  stretched 
a  vast  region  occupied  by  races  more  or  less  nearly  akin 
to  each  other,  and  all  perhaps  having  some  affinity  with 
the  ruder  Hellenic  clans,  although  even  by  the  latter, 
the  kindred  would  probably  have  been  denied.  Of  these 
tribes  the  most  prominent  are  the  Illyrians,  Makedo- 
nians,  and  Thrakians,  each  of  these  being  subdivided 
into  several  subordinate  tribes,  and  all  contributing 
characteristics  common  to  the  dwellers  in  countries 
which  present  an  effectual  barrier  to  political  union  and 
the  life  of  cities.  By  far  the  larger  portion  of  this  enor 
mous  region  is  occupied  by  mountains  often  savage  in 
their  ruggedness,  and  almost  everywhere  presenting  im 
passable  barriers  to  the  march  of  armies.  At  best,  there 
fore,  we  find  the  inhabitants  dwelling  in  village  commu 
nities  ;  and  of  some  we  can  scarcely  speak  as  having 
attained  to  any  notions  of  society  whatever.  Many  were, 
as  in  these  regions  they  are  still,  mere  robbers.  Some 
made  a  trade  of  selling  their  children  for  exportation : 
many  more  were  ready  to  hire  themselves  out  as  mer 
cenaries,  and  were  thus  employed  in  maintaining  the 
power  of  the  most  hateful  of  the  Greek  despots.  The 
more  savage  Illyrian  and  Thrakian  clans  tattooed  their 


CH.  ii.]  The  Hellenic  World.  31 

bodies  and  retained  in  the  historical  ages,  that  practice 
of  human  sacrifice  which  in  Hellas  belonged  to  a  com 
paratively  remote  past.  Without  powers  of  combination 
in  time  of  peace,  they  followed  in  war  the  fashion  which 
sends  forth  mountaineers  like  a  torrent  over  the  land 
and  then  draws  them  back  again,  to  reap  the  harvest  or 
to  feast  and  sleep  through  the  winter.  Like  the  warfare 
of  the  Scottish  Highlanders,  their  tactics  were  confined 
to  a  wild  and  impetuous  rush  upon  the  enemy.  If  this 
failed,  they  could  only  retreat  as  hastily  as  they  had 
advanced.  More  fortunate  in  their  soil  and  in  the  posses 
sion  of  comparatively  extensive  plains  watered  by  consid 
erable  streams,  the  Makedonians,  although  in  the  time  of 
Herodotus,  they  had  not  extended  their  conquests  to  the 
sea,  were  still  far  in  advance  of  their  neighbors.  Popular 
tradition  represented  them  as  a  non-Hellenic  race, 
governed  by  sovereigns  of  pure  Hellenic  blood;  but  the 
belief  had,  it  would  seem,  but  slight  foundation,  if  it  be 
a  fact,  as  Herodotus  states,  that  one  of  these  kings, 
seeking  to  compete  in  the  Olympic  games,  had  his  claim 
disallowed  on  the  score  of  his  non-Hellenic  descent. 
A  few  generations  after  the  time  of  Herodotus,  the 
Makedonians  were  to  be  lords  of  Hellas,  and  almost  of 
the  world;  but  in  his  own  they  were  not  the  most 
formidable  of  the  tribes  to  the  north  of  the  Kambounian 
hills.  In  his  belief,  the  Thrakians  might  with  even 
moderate  powers  of  combination,  have  carried  every 
thing  before  them;  but  there  was  no  fear  of  such  united 
action  on  the  part  of  these  heartless  savages.  The 
Thrakian  was  a  mere  ruffian  who  bought  his  wives, 
allowed  his  children  to  herd  together  like  beasts,  and 
then  sold  them  into  slavery. 

The  coast-line  of  the  regions  occupied  by  these  bar 
barous  tribes  was  dotted  with  Hellenic  settlements  ;  but 


32  The  Persian  IVars.  [CH.  11. 

the  foremost  in  the  planting  of  these  colo- 

Greek  settle 
ments  on  the     nies   was   neither   Athens    nor    Sparta,    the 

northern  coast    -11  ,-i  r  ±.1        T       •  JT^ 

of  the  Egean  heads  respectively  of  the  Ionian  and  Do- 
sea-  rian  Greeks.  These  were  outstripped  in  the 

race  by  the  Euboian  towns  of  Chalkis  and  Eretria,  and 
the  activity  of  the  former,  from  which  had  gone  forth 
the  earliest  colonists  of  Sicily,  was  attested  by  the  name 
Chalkidike  given  to  the  whole  country  lying  to  the  south 
of  a  line  drawn  from  the  head  of  the  Thermaic  to  that 
of  the  Strymonic  gulf.  On  Akte,  the  easternmost  of  the 
three  peninsulas  which  jut  out  between  these  gulfs,  the 
magnificent  mass  of  Athos,  casting  its  shadow  as  far  as 
the  island  of  Lemnos,  rises  sheer  from  the  coast  to  a 
height  exceeding  6,000  feet,  the  ridge  connecting  it  with 
the  mountains  at  the  base  being  about  half  that  height. 
The  intermediate  or  Sithonian  peninsula  has  more  of 
open  ground;  and  on  these  spaces  rose,  among  other 
Chalkidian  cities,  the  towns  of  Olynthos  and  Torone, 
while  at  the  neck  of  the  third  or  Pallenian  peninsula  was 
placed  the  Corinthian  colony  of  Potidaia.  Further  to 
the  east,  near  the  mouth  of  the  Strymon,  we  shall  find  in 
the  history  of  the  invasion  of  Xerxes  the  Edonian  town 
ship  of  Ennea  Hodoi  [the  Nine  Roads],  where,  after  dis 
astrous  failures,  the  Athenians  succeeded  in  establishing 
their  colony  of  Amphipolis.  Finally,  on  the  European 
side  of  the  Hellespont  and  the  Propontis  lay  the  Aiolic 
Sestos,  and  the  Megarian  settlement  of  Byzantion,  the 
future  home  of  Roman  emperors  and  Turkish  sultans. 

On  the  Asiatic  continent,  if  we  consider  the  number 
and  magnificence  of  the  Greek  cities,  the  results  of  Hel- 
The  Asiatic  lenic  colonization  were  splendid  indeed  ; 
but  the  centrifugal  tendencies  (the  phrase 
must  be  used  for  lack  of  a  better)  which  marked  the 
Hellenes  everywhere,  left  them  exposed  to  dangers, 


$  St)-uthers,Jf.  Y 


CH.  ii.]  The  Hellenic  World.  33 

against  which  political  union  would  have  furnished  an 
effectual  safeguard.  In  Sicily  and  Africa  they  had  to 
deal  with  tribes  which  it  would  be  no  great  injustice  to 
describe  as  savages  :  in  Asia  they  came  into  contact  with 
powerful  and  organized  empires,  and  the  circumstances 
which  made  them  subjects  of  the  Lydian  monarch  in 
sured  their  passing  under  the  harder  yoke  of  the  Persian 
despot. 

The  Lydian  kingdom,  against  which  the  Asiatic  Greeks 
were  thus  unable  to  maintain  their  independence,  had 
grown  up  in  a  country  inhabited  by  a  num 
ber  of  tribes,  between   most,  and  perhaps      Geography 
all,  of  whom  there  existed  some  sort  of  am-      ^.Asia 

Minor. 

nity.  These  tribes,  whatever  may  have 
been  their  origin,  were  spread  over  a  region  of  whose 
loveliness  Herodotus  speaks  with  a  proud  enthusiasm. 
The  beauty  of  climate,  the  richness  of  soil,  and  the 
splendor  of  scenery,  which  for  him  made  Ionia  the  most 
delightful  of  all  earthly  lands,  were  not  confined  to  the 
exquisite  valleys  in  which  for  the  most  part  the  Hellenic 
inhabitants  of  Asia  Minor  had  fixed  their  homes  ;  and  the 
only  drawback  even  to  the  colder  parts  of  this  vast  pe 
ninsula,  which  Turkish  greed,  corruption,  and  misrule  are 
now  fast  reducing  to  a  howling  wilderness,  was  that, 
while  they  yielded  grain,  fruits,  and  cattle,  they  would 
not  produce  the  olive.  These  colder  parts  lay  on  that 
large  central  plain  to  the  north  of  the  chain  of  Tauros, 
which  runs  off  towards  the  north,  west,  and  south  into  a 
broken  country,  whence  the  mountains  slope  down  to 
the  sea,  bearing  in  their  valleys  the  streams  which  keep 
up  its  perpetual  freshness.  Stretching  in  a  southwester 
ly  direction  from  the  mouth  of  the  Hellespont,  the  moun 
tains  of  Ida  form  the  southern  boundary  of  the  lands, 
through  which  the  Granikos  and  other  streams  find  their 
D 


34  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  n. 

way  into  the  Propontis  or  sea  of  Marmora.  Striking  to 
the  southeast  until  it  meets  the  great  range  of  Tauros, 
runs  a  mountain  chain  which  sends  out  to  the  southwest 
a  series  of  almost  parallel  ridges,  between  which  lie  the 
most  celebrated  plains  of  Asia  Minor,  each  watered  by 
its  own  stream  and  its  tributaries.  The  first  of  these, 
called  the  Kaikos,  flows  into  the  Elaiatic  gulf  in  the  tri 
angle  formed  by  the  mountains  of  Gargarosand  Temnos 
on  the  north  and  mount  Pelekas  on  the  south.  Again, 
between  mount  Pelekas  and  the  more  southerly  masses 
of  Sipylos  and  Tmolos  lies  the  valley  of  the  Hermos, 
which,  a  few  miles  to  the  north  of  the  citadel  of  Sardeis, 
receives  the  waters  of  the  Paktolos,  and  runs  into  the 
Egean  midway  between  Smyrna  and  Phokaia.  To  the 
east  of  Smyrna  rise  the  heights  of  Olympos,  between 
which  and  mount  Messogis  the  Kaystros  [Cayster]  finds 
its  way  to  the  sea  near  Ephesus.  Finally,  between  the 
southern  slopes  of  Messogis  the  winding  Maiandros 
[Meander]  goes  on  its  westward  way,  until,  a  little  below 
the  Maiandrian  Magnesia,  it  turns,  like  the  Hermos,  to 
the  south  and  discharges  itself  into  the  gulf  which  bears 
its  name.  From  this  point  stretch  to  the  westward  the 
Latmian  hills  where,  as  the  tale  went,  Selene  came  to 
gaze  upon  Endymion  in  his  dreamless  sleep.  Thus, 
each  between  its  mountain  walls,  the  four  streams,  Kai 
kos,  Hermos,  Kaystros,  and  Maiandros,  follow  courses 
which  may  roughly  be  regarded  as  parallel,  through 
lands  than  which  few  are  richer  in  their  wealth  of  histo 
rical  association.  Round  the  ruins  of  Sardeis  gather  the 
recollections  of  the  great  Lydian  kingdom,  while  from 
Abydos  on  the  north  to  the  promontory  which  faces  the 
seaborn  island  of  Rhodes,  every  bay  and  headland  of 
this  glorious  coast  brings  before  us  some  name  sacred 
from  its  ancient  memories,  not  the  least  among  these  be- 


CH.  ii.]  The  Hellenic  World.  35 

ing  Halikarnassos,  the  birthplace  of  the  historian  Hero 
dotus,  and  among  the  greatest  that  spot  on  the  seashore 
beneath  the  heights  of  Mykale,  where,  as  fame  would 
have  it,  the  fleet  of  the  barbarian  was  destroyed  at  the 
very  time  when  Mardonios  underwent  his  doom  at  Plataia. 
Against  the  isolated  communities  of  Greeks  scattered 
throughout  this  lovely  region  Kroisos  [Croesus],  the  last 
of  the  Lydian  sovereigns,  determined,  we 
are  told,  to  put  forth  the  full  strength  of  his  dJm  of"8" 
kingdom.  His  hand  fell  first  on  Ephesus,  Lydia- 
and  after  it  all  the  other  Hellenic  cities  were  reduced  to 
the  payment  of  tribute,  the  result  being  that  Kroisos  be 
came  master  of  all  the  lands  to  the  west  of  the  Halys 
except  the  country  of  the  Lykians  and  Kilikians  who 
were  protected  by  the  mountain  barriers  of  Tauros.  This 
conquest  wrought  a  momentous  change  in  their  position. 
They  were  now  included  in  a  vast  empire  which  was  at 
any  time  liable  to  the  sudden  and  irreparable  disasters 
which  from  time  to  time  changed  the  face  of  the  Asiatic 
world.  If  these  Hellenes  could  so  far  have  modified 
their  nature  as  to  combine  with  the  firmness  of  English 
men,  their  union  might  have  broken  the  power  of  Xerxes 
before  he  could  set  foot  on  the  soil  of  Europe.  But  no 
danger  could  impress  on  them  the  need  of  such  a  sacri 
fice  as  this ;  and  the  whips  of  Kroisos  were  therefore 
soon  exchanged  for  the  scorpions  of  the  Persian  despot. 


36  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  in. 


CHAPTER  III. 

THE    PERSIAN    EMPIRE    UNDER  CYRUS,   KAMBYSES,   AND 
DAREIOS. 

AMONG  the  many  histories  told  of  the  founder  of  the 
Persian  monarchy  Herodotus  regarded  as  the  most  trust- 
Cyrus  and  worthy  the  version  which  represented  Cyrus 
Astyages.  as  the  grandson  of  the  Median  king  Asty- 

ages,  who,  frightened  by  a  prophecy  that  his  daughter's 
child  should  be  his  ruin,  gave  the  babe  on  its  birth  to 
Harpagos  with  orders  that  it  should  be  forthwith  slain. 
By  advice  of  his  wife,  Harpagos  instead  of  killing  the 
child  placed  it  in  the  hands  of  one  of  the  royal  herds 
men,  who  carried  it  home,  and  finding  that  his  wife  had 
just  given  birth  to  a  dead  infant  exposed  the  corpse  of 
the  latter  and  brought  up  Cyrus  as  his  own  son.  Years 
passed  on.  In  the  village  sports  the  boy  played  king  so 
well  that  a  complaint  was  carried  to  AstyageS  ;  and  the 
severe  judge  was  found  to  be  the  child  who  had  been 
doomed  to  die  but  who  turned  out  to  be^"  the  man  born 
to  be  king."  In  his  terror  and  rage  Astyages  took  ven 
geance  on  Harpagos  by  inviting  him  to  a  banquet  at 
which  the  luckless  man  feasted  on  the  body  of  his  own 
son.  His  fears  were  quieted  on  learning  from  the  sooth 
sayers  that  the  election  of  Cyrus  as  king  by  the  village 
children  had  adequately  fulfilled  the  prophecy  ;  but 
Harpagos  had  resolved  that  there  should  be  a  second 
and  more  serious  fulfilment,  and  he  therefore  drove  Cyrus 
into  the  rebellion  which  ended  in  the  dethronement  of 
the  despot.  To  achieve  this  end  Cyrus  convoked  the 


CH.  in.]      Growth  of  the  Persian  Empire.  37 

Persian  tribes,  whom  the  story  manifestly  regards  as  the 
inhabitants  of  a  small  canton,  and  held  forth  to  them  the 
boon  of  freedom,  in  other  words,  of  immunity  from  taxa 
tion,  if  they  would  break  the  Median  yoke  from  off  thpir 
necks.  The  contrast  of  a  costly  banquet  to  which  they 
were  bidden  after  a  day  spent  in  severe  toil  so  impressed 
them  that  they  at  once  threw  in  their  lot  with  Cyrus  and 
presently  changed  their  state  of  oppression  for  the 
pleasanter  power  of  oppressing  others. 

The  same  idea  of  a  scanty  territory  inhabited  by  a  few 
disorderly  clans  marks  the  institutional  legend  of  the 
Median  empire  which  Cyrus  was  to  over 
throw.  The  founder  of  this  empire,  Deiokes, 
aiming  from  the  first,  it  is  said,  at  despot 
ism,  set  himself  to  administer  justice  amongst  the  law 
less  men  by  whom  he  was  surrounded,  and  having  at 
length  won  a  high  name  for  wisdom  and  impartiality 
withdrew  himself  from  them  on  the  plea  that  he  was  un 
able  to  bear  without  recompense  the  continued  tax  on 
his  time.  The  seven  Median  .tribes,  meeting  in  council, 
asked  him  therefore  to  become  their  king  ;  and  Deiokes, 
having  made  them  build  him  a  palace  with  seven  con 
centric  walls,  took  up  his  abode  in  the  centre  and  be 
came  henceforth  a  cruel  and  avaricious  tyrant.  So  came 
into  existence  the  Median  city  of  Agbatana  under  a 
sovereign  who  asserted  the  independence  of  the  Median 
tribes  against  the  Assyrian  kings  of  Nineveh.  The  story 
may  point  to  some  change  in  the  relations  of  the  Medes 
and  Assyrians  ;  but  it  describes  the  origin  of  eastern 
monarchy  not  as  it  would  be  conceived  by  the  Medes, 
but  as  it  would  present  itself  to  Greeks  acquainted  only 
with  the  arts  by  which  their  own  tyrants  had  worked 
their  way  to  power.  The  turbulence  and  -factiousness 
of  the  Median  clans,  the  rigid  justice  under  which 


38  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  HI. 

Deiokes  masks  his  ambitious  schemes,  the  care  which  he 
takes  to  build  himself  a  stronghold  as  soon  as  possible, 
and  to  surround  his  person  with  a  body-guard,  are  all 
features  which  belong  to  the  history  of  Greek  rather  than 
of  Oriental  despots.  The  Greek  ideal  is  still  more  re 
markably  shown  in  the  ascription  to  Dei'okes  of  a  severe, 
laborious,  and  toilsome  administration  which  probably 
no  Asiatic  government  ever  sought  to  realize. 

But  whatever  may  have  been  the  political   changes 

effected  by  Deiokes,  Nineveh,  the  capital  of  the  Assyrian 

kings,  had,  according  to  Herodotus,  under- 

Connection  of 

the  Median,  gone  no  disaster  when  his  son  Phraortes, 
Alfyrinannd  after  a  reign  of  two-and-twenty  years,  met 
empires.  fas  death  before  its  walls.  His  successor 

Kyaxares  sought,  it  is  said,  to  avenge  his  father  by  again 
besieging  Nineveh  :  but  an  irruption  of  Scythians  com 
pelled  him  to  abandon  the  blockade.  In  his  own  land 
some  of  these  Scythians,  we  are  told,  became  his  tribu 
taries  ;  but  a  default  of  payment  was  visited  with  harsh 
punishment,  and  the  fugitives  found  a  refuge  in  the 
kingdom  of  the  Lydian  sovereign  Alyattes,  the  father  of 
Kroisos,  the  last  monarch  of  his  dynasty.  The  refusal 
of  Alyattes  to  surrender  the  Scythians  led  to  a  war  which 
after  six  years,  was  brought  to  an  end  partly  by  an  eclipse 
which  took  place  while  a  battle  was  going  on,  and  in 
part  by  the  mediation  of  Labynetos  king  of  Babylon 
and  the  Kilikin  chief  Syennesis.  These  sovereigns  de 
termined  that  the  doubtful  peace  should  be  strengthened 
by  a  marriage  between  Astyag.ag,  the  heir  to  the  Median 
throne,  and  the  daughter  of  Alyattes.  The  Median  al 
liance  with  Babylon  was  further  cemented  by  the  mar 
riage  of  Nebucadnezzar,  the  son  of  the  Babylonian  king 
Nabopolassar,  with  the  daughter  of  Kyaxares.  Thus 
Kroisos  became  the  brother-in-law  of  Astyages,  and 


CH.  in.]      Growth  of  the  Persian  Empire.  39 

Astyages  the  brother-in-law  of  Nebucadnezzar.  The 
chain  might  well  have  seemed  strong;  but  the  links 
broke,  when  Cyrus  deprived  Astyages  of  his  throne. 
The  duty  of  avenging  his  wife's  brother  seems  not  to 
have  troubled  Nebucadnezzar :  according  to  Herodotus 
it  furnished  to  the  Lydian  Kroisos  the  strongest  motive 
for  measuring  his  strength  against  that  of  the  Persian 
king.  Kyaxares  himself,  we  are  told,  achieved  a  bril 
liant  triumph,  when  with  the  aid  of  the  Babylonian  Na- 
bopolassar,  he  overthrew  the  ancient  dynasty  of  the 
Assyrian  kings,  and  made  Nineveh  a  dependency  of  the 
sovereigns  of  Media. 

Over  the  vast  territory  thus  brought  under  Median 
rule  the  Persian  Cyrus  became  the  lord  ;  but  in  the  con 
dition  of  the  Medians  themselves  the  over 
throw  of  Astyages  made  no  material  change.   pJJpeieMedian 
They  remained  the  second  nation  in  the  em 
pire  and  were  so  closely  associated  with  their  conquerors 
that  the  Greeks  spoke  of  their  great  enemy  as  the  Mede 
rather  than  the  Persian,  and  branded  as  Medizers  those 
of  their  kindred  who  ranged  themselves  on  the  side  of 
the  invading  despot.     Agbatana  also  still  continued  a 
royal  city,  and  the  summer  abode  of  the  Persian  "kings. 

The  supremacy  in  Asia  thus  passed  into  the  hands  of 
a  sovereign  whose  chief  strength  lay  in  that  comparatively 
small  country  which  still  bears  the  name  of 
Fars  or  Farsistan.    By  Herodotus  this  region   Of  Pe°iSa?  y 
is  called  a  scanty  and  rugged  land, — a  de 
scription  not  unbefitting  a  country  which,  with  the  ex 
ception  of  the  hot  district  lying  between  the  mountains 
and  the  coast-line,  consists  chiefly  of  the  high  plateau 
formed  by  the   continuation   of  that  mountain-system 
which,  having  furnished  a  boundary  to  the  Mesopota- 
mian  plain,  turns  eastwards  and  broadens  out  into  the 


40  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  in. 

highlands  of  Persia  proper.  Of  the  whole  of  this  coun 
try  it  may  be  said  that  where  there  is  water,  there  is 
fertility ;  but  much  that  is  now  desert  may  have  been 
rich  in  grass  and  fruits  in  the  days  when  Cyrus  is  said  to 
have  warned  his  people  that,  if  they  migrated  to  a 
wealthier  soil,  they  must  bid  farewell  to  their  supremacy 
among  the  nations.  Strong  in  a  mountain  barrier  pierced 
by  astonishingly  precipitous  gorges,  along  which  roads 
wind  in  zigzag  or  are  thrown  across  furious  torrents  on 
bridges  of  a  single  span,  this  beautiful  or  desolate  land 
was  not  rich  in  the  number  of  its  cities.  About  sixty 
miles  almost  due  north  of  the  present  city  of  Shiraz  are 
the  ruins  of  Pasargadai,  probably  in  its  original  form 
Parsa-gherd  (the  castle  of  the  Persians,  or  the  Persian- 
garth).  On  a  larger  plain,  about  half-way  between  these 
two  towns,  rose  the  second  capital,  Persepolis.  The  two 
streams  by  which  this  plain  is  watered  maintain  the  ex 
quisite  verdure  which  a  supply  of  water  never  fails  to 
produce  in  Persia.  But  rugged  in  parts  and  sterile  as  this 
plateau  may  be,  it  must  be  distinguished  from  that  vast 
region  which,  at  a  height  varying  between  3,000  and 
5,000  feet,  extends  from  the  Zagros  and  Elbruz  ranges 
on  the  west  and  north  over  an  area  of  1,100  by  500  miles 
to  the  Suliman  and  Hala  mountains  on  the  east,  and  on 
the  south  to  the  great  coast  chain  which  continues  the 
Persian  plateau  almost  as  far  as  the  Indus.  Of  this  im 
mense  territory  nearly  two-thirds  are  absolute  desert,  in 
which  the  insignificant  streams  fail  before  the  summer 
heats.  In  such  a  country  the  habits  of  a  large  propor 
tion  of  the  population  will  naturally  be  nomadic ;  and 
the  fresher  pastures  and  more  genial  climate  of  the  hills 
and  valleys  about  Agbatana  would  draw  many  a  roving 
clan  with  their  herds  and  tents  from  regions  scorched  by 
a  heat  which  left  them  no  water. 


CH.  in.]      Growth  of  the  Persian  Empire.  41 

Into  the  vast  empire  ruled  by  the  lord  of  these  Aryan 
tribes  there  was  now  to  be  absorbed  that  great  Lydian 
kingdom  to  the  west  of  the  river  Halys,  of 

i  •    i    T^      •  11-  ^i  lhe  Lydian 

which  Kroisos  was  the  king.     1  he  conquests   kingdom  and 


which  had  brought  the  Lydian  monarch 
thus  far  placed  him  in  dangerous  proximity 
with  a  power  not  less  aggressive  and  more  formidable 
than  his  own.  But  the  relations  which  existed  between 
Kroisos  and  the  Asiatic  Greeks  imparted  to  the  catastro 
phe  at  Sardeis  a  significance  altogether  beyond  that 
which  could  be  attached  to  the  mere  transference  of 
power  from  the  Median  despot  Astyages  to  the  Persian 
despot  Cyrus.  Beyond  the  loss  of  their  political  inde 
pendence  —  a  doubtful  boon  for  cities  so  averse  to  common 
action  —  the  Hellenic  colonies  had  suffered  but  little  by 
falling  under  the  sway  of  the  Lydian  king.  ^  Their  bur 
dens  were  confined  probably  to  the  payment  of  a  fixed 
annual  tribute  and  to  the  supply  of  a  certain  number  of 
troops  for  the  Lydian  armies.  By  way  of  precaution 
also  it  would  seem  that  Kroisos  gave  orders  to  some  of 
the  cities  to  breach  their  walls,  for  Herodotus  mentions 
that  they  were  obliged  to  rebuild  them  when  they  began 
to  form  the  design  of  revolting  from  the  Persian  king. 
Otherwise  the  yoke  of  the  Lydian  monarch  seems  to 
have  been  light  indeed  ;  and  he  was  himself  to  undergo 
a  harder  subjection  than  that  which  he  had  inflicted  on 
the  conquered  Hellenes. 

The  motives  or  causes  tending  to  bring  about  the  war 
between  Kroisos  and  Cyrus  are  distinctly  stated  to  have 
been  first,  the  ambition  of  Kroisos,  next  his  desire  to 
avenge  the  wrong  done  to  his  brother-in-law  Astyages, 
and,  thirdly,  the  greed  and  covetousness  of  the  Persian 
king.  These  causes  may  seem  not  altogether  consistent, 
and  they  may  further  appear  to  be  contradicted  by  va- 


42  The  Persia?!  Wars.  [CH.  ill. 

rious  portions  of  the  wonderful  popular  tra- 

Historyofthe 

war  between  dition  which  has  embodied  in  the  drama  of 
Cyrus?5  a  the  life  of  Kroisos  the  religious  philosophy 
of  the  age.  But  the  meagre  chronicle  of  his 
conquests  along  the  Egean  coasts  sufficiently  attests  the 
active  ambition  of  the  Lydian  king,  while  the  uninter 
rupted  career  of  victory  ascribed  to  Cyrus  is  at  least 
proof  of  the  aggressiveness  of  his  enemy.  The  two 
causes  thus  assigned  for  the  war  involve  no  inconsistency, 
while  the  alliance  between  the  Lydian  and  the  Median 
sovereigns  would  be  with  Cyrus  a  sufficient  reason  for 
crippling  the  power  of  a  chief  whose  vengeance  might 
seriously  affect  his  own  empire.  That  Kroisos,  if  he 
could  have  induced  the  Greeks  to  act  with  energy  on  his 
behalf,  might  have  checked  or  destroyed  the  Persian 
supremacy,  there  can  be  little  doubt  or  none.  The  tra 
dition  that  Cyrus  did  all  that  he  could  to  detach  the 
lonians  from  their  conqueror  may  be  taken  as  adequate 
testimony  for  this  fact,  while  it  further  shows  the  gene 
rally  mild  and  beneficent  character  of  the  Lydian  rule. 
In  short,  Kroisos  seems  fully  to  have  seen  the  paramount 
need  of  Greek  aid.  He  entered  into  alliance  with  some 
of  the  cities  in  the  Egean  islands,  and  made  a  compact 
with  the  Spartans  from  which  he  looked  for  great  advan 
tages  ;  but  the  islanders  were  indifferent,  while  the  Spar 
tans  failed  him  in  the  hour  of  need,  and  thus  his  Hellenic 
subjects  passed  along  with  himself  into  the  hands  of  the 
Persian  conqueror.  Beyond  this  general  sketch  of  the 
struggle,  which  ended  in  the  overthrow  of  a  kingdom  far 
in  advance  of  any  other  Eastern  monarchies,  there  are 
few,  perhaps  no  details  which  we  can  add  with  any  feel 
ing  of  confidence  that  we  are  registering  historical  inci 
dents.  The  warning  which  at  the  outset  of  the  enter 
prise  he  is  said  to  have  received  against  attacking 


CH.  in.]       Growth  of  the  Persian  Empire.  43 

enemies  so  beggarly  as  the  Persians,  shows  how  far  the 
popular  versions  of  the  story  wandered  from  the  true  ac 
count  which  has  been  preserved  to  us  rather  in  hints  and 
incidental  statements  than  in  consecutive  narration.  It 
is  simply  ludicrous  to  suppose  that  any  one  would  have 
represented  to  Kroisos  that  in  a  contest  with  Persia  he 
had  nothing  to  gain  and  everything  to  lose.  The  con 
queror  of  Media  and  lord  of  Nineveh  could  not  without 
absurdity  be  described  as  a  ruler  of  a  poverty-stricken 
kingdom  ;  nor  without  even  greater  absurdity  could  the 
gods  be  thanked  as  not.  having  put  into  the  minds  of  the 
Persians  to  go  against  the  Lydians,  when  the  whole 
course  of  the  narrative  implies  that  the  one  absorbing 
dread  which  oppressed  Kroisos  was  the  fear  of  that  in 
satiable  spirit  of  aggression  which  marks  Asiatic  empires 
until  they  pass  from  robbery  to  laziness. 

In  the  life  of  this  man,  enlightened  no  doubt  and 
generous  for  his  age,  the  religious  feeling  of  a  later  gene 
ration  found  a  signal  illustration  of  the  sad 

j  .  Popular 

and  stern  lesson  that  man  abides  never  in      stories  of  the 
one  stay  and  that  he  is  born  to  trouble  as      iyfof8"" 
the  sparks  fly  upward.     It  saw  in  the  catas-      Kroisos- 
trophe  of  Sardeis    the  fall  of  a  righteous  king  and  a 
righteous  man,  and  on  this  issue  of  a  life  so  splendid 
framed  a  drama  singularly  pathetic  and  touching.     The 
heir  of  immense  wealth  and  master  of  a  stronghold  in 
vulnerable,  like  Achilleus,  except  at  one  point,  living  under 
the  brightest  of  skies  and  amid  the  most  beautiful  of 
earthly  scenes,  he  is  depicted  from  the  first  as  animated 
by  the  ambition  of  being  a  happy  man  and  by  the  con 
viction  that  he  had  really  attained  to  the  state  at  which 
he  aimed.     The  golden  sands  of  the  Paktolos,  or,  as 
others  said,  the  produce  of  his  gold  mines  at  Pergamos, 
speedily  filled  his  treasure-houses,  and  throughout  the 


44  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  in. 

world  the  fame  spread  that  Kroisos  was  the  wealthiest 
and  the  happiest  of  men.  Time  went  on  and  at  length 
in  the  great  Athenian  lawgiver  Solon  [we  must  note  here 
that  the  tale  extends  his  life  for  more  than  forty  years 
after  his  death]  he  found  one  on  whom  his  riches  and 
splendor  produced  no  .impression.  No  man,  said  the 
stranger,  can  be  rightly  called  happy  until  his  life  has 
been  happily  ended.  For  Kroisos  these  simple  words 
were  as  the  handwriting  on  the  wall  foreboding  the  coming 
catastrophe.  Thus  far  not  a  cloud  had  shadowed  the 
radiance  of  his  prosperity  except  the  dumbness  of  his 
younger  son  ;  but  this  evil  was  more  than  compensated 
by  the  beauty  and  vigor  of  Atys  the  brave  and  fair,  the 
pride  and  the  hope  of  his  life,  until  word  came  from  the 
divine  oracle  that  this  peerless  child  must  be  smitten  by 
a  spear  and  die.  In  vain  Kroisos  put  all  weapons  out  of 
the  lad's  reach,  and  wedded  him  to  a  maiden  whose  love 
might  turn  away  his  thoughts  from  any  tasks  involving 
the  least  danger.  A  suppliant  came  to  his  court  praying 
for  absolution  from  the  guilt  of  involuntary  homicide. 
Kroisos  welcomed  him  as  king,  and  as  priest  absolved 
him  from  his  sin :  and  when  other  folk  came  beseeching 
that  Atys  might  be  sent  to  hunt  and  slay  the  boar  which 
was  ravaging  their  land,  he  charged  the  suppliant,  whose 
very  name,  Adrastos,  carried  with  it  the  omen  of  inevit 
able  doom,  to  guard  his  son  from  harm.  But  the  god 
spake  of  no  other  spear  than  that  of  Adrastos ;  and  when 
the  exile  in  his  unutterable  agony  slew  himself  on  the 
tomb  of  Atys,  Kroisos  owned  that  the  instrument  of  the 
divine  will  is  not  to  be  condemned  for  a  result  over 
which  he  has  no  control.  Roused  from  his  long  and  bitter 
mourning  by  the  tidings  of  the  fall  of  his  brother-in-law 
Astyages,  he  resolved,  with  a  slowness  of  faith  not  easily 
explicable  after  the  verifying  of  the  prediction  which  fore- 


CH.  in.]       Growth  of  the  Persian  Empire.  45 

warned  him  of  the  death  of  Atys,  to  test  the  oracles  be 
fore  he  put  to  them  the  question  which  should  determine 
him  to  fight  out  the  quarrel  with  Cyrus  or  to  lay  it  aside. 
Two  only  stood  the  test ;  and  of  these  two  that  which 
satisfied  him  best  was  the  oracle  of  Delphoi,  from  which 
he  learnt  that  if  he  went  against  the  Persians  he  would 
destroy  a  great  power.  Not  yet  wholly  at  ease,  he  asked 
further  whether  his  empire  would  last  long,  and  received 
by  way  of  answer  a  warning  to  flee  and  tarry  not  when  a 
mule  should  be  king  of  the  Medes.  Fully  satisfied  that 
such  an  event  was  impossible,  he  crossed  the  Halys. 
The  engagement  which  followed  was  a  drawn  battle,  and 
Kroisos,  falling  back  on  Sardeis,  dismissed  his  army  with 
orders  to  join  his  standard  again  in  the  spring.  But 
Cyrus,  having  learnt  the  intentions  of  Kroisos,  timed  his 
march  so  as  to  reach  Sardeis  after  the  dispersion  of  his 
troops.  Trusting  to  the  tried  valor  of  his  Lydian  cav 
alry,  Kroisos  went  out  boldly  to  meet  him  :  but  Cyrus  had 
placed  his  camels  in  the  front  line,  and  the  Lydian 
horses  in  dismay  carried  their  riders  from  the  field. 
Kroisos  had  reigned  fourteen  years  ;  and  the  siege  which 
ensued  had  lasted  fourteen  days  when  an  accident  led  to 
the  capture  of  the  city,  and  Kroisos,  with  fourteen  other 
Lydians,  bound  in  chains,  was  placed  on  a  great  pile  of 
wood,  either  by  way  of  offering  to  the  gods  the  first-fruits 
of  victory  or  of  seeing  how  they  would  deal  with  a  man 
who  had  greatly  honored  them.  Then  to  Kroisos  in  his 
agony  came  back  the  words  which  Solon  had  spoken  to 
him  that  no  living  man  could  be  called  happy  ;  and  as 
he  thought  on  this,  he  sighed  and  after  a  long  silence 
thrice  called  out  the  name  of  Solon.  Hearing  this, 
Cyrus  bade  the  interpreters  ask  him  whom  he  called, 
and  after  much  pressing  received  for  answer  that  Solon 
had  thought  nothing  of  all  his  wealth  while  he  sojourned 


46  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  HI. 

with  him,  and  how  the  words  had  come  to  pass  which 
Solon  spake,  not  thinking  of  him  more  than  of  any  others 
who  fancy  that  they  are  happy.  Hearing  the  tale,  Cyrus 
remembered  that  he  too  was  but  a  man  land  that  he  was 
giving  to  the  flames  one  who  had  been  as  wealthy  as  him 
self;  but  his  order  to  take  Kroisos  down  from  the  pile 
came  too  late.  The  wood  had  been  already  kindled, 
and  the  flame  was  too  strong ;  but  Kroisos,  seeing  that 
the  mind  of  Cyrus  was  changed,  prayed  to  Phoibos 
Apollon  to  come  and  save  him,  if  ever  he  had  done 
aught  to  please  him  in  the  days  that  were  past.  Then 
suddenly  the  wind  rose,  and  clouds  gathered  where  none 
had  been  before,  and  there  burst  from  the  heaven  a 
great  storm  of  rain  which  put  out  the  blazing  fire.  So 
Cyrus  knew  that  Kroisos  was  a  good  man  and  that  the 
gods  loved  him  ;  and  when  Kroisos  came  down  from  the 
pile,  Cyrus  asked  him  ''Who  persuaded  thee  to  march 
into  my  land  and  to  become  my  enemy  rather  than  my 
friend?"  "  The  god  of  the  Greeks  urged  me  on,"  an 
swered  Kroisos,  "  for  no  man  is  so  senseless  as  of  his  own 
pleasure  to  choose  war  in  which  the  fathers  bury  their 
children  rather  than  peace  in  which  the  children  bury 
their  fathers."  Meanwhile  the  city  was  given  up  to  plun 
der,  and  Kroisos,  standing  by  the  side  of  Cyrus,  asked 
him  what  the  Persians  were  doing  down  below.  "  Surely," 
said  Cyrus,  "  they  are  plundering  thy  city  and  spoiling 
thy  people."  "  Nay,"  answered  Kroisos,  "  it  is  thy  wealth 
which  they  are  taking,  for  I  and  my  people  now  have 
nothing.  But  take  heed.  The  man  who  gets  most  of 
this  wealth  will  assuredly  rise  up  against  thee  ;  so  place 
thy  guards  at  all  the  gates  and  bid  them  take  all  the 
goods,  saying  that  a  tithe  must  first  be  paid  of  them  to 
Zeus."  Pleased  with  this  advice,  Cyrus  bade  Kroisos 
ask  him  a  favor,  and  the  captive  replied  by  praying  to 


CH.  in.]       Growth  of  the  Persian  Empire.  47 

be  allowed  to  send  his  fetters  to  the  god  of  the  Greeks 
and  to  ask  if  it  were  his  wont  to  cheat  those  who  had 
done  him  good.  So  the  messengers  of  Kroisos  put  his 
question  to  the  priestess  at  Delphoi,  and  listened  to  the 
stately  response.  "  Not  even  a  god,"  she  said,  "  can  es 
cape  the  lot  which  is  prepared  for  him,  and  Kroisos  in 
the  fifth  generation  has  suffered  for  the  sin  of  him  who 
at  the  bidding  of  a  woman  slew  his  lord  and  seized  his 
power.  Much  did  the  god  strive  that  the  evil  might  fall 
in  his  children's  days  and  not  on  Kroisos  himself;  but 
he  could  not  turn  the  Fates  aside.  For  three  years  he 
put  off  the  taking  of  Sardeis,  for  this  much  only  they 
granted  him ;  and  he  came  to  his  aid  when  the  flame 
had  grown  fierce  on  the  blazing  pile.  Yet  more,  he  is 
wrong  for  blaming  the  god  for  the  answer  that  if  he 
went  .against  the  Persians  he  would  destroy  a  great 
power,  for  he  should  then  have  asked  if  the  god  meant 
his  own  power  or  that  of  Cyrus.  Neither,  again,  would 
he  understand  what  the  god  spake  about  the  mule,  for 
Cyrus  himself  was  the  mule,  being  the  son  of  a  Median 
woman,  the  daughter  of  Astyages,  and  of  a  man  born  of 
the  meaner  race  of  the  Persians."  This  answer  the  Ly- 
dians  brought  back  to  Sardeis  :  and  Kroisos  knew  that 
the  god  was  guiltless  and  that  the  fault  was  all  his 
own. 

Thus    was  the  story   of  Kroisos  made  to    justify  the 
religious  philosophy  of  the  time.     The  all-absorbing  idea 

running  through  the  tale  is  that  of  a  corn- 
Sources  of 
pensation    which   takes   no   regard    of  the      the  popular 

personal   deserts   of  the   sufferer,  and   of  a      the  reign  of 
divine  jealousy   which   cannot   endure   the       Krois°s- 
sight  of  overmuch  happiness  in  a  mortal  man.     The  sin 
ner  may  go  down  to  his  grave  in  peace  ;  but  his  fifth  de 
scendant,  a  righteous  man  who  fears  the  gods,  is  to  pay 


48  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  in. 

the  penalty  of  his  iniquity.  It  is  a  doom  which  clearly 
does  not  affect  the  spiritual  character  of  the  man.  The 
prosperity  of  Gyges,  the  founder  of  his  dynasty,  and  the 
disaster  of  Kroisos  are  no  evidence  that  the  former  is 
approved,  and  the  latter  rejected,  by  the  righteous  Being 
whose  justice  runs  in  a  different  groove  from  that  of  the 
Fates.  To  Kroisos  the  catastrophe  brings  wisdom  and 
humility ;  he  is  the  better  and  purer  for  his  troubles. 
This  theological  purpose  must,  of  itself,  deprive  the 
story  of  its  historical  character.  The  artless  remark  of 
Herodotus  that  until  Kroisos  was  actually  taken  no  one 
had  paid  the  least  attention  to  the  plain  warning,  uttered 
five  generations  before,  that  the  fifth  from  Gyges  should 
atone  the  old  wrong,  proves  at  the  least  that  the  predic 
tion  grew  up  after  the  catastrophe  ;  and  the  fabrication 
of  one  prophecy  does  not  tend  to  establish  the  genuine 
ness  of  the  rest.  Nor  is  this  all.  Unless  when  a  literal 
acceptation  of  oracular  responses  is  needed  to  keep  up 
a  necessary  delusion,  the  recipients  of  these  answers 
take  it  for  granted  that  these  utterances  are,  or  are  likely 
to  be,  metaphorical  ;  and  to  Kroisos  himself  the  facts 
shrouded  under  the  guise  of  the  mule-king  were  better 
known  than  they  could  be  to  any  other.  The  Median 
sovereign  was  his  brother-in-law ;  and  the  very  matter 
which  had  stirred  his  wrath  was  that  Cyrus,  the  son  of 
the  Persian  Kambyses,  had  dethroned  his  grandfather 
and  thus  brought  Medes  and  Persians  under  one  sceptre. 
The  sequel  of  the  tale  Herodotus  admits  that  he  had  ob 
tained  from  Lydian  informants.  The  story  of  the  rescue 
of  Kroisos  from  the  flames  is  not  to  be  found  in  the 
Persian  chronicle  of  Ktesias.  No  Persian  could  repre 
sent  his  king  as  profaning  the  majesty  and  purity  of  fire 
Try  offerings  of  human  bodies  ;  and  the  one  fact  to  which 
tl?.e  whole  story  points  is  that  by  some  means  or  other 


CH.  in.]      Growth  of  the  Persian  Empire.  49 

the  great   Lydian  empire  was  absorbed  in  the  mightier 
monarchy'of  Persia. 

The  fall  of  Kroisos  was  followed,  it  is  said,  by  a  re 
quest  of  the  lonians  to  be  received  as  tributaries  of  Cy 
rus  on  the  same  terms  which  had  been  im 
posed  on  them  by  the  Lydian  king.  The  Al^ Minor 
petition  was  refused,  and  the  dread  of  op.  ^^fj*11 
pression  was  so  great  as  to  induce  many  of 
the  Ionian  cities  to  repair  their  fortifications  which  had 
been  breached  by  the  orders  of  Kroisos  and  to  send  to 
Sparta  a  pressing  entreaty  for  aid.  The  Spartans  would 
take  no  active  measures  on  their  behalf;  but  they  sent 
one  ship  to  ascertain  generally  the  state  of  affairs  in 
Ionia,  the  result  being  that  one  of  their  officers  named 
Lakrines  went  to  Sardeis  and  warned  Cyrus  that  any  at 
tempt  to  injure  an  Hellenic  city  would  provoke  the  anger 
of  the  Lakedaimonians.  To  this  warning  Cyrus  replied 
by  asking  who  the  Lakedaimonians  might  be ;  and  on 
hearing  some  account  of  them  he  added  that  he  had 
never  feared  men  who  set  apart  a  place  in  their  city 
where  they  came  together  to  buy,  sell,  and  cheat.  But 
Cyrus  himself  could  tarry  no  longer  in  the  West,  and  his 
deputies  were  left  to  complete  the  task  which  he  had  left 
unfinished.  This  result  was  for  a  time  hindered  by  the 
revolt  of  the  Lydian  Paktyas  who  had  been  -charged  to 
bring  to  Sousa  the  plundered  treasures  of  Sardeis,  then 
by  the  opposition  of  the  Karians,  and  lastly  by  the  ob 
stinate  resistance  of  the  Lykians,  who,  it  is  said,  slew  their 
wives  and  children,  and  then  rushing  out  on  the  enemy 
fought  till  not  a  man  of  them  remained  alive. 

But  while  these  isolated  states,  whose  civilization  was 
far  beyond  that  of  their  conquerors,  were      Expedition 
being  absorbed  in  the  vast  mass  of  Persian 
dominion,  that  dominion  was  being  extended 


50  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  in. 

to  the  east  and  south  by  Cyrus  himself,  who  swept  like 
a  whirlwind  over  all  Asia,  subduing,  as  the  historian  tells 
us,  every  nation  without  passing  over  one.  Of  the  de 
tails  of  these  conquests,  with  a  single  exception,  we 
know  nothing;  and  even  in  this  solitary  instance,  we 
can  assert  nothing  positively  beyond  the  fact  that  the 
sceptre  of  the  old  Babylonian  or  Assyrian  kings  was 
broken  by  the  despot  of  Persia.  But  as  the  historical 
scene  changes  from  Ionia  to  Babylon,  we  are  driven  to 
note  the  contrast  between  the  intense  individual  energy 
of  the  Hellenic  communities  with  their  lack  of  political 
combination  and  the  iron  system  of  Asiatic  centraliza 
tion,  which  could  accomplish  the  most  gigantic  tasks  by 
sheer  manual  labor,  the  multitude  as  a  political  machine 
being  everything,  the  individual  man  nothing.  Long 
before  the  Greeks,  and  the  tribes  akin  to  them,  had 
emerged  from  the  savage  exclusiveness  of  the  primitive 
family  life,  long  before  the  idea  of  the  Polis  or  City  or 
State  had  dawned  upon  their  minds,  the  Syrian  sover 
eigns  could  mass  and  move  myriads  at  their  will,  could 
raise  huge  cities,  and  rear  sumptuous  temples  for  a  reli 
gion  which  prescribed  to  each  man,  not  merely  the  rou 
tine  of  his  daily  life,  but  his  social  and  political  duties, 
and  for  a  creed  which  left  no  room  whatever,  for  the  in 
dependent 'exercise  of  thought  and  reason.  But  if 
Asiatic  civilization,  regarded  as  its  worst  enemy,  the 
temper  which,  without  a  single  secondary  motive,  or  the 
selfish  desire  of  maintaining  an  established  system, 
seeks  wisdom  from  the  study  of  things  as  they  are,  still 
in  turning  to  account  the  physical  resources  of  a  country 
it  has  not  seldom  achieved  a  splendid  success.  The 
plains  of  Bagdad  and  Mosul  are  now  a  dreary  and  deso 
late  waste :  but  these  arid  sands  were  thrice  in  the  year 
covered  with  a  waving  sea  of  corn,  in  the  days  when 


CH.  in.]      Growth  of  the  Persian  Empire.  51 

• 

Sennacherib  or  Nebuchadnezzar  ruled  at  Nineveh  or 
Babylon.  Pitiless  as  may  have  been  their  despotism, 
they  yet  knew  that  their  own  wealth  must  be  measured 
by  the  fertility  of  the  soil,  and  thus  they  took  care  that 
their  whole  country  should  be  parcelled  out  by  a  net 
work  of  canals,  the  largest  of  which  might  be  a  high 
road  for  ships  between  the  Euphrates  and  the  Tigris.  On 
the  soil  thus  quickened  the  grain  of  corn,  of  millet,  or 
of  sesame  was  multiplied,  as  the  more  cautious  said,  fifty 
or  an  hundredfold,  or,  as  Herodotus  believed,  in  years 
of  exceptional  abundance  even  three  hundred  fold. 
Scarcely  less  dazzling  than  this  picture  of  cereal  wealth, 
produced  in  a  land  where  rain  scarcely  ever  fell,  is  the 
description  which  Herodotus  gives  of  the  magnificence 
of  Babylon  :  and  he  saw  the  great  city  after  it  had  been 
given  up  to  plunder  by  Dareios,  and  robbed  of  its  cost 
liest  treasures  by  Xerxes.  The  coloring  of  his  sketch 
must  be  heightened  if  we  would  realize  the  grandeur  of 
that  royal  town  enclosed  amidst  exquisite  gardens,  sur 
rounded  by  walls  which  rose  to  a  height,  it  is  said,  of 
300  feet,  each  side  of  the  square  extending  to  1 5  English 
miles,  and  giving  the  means  of  egress  and  ingress  by 
five-and-twenty  brazen  gates.  Within  this  wall  rose  at 
some  distance  another,  less  huge,  but  still  very  strong; 
and  within  this  were  drawn  out  the  buildings  and  streets 
of  the  city  in  rectangular  blocks,  reaching  down  to  the 
wall  which  was  carried  from  one  end  of  the  town  to  the 
other  along  the  banks  of  the  river,  broken  only  by  the 
huge  brazen  gates,  which  at  the  end  of  each  street  gave 
access  to  the  water.  High  above  the  palaces  and  houses 
around  it,  towered  the  mighty  temple  of  Bel,  story  above 
story,  to  a  height,  it  is  said,  of  600  feet,  from  a  base  ex 
tending  over  more  than  1,200  feet  on  each  side,  while 
the  stream  was  spanned  by  a  bridge,  the  several  portions 


52  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  III. 

of  which  were  drawn  aside  at  night,  but  which  was  used 
during  the  day  by  those  who  did  not  care  to  enter  the 
ferry-boats  stationed  at  each  landing-place  along  the 
river  walls. 

This  mighty  city  was  surprised  and  taken  by  Cyrus, — 

how,  we  cannot  venture  positively  to  say.  For  a  year  his 

coming  was  delayed,  we  are  told,  by  the 

Siege  and  ..  .  .         .  . 

fail  of  Baby-  grave  duty  of  avenging  on  the  river  Gyndes 
the  insult  which  it  had  offered  to  one  of  the 
sacred  white  horses.  This  stream  which  joins  the  Tigris 
near  the  modern  Bagdad  had  dared  to  drown  the  animal 
which  had  plunged  into  it,  and  the  fiat  of  the  king  went 
forth  that  the  river  should  be  so  lowered  by  the  disper 
sion  of  its  waters  through  a  hundred  canals,  that  women 
should  henceforth  cross  it  without  wetting  their  knees. 
This  seeming  freak  has  been  ascribed  to  a  wise  and  deli 
berate  design  by  way  of  preparing  his  army  for  the  more 
momentous  task  of  diverting  the  Euphrates  as  the  means 
for  surprising  Babylon.  But  it  may  well  be  asked  how 
Cyrus  could  know,  a  year  before,  that  he.  would  have 
either  the  need  or  the  opportunity  of  putting  this  plan 
into  action,  or  why  with  his  unbounded  command  of 
labor,  insuring  the  same  results  at  one  time  as  at  an 
other,  he  should  find  it  necessary  thus  to  rehearse  the 
most  troublesome  scene  in  the  coming  drama.  The 
story  runs  that  Cyrus  had  made  his  preparations  for  lay 
ing  bare  the  bed  of  the  Euphrates  while  the  inhabitants 
of  Babylon  remained  wholly  ignorant  of  all  that  was 
going  on,  and  that  his  men  marching  along  the  bed  of 
the  stream  entered  the  town  and  took  possession  of  it 
during  a  time  of  festival  when  the  people  had  relaxed  the 
vigilance  needed  in  the  presence  or  neighborhood  of  a 
watchful  enemy.  But  the  whole  design  assumes  that  the 
feast  would  be  accompanied  by  the  incredible  careless- 


CH.  in.]      Growth  of  the  Persian  Empire.  53 

ness  of  not  merely  withdrawing  all  the  guards  (a  few 
would  have  sufficed  for  the  discomfiture  of  the  Persians) 
from  the  river  walls,  but  of  leaving  open  all  the  gates  in 
these  walls,  — a  carelessness  moreover  which  made  the 
whole  task  of  canal-digging  for  the  purpose  of  diverting 
the  Euphrates  a  superfluous  ceremony,  for,  the  gates 
being  open  and  the  guards  withdrawn,  boats  would  have 
furnished  means  of  access  for  the  assailants  far  more 
easy,  rapid,  and  sure,  than  the  oozy  bed  of  an  alluvial 
stream  which,  if  the  slightest  alarm  had  been  given,  must 
have  insured  the  destruction  of  the  whole  army.  Indeed, 
it  is  perfectly  possible  that  boats  may  have  been  the 
means  employed,  and  that  thus,  whatever  struggle  there 
may  have  been  at  the  gates,  the  Persians  would  not  be 
in  the  helpless  plight  which  would  have  left  them  at  the 
mercy  of  the  enemy  as  they  plunged  through  the  slime 
of  the  river-bed.  If  by  boats  or  in  any  other  way  the 
Persians  contrived  to  effect  an  entrance  through  the  open 
river-gates,  the  tale  might  very  soon  run  that  Cyrus  had 
outdone  all  former  exploits,  and  made  the  bed  of  the 
Euphrates  a  highway  for  his  troops. 

So  fell  the  ancient  and  mighty  city.     It  was  treated 
much  like  the  Hellenic  cities  of  Asia  Minor.     Its  walls, 
it  is  said,  were  breached  and  a  tribute  was         Death  of 
imposed ;  but  it  underwent  no  spoliation,  and      S^slon  of 
the  population  remained  probably   undis-      Egypt  by 
turbed.  From  Babylon  the  thirst  of  conquest 
led  Cyrus,  according  to  Herodotus,  against  the  hordes 
which  wandered  through  the  lands  to  the  east  of  the 
Araxes :  in  the  picture  of  Xenophon,  Cyrus  dies  peace 
fully  in  his  bed.     In  the  former  story  the  savage  queen 
Tomyris,  whom  he  sought  in  marriage,  defied  the  man 
who  desired  not  herself  but  her  kingdom,  and  fulfilled 
her  promise  of  satisfying  his  lust  for  slaughter  by  thrust- 


54  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  in. 

ing  his  severed  head  into  a  skin  filled  with  human  blood. 
But  if  the  career  of  Cyrus  ended  with  defeat,  the  impulse 
which  his  energy  had  given  to  the  Persian  tribes  re 
mained  as  strong  as  ever.  For  them  freedom,  as  they 
called  it,  meant  immunity  from  taxation  in  time  of  peace 
and  unbounded  plunder  in  time  of  war.  The  motive 
thus  supplied  would  account  for  the  invasion  of  Egypt  as 
readily  as  for  the  campaigns  in  Lydia  and  Babylonia. 
The  stories  which  ascribed  the  enterprise  to  personal 
affronts  offered  to  Kambyses  who  had  succeeded  to  his 
father  Cyrus  are  scarcely  worth  notice;  but  another 
cause  has  been  assigned  for  it  which  is  more  consonant 
with  the  ancient  majesty  of  the  lords  of  the  Nile.  Egyp 
tian  tradition  delighted  to  tell  of  an  invincible  king  who 
led  his  army  of  700,000  men  from  the  walls  of  Thebes, 
and,  during  nine  years  unclouded  by  a  single  disaster, 
made  himself  master  of  an  empire  extending  from  the 
cataracts  of  Sy6n6  to  Bokhara,  and  from  the  Indus  to 
the  Egean  Sea.  It  also  loved  to  tell  of  the  merciless 
fury  of  his  warfare  as  his  armies  harried  the  vast  regions 
of  Ethiopia  and  Libya,  of  Media  and  Persia,  of  Baktria 
and  Scythia.  The  memory  of  such  tremendous  massacres 
might  well  set  the  hearts  of  nations  on  fire  for  many  a 
generation,  and  arouse  in  Cyrus,  or  any  other  king,  an 
insatiable  craving  for  revenge.  But  Persian  tradition 
knew  nothing  of  this  great  Egyptian  inroad ;  and  the 
traditions  of  Egypt  are  in  like  manner  silent  on  those 
conquests  of  Semiramis  which  Assyrian  legend  extended 
over  the  valley  of  the  Nile. 

But   the  true  interest   and   significance  of  Egyptian 

history  may  happily  be  disconnected  from  the  fortunes 

and  the  exploits  of  its  individual  kings.  What  - 

tion  of  ever  be  the  sequence  of  its  dynasties,  one 

fact  remains  unshrouded  by  the  mists  which 


CH.  in.]      Growth  of  the  Persian  Empire.  55 

float  about  its  traditional  chronicles.  Long  before  the 
first  feeble  notions  of  a  settled  order  were  awakened 
among  the  Aryan  tribes  of  the  West,  long  even  before 
Mesopotamian  civilization  showed  its  ungainly  propor 
tions,  the  inhabitants  of  the  valley  of  the  Nile  presented 
in  their  wealth  and  organization,  in  their  art  and  science, 
a  marvelous  sight  which,  more  than  the  vastness  of 
Babylon,  excited  in  after  ages  the  astonishment  of  Hero 
dotus.  This  wonderful  exuberance  of  life,  at  a  time 
when  every  other  land  was  sunk  in  barbarism,  was  the 
result  of  the  fertility  of  the  Nile  valley ;  and  the  Nile 
valley  was  the  creation  of  the  great  river  which  first 
scooped  out  its  channel  and  then  yearly  filled  it  up 
with  mud.  The  low  limestone  hills,  which  serve  as  a 
boundary  to  the  narrow  strip  of  luxurious  vegetation  on 
either  side  of  the  stream,  mark  the  course  of  the  river 
as  it  has  been  thrust  hither  and  thither  in  its  path  accord 
ing  to  the  strength  of  the  material  with  which  it  came 
into  conflict.  Where  this  material  was  soft,  its  channel 
is  wide :  where  it  presented  a  less  yielding  front,  the 
stream  narrows,  until  in  the  granite  districts  of  Assouan 
it  forces  its  way  through  the  rock  by  plunging  down  a 
cataract.  In  all  likelihood  these  falls  which  the  traveler 
now  faces  in  the  upper  part  of  its  course  have  receded 
gradually  southward  from  Cairo  :  and  thus  the  Nile  has 
only  been  beforehand  in  the  process  which  is  now  slowly 
but  surely  eating  away  the  ledge  of  rock  which  forms 
the  barrier  of  Niagara.  These  cliffs,  it  is  true,  are  now 
far  above  the  level  of  the  stream ;  but  the  markings  which 
Egyptian  kings  have  left  at  Semneh  in  Nubia  show  that 
at  a  time  long  preceding  the  visit  of  Herodotus  to  Egypt 
the  river  rose  to  a  height  exceeding  by  24  feet  that 
which  it  ever  reaches  now,  while  the  deserted  bed  of  a 
still  earlier  age  proves  that  the  inundation  rose  at  least 


56  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  in. 

27  feet  above  its  highest  mark  at  the  present  day. 
Hence  it  may  be  said  with  literal  truth  that  Egypt  is  the 
creation  of- the  Nile.  Throughout  its  long  journey  of 
more  than  1,000  miles  after  entering  the  region  of  the 
cataracts,  this  mysterious  stream,  receiving  not  a  single 
affluent,  lavishes  its  wealth  on  the  right  hand  and  on  the 
left,  not  only  affording  to  the  people  of  each  spot  an  easy 
and  sure  maintenance  which  called  for  the  use  of  neither 
spade  nor  plough  nor  any  nourishment  beyond  that  of 
its  life-giving  waters,  but  furnishing  the  materials  for  an 
active  commerce  by  the  difference  of  its  products  in  the 
northern  and  southern  portions  of  its  course,  and  by  the 
long  prevalence  of  northerly  winds  which  enable  vessels 
to  overcome  the  force  of  the  descending  current.  All 
this  it  did,  and  even  more.  The  ease  and  rapidity  with 
which  the  crops  were  sown  and  the  harvest  gathered 
insured  to  the  people  an  amount  of  leisure  which  to  the 
barbarians  of  Europe  toiling  for  bare  subsistence  was  an 
unknown  luxury.  It  is  no  wonder,  therefore,  that  the  in 
habitants  of  the  Nile  valley  should  have  grown  into  a 
well-ordered  state  while  even  the  beautiful  banks  of  the 
Hermos  and  the  Maiaridros  (Meander)  were  still  a  soli 
tude  or  peopled  only  by  rude  and  isolated  tribes.  But 
more  than  this,  the  river  which  gave  them  wealth 
guarded  them  against  their  enemies.  The  strip  of 
verdure  which  marks  its  course  stretches  to  no  greater 
width  than  two  miles  and  a  half  on  either  side :  and  this 
happy  region  is  shut  in  by  arid  deserts  in  which  an 
abundance  of  nitre  would  render  all  rain  water,  if  any 
fell  there,  unfit  for  drinking. 

But  if  the  river  insured  the  rapid  development  of  the 
people  who  might  dwell  on  its  banks,  it  also  determined 
Character  of  ^  character  of  their  civilization.  Allow- 
the  Egyp-  ance  being  made  for  some  variation  of 

tian  people. 


CH.  in.]       Growth  of  the  Persian  Empire.  57 

climate  in  its    long  course,    the    physical    conditions 
of  their  existence   were    throughout    much   the   same. 
Everywhere    there    was    the    river    with    its.    nourish 
ing  stream,  and  the  strip  of  verdure  which  was  literally 
its  child.     Everywhere  were  the  low  hills  girding  in  this 
garden  and  marking  off  the  boundless  burning  desert, 
and  over  all  by  day  and  by  night  hung  the  blue  unclouded 
sky,  across  which  the  sun  journeyed  in  his  solitary  chariot, 
to  be  followed  by  his  bride  the  moon,  with  the  stars,  her 
innumerable  sisters  or  children.     When  to  this  we  add 
that  from  one  end  of  the  land  to  the  other  there  was  no 
stronghold  where  a  discontented  or  rebellious  chief  might 
defy  the  king  of  the  people,  and  no  spot  which  gave  ac 
cess  to  an  invader  across  the  fiery  barrier  to  the  east  or 
the  west,  we  have  a  series  of  conditions  which  must  pro 
duce  a  great  people,  but  which  will  keep  all  on  a  dead 
level  of  submission  to  the  one  governing  power.     But 
this  people,  so  shut  off  from  all  other  nations  and  thus 
rising  into  an  astonishingly  early  greatness,  exhibited 
few,  if  any  points  of  resemblance  to  the  tribes  of  the  vast 
continent  in  which  their  river  ran.     In  color  less  dark 
than  the  Arab,  in  features  little  resembling  any  Semitic 
tribe  and  displaying  often  a  strange  resemblance  to  the 
Greek,  in  habit  utterly  opposed  to  the  roving  Bedouin, 
the  Egyptians  embellished  their  life  with  arts  which  no 
negro  tribe  has  ever  known.     They  were  spinners  and 
weavers,  potters  and  workers  in  metals,  painters  and 
sculptors.     Their  social  order  harmonized  in  its  system 
of  castes  with  that  of  India,  and,  it  may  very  safely  be 
added,  with  that  of  the  Greek  and  Latin  tribes  ;  and  their 
castes  were  united  in  a  firm  and  centralized  polity  in 
which  the  king  ruled  conjointly  with,  if  not  in  submission 
to,  the  priestly  order  which  surrounded  his  life  and  that 
of  the  people  with  a  multitude  of  ceremonial  rules  invested 


58  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  HI. 

with  an  appalling  power  by  the  terrors  of  an  unseen 
world.  The  manifest  imperfection  of  man  in  the  present 
life,  the  palpable  injustice  which  it  is  impossible  for  any 
system  of  human  laws  at  all  times  to  avoid,  the  conscious 
ness  of  powers  which  here  have  but  small  and  fitful 
scope,  the  impulses  of  affection  which  here  seem  to  be 
called  into  being  only  to  be  chilled  and  crushed,  the 
tyranny  of  a  ruling  order  which  demanded  the  toil  and 
slavery  of  the  many  for  the  idle  luxury  of  the  few, — all 
these  were  things  which  could  not  fail  to  impress  them 
selves  with  singular  force  upon  the  Egyptian  mind,  and 
in  this  impression  to  furnish  a  basis  on  which  a  vigorous 
priestly  order  might  found  an  ascendency  at  once  over 
the  people  and  over  their  rulers.  It  is  impossible  to  look 
at  the  art  and  the  literature  of  ancient  Egypt,  as  they 
have  come  down  to  us,  without  seeing  that,  whatever 
might  be  the  outward  splendor  of  the  land,  the  power 
and  luxury  of  the  nobles,  or  the  general  comfort  of  the 
people,  the  mind  of  the  Egyptians  turned  naturally  and 
dwelt  most  constantly  on  the  land  which  lies  beyond  the 
grave.  Sins  and  offences  which  lay  beyond  the  reach  of 
human  law  were  not  therefore  beyond  the  reach  of 
punishment.  The  Greek  tribunal  of  Minos,  Rhadaman- 
thys,  and  Aiakos  was  seen  in  that  august  assembly  be 
fore  which  every  Egyptian  from  the  Pharaoh  to  the 
meanest  slave  must  appear  for  the  great  scrutiny.  This 
belief  exhibited  itself  in  the  magnificent  temples  which 
mark  the  Egyptians  pre-eminently  among  all  other 
ancient  nations. 

To  the  Greeks  this  country  with  its  ancient  and  mys 
terious  civilization  remained,  it  is  said,  altogether  un 
known  down  to  a  time  preceding  the  battle  of  Marathon 
n  .  f  by  about  180  years.  At  that  time,  we  are 

Opening  oi  J  J 

Egypt  to  the      told,  Egypt  was  divided  among  twelve  kings 


CH.  in.]      Growth  of  the  Persian  Empire.  59' 

who  had  been  warned  that  the  man  who  should 
offer  a  libation  out  of  a  brazen  vessel  in  the  temple 
of  the  God  of  Fire  would  become  lord  of  the  whole  land. 
This  prophecy  was  fulfilled  when  the  priest  brought 
eleven  golden  vessels  only  for  the  use  of  kings  at  the 
sacrifice,  and  Psammitichos,  one  of  the  twelve,  made  his 
brazen  helmet  serve  the  purpose  of  the  ewer.  The 
eleven  in  panic  terror  drove  him  away  :  and  the  banished 
prince,  as  he  lurked  in  the  marshes,  learnt  from  an  oracle 
that  aid  would  come  to  him  from  brazen  men.  Such 
men,  the  tidings  soon  came,  were  ravaging  the  coasts  of 
the  Delta.  They  were  Ionian  and  Karian  marauders, 
whose  help  by  dint  of  large  promises  he  succeeded  in 
securing  and  through  whom  he  became  master  of  all 
Egypt.  These  mercenaries  Psammitichos  placed  as  a 
kind  of  standing  army  in  places  called  the  Camps  near 
Boubastis,  while  it  is  also  said  that  in  his  reign  a  fleet  of 
Milesians  took  possession  of  a  harbor  on  the  eastern 
shore  of  the  Kanopic  mouth  of  the  Nile,  and  there  built 
the  city  of  Naukratis,  which  became  the  great  seat  of 
trade  between  Egypt  and  Europe. 

Four  sovereigns  come  between  this  successful  leader 
and  the  luckless  Psammenitos  in  whose  reign  Egypt  was 
swallowed  up  in  the  vast  dominion  of  Persia. 
Psammitichos  himself  had  to  spend,  it  is 
said,  nearly  thirty  years  in  the  siege  of 
Azotos  or  Ashdod,  and  his  presence  there 
was  so  far  fortunate  that  it  enabled  him  to  arrest  the 
march  of  the  Scythian  hordes  which  would  otherwise 
have  found  their  way  into  Egypt.  His  son  Nekos,  the 
Pharaoh  Necho  of  the  Jewish  historians,  had  to  contend 
with  more  formidable  enemies  for  the  possession  of 
Judaea  and  Phenicia.  The  Median  king  Kyaxares  had, 
it  is  said,  taken  the  city  of  Nineveh,  while  the  Babylonian 


60  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  in. 

sovereign,  Nebuchadnezzar,  claimed  the  submission  of  all 
the  lands  lying  to  the  north  of  the  desert  of  Sinai.  The 
campaign  of  Nekos  in  Palestine  was  at  the 
outset  successful.  Josiah,  the  Jewish  king, 
fell  at  Magdolon  (Megiddo)  ;  and  Jerusalem,  known  to 
Herodotus  as  Kadytis  (it  still  bears  the  name  El 
Khoddes),  became  the  prize  of  the  conqueror.  But  the 
fruits  of  his  victory  were  lost,  when  he  encountered 
Nebuchadnezzar  on  the  field  of  Kirkesion  (Carchemish). 
From  his  son  after  a  short  and  uneventful  reign  the  sceptre 
passed  to  Apries,  the  last  of  the  line  of  Psammitichos. 
An  expedition  of  Apries,  the  Hophrah  of  the  Jewish 
Books  of  Kings,  against  the  Greek  colonies  of  Barke  and 
Kyrene,  ended  in  a  failure  which  led  the  men  of  the 
Egyptian  military  caste  to  suspect  that  he  had  purposely 
led  them  into  disaster  in  order  to  establish  his  own  power 
by  the  diminution  of  their  numbers.  The  suspicion  led 
to  their  revolt  under  Amasis,  who  became  king  in  spite 
of  the  efforts  of  the  Greek  mercenaries  on  behalf  of 
Apries.  The  four-and-forty  years  of  the  reign  of  Amasis 
were  for  Egypt  a  breathing-time  of  comparative  tran- 
quility  before  the  storms  of  Persian  invasion  and  con 
quest.  For  the  Greek  settlers  in  the  Delta  it  was  a  period 
of  great  prosperity.  Their  settlement  of  Naukratis  re 
ceived  the  privilege  of  a  stringent  monopoly.  Foreign 
merchants,  arriving  at  any  other  mouth  of  the  Nile,  were 
compelled  to  swear  that  they  had  been  driven  thither 
by  stress  of  weather  and  to  depart  at  once  for  the  Kan- 
opic  mouth,  or  in  default  of  this  their  goods  were  sent  to 
Naukratis  by  one  of  the  inland  canals.  The  leanings  of 
Amasis  towards  the  Greeks  were  still  further  shown  by 
his  marriage  with  a  Greek  woman,  and  by  his  alliance 
with  Polykrates  the  despot  of  Samos. 

This  ancient  kingdom  with  its  wonderful  cities  and  its 


CH.  in.]      Growth  of  the  Persian  Empire.  61 

teeming  soil  was  now  in  its  turn  to  become  a  prey  to 
Persian  conquerors.     Had  Amasis  lived,  the    - 

A  Conquest  of 

struggle  might  have  been  prolonged,  and  Egypt  by  the 
the  results  might  have  been  different ;  but  * 
he  died  a  few  months  before  the  invasion,  and  his  son 
Psammenitos  seems  to  have  inherited  neither  his  wis 
dom  nor  his  vigor.  The  army  of  Kambyses,  the  son 
of  Cyrus,  marched  across  the  desert  which  protects 
Egypt  from  the  north-east,  while  his  fleet,  supplied  by 
the  Phenician  cities  and  the  Greeks  of  Asia  Minor, 
blockaded  the  Egyptian  king  in  Memphis.  A  herald 
sent  in  a  Greek  vessel  demanded  the  surrender  of  the 
city.  By  way  of  reply  the  Egyptians  seized  the  ship  and 
tore  the  crew  to  pieces  ;  and  the  first  fuel  was  thus  sup 
plied  for  the  great  conflagration  which  was  to  follow. 
The  capture  of  Memphis  after  an  obstinate  resistance  led 
to  the  submission  of  the  Lybian  tribes  and  also  of  the 
Greek  colonies  which  Apries  had  vainly  sought  to  sub 
jugate. 

Thus  had  Kambyses  carried  to  its  utmost  bounds  the 
Persian  empire,  as  it  was  conceived  by  the  Greek  his 
torian  Herodotus.  The  Persian  King  was  , 

,,,-,,,  .  ,.  Failure  of  the 

lord  of  all  the  nations  from  Baktna  to  the  expeditions  m- 
Nile,  and  he  must  now  pay  the  penalty  for  ^d  thePia 
overweening  wealth  and  grandeur  which  desert- 
had  been  already  inflicted  on  Kroisos.  The  Egyptians 
would  have  it  that  he  was  smitten  by  a  divinely  sent 
madness ;  the  facts  related  seem  rather  to  point  to  a 
scheme  carefully  laid  and  deliberately  carried  out.  The 
first  symptoms  of  the  disease  were  shown,  as  they  thought, 
in  the  insults  heaped  on  the  memory  of  Amasis,  and  in 
the  infatuation  which  led  him  from  Thebes  to  march 
against  the  Ethiopians  and  to  send  an  army  of  56,000 
men  to  destroy  the  shrine  of  Amoun  (Zeus  Ammon)  in 


62  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  ill. 

the  desert.  Scarcely  more  than  a  fifth  part  of  his  march 
was  to  be  accomplished  towards  the  land  of  that  mys 
terious  people,  who  lay  far  beyond  the  Nile  cataracts. 
His  men  thought  that  they  were  going  to  a  region  where 
the  earth  daily  produced  like  the  wonderful  napkins 
and  pitchers  of  our  popular  stories,  inexhaustible  ban 
quets  of  luscious  and  ready-cooked  meats.  But  before 
they  could  cross  the  zone  of  burning  sand  which  lay  be 
tween  them  and  those  luxurious  feasts,  the  failure  even 
of  grass  for  food  drove  them  to  decimate  themselves  ; 
and  this  outbreak  of  cannibalism  warned  Kambyses  that 
some  tasks  were  too  hard  even  for  the  Great  King.  Pro 
bably  before  he  could  reach  Memphis,  he  had  heard  of 
another  disaster.  The  men  whom,  perhaps  in  his  zeal 
for  Zoroastrian  monotheism,  he  had  sent  to  destroy  the 
temple  of  Amoun,  were  traced  as  far  as  the  city  of  Oasis  ; 
but  from  the  day  on  which  they  left  it,  not  one  was  ever 
seen  again.  The  guardians  of  the  shrine  asserted  (and 
the  guess  was  in  all  likelihood  right)  that  they  had  been 
overwhelmed  by  a  dust  storm  and  their  bodies  buried 
beneath  the  pillars  of  fiery  sand. 

A  third  enterprise  by  which  Kambyses  proposed  to 
extend  his  empire  as  far  as  the  Tyrian  colony  of  Carthage 
Failure  of  was  frustrated  bv  the  refusal  of  the  Phenician 
Ae  proposed  sailors  to  serve  against  their  kinsfolk.  With 
against'  Babylon  Tyre  which  had  been  conquered 

Carthage.  by  Nebuchadnezzar  had  come  under  the 
Persian  yoke ;  but  Kambyses  felt  perhaps  that  he  could 
not  afford  to  quarrel  with  men  who  had  practically  the 
whole  carrying  trade  of  the  Mediterranean  in  their  hands, 
and  whose  treachery  on  the  distant  shores  of  Africa 
might  involve  worse  disasters  than  any  which  had  thus 
far  befallen  his  own  arms  or  those  of  his  father.  Like 
the  Egyptians,  the  inhabitants  of  the  great  Phenician 


CH.  in.]      Growth  of  the  Persian  Empire.  63 

cities  on  the  eastern  costs  of  the  Mediterranean  had  ac 
quired  a  reputation  which  carries  their  greatness  back 
to  ages  long  preceding  the  dawn  of  any  history.  So 
soon  as  we  have  any  knowledge  of  Europe  at  all,  we 
find  the  Phenicians  prominent  as  the  navigators  of  the 
great  inland  sea.  From  the  earliest  times  in  which  we 
hear  of  them  they  inhabit  the  strip  of  land  which,  no 
where  more  than  20  miles  in  breadth,  lies  between  mount 
Lebanon  and  the  sea  for  a  distance  stretching  not  more 
than  120  miles  northwards  from  the  Bay  of  Carmel.  At 
the  extreme  north  and  south,  on  two  small  islands,  lay 
Arados  and  the  great  city  of  Tyre.  Between  these  came 
Sidon  nearest  to  Tyre  on  the  South,  then  Berytos  (Bey- 
rout)  and  Byblos,  with  Tripolis  which  served  as  a 
centre  for  the  confederation.  The  disposition  of  this 
town  was  a  singular  proof  of  the  isolating  or  centrifugal 
tendencies  which  marked  these  great  mercantile  states 
not  less  than  the  Greek  cities.  It  was  divided  into  three 
distinct  portions,  separated  from  each  other  by  the  space 
of  a  furlong,  set  apart  severally  for  the  three  cities  of 
Tyre,  Sidpn,  and  Arados.  The  singular  energy  of  the 
individual  communities,  as  contrasted  with  their  scanty 
power  of  combination,  is  in  close  accordance  with  the 
Hellenic  character;  and  in  fact  the  Greek  and  Phenician 
tribes,  whatever  may  have  been  the  moral  or  religious 
influence  exercised  by  the  latter  on  the  former,  come 
mainly  before  us  as  powers  which  check  each  other  in  the 
most  important  stages  of  their  development.  But  the 
Phenicians  had  always  been  foremost  in  the  race ;  and 
while  the  most  daring  of  the  Greeks  scarcely  ventured 
further  westward  than  Massalia  (Marseilles)  and  the 
Corsican  Alalia,  Phenician  colonies,  like  Gades  (Cadiz), 
had  risen  to  eminence  on  the  shores  of  the  mysterious 
Atlantic  Ocean  beyond  the  Pillars  of  Herakles. 


64  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  ill. 

The  refusal  of  these  hardy  mariners  to  serve  against 
Carthage,  secured  the  freedom  of  the  great  city  which 
The  last  days  under  Hannibal  was  to  contend  with  Rome 
of  Kambyses.  for  t^e  dominion  of  the  world ;  but  in  Kam- 
byses  this  disregard  of  his  wishes,  following  on  the  dis 
asters  which  had  befallen  his  army,  stirred  up,  we  are 
told,  the  tiger-like  temper  which  must  slake  its  rage  in 
blood.  The  opportunity  was  supplied  by  the  jubilant 
cries  which  reached  the  ears  of  Kambyses  on  his  return 
to  Memphis.  The  people  were  shouting  because  they 
had  found  the  calf  in  whom  they  worshipped  the  incar 
nation  of  the  god  Apis ;  but  the  tyrant  would  have  it  that 
they  were  making  merry  over  his  calamities.  In  vain 
the  natives  whom  he  had  left  to  govern  Memphis  strove 
to  explain  the  real  cause  of  the  rejoicing;  they  were  all 
put  to  death.  The  priests,  who  were  next  summoned, 
gave  the  same  explanation ;  and  Kambyses  said  he 
would  see  this  tame  god  who  had  come  among  them. 
The  beast  was  brought,  and  Kambyses,  drawing  his  dag 
ger,  wounded  him  on  the  thigh.  "  Ye  fools,  these  are 
your  gods,"  he  cried,  "  things  of  flesh  and  blood  which 
may  be  hurt  by  men.  The  god  and  his  worshippers  are 
well-matched  ;  but  you  shall  smart  for  raising  a  laugh 
against  me."  So  the  priests  were  scourged;  an  order 
was  issued  that  every  one  found  in  holiday  guise,  should 
forthwith  be  slain  ;  and  the  feast  was  broken  up  in  ter 
ror.  The  calf-god  pined  away  and  died  in  the  temple, 
and  the  priests  buried  it  secretly  with  the  wonted  rites. 
From  this  time  the  madness  of  Kambyses,  so  the  Egyp 
tians  said,  became  frenzy ;  but  it  is  possible  that  his  mad 
ness  may  not  have  lacked  method,  and  that  these  insults 
to  Apis  and  his  worshippers,  were  only  part  of  a  delibe 
rate  plan  for  crushing  the  spirit  of  the  conquered  nation. 
It  is  to  this  period  that  Herodotus  assigns  the  murder  of 


CH.  in.]      Growth  of  the  Persian  Empire.  65 

his  brother  Smerdis,  whom  Kambyses,  in  a  dream  had 
seen  sitting  on  a  throne,  while  his  head  touched  the 
heaven.  Putting  on  this  dream  the  only  interpretation 
which  would  suggest  itself  to  a  despot,  Kambyses  at 
once  sent  off  an  officer  named  Prexaspes,  with  orders  to 
slay  the  prince.  But  his  army  on  its  homeward  march 
had  not  advanced  beyond  the  Syrian  village  of  Agba- 
tana,  when  a  herald,  coming  from  Sousa,  bade  all  per 
sons  to  own  as  their  king,  not  Kambyses,  but  his  brother 
Smerdis.  Prexaspes  on  being  questioned,  swore  that  he 
had  slain  and  buried  the  prince  with  his  hands ;  and 
the  despot,  now  seeing  that  the  dream  had  showed  him 
another  Smerdis,  wept  for  his  brother  whom  he  had  so 
uselessly  doomed  to  death.  Then  bidding  his  people 
march  on  at  once  against  the  usurper,  he  leaped  on  his 
horse ;  but  the  sword  from  which  the  sheath  had  acci 
dentally  fallen  off,  gashed  his  thigh,  the  part  where  he 
had  wounded  the  calf-god.  Then  asking  the  name  of 
the  place,  he  learnt  that  he  was  at  Agbatana:  and  at 
Agbatana  the  oracle  of  Bouto  had  declared  that  he  was 
to  die.  Thus  far  he  had  indulged  therefore  in  pleasant 
dreams  of  an  old  age  spent  among  the  Median  hills; 
but  he  knew  now  that  the  Syrian  village  was  to  be  the 
limit  of  his  course.  His  remaining  days  or  hours  were 
spent  in  bewailing  his  evil  deeds  to  his  courtiers,  and  in 
exhorting  them  to  stand  out  bravely  against  the  usurper 
who  intended  to  transfer  to  the  Medes  the  supremacy  of 
the  Persians.  His  words  were  not  much  heeded,  for 
Prexaspes  now  swore  as  stoutly  that  he  had  never 
harmed  Smerdis,  as  he  had  to  Kambyses  declared  that 
he  had  buried  him  with  his  own  hands;  and  thus  the 
Magian  Smerdis  became  king  of  the  Persians.  But  his 
reign  was  to  be  soon  cut  short.  The  usurper,  who  had 
had  his  ears  cut  off,  was  discovered  to  be  an  impostor  by 
F 


66  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  in. 

the  daughter  of  Otanes,  who  passed  her  hands  over  his 
head  as  he  slept;  and  her  father  taking  ^six  other  Persian 
nobles,  Dareios,  the  son  of  Hystaspes  being  the  last, 
into  his  counsels,  first  devised  a  plan  for  slaying  the 
usurper  and  his  followers,  and  after  their  massacre,  held 
a  second  counsel,  to  determine  the  form  of  government 
which  it  would  be  wise  to  set  up.  Otanes  proposed  a 
republic  as  the  only  mode  of  securing  responsible  rulers ; 
Megabyzos  recommended  an  oligarchy,  on  the  ground 
that  the  insolence  of  the  mob  is  as  hateful  as  that  of  any 
despot,  while  Dareios,  arguing  that  no  system  can  be 
so  good  as  that  of  monarchy  if  the  ruler  be  perfect  as  he 
ought  to  be,  insisted  that  the  customs  of  the  Persians 
should  not  be  changed.  Upon  this  Otanes,  seeing  how 
things  would  go,  bargained  for  his  own  independence, 
while  the  rest  agreed  that  they  would  acknowledge  as 
king,  that  one  of  their  number  whose  horse  should  neigh 
first  after  being  mounted  on  the  following  morning.  The 
groom  of  Dareios  took  care  that  this  horse  should  be  the 
one  which  bore  his  master. 

Such  was  the  story  which  Herodotus  received  in  great 
part  from  Egyptian  informants,  whose  narrative  would 
The  record  naturally  be  colored  by  national  antipathy 
of  Behistun.  to  t^e  foreign  conqueror.  The  great  inscrip 
tion  of  Behistun,  which  is  at  the  least  a  contemporary 
record  and  probably  as  truthful  as  any  which  a  Persian 
could  set  down,  gives  an  account  differing  from  this  tra 
dition  in  many  important  particulars.  It  affirms  that  the 
tyrant's  brother  was  murdered  long  before  the  army 
started  for  Egypt ;  that  Kambyses  killed  himself  pur 
posely  ;  that  the  name  of  the  Magian  was  not  Smerdis 
but  Gomates  ;  and  that  his  usurpation  was  a  religious, 
and  not,  as  has  been  generally  supposed,  a  national  re 
bellion,  its  object  being  to  restore  the  ancient  element 


CH.  in.]      Growth  of  the  Persian  Empire.  67 

worship  which  the  predominance  of  the  stricter  monothe 
ism  of  Zoroaster  had  placed  under  a  cloud.  Of  the  mu 
tilation  of  the  Magian,  of  his  betrayal  by  the  daughter 
Otanes,  of  the  conspiracy  of  the  Seven,  this  monument 
says  absolutely  nothing.  To  the  version  of  Herodotus 
who  represents  Dareios  as  the  last  to  join  the  conspiracy, 
it  gives  the  most  complete  contradiction  Dareios  asserts 
unequivocally  that  no  one  dared  to  say  anything  against 
the  Magian  until  he  came.  To  the  Seven  he  makes  no 
reference,  unless  it  be  in  the  words  that  "  with  his  faith 
ful  men  "  he  fell  on  the  Magian  and  slew  him,  while  the 
story  of  his  election  by  the  trick  of  his  groom  is  put  aside 
by  his  assertion  that  the  empire  of  which  Gomates  dis 
possessed  Kambyses  had  from  the  olden  time  been  in 
the  family  of  Dareios.  If  the  incidents  peculiar  to  the 
tale  of  Herodotus  had  been  facts,  the  rock  inscription 
must  have  made  to  them  at  least  some  passing  allusion, 
if  not  some  direct  reference. 

The  death  of  the  usurper  was  followed,  we  are  told, 
by  a  general  massacre  of  the  Magians.  This  massacre 
seems  to  point  to  a  state  of  confusion  and  Revolt  of 
disorder  which,  according  to  Herodotus,  the  Medes. 
prevented  Dareios  from  taking  strong  measures  against 
some  refractory  or  rebellious  satraps  of  the  empire.  The 
statement  is  amply  borne  out  by  the  inscription  of  Behis- 
tun,  which  describes  the  early  years  of  the  reign  of  Dar 
eios  as  occupied  in  the  suppression  of  a  series  of  obstinate 
insurrections  against  his  authority.  The  slaughter  of 
the  Magian  and  his  partisans  seems  in  no  way  to  have 
deterred  the  Medes  from  making  a  general  effort  to  re 
cover  the  supremacy  of  which  they  had  been  deprived 
by  Cyrus.  But  the  fortune  of  war  went  Revolt  of 
against  them.  The  revolt  of  Babylon  may  Babylon. 
have  been  an  event  even  more  serious.  It  was  with 


68  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  HI. 

great  difficulty  crushed,  and  the  walls  of  the  great  city 
were  so  far  dismantled  as  to  leave  the  place  henceforth 
at  the  mercy  of  the  conqueror.  Babylonia  now  became 
a  Persian  province  with  Zopyros  as  its  satrap. 

Another    formidable    antagonist    Dareios    found    in 

Oroites,  the  satrap  of  Lydia,  notorious  as  the  murderer 

of  Polykrates,  the  despot  of  Samos.  Having 

Despotism  of  ...          ,  -  r     i  •      •  i        j 

Polykrates  made  himself  master  of  this  island  some 
time  before  the  Egyptian  expedition  of 
Kambyses,  Polykrates  had  entered  into  a  close  alliance 
with  Amasis,  the  king  of  Egypt.  This  alliance  Amasis, 
we  are  told,  broke  off  because  he  saw  in  the  unbroken 
prosperity  of  Polykrates  the  surest  token  of  coming  dis 
aster.  In  vain  he  urged  his  friend  to  torment  himself  if 
the  gods  would  not  chastise  him.  Polykrates,  following 
his  advice,  flung  his  seal-ring  into  the  deep  sea ;  a  few 
days  later  it  was  found  in  the  body  of  a  fish  which  was  to 
be  served  at  his  supper.  Appalled  at  this  unbroken  good 
fortune,  Amasis,  so  the  story  runs,  threw  up  the  alliance, 
in  order  that,  when  some  evil  fate  overtook  Polykrates, 
his  own  heart  might  not  be  grieved  as  for  a  friend.  It  is, 
however,  more  likely  that  it  was  broken  off  not  by  Amasis 
but  by  Polykrates  himself,  for  the  next  thing  related  of 
him  is  an  offer  to  furnish  troops  for  the  army  of  Kam 
byses.  The  Persian  king  eagerly  accepted  the  offer,  and 
Polykrates  as  eagerly  availed  himself  of  the  opportunity 
to  get  rid  of  those  Samians  whom  he  regarded  as  disaf 
fected  towards  himself.  Of  these  exiles  some  hurried  to 
Sparta,  and  their  importunities  induced  the  Spartans  and 
Corinthians  to  send  a  joint  expedition  to  besiege  Poly 
krates  in  his  capital  which  Herodotus  describes  as  the 
most  magnificent  city  in  the  world.  But  Spartan  inca 
pacity  in  blockade  had  early  become  a  proverb.  At 
Samos  they  grew  tired  of  the  task  after  having  perse- 


CH.  in.]      Growth  of  the  Persian  Empire.  69 

vered  in  it  for  forty  days  ;  and  so  came  to  an  end  the  first 
Spartan  expedition  into  Asia.  But  according  to  the  re 
ligious  belief  of  Herodotus  and  his  generation,  the  time 
was  come  when  the  man,  whose  prosperity  had  been  thus 
far  unclouded  and  who  had  received  enjoyment  as  well 
from  the  friendship  of  the  most  illustrious  poets  of  the 
day  as  from  the  great  works  for  which  he  had  rendered 
his  island  famous,  should  exhibit  in  his  own  person  the 
working  of  that  law  which  keeps  human  affairs  in 
constant  ebb  and  flow.  This  belief  was  justified  by  the 
story  which  ascribed  to  Oroites  the  wantonly  treacherous 
murder  of  Polykrates  ;  but  a  mere  hint  given  by  the  his 
torian  reveals  the  fact  that  Oroites  had  taken  the  part  of 
the  usurper  Gomates,  and  explains  his  obstinate  defiance 
of  Dareios.  How  far  Oroites  in  his  conduct  to  Polykrates 
observed  the  rules  of  honorable  warfare,  we  have  no 
means  of  determining  ;  all  that  we  need  to  notice  here 
is  that  Oroites  was  slain,  that  after  desperate  calamities 
Syloson,  the  exiled  brother  of  Polykrates,  remained 
despot  of  Samos,  and  that  thus  the  greatest  of  Hellenic 
cities  passed  in  a  state  of  desolation  under  the  yoke  of 
Dareios,  who  was  known  among  his  subjects  rather  as 
an  organizer  than  as  a  conqueror,  or,  as  the  Persians 
put  it,  rather  as  a  huckster  than  as  the  father  of  his 
people. 

Under  the  former  kings  the  several  portions  of  the 
empire  had  sent  yearly  gifts  ;  Dareios  resolved  that  the 
twenty  provinces  of  his  empire  should  pay 
an   assessed  tribute.     The  system  was   a      tion  of  the 

,  .  ,  ,       ,         '  .  Persian  em- 

rough  and  ready  method  for  secunng  to      pire  under 
the  king  a  definite  annual  revenue.    The 
amount  raised  in  excess  of  this  sum  would  be  determined 
by  the  rapacity  or  the  cruelty  of  the  satraps  and  their 
collectors  who  gathered  the  tribute  from  the  native  ma- 


70  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  in. 

gistrates  of  the  conquered  peoples.  Herodotus  is  naturally 
careful  to  state  the  measure  of  the  burdens  imposed  on 
the  Asiatic  Greeks.  With  the  Karians,  Lykians,  and 
some  other  tribes,  the  lonians  had  to  pay  yearly  400 
silver  talents,  the  Mysians  and  Lydians  together  being 
assessed  in  the  sum  of  500  talents.  According  to  the 
account  the  whole  revenue  of  the  empire  was  about  four 
millions  and  a  quarter  of  English  money.  A  further  step 
in  advance  of  his  predecessors  was  the  introduction  by 
Dareios  of  coined  money,  and  of  the  system  of  royal  high 
roads  furnished  with  permanent  posting  establishments 
at  each  stage.  A  journey  of  ninety  days  on  one  of  these 
roads  brought  the  traveler  from  Sardeis  to  Sousa.  But 
although  something  was  thus  done  for  the  wealth  and 
dignity  of  the  king,  the  Persian  empire  remained,  as  it 
had  been,  a  mere  agglomeration  of  units,  with  no  other 
bond  than  that  of  a  common  liability  to  tribute  and  taxa 
tion,  with  no  common  sentiment  extending  beyond  the 
bounds  of  the  several  tribes,  and  with  no  inherent 
safeguards  against  disruption  from  without  or  decay  and 
disorganization  within. 

The  sequel  of  the  reign  of  Dareios  is  made  up  of  two 
stories,  each  of  which  brings  him  into  connection  with 
the  Greeks  who  were  to  work  dire  havoc  on 
s^  *"s  empire  in  the  days  of  his  son.  The  for 
mer  of  these  tales  professes  to  explain  the 
reasons  which  induced  Dareios  to  despatch  an  exploring 
expedition  to  cities  so  remote  as  the  Hellenic  settlements 
in  southern  Italy.  Among  the  Greeks  who  accompa 
nied  Polykrates  on  his  last  and  fatal  journey  was  Demo- 
kedes,  a  physician  of  Kroton,  who,  having  the  good  luck 
to  heal  the  injured  foot  of  Dareios,  was  treated  with  roy 
al  honors,  but  for  whom  wealth  apart  from  freedom,  in 
his  interpretation  of  the  word,  went  for  nothing.  His 


CH.  in.]       Growth  of  the  Persian  Empire.  71 

one  anxiety  was  to  see  his  home  once  more  ;  and  the 
possibility  that  he  might  accomplish  "his  purpose  flashed 
across  his  mind,  when  he  was  called  in  to  prescribe  for 
Atossa  the  wife  of  Dareios  and  mother  of  Xerxes.  In 
return  for  the  exercise  of  his  skill  Demokedes  insisted 
on  one  condition  ;  and  by  the  terms  of  the  bargain 
Atossa  appeared  before  Dareios  to  reproach  him  for  sit 
ting  idle  on  his  throne  without  making  an  effort  to  extend 
the  Persian  power.  "A  man  who  is  young,"  she  said, 
"and  lord  of  vast  kingdoms  should  do  some  great  thing 
that  the  Persians  may  know  that  it  is  a  man  who  rules 
over  them."  In  reply  Dareios  said  that  he  was  about  to 
make  an  expedition  into  Scythia.  "  Nay,"  answered 
Atossa  (and  to  the  Athenians  who  heard  or  read  the 
narrative  of  Herodotus  the  words  conveyed  a  delight 
ful  irony),  "go  not  against  the  Scythians  first.  I  have 
heard  of  the  beauty  of  the  women  of  Hellas,  and  desire 
to  have  Athenian  and  Spartan  maidens  among  my  slaves  : 
and  thou  hast  here  one  who  above  all  men  can  show  thce 
how  thou  mayest  do  this, — I  mean  him  who  has  healed 
thy  foot."  Atossa,  however,  could  obtain  nothing  more 
than  an  order  that  some  ships  should  be  sent  to  spy  out 
the  land  and  that  Demokedes  should  serve  as  guide. 
The  physician  was  determined  that  the  voyage  should 
be  extended  to  the  Italian  coast.  At  Taras  [Tarentum] 
he  prevailed  on  the  tyrant  of  the  place  to  shut  up  the 
Persians  in  prison  while  he  made  his  escape  to  Krotonv 
These  luckless  men  were  set  free  from  their  dungeon 
only  to  suffer  shipwreck  and  to  be  made  slaves.  Such 
of  them  as  were  ransomed  made  their  way  back  to  Da 
reios  with  a  message  from  Demokedes  explaining  that 
he  could  not  fulfil  his  solemn  promise  of  returning  be 
cause  he  had  married  the  daughter  of  Milon  the  wrest 
ler.  This  gross  treachery,  with  the  disasters  which  it 


72  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  in. 

brought  in  its  train,  might  well  rouse  any  despot's  rage 
and  impel  him  to  take  immediate  vengeance.  But  there 
is  not  even  a  hint  that  it  spurred  Dareios  on  to  the  work 
of  preparation,  or  drew  from  him  the  least  expression  of 
anger.  The  next  incident  related  in  his  history  is  not 
the  dispatching  of  an  army  against  the  w.estern  Greeks, 
but  his  own  departure  for  that  invasion  of  Scythia  which 
Atossa  had  prayed  him  to  postpone  in  favor  of  her  own 
plan.  The  mission  of  Demokodes  is  thus,  as  a  political 
motive,  superfluous,  while  his  motives  in  risking  the  ruin 
of  all  the  Greek  states  for  the  sake  of  securing  his  own 
return  to  Kroton  are  unfathomable.  The  Persian  ships, 
it  is  true,  would  have  been  welcomed  at  Athens,  for  there 
the  dynasty  of  Peisistratos  was  still  in  power ;  but  the 
traditions  which  relate  the  fall  of  the  Lydian  kingdom 
indicate  no  little  indignation  among  other  Greek  states 
at  the  subjugation  of  their  eastern  kinsfolk  by  Cyrus, 
and  make  it  highly  unlikely  that  a  Persian  squadron 
would  be  suffered  to  move  safely  along  the  coasts  of  the 
Peleponnesos.  Politically,  Dareios  would  have  been 
wise  in  attacking  the  Greeks  while  he  still  had  a  sup 
porter  at  Athens  ;  but  the  fact  that  he  made  no  attempt 
to  do  so  seems  sufficiently  to  prove  that  the  idea  never 
entered  his  mind,  and  that  the  expedition  which  ended 
in  the  battle  of  Marathon  was  brought  about  immediately 
by  the  persistent  intrigues  of  the  Peisistratidai  after  their 
expulsion.  The  story  of  Demokedes  is  superfluous  from 
another  point  of  view.  The  fall  of  Kroisos  had  brought 
the  Persians  into  direct  conflict  with  the  Asiatic  Greeks ; 
and  through  these  a  struggle  was  perhaps  from  the  first 
inevitable  with  their  kinsmen  in  the  west.  The  desire  of 
having  Hellenic  maidens  as  her  slaves  might  therefore 
be  awakened  in  Atossa  without  the  intervention  of  De 
mokedes  :  nor  could  her  charge  of  sloth  against  the  king 


en.  in.]       Growth  of  the  Persian  Empire.  73 

be  maintained  without  glaring  falsehood.  Unless  Dareios 
lied  in  the  inscription  which  he  carved  on  the  rocks  of 
Behistun,  no  room  is  left  for  imputations  of  military 
inactivity  in  the  first  or  in  any  other  part  of  his  reign. 

The  Scythian  expedition  of  Dareios  is  an  enterprise 
which  must  be  noticed,  as  it  is  directly  connected  with 
the  fortunes  of  Miltiades,  the  future  victor  Expedition 
of  Marathon,  and  of  some  of  the  most  pro-  of  Dareios 
minent  actors  in  the  Ionian  revolt  which  pre 
ceded  the  invasion  of  Attica  by  Datis  and  Artaphernes. 
Over  a  bridge  of  boats  across  the  Bospopos  Dareios 
marched  through  Thrace  to  the  spot  where  the  lonians 
had  already  prepared  another  bridge  of  boats  by  which 
he  was  to  cross  the  Istros  (Danube).  This  bridge  Dareios 
wished  at  first  to  break  up  immediately  after  his  passage  : 
but  when  K6es,  the  tyrant  of  Mytilene,  warned  him  of 
the  danger  (not  of  defeat  in  battle,  for  this  he  professed 
to  regard  as  impossible,  but)  of  starvation,  he  ordered 
the  lonians  to  keep  guard  for  sixty  days  and  then,  if  by 
that  time  he  should  not  have  returned,  to  break  up  the 
bridge.  Once  in  the  Scythian  land,  the  Persians,  we  are 
told,  were  lured  across  the  Tanais  to  the  banks  of  the 
Oaros,  whence  the  Scythians  who  acted  as  decoys  began 
to  move  westwards.  Eagerly  pursuing  them,  yet  never 
able  to  come  up  with  them,  Dareios  at  last  in  sheer  wea 
riness  sent  a  message  to  the  Scythian  king,  bidding  him 
to  submit  and  give  earth  and  water,  or  else  to  come  for 
ward  and  fight  like  a  man.  The  reply  was  that  the 
Scythians  were  only  following  their  usual  habits  of 
moving  about,  and  that  if  Dareios  wished  to  see  how 
they  could  fight,  he  had  only  to  lay  hands  on  the  tombs 
of  their  forefathers.  He  was  thus  obliged  to  go  on  his 
way,  finding  his  most  efficient  allies  in  the  donkeys  and 
mules  of  his  army  which  by  their  braying  or  by  their 


74  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  in. 

odd  looks  frightened  the  Scythian  cavalry.  The  mono 
tony  of  his  course  was  at  last  broken  by  the  arrival  of  a 
herald  who  brought  as  gifts  for  the  king  a  bird,  a  mouse, 
a  frog,  and  five  arrows.  In  the  king's  belief  these  gifts 
meant  that  the  Scythians  yielded  up  themselves,  their 
land,  and  their  water,  because  the  mouse  lives  on  the 
land  and  the  frog  in  the  water,  while  the  bird  signified 
the  horses  of  warriors,  and  the  arrows  showed  that  they 
surrendered  their  weapons.  But  Dareios  was  dismayed 
to  learn  that  the  signs  could  be  interpreted  as  a  warning 
that  unless  they  could  become  birds  and  fly  up  into 
heaven,  or  go  down  like  mice  beneath  the  earth,  or  be 
coming  frogs  leap  into  the  lake,  they  would  be  shot  to 
death  by  the  Scythian  arrows.  An  immediate  retreat 
was  ordered  to  the  bridge  across  the  Istros;  but  the 
Scythians,  taking  a  shorter  road,  arrived  before  him 
and  urged  the  lonians  to  abandon  their  trust,  not  only 
because  by  so  doing  they  would  free  themselves  but  be 
cause  they  had  no  right  to  aid  and  abet  a  wanton  inva 
der.  The  advice  of  Miltiades  was  to  do  as  the  Scythians 
wished;  but  though  the  other  despots  gave  at  first  an 
eager  assent,  they  changed  their  minds  when  Histiaios 
of  Miletos  warned  them  that  only  through  the  help  of 
Dareios  could  they  hope  to  retain  their  power ;  and  thus 
Miltiades  found  himself  opposed  to  eleven  tyrants,  six 
of  whom  were  from  the  Hellespont  while  four  ruled  over 
Ionian  cities,  the  eleventh  being  the  Aiolian  Aristagoras 
of  Kym6.  Pretending  therefore  to  follow  their  advice, 
the  Greeks  urged  the  Scythians  to  go  in  search  of  the 
Persian  host  and  destroy  it.  The  Scythians  hurried  off, 
and  were  as  unsuccessful  now  in  finding  the  Persians  as 
the  Persians  had  been  in  tracking  the  Scythians.  Mean 
while  Dareios  hurried  to  the  bridge  :  and  the  Scythians 
on  learning  how  they  had  been  tricked  comforted  them- 


CH.  in.]       Growth  of  the  Persian  Empire.  75 

selves  by  reviling  the  lonians  as  cowards  who  hug  their 
chains. 

So  ends  a  narrative  in  which  all  that  takes  place  on 
the  Scythian  side  of  the  Danube  is  like  a  bewildering 
dream.  The  great  rivers  which  water  the 
vast  regions  to  the  north  of  the  Black  Sea 
are  forgotten  in  a  description  of  the  wander- 
ings  of  a  million  of  men  in  a  country  which 
yielded  no  food  and  in  many  places  no  water.  An  east 
ward  march  of  700  or  800  miles  in  which  no  great  stream 
is  crossed  except  the  Tanais  (the  Don),  and  in  which 
the  Scythians  never  attack  them  when  to  attack  them 
would  be  to  destroy  them  utterly,  is  followed  by  a  march 
of  a  like  length  westward,  with  the  same  result.  The 
motive  assigned  for  the  expedition  is  the  desire  of  Dareios 
to  avenge  the  wrong  done  by  the  Scythians  to  the  Median 
empire  about  a  hundred  years  before ;  but  this  motive  is 
scarcely  more  constraining  than  that  which  is  supposed 
to  have  taken  the  Persians  to  Egypt  to  avenge  the 
slaughter  of  their  remote  forefathers  by  Rameses  or 
Sesostris.  As  to  the  incidents  at  the  bridge,  it  is  enough 
to  say  that  either  the  lonians  were  faithful  to  Dareios,  or 
they  were  not ;  that  the  Scythians  either  were,  or  were 
not,  in  earnest  in  their  efforts  to  defend  their  country 
and  to  punish  the  invaders  ;  and  that  in  either  case  these 
incidents  could  not  have  taken  place.  Whether  the 
Greeks  wished  to  abandon  Dareios  or  to  save  him,  they 
most  have  urged  the  Scythians  to  remain  on  the  bank,  in 
the  one  case  that  the  Scythians  might  fall  victims  to  the 
Persians,  in  the  other  that  they  might  destroy  the  Persian 
army  in  the  confusion  caused  by  the  efforts  of  an  un 
wieldy  multitude  caught  in  a  snare.  The  Scythians, 
indeed,  are  represented  as  knowing  perfectly  well  the  po 
sition  of  the  Persian  army  at  every  stage  of  their  march ; 


76  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  in. 

and  therefore,  as  knowing  that  Dareios  was  in  full  retreat 
for  the  bridge,  they  knew  that  he  and  his  army  must 
cross  it  or  speedily  perish.  Yet  they  are  infatuated 
enough  to  depart  at  the  bidding  of  the  lonians  to  go  and 
look  for  an  enemy,  whom,  if  only  they  remained  where 
they  were,  they  might  certainly  slaughter  at  their  ease. 
They  had  nothing  to  do  but  concentrate  their  forces  on 
the  eastern  bank,  leaving  empty  a  space  of  a  few  furlongs 
or  miles  in  front  of  the  bridge,  and  the  Persian  host 
must  have  run  into  the  jaws  of  utter  destruction. 

It  is,  however,  perfectly  natural  that   the  Greek  tradi 
tion  should  represent  the  defeat  of  the  Persian  king  as 
more  disastrous  than  it  really  was,  or  even 
invent  a  defeat   when  the   enterprise  was 


comparatively  successful.  It  is  most  sig 
nificant  that  with  the  passage  of  the  Danube 
on  his  return  all  the  difficulties  of  Dareios  disappear.  It 
was  his  wish  that  the  Thrakians  should  be  made  his  sub 
jects  ;  and  his  general  Megabazos  bears  down  all  oppo 
sition  with  a  vigor  to  which  Scythian  revenge,  it  might 
be  thought,  would  offer  some  hindrance,  for  we  are  told 
that  they  made  a  raid  as  far  as  the  Chersonesos  and  even 
sent  to  Sparta  to  propose  a  joint  attack  on  the  Persians. 
But  from  the  Scythians  Megabazos  encounters  no  oppo 
sition  ;  and  his  course  to  the  Strymon  is  one  of  unin 
terrupted  conquest.  Near  the  mouth  of  this  river  was  the 
Edonian  town  of  Myrkinos  in  a  neighborhood  rich  in 
forests  and  corn-lands  as  well  as  in  mines  of  gold  and 
silver.  Here  when  the  Great  King  announced  his  wish 
to  reward  his  benefactors,  Histiaios  begged  that  he  might 
be  allowed  to  take  up  his  abode,  while  K6es  contented 
himself  with  asking  that  he  might  be  made  despot  of 
Mytilene.  The  supremacy  of  the  Persian  king  was  at 
this  time  extended  to  the  regions  of  the  Paionian  and 


CH.  iv.]        The  Early  History  of  Athens.  77 

Makedonian  tribes  as  well  as  to  the  island  of  Lemnos. 
But  Lemnos  was  not  to  remain  long  under  Persian  power. 
When  a  little  while  later  the  resources  of  the  empire 
were  being  strained  to  suppress  the  Ionic  revolt,  the 
Athenian  Miltiades  made  a  descent  on  the  island,  which 
remained  henceforth  closely  connected  with  Athens,  the 
future  bulwark  of  Greece  and  of  Europe  against  the  law 
less  domination  of  an  oriental  despot. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

HISTORY  OF    ATHENS   IN  TH~ET  TIMES  OF  SOLON, 
PEISISTRATOS    AND    KLEISTHENES.  - 

ATHENS  was  at  this  time  under  the  government  of  ty 
rants,  from  whom  the  Persian  King  might  naturally  look 
for  something  more  than  indifference  or  neu- 

Growth  of 

trality  in  any  enterprise  for  the  extension  of      .hereditary 

,  .  -.-,  _.         -  .    ,  sovereignty 

his  empire  in  Europe.  Yet  from  Athens  am0ng  the 
Dareios  was  to  experience  the  first  steady  Greeks, 
resistance  to  his  schemes,  and  her  citizens  were  to  deal 
on  his  power  in  his  own  life-time  a  blow  more  serious  than 
any  which  it  had  yet  received.  So  far  as  he  could  see, 
there  was  nothing  in  the  condition  of  Athens  to  distin 
guish  it  from  the  many  other  Greek  cities  which  either 
were  or  had  been  governed  by  tyrants ;  nor  can  we  un 
derstand  why  at  Athens  tyranny  should  be  followed  by 
results  so  different  from  those  which  it  produced  at  Co 
rinth,  unless  we  go  back  to  the  earlier  state  of  things 
which  rendered  such  despotism  possible.  We  have  al 
ready  seen  that  the  natural  tendency  of  the  earnest 
Greek,  as  of  other  Aryan  society,  would  be  towards  an 


7 8  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  iv. 

oligarchy  of  chiefs,  each  of  whom  ruled  his  family  by 
the  most  solemn  of  religious  sanctions,  as  the  represen 
tative  of  the  founder  who  had  become  the  object  of  the 
family  worship,  although  his  life  on  earth  had  been  little 
better  than  that  of  the  beast  in  his  den.  If  the  family,  as 
years  went  on,  was  extended  into  a  clan,  if  the  clan  by 
union  with  other  clans  formed  a  tribe,  if  an  aggregation 
of  tribes  grew  into  a  city,  the  principle  of  authority  re 
mained  the  same.  The  city,  the  tribe,  the  clan,  the 
family,  each  had  its  own  altar  and  its  own  ritual,  and  in 
each  the  magistrate  was  both  priest  and  king.  But  there 
would  always  be  the  temptation  for  any  head  of  a  tribe  or 
clan,  who  had  the  power,  to  make  himself  master  of  his 
fellow-chiefs,  and  such  a  chief  would  claim  from  his 
former  colleagues  the  submission  which  they  exacted 
from  their  own  subjects.  He  would,  in  short,  be  the  irre 
sponsible  holder  of  an  authority  founded  on  divine  right^ 
and  as  such,  he  would  claim  the  further  right  of  trans 
mitting  his  power  to  his  heir.  Thus  in  the  East,  where 
slavery  soems  indigenous,  would  grow  up  the  servile  awe 
of  kings,  who,  as  representatives  of  the  deity,  showed 
themselves  only  on  rare  occasions  in  all  the  paraphernalia 
of  barbaric  royalty,  and  otherwise  remained  in  the  seclu 
sion  of  the  seraglio,  objects  of  mysterious  veneration  and 
dread.  No  such  Basileis,  or  kings,  as  these  established 
themselves  beyond  the  bounds  of  Asia  and  Africa ;  and 
although  many,  perhaps  most,  of  the  Greek  cities  came 
to  be  ruled  by  hereditary  sovereigns,  the  distinction  be 
tween  the  Basileus  or  the  hereditary  chief,  and  the  des 
pot  or  tyrant  who  had  subverted  a  free  constitution, 
was  never  very  strongly  marked.  It  is  true  that  for  the 
former,  as  such,  the  Greek  professed  to  feel  no  special 
aversion,  while  the  latter  was  a  wild  beast  to  be  hunted 
down  with  any  weapons  and  in  any  way  ;  but  practically 


CH.  iv.]  Early  History  of  Athens.  79 

the  Greek  regarded  a  Basileus  as  a  growth  which  could 
not  well  be  produced  on  Hellenic  soil,  nor  could  he 
easily  be  brought  to  look  upon  Greek  kings  with  the  re 
spect  which  he  willingly  paid  to  the  sovereigns  of  Sousa, 
Nineveh,  or  Babylon.  When  therefore  a  Greek  dynasty 
was  set  aside  and  an  oligarchy  established  in  its  place, 
this  was  strictly  nothing  more  than  a  return  to  the  earlier 
form  of  government.  The  great  chiefs  resumed  the  full 
rights,  of  which  they  had  conceded,  or  been  compelled 
to  yield,  some  portion  to  the  king.  For  this  reason  also 
the  change  from  monarchy  to  oligarchy  seems  to  have 
been  effected  generally  without  any  great  convulsion  and 
even  without  much  disturbance. 

It  might  be  supposed  that  the  Greek  cities  which  were 
thus  governed  by  oligarchies  were  on  the  high  road  to 
constitutional  order  and  freedom.  But 
nothing  could  be  further  from  the  truth;  tyrSes. 
for  though  the  oligarch  could  not  fail  to 
see  a  large  multitude  lying  beyond  the  sacred  circle  of 
his  order,  yet  it  was  a  sacred  circle,  and  beyond  its 
limits  he  recognised  no  duties.  Between  him  and  those 
men  whom  his  forefathers  had  reduced  to  subjection  or 
to  slavery  there  was  no  bond  of  blood,  and  therefore 
there  could  be  no  community  of  religion.  They  could 
not  therefore  share  his  worship  ;  and  as  without  worship 
no  function  of  government  could  be  carried  on,  their 
admission  to  political  power  could  be  only  profanation. 
Thus  for  the  subject  or  inferior  classes  the  change  from 
kingship  to  oligarchy  had  been  in  theory  no  change  at 
all ;  and  the  latter  state  of  things  differed  from  the  former 
only  in  this,  that  even  in  the  ruling  class  there  were  per 
sons  who  to  achieve  their  own  selfish  purpose  might 
court  the  favor  of  the  people  and  enlist  their  aid  by 
promising  them  justice.  This  was,  in  fact,  the  most  po- 


8o  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  iv. 

Lv 

tent,  and  perhaps  the  most  frequently  employed,  of  the 
modes  by  which  some  ambitious  or  discontented  mem 
ber  of  the  ruling  class  succeeded  in  making  himself  ab 
solute.  Coming  forward  in  the  character  of  the  dema 
gogue,  and  declaiming  against  the  insolence  and  cruelty 
of  his  fellow  Eupatrids,  perhaps  exhibiting  in  his  own 
person  the  pretended  evidences  of  their  brutality,  the 
man  who  aimed  at  supreme  power  induced  the  people  to 
take  up  arms  in  his  behalf  and  so  surround  him  with  a 
body-guard.  The  next  step  was  to  gain  a  commanding 
military  position  ;  and  if  he  could  gather  around  him  a 
band  of  foreign  mercenaries,  his  task  was  at  once  practi 
cally  accomplished. 

The  history  of  the  Peisistratidai  at  Athens  sufficiently 

illustrates  the  means  by  which  tyrannies  were  established 

and   put  down :  and  when  we  find  stories 

tarly  his- 

toryofthe  more  or  less  resembling  the  Athenian  tra- 
peopfe?11  ditions  told  of  other  Greek  cities  at  the  same 
or  in  earlier  times,  we  may  fairly  infer  that 
throughout  Hellas  generally  the  change  was  going  on 
which,  by  the  substitution  of  oligarchical  for  kingly  rule, 
followed  by  the  usurpation  of  despots  who  made  the  sway 
of  one  man  still  more  hateful,  fostered  the  growth  of  the 
democratic  spirit,  until  it  became  strong  enough  to 
sweep  away  every  obstacle  in  its  free  development.  But 
that  which  distinguished  Athens  from  other  cities  in  which 
these  changes  were  going  on  was  the  work  which  Solon 
began  and  in  great  part  carried  out  before  Peisistratos 
made  himself  master  of  the  city.  If  we  may  judge  from 
the  descriptions  left  to  us  by  Solon  himself,  the  internal 
condition  of  the  country  was  one  of  extreme  misery. 
The  men  who  bore  rule  in  the  state  were  guilty  of  gross 
injustice  and  of  violent  robberies  among  themselves, 
while  of  the  poor  many  were  in  chains  and  had  been 


CH.  iv.]         .  Early  History  of  Athens.  81 

sold  away  even  into  foreign  slavery.  Nay,  in  the  indig 
nant  appeal  which,  after  carrying  out  his  reforms,  Solon 
addresses  to  the  Black  Earth  as  a  person,  he  speaks  of 
the  land  itself  as  having  been  in  some  way  enslaved  and 
as  being  now  by  himself  set  free,  by  the  removal  of 
boundaries  which  had  been  fixed  in  many  places.  Many 
again,  he  adds,  had  through  his  efforts  been  redeemed 
from  foreign  captivity,  while  those  who  on  Attic  soil 
were  reduced  to  slavery  and  trembled  before  their  despots 
were  now  raised  to  the  condition  of  freemen.  This 
sketch  exhibits  the  Athenian  people  as  divided  practical 
ly  into  two  classes,  the  one  consisting  of  the  Eupatrid  or 
blue-blooded  nobles  who  were  the  owners  of  the  land, 
the  other  of  the  Thetes  or  peasants,  known  also  as  Hek- 
temorioi  from  the  sixth  portion  of  the  produce  of  the 
soil  which  they  paid  as  the  terms  of  their  tenure.  Failure 
in  the  performance  of  this  contract  left  the  peasant  much 
at  the  mercy  of  his  lord,  who  probably  noted  the  defi 
ciency  of  the  present  year  as  a  debt  to  be  paid  during 
the  following  year.  Certain  it  is  that  when  this  debt  had 
risen  to  an  amount  which  made  payment  in  kind  hope 
less,  the  lord  might  sell  the  tenant  and  his  family  into 
slavery  ;  and  as  a  hard  season  might  at  any  time  place 
him  in  this  condition  of  debt,  the  utter  insecurity  of  his 
position  left  him  but  little  raised  above  the  level  of  the 
slave.  On  land  enclosed  within  the  sacred  boundary 
stones  he  could  never  be  more  than  a  tiller  of  the  soil ; 
and  that  the  greater  part  of  the  Athenian  soil  was  shut 
in  by  these  landmarks,  is  asserted  by  Solon  himself. 
Thus  we  have  on  the  one  side  a  few  heads  of  families 
who  might  in  the  strictest  sense  of  the  term  be  spoken  of 
as  despots,  and  on  the  other  the  dependents  who 
trembled  before  them  but  who  were  suffered  to  draw  their 
livelihood  from  the  soil  on  paying  the  sixth  portion  of 
G 


82  The  Persian  Wars.         •        [CH.  iv. 

the  produce.  It  is  true  that  even  this  fixed  payment 
marks  a  step  forward  in  the  condition  of  the  laborer  who 
had  started  without  even  this  poor  semblance  of  right, 
for  so  long  as  the  tenant's  freedom  depended  on  the 
caprice  of  the  lord  or  the  scantiness  of  a  harvest,  it  was 
but  a  semblance  after  all.  In  short,  he  had  never  been 
legally  set  free  from  the  servile  state,  and  in  default  of 
payment  to  that  state  he  reverted.  So  long  as  things 
continued  thus,  Solon  might  with  perfect  truth  say  that, 
the  land  itself  was  enslaved,  for  the  scanty  class  of  small 
proprietors,  even  if  any  such  then  existed,  would  be 
powerless  against  the  Eupatrid  land-owners.  It  was  not 
less  obvious  that  things  could  not  go  on  indefinitely  as 
they  were.  Either  the  half-emancipated  peasant  must 
become  a  free  owner  of  the  soil,  or  he  must  fall  back 
into  his  original  subjection.  Here  then,  in  dealing  with 
grievances  which  every  year  must  become  less  and  less 
tolerable,  Solon  had  abundant  materials  for  his  much- 
discussed  measure  known  as  the  Seisachtheia  or  Re 
moval  of  Burdens  ;  and  the  measures  which  such  a  state 
of  things  would  render  necessary  are  precisely  those 
which  seem  to  be  indicated  by  his  words.  From  all 
lands  occupied  by  cultivators  on  condition  of  yielding  a 
portion  of  the  produce  he  removed  the  pillars  which 
marked  the  religious  ownership  of  the  Eupatridai,  and 
lightened  the  burdens  of  the  cultivators  by  lessening  the 
amount  of  produce  or  money  which  henceforth  took  the 
shape  of  a  rent.  In  short,  a  body  of  free  laborers  and 
poor  land-owners  was  not  so  much  relieved  of  a  heavy 
pressure  as  for  the  first  time  called  into  being. 

This  Relief-act  was  a  part  only  of  Solon's 
fication  of         work.    There  had  grown  up  in  Attica  a  large 
population  not   included    in   any  tribe, — in 
other  words,  possessing  no  religious  title  to 


CH.  IV.]  Early  History  of  Athens.  83 

political  privileges,  and  therefore  in  the  opinion  of  the 
Eupatrids  incapable  of  taking  part  in  the  ordering  of  the 
state  except  at  the  cost  of  impiety.  But  in  this  popula 
tion  were  included  men  from  whose  energy  and  thrift  the 
country  might  derive  special  benefit;  and  it  was  clear 
that  the  statesman,  if  he  wished  to  avail  himself  of  their 
activity,  must  introduce  a  new  classification  which  should 
take  in  all  the  free  inhabitants  of  the  land  without  refe 
rence  to  affinities  of  blood,  and  based  wholly  on  property. 
The  result  of  this  change  which  divided  the  free  popula 
tion  into  four  classes  according  to  their  yearly  income, 
was  that  it  excluded  the  poor  Eupatrid  from  offices  and 
honors  which  he  regarded  as  the  inalienable  and  ex 
clusive  inheritance  of  the  old  nobility.  If  this  property 
fell  short  of  500  bushels  of  wheat  annually,  he  could  not 
be  a  member  of  the  great  council  of  Areiopagos,  nor 
could  he  be  elected  among  the  nine  archons  or  magis 
trates  who  became  permanent  members  of  that  body,  if, 
at  the  end  of  their  year  of  office,  their  public  conduct 
should  have  been  found  satisfactory.  These  high  officers 
were  thus  made  accountable  for  their  administration  and 
liable  to  impeachment  in  case  of  misbehaviour,  while 
they  were  elected  by  the  whole  body  of  the  citizens,  in 
cluding,  of  course,  as  the  Eupatrids  called  them,  the 
rabble  of  the  fourth  class.  But  if  by  exclusion  of  the 
poorer  Eupatrids  from  these  great  offices  the  spell  of  the 
ancient  despotism  of  religion  and  blood  was  broken,  the 
relations  of  the  tribes  to  the  state  continued  nevertheless 
unchanged.  Unless  the  citizen  belonged  to  a  tribe,  he 
could  not,  even  if  he  belonged  to  the  richest  class,  be 
either  an  archon  or  a  member  of  the  Areiopagos,  nor 
could  he  belong  to  the  Probouleutic  Council  or  Senate, 
which  determined  the  measures  to  be  submitted  to 
the  public  assembly,  and  which  consisted  of  400 


84  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  iv. 

members,  in  the  proportion  of  one  hundred  for   each 

tribe. 

Thus  by  giving  to  every  citizen  a  place  in  the  great 

council  which  elected  the  chief  magistrates  and  reviewed 
their  conduct  at  the  end  of  their  year  of 
office,  and  by  securing  to  all  the  right  of  per. 


Solon*"  sonal  appeal  to  the  archon,  Solon  assured  to 

the  main  body  of  the  people  a  certain  inde 
pendence  of  the  Eupatrids,  which  might  hereafter  be 
built  up  into  a  compact  fabric  of  civil  liberty  ;  but  since 
no  one  who  did  not  possess  the  religious  title,  as  being 
the  member  of  a  tribe,  could  hold  office,  Solon  prac 
tically  left  the  constitution,  as  he  found  it,  oligarchic. 
Still  his  conviction  that  he  had  done  much  to  improve 
the  condition  of  his  countrymen  generally  is  attested  by 
the  condition  which  represents  him  as  binding  the  Athe 
nians  for  ten,  or  as  some  said,  for  a  hundred  years,  to 
suffer  no  change  to  be  made  in  his  laws,  and  then  to 
make  it  impossible  that  such  change  might  come  from 
himself,  departing  on  a  pilgrimage  which,  as  we  know 
from  his  own  words,  took  him  to  Egypt  and  to  Kypros 
(Cyprus).  Of  a  visit  to  Sardeis  the  fragments  of  his 
poems  say  nothing  :  nor  could  they  say  anything,  if  the 
fall  of  Kroisos  took  place  nearly  half  a  century  after  his 
legislation.  When  Solon  returned  to  Athens,  the  tide 
had  turned  ;  and  the  comparative  harmony  which  had 
enabled  him  to  carry  his  reforms  had  given  place  to 
turbulence  and  faction.  The  Eupatrid  land-owners  of  the 
plain,  called  Pediaians,  were  ranged  under  Lykourgos  ; 
the  Paralians,  or  those  of  the  coast,  had  sided  with  the 
Alkmaionid  Megakles,  while  Peisistratos  headed  the  men 
of  the  hills.  In  the  struggle  which  ensued  Solon,  it  is 
said,  foresaw  that  Peisistratos  must  be  the  conqueror; 
but  he  strove  in  vain  to  rouse  the  Athenians  to  combine 


CH.  iv.]  Early  History  of  Athens.  85 

against  the  tyranny  with  which  they  were  threatened. 
To  no  purpose  he  stood  in  his  armor  at  the  door  of  his 
house  ;  and  he  could  but  console  himself  with  the  thought 
that  he  had  done  his  duty,  and  reply  to  those  who  asked 
him  on  what  he  relied  to  save  himself  from  the  ven 
geance  of  his  enemies,  "  On  my  old  age."  Peisistratos, 
we  are  told,  did  him  no  harm;  and  the  man  who  had 
done  more  than  any  other  who  had  gone  before  him  to 
make  his  country  free  died  in  peace,  full  of  years  and 
with  a  fame  which  is  the  purer  for  the  unselfishness 
which  refused  to  employ  for  his  own  exaltation  opportu 
nities  greater  than  any  which  fell  to  the  lot  even  of 
Peisistratos  himself. 

The  success  of  this  man  is  sufficient  evidence  of  the 
slow  growth  of  the  democratic*  spirit  among  the  Athe 
nians.  As  the  champion  of  the  hill-men,  Usur  adon 
Peisistratos  went  to  Athens,  and  declared  of  Peisistra- 
that  he  had  narrowly  escaped  from  his  ene 
mies,  who  had  fallen  upon  him  in  the  country.  Pointing 
to  the  wounds,  which  he  had  inflicted  on  his  mules  and 
on  himself,  as  attesting  the  truth  of  his  story,  he  prayed 
the  people  to  grant  him  a  body-guard  for  his  protection 
against  the  weapons  of  the  rival  factions  or  parties.  His 
request  was  granted,  in  spite,  it  is  said,  of  the  strenuous 
opposition  of  Solon ;  and  the  disguise  was  thrown  off, 
when,  with  the  help  of  his  spear-bearers,  he  seized  the 
Akropolis,  and  Megakles  with  the  Alkmaionids  fled  from 
the  city. 

Having  thus  made  himself  master  of  Athens  Peisis 
tratos,  in  the  opinion  of  Herodotus,  ruled  wisely  and 
well,  without  introducing  a  single  constitu- 

Subsequent 

tional  change.     With  sound  instinct  he  per-      fortunes  of 
ceived  that  the  Solonian  forms  were  suffi 
ciently  oligarchic   in   spirit  to   suit  his   purposes;    but 


86  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  iv. 

although  Athens  had  thus  the  benefit  of  a  despotism 
lightened  as  it  had  been  lightened  in  no  other  Hellenic 
city,  the  wisdom  and  other  good  qualities  of  Peisistratos 
and  his  successors  failed  to  make  the  course  of  their 
despotism  run  smoothly.  The  first  disaster,  we  are  told, 
was  not  long  in  coming.  Peisistratos  owed  his  power  to 
the  divisions  among  the  people  ;  and  a  coalition  of  the 
men  of  the  plain  and  of  the  sea-coast  was  at  once 
followed  by  his  expulsion.  A  reconciliation  with  Mega- 
kles  the  leader  of  the  coast-men  brought  about  his 
restoration,  to  be  followed  by  a  second  expulsion  when 
that  compact  was  broken.  Ten  years  had  passed  in 
exile,  when  Peisistratos  contrived  to  occupy  Marathon 
without  opposition,  and  to  surprise  the  Athenian  army 
which  came  out  against 'him.  Master  of  the  Akropolis 
for  the  third  time,  he  resolved  to  leave  no  room  for  the 
combination  which  had  twice  driven  him  away.  Mega- 
kles  with  his  adherents  left  the  country ;  the  rest  of  his 
opponents  were  compelled  to  give  hostages  whom  he 
placed  in  the  keeping  of  the  tyrant  of  Naxos ;  and  his 
power  was  finally  established  by  a  large  force  of  Thra- 
kian  mercenaries. 

For  Peisistratos  himself  there  were  to  be  no  more  al 
ternations  of  disaster  and  success.  He  died  tyrant  of 
Despotism  of  Athens,  527  B.C.,  and  his  sons  Hippias  and 
piLStndHip"  Hipparchos  followed,  we  are  told,  the  ex- 
Hipparchos.  ample  of  sobriety  and  moderation  set  by 
their  father.  But  their  political  foresight  failed  to  guard 
them  against  dangers  arising  from  their  personal  vices. 
In  an  evil  hour  Hipparchos  sought  to  form  a  shameful 
intimacy  with  the  beautiful  Harmodios.  The  fears  or  the 
wrath  of  Aristogeiton  were  roused  by  this  attempt  on  his 
paramour  ;  and  the  Peisistratid  dynasty  brought  on  itself 
the  doom  which  for  the  same  reason  befell  many  another 


CH.  iv.]  Early  History  of  Athens.   *  87 

dynasty  in  Hellas  and  elsewhere.  Supported  by  a  body 
of  conspirators,  Aristogeiton  determined  to  strike  down 
the  tyrants  in  the  great  Panathenaic  procession  :  but 
when  the  day  came,  one  of  his  accomplices  was  seen 
talking  familiarly  with  Hippias.  Fearing  betrayal,  Aris 
togeiton  and  his  partisans,  hurrying  away,  fell  on  Hip- 
parchos  and  slew  him.  For  four  years  longer  Hippias 
remained  despot  of  Athens  :  but  his  rule  was  marked 
henceforth  by  suspicion  and  harshness  and  by  the  mur 
der  of  many  citizens.  In  the  time  of  Thucydides  it  was 
the  almost  universal  belief  at  Athens  that  Hipparchos 
succeeded  Peisistratos  as  his  eldest  son,  and  that  the 
deed  of  Aristogeiton  and  Harmodios  not  merely  avenged 
a  private  wrong  but  gave  freedom  to  the  land.  Not  only 
did  the  popular  song  hallow  with  the  myrtle  wreath  the 
sword  which  had  slain  the  tyrant  and  given  back  equal 
laws  to  Athens ;  but  the  honors  and  immunities  front  all 
public  burdens  granted  to  their  descendants  attested  the 
strength  of  the  popular  conviction  that  the  dynasty  came 
to  an  end  with  the  assassination  of  Hipparchos.  Thucy 
dides  is  careful  to  point  out  that  the  belief  was  a  delusion. 
Hippias,  not  Hipparchos,  was  the  elder  son  ;  and  far 
from  ceasing  to  rule  when  his  brother  died,  he  thence 
forth  made  Athens  feel  the  scourge  of  tyranny.  But  the 
circumstances  attending  the  death  of  his  brother  warned 
Hippias  that  yet  more  disasters  might  be  in  store  for 
him,  and  that  he  would  do  well  to  provide  betimes  against 
the  evil  day.  His  decision  led  to  momentous  conse 
quences  in  the  history  of  Athens  and  of  the  world.  His 
thoughts  turned  to  the  Persian  king,  whose  power  after 
the  fall  of  the  Lydian  monarchy  had  been  extended  to 
the  shores  of  the  Hellespont  and  to  whom  the  Athenian 
settlement  at  Sigeion  had  thus  become  tributary.  To  the 
Chersonesos  or  peninsula  on  which  this  city  was  situated 


88  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  iv. 

Hippias  had  sent  Miltiades,  the  future  victor  of  Marathon, 
as  governor.  Here  Miltiades  maintained  himself  with 
the  aid  of  a  body  of  mercenaries  and  married  the 
daughter  of  the  Trakian  chief  Oloros.  Hippias  also  saw 
the  advantage  of  political  marriages.  The  tyrant  of 
Lampsakos  was  in  high  favor  with  the  Persian  king 
Dareios,  and  Hippias  gladly  bestowed  his  daughter  on 
his  son,  although  an  Athenian  might  fairly  look  down 
upon  a  Lampsakene.  In  Sigeion,  then,  he  thought  that 
he  might  have  a  safe  refuge,  and  in  the  Lampsakene 
despot  he  found  a  friend  through  whom  he  gained  per 
sonal  access  to  the  Persian  king. 

While  Hippias  was  thus  guarding  himself  against  pos 
sible  disasters,  the  intrigues  of  the  Alkmaionidai  were 

preparing  the  way  for  the  expulsion  which 
Hippias°from  he  dreaded.  About  five  years  before  the 

marriage  of  his  daughter  the  Delphian 
temple  had  been  burnt  by  accident.  Taking  the  contract 
for  its  restoration,  the  Alkmaionids  carried  out  the  work 
with  a  magnificence  altogether  beyond  the  terms  of  their 
(engagements  ;  and  availing  themselves  of  the  feelings  of 
gratitude  roused  by  their  generosity,  they  desired  that  to 
all  Spartans  who  might  consult  the  oracle  one  answer 
should  be  returned,  "Athens  must  beset  free."  The 
Delphians  took  care  that  this  should  be  done  ;  and  the 
Spartans,  wearied  out  by  the  repetition  of  the  command, 
sorely  against  their  will  sent  an  army  by  sea.  But  Hip 
pias  had  been  forewarned.  In  the  battle  fought  on  the 
Phalerian  plain  the  Spartan  leader  was  slain  and  his 
army  routed.  Still  ucged  on  by  the  oracle,  the  Spartans 
invaded  Attica  under  their  King  Kleomenes  ;  but  their 
skill  as  besiegers  was  beneath  contempt,  and  their  disin 
clination  for  the  task  which  they  had  taken  in  hand  was 
fast  growing  into  disgust,  when  the  children  of  Hippias 


CH.  iv.]  Early  History  of  Athens.  89 

were  taken  in  an  attempt  to  smuggle  them  out  of  the 
country.     The  tables  were  turne-d,  and  for  the  recovery 
of  his  children  Hippias  agreed  to  leave  Attica  within  five 
days.     Thus,  after  the  lapse  of  fifty  years 
from  the  establishment  of  the  first  tyranny 
of  Peisistratos,  the  last  despot  of  the  house  betook  him 
self  to  the  refuge  which  he  had  prepared  on  the  banks  of 
the  Skainandros :  and  a  pillar  on  the  Akropolis  set  forth 
for  the  execration  of  future  ages  the  evil  deeds  of  the 
dynasty  and  the  names  of  its  members. 

The  expulsion  of  Hippias  was  followed  almost  imme 
diately  by  a  wonderful  development  of  the  principle 
involved  in  the  legislation  of  Solon.  That  The  reforms 
legislation  had  acknowledged  the  right  of  all  of  Kleisthe- 
citizens  to  share  in  the  work  of  government ; 
but,  unless  a  despotism  came  in  the  way,  the  scant  mea 
sure  of  power  which  he  granted  to  the  vast  majority  was 
sure  to  lead  sooner  or  later  to  more  momentous  changes. 
It  was  not  likely  that  perhaps  seven-tenths  of  the  people 
should  patiently  endure  their  exclusion  not  only  from  the 
archonship  and  the  council  of  Areiopagos  but  from  the 
senate  of  the  Four  Hundred.  Such  a  constitution  as  this 
a  despot,  hedged  behind  the  spears  of  his  mercenaries, 
could  without  difficulty  use  for  his  own  purposes.  With 
the  loss  of  freedom  of  speech  the  powers  of  the  general 
assembly  of  the  citizens  would  fall  into  abeyance,  while 
the  archons  would  become  his  subservient  instruments. 
The  story  which  he  tells  us  that  Peisistratos  obeyed  a 
summons  citing  him  to  appear  before  the  archons  tells 
us  also  that  his  accuser  failed  to  put  in  an  appearance 
on  the  day  of  trial.  With  the  expulsion  of  Hippias  the 
Solonian  laws  nominally  resumed  their  force ;  but  their 
action  was  for  a  time  hindered  by  a  renewal  of  the  fac 
tions  which  it  was  the  object  of  the.  Solonian  constitution 


90  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  iv. 

to  put  down, — the  contending  parties  being  the  Alk- 
maionid  Kleisthenes,  who  was  popularly  credited  with 
the  corruption  of  the  Delphian  priestess,  and  a  member 
of  a  noble  house  named  Isagoras.  Kleisthenes  was  de 
feated  :  but  when  we  find  that  on  being  thus  repulsed  he 
took  the  people  into  partnership  and  that  his  first  act 
was  to  substitute  new  tribes  for  the  old,  we  see  that  the 
contest  went  to  the  very  foundations  of  the  old  social 
order.  All  the  citizens  who  were  not  members  of  phra- 
triai  or  tribes,  and  who  were  therefore,  no  matter  what 
might  be  their  wealth,  thrust  down  into  the  fourth  class, 
ranged  themselves  necessarily  on  his  side :  and  thus 
Kleisthenes  numbered  among  his  partisans  the  most  in 
telligent  and  enterprising  men  in  the  land.  The  discon 
tent  of  such  men  would  be  a  serious  and  growing  danger 
to  the  state  :  nor  could  Kleisthenes  fail  to  see  that  if  he 
wished  to  put  out  a  fire  which  was  always  smouldering 
and  might  at  any  time  burst  into  furious  flame,  he  must 
strike  at  the  root  of  the  religious  organization  which 
effectually  hindered  the  political  growth  of  the  whole 
people.  To  create  new  tribes  on  a  level  with  the  old 
ones  was  an  impossibility :  to  add  to  the  number  of 
phratries  or  families  contained  in  them  would  be  equiva 
lent  to  the  commission  of  a  sacrilege.  There  was  there 
fore  nothing  left  but  to  do  away  with  the  religious  tribes 
as  political  units  and  to  substitute  for  them  a  larger  num 
ber  of  new  tribes  divided  into  cantons  taking  in  the 
whole  body  of  the  Athenian  citizens.  Such  a  change, 
although  it  left  the  houses  and  clans  or  phratries  un 
touched  as  religious  societies  founded  on  an  exclusive 
worship,  would  be  regarded  by  .the  conservative  Eu- 
patrid  as  virtually  a  death-blow  to  the  old  political  faith. 
Nothing  more  is  needed  to  explain  the  vehement  oppo 
sition  of  Isagoras.  It  was  the  proposal  of  this  change 


CH.  iv.]  Early  History  of  Athens.  91 

which  roused  his  antagonism,  and  not  the  rivalry  of 
Isagoras  which  led  Kleisthenes  to  put  forth  his  scheme 
as  a  new  method  of  winning  popularity.  The  struggle  at 
Athens  is  reflected  in  the  strife  between  the  patricians 
and  the  plebeians  of  Rome,  and  again  between  the  great 
families  of  the  German  and  Italian  cities  in  the  middle 
ages  and  the  guilds  which  grew  up  around  them. 

But  Kleisthenes  had  learned  by  a  long  and  hard  ex 
perience  to  guard  against  the  outbreak  of  factions  and 
local  jealousies.  This  end  he  endeavored 
to  attain  by  two  means,— the  one  being  the  ^^w 
splitting  up  of  the  tribes  in  portions  scattered 
over  the  country,  the  other  being  the  Ostracism.  So 
carefully  did  he  provide  that  the  cantons  of  the  tribes 
should  not  be  generally  adjacent  that  the  five  Demoi  or 
cantons  of  Athens  itself  belonged  to  five  different  tribes. 
The  demos  or  canton,  in  short,  became  in  many  respects 
like  our  parish,  each  having  its  one  place  of  worship 
with  its  special  rites  and  watching  over  its  own  local  in 
terests,  each  levying  its  own  taxes  and  keeping  its  re 
gister  of  enrolled  citizens.  This  association,  which  was 
seen  further  in  the  common  worship  of  each  tribe  in  its 
own  chapel,  differed  from  the  religious  society  of  the  old 
patrician  houses  in  its  extension  to  all  citizens  ;  but  it 
served  to  keep  up  the  exclusiveness  which  distinguished 
the  polity  of  the  most  advanced  of  ancient  democracies 
from  the  theory  of  modern  citizenship. 

If,  however,  those  citizens  who  had  not  belonged  to 
the  old  religious  tribes  would  find  their  interest  in  the 
new  order  of  things,  the  genuine  Eupatrid 
oligarchs  would   regard   it  with   indignant        ^he  °stra- 
hatred.     For  such  men  there  would  always 
be  a  strong  temptation  to  subvert  a  constitution  from 
which  they  had  nothing  to  expect  but  constant  encroach- 


92  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  iv. 

ments  on  their  ancient  privileges  :  and  if  one  like  Pei- 
sistratos  or  Isagoras  should  give  the  signal  for  strife,  the 
state  could  look  to  the  people  alone  to  maintain  the  law. 
In  other  words,  the  only  way  to  peace  and  order  would 
lie  through  civil  war.  It  became,  therefore,  indispensa 
bly  necessary  to  provide  a  machinery  by  which  the  plots 
of  such  men  might  be  anticipated,  and  which  without 
violence  or  bloodshed  should  do  the  work  of  the  mer 
cenaries  or  assassins  of  the  despot ;  and  it  was  accord 
ingly  left  to  the  citizens  to  decide,  once  perhaps  in  each 
year,  by  their  secret  and  irresponsible  vote,  whether  for 
the  safety  of  the  whole  community  one  or  more  of  the 
citizens  should  go  for  a  definite  period  of  years  into  an 
exile  which  involved  neither  loss  of  property  nor  civil 
infamy.  Against  the  abuse  even  of  this  power  the  most 
jealous  precautions  were  taken.  The  necessity  of  the 
measure  was  fully  discussed  in  the  Probouleutic  or  con 
sulate  Senate  which  now  consisted  no  longer  of  400  re 
presentatives  of  the  old  religious  tribes,  but  of  500,  each 
of  the  ten  new  tribes  being  represented  by  50  senators, 
elected  apparently  by  lot.  Even  when  it  was  decided 
that  the  condition  of  affairs  called  for  the  application  of 
ostracism,  the  people  were  simply  invited  to  name  on 
the  shells  by  which  their  votes  were  given  the  man 
whose  presence  they  might  regard  as  involving  serious 
danger  to  the  commonwealth.  No  one  could  be  sent  in 
to  exile  unless  at  least  6,000  votes,  amounting  to  perhaps 
one-fourth  of  the  votes  of  the  whole  body  of  citizens, 
were  given  against  him.  The  result  might  be  that  a 
smaller  number  of  votes  demanded  the  banishment  of 
an  indefinite  number  of  citizens,  and  in  this  case  the 
ceremony  went  for  nothing.  If  more  than  6,000  votes 
were  given  against  any  man,  he  received  warning  to 
quit  Athens  within  ten  days  ;  but  he  departed  without 


CH.  iv.]  Early  History  of  Athens.  93 

civil  disgrace  and  without  losing  any  property.  Thus 
without  bloodshed  or  strife  the  state  was  freed  from  the 
presence  of  a  man  who  might  be  tempted  to  upset  the 
laws  of  his  country ;  and  this  relief  was  obtained  by  a 
mode  which  left  no  room  for  the  indulgence  of  personal 
ill-will.  The  evil  thus  met  belonged  strictly  to  a  grow 
ing  community  in  which  constitutional  morality  had  not 
yet  taken  firm  root.  The  remedy  therefore  was  neces 
sarily  provisional,  and  it  fell  into  disuse  just  when  the 
government  of  Athens  was  most  thoroughly  democratic. 
It  was  this  constitution  with  its  free-spoken  Ekklesia 
or  council  of  the  people,  its  permanent  senate,  and  its 
new  military  organization,  which  Isagoras  opposition  of 
resolved,  if  it  were  possible,  to  overthrow.  ^g^eTrt" 
With  true  oligarchical  instinct,  he  saw  that  umph  of 

,  .  .         Kleisthenes. 

unless  he  could  check  the  impulse  given  by 
freedom  of  speech  and  by  admitting  to  public  offices  all 
but  the  poorest  class  of  citizens,  the  result  must  be  the 
growth  of  a  popular  sentiment  which  would  make  the 
revival  of  Eupatrid  ascendency  a  mere  dream.  The 
Alkmaionids  had  lain  for  more  than  a  century  under  a 
curse  pronounced  on  them  for  their  share  in  the  death  of 
Kylon  or  his  adherents  after  their  seizure  of  the  Akro- 
polis.  Of  the  religious  terrors  inspired  by  this  curse  Isa 
goras,  aided  by  his  friend  the  Spartan  King  Kleomenes, 
so  successfully  availed  himself  that  Kleisthenes  with 
many  others  was  constrained  to  leave  Athens.  Enter 
ing  the  city  after  his  departure,  Kleomenes  drove  out, 
as  lying  under  the  curse,  700  families  whose  names  had 
been  furnished  to  him  by  Isagoras.  Here  his  sucess 
ended.  The  council  of  Five  Hundred  refused  to  dis 
solve  themselves  at  his  bidding.  Taking  refuge  with 
Isagoras  and  his  adherents  in  the  Akropolis,  Kleomenes 
was  compelled,  after  a  blockade  of  three  days,  to  make 


94  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  iv. 

terms  for  his  own  departure  and  that  of  Isagoras,  leav 
ing  the  followers  of  the  latter  to  their  fate  ;  and  nothing 
less  than  the  death  of  these  men  would  now  satisfy  the 
exasperated  people.  The  retreat  of  Kleomenes  was  fol 
lowed  by  the  return  of  Kleisthenes  and  the  exiled 
families. 

With  Sparta  it  was  obvious  that  the  Athenians  now 

had  a  deadly  quarrel,  and  on  the  other  side  they  knew 

that  Hippias  was  seeking  to  precipitate  on 

Eiobassy  from      ,  .  f     .         _.        .          .,  .  T 

the  Athenians  them  the  power  of  the  Persian  king.  It 
satr"apaof ernes  seemed  therefore  to  be  a  matter  of  stern 
Sardeis.  necessity  to  anticipate  the  intrigues  of  their 

banished  tyrant ;  and  the  Athenians  accord 
ingly  sent  ambassadors  to  Sardeis  to  make  an  indepen 
dent  alliance  with  the  Persian  despot.  The  envoys  on 
being  brought  into  the  presence  of  Artaphernes,  the 
satrap  of  Lydia,  were  told  that  Dareios  would  admit 
them  to  an  alliance  if  they  would  give  him  earth  and 
water, — in  other  words,  if  they  would  acknowledge  them 
selves  his  slaves.  To  this  demand  of  absolute  subjec 
tion  the  envoys  gave  an  assent  which  was  indignantly 
repudiated  by  the  whole  body  of  Athenian  citizens. 
This  memorable  incident,  is,  in  itself,  of  extreme  signifi 
cance  ;  and  it  is  impossible  to  lay  too  great  stress  upon 
it  in  connection  with  the  subsequent  narrative  of  events 
directly  leading  to  the  great  struggle  which  ended  in  the 
defeat  of  Xerxes. 

Foiled  for  the  time  in  his  efforts,  Kleomenes  was  not 
cast  down.     Regarding  the  Kleisthenian  constitution  as 

a  personal  insult  to  himself,  he  was  resolved 
fffortTof^he6  ^at  I-sagoras  should  be  despot  at  Athens. 
Spartans  for  Summoning  the  allies  of  Sparta,  he  led  them 
ofeHipp°ias!i0n  as  far  as  Eleusis,  12  miles  only  from  Athens, 

without  informing  them  of  the  purpose  of 


CH.  iv.]  Early  History  of  Athens.  95 

his  campaign.  He  had  no  sooner  confessed  it  than  the 
Corinthians,  declaring  that  they  had  been  brought  away 
from  home  on  an  unrighteous  errand,  went  back,  fol 
lowed  by  the  other  Spartan  King,  Demaratos  the  son  of 
Ariston ;  and  this  conflict  of  opinion  broke  up  the  rest 
of  the  army.  This  discomfiture  of  their  enemy  seemed 
to  inspire  fresh  strength  into  the  Athenians,  who  won  a 
series  of  victories  over .  the  Boiotians  and  Euboians. 
Speaking  of  this  outbreak  of  warlike  activity,  Herodotus 
cannot  repress  his  conviction  that  freedom  of  speech  is 
a  right  good  thing,  since  under  their  tyrants  the  Athe 
nians  were  in  war  no  better  than  their  neighbors,  while 
on  being  rid  of  them  they  rose  rapidly  to  pre-eminence, 
the  reason  being  that  forced  service  for  a  master  took 
away  all  their  spirit,  whereas  on  winning  their  freedom 
each  man  made  vigorous  efforts  for  himself.  It  was  this 
vehement  energy  which  was  to  turn  the  scale  against 
the  Persian  King,  and,  having  first  won  the  admiration 
of  the  Greeks  generally,  to  change  into  bitter  hatred  the 
indifference,  or  perhaps  even  the  sympathy,  which  led 
the  Corinthians  to  abandon  the  cause  of  Kleomenes  at 
Eleusis. 

The  success  of  Kleomenes  in  the  expulsion  of  Hippias 
had  awakened  in  him  feelings  almost  as  bitter  as  his 
failure  to  effect  the  ruin  of  Kleisthenes.  The 

~    .   .  .  Discomfiture 

task  of  overthrowing  the  Peisistratids  had  of  the  Spartan 
been  inexpressibly  repulsive  to  him  :  and  his  menes  at^leu- 
anger  on  being  discomfited  at  Eleusis  by  sis- 
the  defection  of  his  own  allies  was  heightened  by  indig 
nation  at  the  discovery  that  in  driving  out  his  friend 
Hippias  he  had  been  simply  the  tool  of  Kleisthenes  and 
of  the  Delphian  priestess  whom  Kleisthenes  had  bribed. 
It  was  now  clear  to  him  and  to  his  countrymen  that  the 
Athenians  would  not  acquiesce  in  the  predominance  of 


96  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  iv. 

Sparta,  and  that  if  they  retained  their  freedom,  the 
power  of  Athens  would  soon  be  equal  to  their  own. 
Their  only  safety  lay  therefore  in  providing  the  Athe 
nians  with  a  tyrant.  An  invitation  was,  therefore, 
sent  to  Hippias  at  Sigeion,  to  attend  a  congress  of  the 
allies  at  Sparta,  who  were  summoned  to  meet  on  the  ar 
rival  of  the  exiled  despot. 

The  words  in  which  these  facts  are  related  by  the  his 
torian  Herodotus  show  not  merely  that  Sparta  regarded 
herself  as  in  some  sort  the  first  city  in  Hel- 

Invitation  to  » 

Hippias  to  at-    las,  but  that  among  the  Greek  cities  there 

tend  a  congress  f  •,  -,.  111 

of  Spartan  were  not  a  few  who  were  disposed  to  look 
up  to  her  as  such.  Her  claim  to  suprema 
cy  is  seen  in  the  complaint  that  Athens  was  not  willing 
to  acknowledge  it ;  and  the  recognition  of  this  claim  in 
certain  quarters  is  proved  by  the  fact  that  the  men  of 
Corinth  and  other  cities  marched  with  Kleomenes  to 
Eleusis  even  though  they  were,  as  we  have  seen,  kept  in 
ignorance  of  the  purpose  for  which  they  had  been  brought 
together.  The  congress  now  summoned  exhibits  Sparta 
still  more  clearly  as  the  head  of  a  great  confederacy, 
able  to  convoke  her  allies  at  will,  yet  not  able  to  dis 
pense  with  the  debates  in  council  which  implied  their 
freedom  to  accept  or  reject  her  plans.  The  assembly 
in  which  Hippias  appeared  to  plead  the  cause  of  despot 
ism  seems  to  have  gone  through  all  the  formalities 
needed  to  maintain  the  self-respect  of  citizens  of  subor 
dinate  but  independent  states.  The  address  of  the  Spar 
tans  to  the  allies  thus  convoked  was  after  their  wonted 
fashion  brief  and  to  the  point.  In  it  they  candidly  con 
fessed  their  folly  in  having  been  duped  by  the  Pythia  at 
Delphoi  and  in  having  given  over  the  city  of  Athens  to 
an  ungrateful  Demos  which  had  already  made  the  Boio- 
tians  and  Euboians  feel  the  sting  of  democracy  and 


CH.  iv.J  Early  History  of  Athens.  97 

would  speedily  make  others  feel  it  also  ;  and  not  less 
candidly  they  besought  the  allies  to  help  in  punishing 
the  Athenians   and  in  restoring  to  Hippias  the  power 
which  he  had  lost.     The  reply  of  the  Corinthian  Sosikles 
is  an  indignant  condemnation  of  this  selfish  and  heart 
less  policy.     "Surely  heaven   and   earth  are  going   to 
change  places,"  he  said,  "  and  fishes  will  live  on  land  and 
men  in  the  sea,  now  that  you,  Lakedaimonians,  mean  to 
put  down  free  governments  and  to  restore  in  each  city  that 
most  unrighteous  and  most  bloodthirsty  thing, — a  despot 
ism.     If  you  think  that  a  tyranny  has  a  single  good  fea 
ture  to  recommend  it,  try  it  first  yourselves   and  then 
seek  to   bring   others  to   your  opinion    about   it.     But 
in  point  of  fact  you  have  not  tried  it,  and  being  religious 
ly  resolved  that  you  never  will  try  it,  you  seek  to  force 
it  upon  others.     Experience  would   have  taught  you  a. 
more  wholesome  lesson  :  we  have  had  this  experience 
and  we  have  learnt  this  lesson."     This  moral  is  enforced 
by  some  strange  stories  told  of  the  Corinthian   tyrants 
Kypselos  and  Periandros,  the  memory  of  whose  crimes 
still    made   the  Corinthians  shudder  ;  and  the  speaker 
ends  with   Spartan  plainness  of  speech  by  confessing 
the  wonder  which  their  invitation  to  Hippias  had  excited 
at  Corinth,  and  the  still  greater  astonishment  with  which 
they  now  heard  the  explanation  of  a  policy,  in  the  guilt 
of  which  the  Corinthians  at  least  were  resolved  that  they 
would  not  be  partakers. 

This  most  important  debate,  in  which  the  acceptance 
of  the  Spartan  proposal  must  have  wonderfully  smoothed 
the  path  of  Xerxes  and  perhaps  have  insured 
his   triumph   without   a   battle,  shows  with          Hippias°to 
great  clearness,  the  nature  of  the  political 
education  through  which  the  oligarchical  states  of  Hellas 
were  passing,  although  at  some  distance  in  the  rear  of 
H 


98  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  iv. 

the  democratic  Athens.  The  Corinthians  and  the  Spar 
tans  were  agreed  in  their  hatred  of  any  system  which 
should  do  away  with  all  exclusive  privileges  of  the  an 
cient  houses,  and  which,  breaking  down  the  old  religious 
barriers  which  excluded  all  but  the  members  of  those 
houses  from  all  public  offices  and  even  from  all  civil 
power,  should  intrust  the  machinery  of  government  to 
the  herd  of  the  profane.  Both  also  were  agreed  in  their 
hatred  of  a  system  which  placed  at  the  head  of  a  state  a 
man  who  owed  no  allegiance  to  its  laws,  and  whose 
moderation  and  sobriety  at  one  time  could  furnish  no 
guarantee  against  the  grossest  oppression  and  cruelty  at 
another.  This  horrible  system  was  different  in  kind 
from  the  rugged  discipline  which  a  feeling  of  pride  ren 
dered  tolerable  to  Spartans.  That  discipline  was  self- 
imposed,  and  the  administration  of  it  was  in  the  hands 
of  elected  officers,  to  whom  even  the  kings  were  account 
able.  Hence  Sosikles  could  say  with  truth  that  the 
Spartans  had  no  experience  of  a  tyranny,  and  therefore 
no  real  knowledge  of  its  working,  which  could  find  a 
parallel  only  in  the  crushing  yoke  of  Asiatic  despots. 
But  the  Spartan  in  this  debate  differed  from  the  Corin 
thian,  in  the  clearness  with  which  he  saw  that  there  was 
that  in  the  Athenian  democracy  which,  if  not  repressed, 
must  prove  fatal  to  the  oligarchical  constitutions  around 
it.  To  this  point  the  Corinthian  had  not  yet  advanced, 
and  he  could  now  insist  on  the  duty  of  not  meddling 
with  the  internal  affairs  of  an  independent  community. 
Many  years  later,  in  the  debates  which  preceded  the 
outbreak  of  the  Peloponnesian  war,  the  Corinthian 
deputies  held  a  very  different  language.  Their  eyes 
had  been  opened  in  the  meantime  to  the  radical  antag 
onism  of  the  system  in  which  every  citizen  is  invested 
with  legislative  and  judicial  powers,  and  the  system  in 


CH.  v.]  The  Ionic  Revolt.  99 

which  these  powers  are  in  the  hands  of  an  hereditary 
patrician  caste.  That  the  Corinthians  would  be  brought 
to  see  this  hereafter,  was  the  gist  of  the  reply  made  by 
Hippias.  The  time  was  coming,  he  said,  in  which  they 
would  find  the  Athenians  a  thorn  in  their  side.  For  the 
present,  his  exhortations  were  thrown  away.  The  allies 
protested  unanimously  against  all  attempts  to  interfere 
with  the  internal  administration  of  any  Hellenic  city ; 
and  the  banished  tyrant  went  back  disappointed  to 
Sigeion. 


CHAPTER  V. 

THE  IONIC  REVOLT. 

IN  the  narrative  of  the  causes  which  led  to  the  great 
struggle  between  Athens  and  Persia,  the  slightest  hints 
given  of  the  movements  of  Hippias  are  of 

.  .    .  Intrigues  of 

an  importance  which  cannot  easily  beexag-  Hippias  at 
gerated.  He  had  allied  himself,  as  we  have  Sardels- 
seen,  with  the  despot  of  Lampsakos  on  the  express  ground 
that  the  tyrant  stood  high  in  the  favor  of  Dareios  ;  and 
when  he  was  compelled  to  leave  Athens,  he  departed  to 
Sigeion  with  the  definite  purpose  of  stirring  up  the  Per 
sian  king  against  his  countrymen.  His  intrigues  were 
probably  as  persistent  as  those  of  James  II.  at  St.  Ger 
main's,  and  perhaps  more  vigorous;  and  his  disappoint 
ment  at  the  Spartan  congress  sent  him  back  to  the  Hel 
lespont  more  determined  than  ever  to  regain  his  power 
by  fair  means  or  by  foul.  To  this  end  we  cannot  doubt  that 
the  friendship  of  the  Lampsakene  despot  was  taxed  to 
the  utmost ;  and  we  have  the  explicit  statement  of  Hero- 


ioo  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  v. 

dotus  that  from  the  moment  of  his  return  from  Sparta  he 
left  not  a  stone  unturned  to  provoke  Artaphernes,  the 
Lydian  satrap  who  held  his  court  at  Sardeis,  to  the  con 
quest  of  Athens,  stipulating  only  that  the  Peisistratidai 
should  hold  it  as  tributaries  of  Dareios.  The  whole  course 
of  the  subsequent  narrative  shows  that  the  counsels  of 
Hippias  inspired  Artaphernes  with  the  hope  of  bringing 
Athens,  and,  if  Athens,  then  every  other  Greek  city, 
under  Persian  rule ;  and  the  restoration  of  the  tyrant  to 
the  power  which  he  had  lost  was  desired  by  the  satrap 
as  the  means  not  so  much  of  subverting  a  free  constitu 
tion  as  of  extending  the  dominion  of  the  Great  King. 
Henceforth  the  idea  of  Hellenic  conquest  became  a  re 
ligious  passion  not  less  than  a  political  purpose. 

The  result  of  the  Spartan  congress  was,  of  course,  im 
mediately  known  at  Athens;  nor  could  the  Athenians  be 

under  any  doubt  of  the  mode  in  which  Hip- 
Embassy  .  ....... 

fi^m  Athens  to   pias  would   employ  himself  on  his  return 

nes'  to  Asia.  Their  ambassadors  accordingly 
appeared  a  second  time  before  Artaphernes,  and  laying 
before  him  the  whole  state  of  the  case,  urged  every  avail 
able  argument  to  dissuade  the  Persian  king  from  inter 
fering  in, the  affairs  of  the  western  Greeks.  But  the 
words  of  Hippias  had  done  their  work  ;  and  Artaphernes 
charged  the  Athenians,  if  they  valued  their  safety,  to  re 
ceive  him  again  as  their  tyrant.  The  Athenians  retorted 
by  a  flat  refusal,  and  interpreted  the  answer  of  Artaph 
ernes  as  a  practical  declaration  of  war. 

The  relations  of  the  western  Greeks  with  the  Persians 
were  now  to  become  more  complicated.     The  govern 
ment  of  the  important  city  of  Miletos  had 
been  placed  in  the  hands  of  Aristagoras,  a 
kingPersian       nephew    of   Histiaios,   either   by    Dareios, 
or   by  Histiaios   himself,  who   was    shortly 


CH.  v.]  The  Ionic  Revolt.  loi 

afterwards  withdrawn  from  his  new  settlement  at  Myr- 
kinos  to  a  splendid  but  irksome  captivity  in 
Sousa.  The  help  of  Aristagoras  was  now 
sought  by  some  oligarchic  exiles  whom  the  people  of 
Naxos  had  driven  out.  But  although  Aristagoras  would 
gladly  have  made  himself  master  of  Naxos  and  of  the 
large  group  of  islands  to  which  it  belonged,  he  felt  that 
his  own  power  alone  was  inadequate  to  the  task,  and  ac 
cordingly  he  told  the  exiles  that  they  must  have  the 
help  of  Artaphernes,  the  brother  of  the  Persian  king. 
Beseeching  him  to  stint  nothing  in  promises,  the  exiles 
in  their  turn  assured  him  that  they  would  pay  him  well 
and  would  also  take  on  themselves  the  whole  costs  of 
the  expedition.  To  Artaphernes,  therefore,  Aristagoras 
held  out  not  merely  these  inducements  but  the  further 
bait  that  the  conquest  of  Naxos  would  bring  with  it  the 
possession  of  the  neighboring  islands,  and  even  of  Euboia, 
which  would  give  him  the  command  of  a  large  portion 
of  the  Boiotian  and  Attic  coast.  One  hundred  ships,  he 
said,  would  amply  suffice  for  the  enterprise  ;  but  Arta 
phernes,  heartily  assenting  to  the  plan,  promised  him 
two  hundred,  while  Dareios,  when  his  brother's  report 
was  laid  before  him,  expressed  his  full  approval  of  the 
scheme.  Unfortunately  for  Aristagoras  the  Naxians  re 
ceived  warning  of  the  intended  expedition  too  soon  ;  and 
their  complete  preparation  foiled  the  efforts  of  their  ene 
mies  for  four  months  or  more,  while  these  efforts  involved 
the  waste  of  a  vast  amount  of  money,  not  a  little  of 
which  Aristagoras  had  himself  undertaken  to  provide. 
He  was  thus  in  a  position  of  serious  and  immediate  dan 
ger.  He  had  not,  indeed,  as  has  sometimes  been  urged 
against  him,  deceived  Artaphernes,  for  the  result  was  not 
in  his  power ;  but  he  had  promised  to  bear  the  cost  of 
maintaining  the  fleet,  and  he  no  longer  had  the  means 


102  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  v. 

of  meeting  it.  This  alone  might  well  seem  to  him  an 
offence  which  Artarphernes  would  never  pardon ;  and 
his  mind  naturally  reverted  to  thoughts  familiar  to  the 
Asiatic  Greeks  from  the  time  when  they  had  passed  un 
der  me  dominion  of  the  Lydian  monarchs,  and  still  more 
under  the  heavier  yoke  of  the  Persian  kings.  His  action 
was  determined,  it  is  said,  by  a  message  received  at  this 
time  from  Histiaios  bidding  him  to  shave  the  head  of  the 
bearer  and  read  what  was  written  on  it.  The  tattooed 
marks  conveyed  an  exhortation  to  revolt. 

Among  the  lonians  present  at  the  council  which  Aris- 
tagoras  then  convoked  was  Hekataios,  the  logographer, 
or,  to  put  it  in  other  words,  a  man  who 
made  it  his  business  to  rationalize  and  im- 
anf  Athens  Part  sometmng  like  an  historical  look  to 
the  popular  traditions.  That  he  made  the 
least  effort  to  chronicle  events  of  his  own  time,  there  is 
not  the  slightest  reason  to  suppose ;  and  therefore  it 
could  only  be  from  hearsay  that  Herodotus  became  ac 
quainted  with  the  part  which  he  is  said  to  have  played 
in  that  assembly.  Warning  them  plainly,  we  are  told, 
that  they  could  not  expect  to  cope  with  the  Persian 
power,  but  that,  if  they  resolved  to  run  the  risk,  they 
should  at  the  least  take  care  that  they  had  the  command 
of  the  sea,  he  urged  them  especially  to  seize  the  vast 
wealth  of  the  oracle  of  Branchidai  which  might  otherwise 
fall  into  the  hands  o'f  their  enemies.  His  advice  was  re 
jected  :  but  a  ship  was  sent  to  Myous  (where  the  Persian 
armament  was  encamped  after  its  return  from  Naxos), 
with  orders  to  seize  on  such  of  the  Greek  tyrants  as 
might  be  found  there.  Among  the  despots  thus  seized 
was  K6es  of  Mytilene  who  had  counseled  Dareios  not 
to  break  up  the  bridge  on  the  Danube  (p,  73).  These 
were  all  given  up  to  their  respective  cities  by  Aristagoras 


CH.  v.]  The  Ionic  Revolt.  103 

who,  to  insure  greater  harmony  and  enthusiasm  in  the 
enterprise,  surrendered,  in  name  at  least,  his  own  power 
in  Miletos ;  and  all  were  allowed  by  their  former  sub 
jects  to  depart  unhurt  except  Koes,  who  was  stoned  to 
death.     Thus  having  put  down  the  tyrants  and  ordered 
the  citizens  of  the  towns  to    choose    each  their    own 
strategos  or  general,  Aristagoras  sailed  away  in  the  hope 
of  getting   help   from    the   powerful   city    from    which 
Kroisos  and  Hippias  had  alike  sought  aid.     He  carried, 
with  him,  we  are  told,   a  brazen  tablet  on  which  was 
drawn  a  map  of  the  world,  as  then  known,  with  all  the 
rivers  and  every  sea.     Having  reached  Sparta,  the  tale 
goes  on  to  say,  he  pleaded  his  cause  earnestly  before 
king  Kleomenes.     He  dwelt  on  the  enslavement  of  the 
Asiatic  Greeks  as  a  disgrace  to  the  city  which  had  risen 
to  the  headship  of  Hellas,  and  on  the  wealth  as  well  as 
the  glory  which  with  a  little  trouble  and  risk  they  would 
assuredly  win.     The  trousered   and  turbaned    Persians 
who   fought  with   bows   and  javelins   it   would   be  no 
specially  hard  task  to  vanquish  ;  and   the  whole  land 
from  Sardeis  to  Sousa  would  then  be  for  them  one  con 
tinuous  mine  of  wealth.     The  picture  was  tempting ;  but 
when  Aristagoras  appeared  on  the  third  day  to  receive 
the  final  answer,  he  was  asked  how  far  it  might  be  from 
the  coast  to  Sousa.     "A  three  months' journey,"  said 
the  unlucky  Aristagoras,  who  was  going  on  to  show  how 
easily  it  might  be  accomplished,  when  Kleomenes  bade 
him  leave  Sparta  before   the   sun  went   down.     There 
seemed  to   be   yet  one  last  hope.     With  a  suppliant's 
branch   Aristagoras   went  to   the  house  of  Kleomenes. 
Finding  him  with  his  daughter  Gorgo,  the  future  wife  of 
the  far-famed  Leonidas,  he  asked  that  the  child,  then 
eight  or  nine  years  old,   might  be    sent   away.     The 
king  bade  him  say  what  he  wished  in  her  presence  ;  and 


io4  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  v. 

the  Milesian,  beginning  with  a  proffer  of  ten  talents,  had 
raised  the  bribe  to  a  sum  of  fifty  talents,  when  the  child 
cried  out,  "  Father,  the  stranger  will  corrupt  you,  if  you 
do  not  go  away."  Thus  foiled,  Aristagoras  hastened  to 
Athens,  where  to  his  glowing  descriptions  he  added  the 
plea  that  Miletos  was  a  colony  from  Athens,  and  that  to 
help  the  Milesians  was  a  clear  duty.  The  historian 
Herodotus  remarks  that  Aristagoras  found  it  easier  to 
deceive  30,000  Athenian  citizens  than  a  solitary  Spartan, 
for  the  Athenians  at  once  promised  to  send  twenty  ships 
to  their  aid ;  but  he  forgot  that  the  circumstances  of  the 
two  cities  were  widely  different.  The  futile  threats  of  the 
Spartan  officer  who  appeared  before  Cyrus  (p.  49)  were 
probably  no  longer  remembered ;  but  the  aid  of  the  Per 
sians  had  been  not  only  invoked  against  Athens  but 
definitely  promised,  and  the  Athenians  had  been  assured 
that  they  were  courting  ruin  if  they  refused  to  submit 
once  more  to  the  yoke  of  Hippias.  Athens,  therefore,  as 
Herodotus  himself  had  asserted,  and  as  we  cannot  too 
carefully  remember,  was  already  virtually  at  war  with 
Persia ;  and  in  pledging  themselves  to  help  Aristagoras, 
the  Athenians  were  entering  on  a  course  which  after  a 
severe  struggle  secured  to  them  abundant  wealth  and  a 
brilliant  empire.  So  runs  the  story  :  but  we  cannot  fail 
to  note  that  the  whole  address  of  Aristagoras  to  Kleo- 
menes  distinctly  rests  on  the  practicability  of  conquering 
the  whole  Persian  empire  and  even  on  the  easiness  of 
the  task.  The  deliverance  of  the  Ionic  cities  from  a 
foreign  yoke  is  made  completely  subordinate  to  the  larger 
scheme  which  is  to  make  the  Spartans  masters  of  the 
vast  regions  lying  between  the  Hadriatic  sea  and  the 
deserts  of  Bokhara.  Such  a  notion  might  perhaps  have 
arisen  in  a  Greek  mind  when  the  Persian  tribute-gatherers 
had  been  driven  from  the  coasts  of  Asia  Minor :  but 


CH.  v.]  The  Ionic  Revolt.  105 

at  the  time  with  which  we  are  now  dealing  such  an  idea, 
if  put  into  words,  must  have  appeared  a  wild  and  absurd 
dream. 

When  at  length  Aristagoras  reached  Miletos  with  the 
twenty  Athenian  ships  together  with  five  others  contribu 
ted  by  the  Eretrians  of  Euboia,  he  set  in  order 
an  expedition  to  Sardeis,  which  was  occu- 
pied  without  resistance,  Artaphernes  being 
unable  to  do  more  than  hold  the  Akropolis.     The  acci 
dental  burning  of  a  hut  (the  Sardian  houses  were  built 
wholly  of  reeds  or  had  reed  roofs)  caused  a  conflagration 
which  brought  the  Lydians  and   Persians  in  wild  terror 
to  the  Agora  or  market-place.     The  Athenians,  fearing 
to  be  overborne,  it  is  said,  by  mere  numbers,  retreated 
to  the  heights  of  Tmolos,   and  as  soon  as  it  was  dark 
hastened  away  to  their  ships.     The  fire  at  Sardeis  by 
destroying  the  temple  of  Kybebe  (Cybele)  furnished,  we 
are  told,  an  excuse  for  the  deliberate  destruction  of  the 
temples  of  Western  Hellas  by  the  army  of  Xerxes  ;  but 
a  more   speedy  punishment  awaited   the  lonians,  who 
were  overtaken  by  the  Persians  and  signally  defeated  in 
a  battle  fought  near  Ephesus.     The  historian  is  speaking 
of  this   accidental  conflagration  when  he  tells  us  that 
Dareios  on  hearing  the  tidings  asked  who  the  Athenians 
might  be,   and,  on  being  informed,  shot  an  arrow  into 
the  air,  praying  the  gods  to  suffer  him  to  take  vengeance 
on  this  folk.     About  the  lonians  and  their  share  in  the 
matter  he  said,  it  would  seem,  nothing.     These  he  knew 
that  he  might  punish  when  and  as  he  might  choose  ;  but 
so  careful  was  he  not  to  forget  the  foreigners  who  had 
done  him  wrong,  that  an  attendant  received  orders  to 
bid  his  master  before   every  meal  to   remember   the 
Athenians.     Stories  such  as  this  would,  as  we  can  well 
imagine,  highly  gratify  Athenian  pride  or  vanity ;  nor  is 


io6  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  v. 

the  influence  of  such  feelings  to  be  put  out  of  sight  in  an 
effort  to  get  at  the  true  history  of  the  time.  Not  only  has 
the  historian,  from  whom  it  may  be  said  that  our  whole 
knowledge  of  this  period  is  derived,  told  us  plainly  that 
Hippias  had  been  for  years  doing  all  that  he  could  to 
provoke  a  Persian  invasion  of  his  country,  but  Athenian 
ambassadors  had  twice  appeared  before  Artaphernes,  the 
brother  of  Dareios,  to  counteract  his  intrigues.  The  de 
sire  to  glorify  the  Athenians  could  under  such  circum 
stances  alone  explain  the  growth  of  a  tale  which  repre 
sents  Dareios  as  ignorant  of  the  very  name  of  a  people 
whose  concerns  he  had  been  compelled  to  discuss  or  to 
hear  discussed  for  years.  Lastly,  we  must  mark  the 
significant  facts  that  Dareios  set  to  work  at  once  to 
chastise  the  Asiatic  lonians,  while  he  made  no  attempt 
to  punish  the  Athenians  for  more  than  eleven  years. 

For  some  reason  or  other  the  Athenians  had  deserted 
the  lonians,  refusing  absolutely  to  give  them  any  further 
Dut  the  revolt  assumed  nevertheless 


Extension  of 

the  revolt  to        a  more  serious  character.     The  movement 

Byzantion  ,  ,  .  r  _  .  Tr       . 

and  other  spread  to  the  city  of  Byzantion,  to  Kana, 

and  to  Kypros  (Cyprus)  ;  and  Histiaios,  we 
are  told,  was  sent  down  to  suppress  it.  The  influence 
which  he  exercised  over  the  mind  of  Dareios  was  not 
felt,  it  seems,  by  Artaphernes.  Histiaios  failed  to  check 
the  insurrection  :  he  was  even  charged  with  supplying 
fuel  for  the  fire.  After  a  long  series  of  strange  adventures 
he  was  taken  prisoner  by  a  troop  of  Persian  cavalry  ;  and 
Artaphernes,  fearing  that  Histiaios  would  find  no  diffi 
culty  in  making  his  peace  with  Dareios,  ordered  him  to 
be  crucified.  His  head  was  sent  to  Sousa,  where  Dareios 
received  it  with  the  ceremonious  respect  due  to  a  bene 
factor  of  the  Great  King.  In  short,  he  refused  to  believe 
the  accusations  made  against  him  ;  and  this  circumstance 


CH.  v.]  The  Ionic  Revolt.  107 

alone  may  justify  us  in  suspending  our  judgment  on  the 
strange  tale  which  relates  his  adventures  after  leaving 
Sousa.  If  Dareios  had  really  felt  the  suspicion  of 
treachery  which  Herodotus  thinks  that  he  entertained, 
he  could  never  have  sent  Histiaios  to  the  sea-coast  with 
out  placing  efficient  checks  on  his  movements  :  nor  un 
less  he  had  ample  evidence  to  warrant  his  blunt  phrases, 
could  even  Artaphernes  have  ventured  to  say,  when 
Histiaios  appeared  before  him,  "  It  is  just  this  —  you 
stitched  the  slipper,  and  Aristagoras  put  it  on."  If  that 
satrap  really  believed  this,  he  would  have  been  more 
than  justified  as  a  Persian  viceroy  in  ordering  him  to  be 
instantly  slain. 

From  the  situation  of  their  island  the  Kyprians  (Cy 
prians)  had  perhaps  little  chance  of  success         cause  of 
from  the  first  in  their  attempts  to  shake  off        the  revolt 
the   Persian   yoke.      Their  resistance   did 


them  credit  ;  but  their  gallantry  was  foiled 
by  the  treachery  of  one  of  their  despots,  who  in  a  battle 
deserted  to  the  Persians,  followed  by  all  the  Salaminian 
war-chariots.  From  this  time  the  history  of  the  Ionian 
revolt  is  little  more  than  a  chronicle  of  disasters.  The 
lonians,  seeing  that  the  cause  of  the  Kyprians  was  lost, 
left  them  to  their  fate  ;  and  the  island  was  subdued  after 
one  year  of  precarious  freedom.  Having  expelled  the 
lonians  from  Sardeis,  the  Persian  generals  marched 
northwards,  reducing  city  after  city,  when  they  were 
compelled  to  hasten  to  the  south  by  the  tidings  that 
Karia  was  in  rebellion.  In  a  battle  fought  near  Labranda 
the  Karians,  supported  by  the  men  of  Miletos,  under 
went  a  terrible  defeat  ;  but  their  spirit  was  not  yet 
broken,  and,  laying  an  ambuscade  for  their  enemy,  they 
succeeded,  it  is  said,  in  cutting  off  the  whole  Persian 
force  with  the  three  generals  in  command.  But  they 


io8  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  v. 

were  dealing  with  a  sovereign  who  could  send  army  after 
army  into  the  field  ;  and  this  catastrophe  had  no  influence 
on  the  general  issue  of  the  revolt.  The  disaster  in  Karia 
was  more  than  compensated  by  fresh  successes  on  the 
Propontis  and  the  Hellespont;  and  the  golden  visions 
of  Aristagoras  gave  way  before  the  simple  desire  of 
securing  his  own  safety.  He  suggested  to  the  allies  that 
they  ought  to  be  ready,  in  case  of  expulsion  from  Miletos, 
with  a  place  of  refuge  either  in  Myrkinos,  the  settlement 
of  his  uncle  Histiaios,  or  in  the  island  of  Sardo  (Sar 
dinia).  But  his  own  mind  was  really  made  up  before  he 
summoned  the  council ;  and  leaving  Pythagoras  in  com 
mand  of  Miletos,  he  sailed  to  Myrkinos,  of  which  he 
succeeded  in  taking  possession.  Soon  after,  he  attacked 
and  besieged  a  Thrakian  city,  but  was  surprised  and 
slain  with  all  his  forces. 

The  hopes  of  the  lonians  now  rested  wholly  on  their 
fleet.     It  was  decided  that  no  attempt  should  be  made  to 
oppose  the  Persian  land  forces,  and  that  the 
th?iSStanf       Milesians  should  be  left  to  defend  their  walls 
fleet  at  against  the  besiegers,  while  the  ships  should 

assemble  at  Lade,  then  an  island  off  the 
Milesian  promotory,  to  which  by  an  accumulation  of  sand 
it  is  now  attached.  But  if  the  lonians  were  afraid  of  the 
Persian  armies,  the  Persians  were  scarcely  less  afraid  of 
the  Ionian  fleet,  and  this  want  of  confidence  in  them 
selves,  and  even,  it  would  seem,  in  their  Phenician 
sailors,  led  them  to  resort  to  a  policy  which  might  cause 
division  and  disunion  among  their  adversaries.  The 
Greek  tyrants  who  were  allowed  to  go  free  by  their 
former  subjects,  when  the  Mytilenian  K6es  was  stoned 
to  death,  were  instructed  to  tell  them  that  immediate 
submission  would  win  for  them  a  complete  amnesty  to 
gether  with  a  pledge  that  they  should  not  be  called  upon 


CH.  v.]  The  Ionic  Revolt.  109 

to   bear   any  burdens   heavier  than   those  which   had 
already  been  laid  upon  them,  but  that  if  they  shed  Per 
sian  blood  in  battle,  the  punishment  inflicted  upon  them 
would  be  terrible  indeed.    These  proffers  were  conveyed 
to  the  Greek  cities  by  messengers  who  entered  by  night ; 
and  the  citizens  of  each  town,  thinking  that  the  overtures 
were  made  to  themselves  alone,  returned  a  positive  re 
fusal.   For  a  time  the  debates  at  Lade  took  another  turn. 
The  Phokaian  general  Dionysios,  warning  the  loriians 
that  for  them  the  issue  of  slavery  or  of  freedom  hung  on 
a  razor's  edge,  told  them  plainly  that  they  could  not 
hope  to  escape  the  punishment  of  runaway  slaves,  unless 
they  had  spirit  enough  to  bear  with  present  hardship 
for  the  sake  of  future  ease ;  but  at  the  same  time  he 
pledged  himself  that,  if  they  would  submit  to  his  direc 
tion,  he  would  insure  to  them  a  complete  victory.     The 
acceptance  of  his  proposal  was  followed  by  constant  and 
systematic  manceuvering  of  the  fleet,  while,  after  the  daily 
drill  was  over,  the  crews,  instead  of  lounging  and  sleep 
ing  in  their  tents  on  the  shore,  were  compelled  to  remain 
on  board  their  ships,  which  were  anchored.     For  seven 
days  they  endured  this  tax  on  their  patience ;  but  at  the 
end  of  the  week  Ionian  nature  could  hold  out  no  longer, 
and  the  issue  of  the  revolt  was  left  to  be  decided  by  a 
battle   of  which  the  historian    Herodotus   admits   that 
he  knows    practically  nothing.     Charges  and  counter 
charges  of  cowardice  and  treachery  were  mingled  with 
the  story  that,  as  soon  as  the  fight  began,  all  the  Samians, 
according  to  an  arrangement  made  with  their  deposed 
tyrant  Aiakes,  sailed  off  homewards,  with  the  exception 
of  eleven  ships  whose  trierarchs  or  captains  refused  to 
obey  the  orders  of  their  generals.     This  treacherous  de 
sertion  led  to  the  flight  of  the  Lesbians,  whose  example 
was  speedily  followed  by  the  larger  number  of  the  ships 


no  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  v. 

composing  the  Ionian  fleet.  With  this  dastardly  beha 
viour  the  conduct  of  the  Chians  stands  out  in  honorable 
contrast:  but  although  with  their  hundred  ships  they 
succeeded  in  taking  many  of  the  enemy's  vessels,  their 
own  numbers  were  at  last  so  far  reduced  that  they  were 
compelled  to  abandon  an  unavailing  contest. 

Whatever  points  in  it  may  be  confused  or  uncertain, 

the  narrative  lays  bare  an  astonishing  lack  of  coherence 

among   the    confederates.      Almost   every- 

Disunion  .  .  * 

and  weak-  where  we  see  a  selfish  isolation,  of  which 
Asiatic  distrust  and  faithlessness  are  the  natural 

fruits ;  and  as  in  the  intrigues  of  Hippias 
we  have  a  real  and  adequate  cause  for  Persian  interfer 
ence  in  Western  Greece,  so  this  selfishness  and  obsti 
nacy  of  the  Asiatic  Greeks  explains  fully  the  catastrophe 
which  followed  the  enterprise  too  hastily  taken  in  hand 
by  Aristagoras.  The  old  strife  between  patricians  and 
plebeians,  which  had  crushed  for  a  time  the  political 
growth  of  Athens,  paralyzed  the  Eastern  Greeks  in  their 
struggle  with  Persia.  The  tyranny  which  left  even 
Athenians  spiritless,  until  their  chains  were  broken, 
compelled  the  Samian  commons  to  take  part  in  a 
treachery  which  they  loathed  and  against  which  some 
protested  by  an  act  of  mutiny.  The  fate  of  the  insur 
rection  was  sealed  by  the  partizans  of  the  banished  des 
pots  ;  and  Dionysios,  the  Phokaian,  determined  to  quit 
his  country  forever.  With  three  war-ships  taken  from 
the  enemy  he  sailed  straight  to  Phenicia,  and  swooping 
down  on  an  unguarded  port,  sunk  some  merchant  vessels 
and  sailed  with  a  large  booty  to  Sicily.  Here  he  turned 
pirate,  imposing  on  himself  the  conditions  that  his  pil 
lage  should  be  got  from  the  Carthaginians  and  Tyr 
rhenians  and  not  from  the  Italiot  or  Sikeliot  Greeks. 
The  ruin  of  the  Ionic  fleet  left  Miletos  exposed  to 


CH.  v.]  The  Ionic  Revolt.  in 

blockade  by  sea  as  well  as  by  land.     The  Persians  now 
set  vigorously   to   work,    undermining  the 

Siege  and 

walls  and  bringing  all  kinds  of  engines  to  capture  of 
bear  upon  them :  and  at  last,  in  the  sixth 
year  after  the  outbreak  of  the  revolt  under  Arista- 
goras,  the  great  city  fell.  The  grown  men, 
we  are  told,  were  for  the  most  part  slain ; 
the  rest  of  the  people  were  carried  away  to  Sousa, 
whence  they  were  sent  by  Dareios,  to  take  up  their 
abode  in  the  city  of  Ampe  at  the  mouth  of  the  Tigris. 
Miletos  with  the  plain  surrounding  it  was  occupied  by 
the  Persians ;  the  temple  at  Branchidai  was  plundered 
and  burnt,  and  the  treasures  which  Hekataios  had 
advised  the  lonians  to  use  to  good  purpose  became  the 
prey  of  the  conqueror.  We  must  suppose,  however, 
that  new  Greek  inhabitants  were  afterwards  admitted 
into  the  city,  for  Miletos,  shorn  though  it  was  of  its 
ancient  greatness,  continued  to  be,  as  it  had  been,  Hel 
lenic.  In  the  following  year  the  chief  islands 
of  the  groups  nearest  to  the  Asiatic  coast 
were  one  after  another  taken ;  and  thus  was 
brought  about  that  which  Herodotus  speaks 
of  as  the  third  conquest  of  Ionia, — the  first  being  its  sub 
jugation  by  the  Lydian  kings,  the  second  its  absorption 
along  with  the  empire  of  those  sovereigns  into  the  ocean 
of  Persian  dominion. 

From   the   conquest   of  the  Ionic    cities    the  Persian 
commanders  sailed  on  against  the  towns  on  the  north 
ern  shores  of  the  Hellespont.      The  task 
before  them  was  not  hard.  Many  towns  sur-         Miltiades 
rendered  at  once  ;  the  inhabitants  of  Byzan- 
tion  and  of  Chalkedon  on  the  opposite  Asiatic  promontory 
fled   away  and  found  a  new  home  on  the  coast  of  the 
Euxine  sea.     The  deserted  cities,  we  are  told,  were  burnt 


ii2  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  vi. 

to  the  ground  by  the  Phenicians,  who  took  all  the  towns 
of  the  Thrakian  Chersonesos  except  Kardia.  Here 
Miltiades,  the  future  victor  of  Marathon,  still  lingered, 
until,  hearing  that  the  Phenicians  were  at  Tenedos,  he 
loaded  five  ships  with  his  goods,  and,  setting  sail  for 
Athens,  reached  that  city  safely,  although  he  lost  one  of 
his  vessels  in  an  encounter  with  the  Phenician  fleet  off 
the  promontory  of  Elaious. 

L  1  B.  K  A  R  Y 


DIVERSITY  OF 


LIFORNIA. 

THE  INVASION  OF  DATIS  AND  ARTAPHERNES. 


THE  threats  of  vengeance  by  which  it  is  said  that  the 
Persians  sought  to  chill  the  courage  of  the  Asiatic  Greeks 

were  not  fulfilled.  Whatever  may  have 
f  Aru-  been  their  motives,  we  find  them,  after  the 
fon™es  m  complete  subjugation  of  the  country,  adopting 

a  policy  which  does  credit  to  their  humanity, 
although  perhaps  not  to  their  prudence;  and  the  satrap 
Artaphernes  comes  before  us  as  an  administrator  en 
gaged  in  placing  on  a  permanent  footing  the  relations  of 
these  Greeks  with  their  master.  The  method  of  his  re 
forms  certainly  struck  at  the  root  of  the  evils  which  had 
arrested  or  distorted  their  political  growth  ;  and  for  so 
doing  it  might  be  thought  that  he  would  deserve  blame 
rather  than  praise  at  the  hands  of  a  despot  who  could 
scarcely  be  expected  to  look  with  favor  on  a  system 
likely  to  make  his  enemies  more  formidable.  By  com 
pelling  these  Greek  tribes  to  lay  aside  their  incessant 
feuds  and  bickerings,  and  to  obey  a  law  which  should 
put  an  end  to  acts  of  violence  and  pillage  between  Hel- 


CH.  vi.]  Invasion  of  Datis  and  Artaphernes.          113 

lenic  cities,  he  was  enforcing  changes  which  could 
scarcely  make  them  more  obedient  and  tractable  sub 
jects,  and  which  the  historian  rightly  regarded  as  a  vast 
improvement  on  their  former  condition.  These  changes, 
Herodotus  significantly  adds,  he  compelled  them  to 
adopt  whether  they  desired  them  or  not,  while,  after 
havmg  the  whole  country  surveyed,  he  also  imposed  on 
each  that  assessment  of  tribute  which,  whether  paid  or 
not  (and  during  the  whole  period  of  Athenian  supremacy 
it  was  not  paid),  remained  on  the  king's  books  as  the 
legal  obligation  of  the  Asiatic  Greeks,  until  the  Persian 
Empire  itself  fell  before  the  victorious  arms  of  Alexan 
der  the  Great.  As  the  amount  of  his  assessment  was 
much  what  it  had  been  before  the  revolt,  the  Persians 
cannot  be  charged  with  adding  to  their  burdens  by  .way 
of  retaliation. 

Still  more  remarkable,  in  the  judgment  of  Herodotus, 
were  the  measures  of  Mardonios,  who  arrived  at  the 
Hellespont  in  the  spring  of  the  second  year 
after  the  fall  of  Miletos.  This  man,  who  Mardonios. 
had  maried  a  daughter  of  Dareios,  and  who  493  B'  c' 
was  now  in  the  prime  of  manhood,  had  come  expressly 
for  the  purpose  of  extending  the  Persian  empire  over  the 
whole  of  western  Greece ;  but  before  he  went  on  to  take 
that  special  vengeance  on  Athens  which  was  the  alleged 
object  of  his  expedition,  he  undertook  and  achieved, 
it  is  said,  the  task  of  putting  down  the  tyrants  and  of 
establishing  democracies  in  all  the  Ionic  cities.  The 
work  was  one  which,  as  Herodotus  truly  remarks,  was 
little  to  be  looked  for  from  a  Persian  ;  yet  it  can  scarcely 
mean  more  than  that  he  drove  away,  or  possibly  killed 
(as  the  more  effectual  mode  of  dealing  with  them),  the 
Hellenic  tyrants,  on  whose  deposition  the  people 'would 
at  once  return  to  the  constitution  subverted  by  these  des- 


H4  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  vi. 

pots ;  nor  is  it  easy  to  see  wherein  this  task  differed  from 
that  which  the  historian  has  just  ascribed  to  Artaphernes. 
In  his  account  of  the  changes  enforced  by  that  satrap  no 
mention  is  made  of  tyrants.  The  cities  are  compelled 
to  enter  into  permanent  alliance  with  each  other,  where 
as,  if  these  cities  had  each  its  sovereign,  the  engagements 
must  have  been  made  in  the  names  of  these  rulers  :  nor 
could  Artaphernes  have  failed  to  perceive  that  unless  all 
the  towns  had  tyrants  or  rulers,  or  were  made  to  govern 
themselves,  it  would  be  impossible  to  maintain  peace 
long,  and  indeed  that,  unless  he  expelled  the  tyrants,  in 
whom  he  could  by  no  means  place  implicit  trust,  his 
labor  must  be  thrown  away.  All  therefore  that  can  be 
said  is  that,  if  Artaphernes  carried  out  his  measures  be 
fore  the  arival  of  Mardonios,  nothing  more  remained  for 
the  latter  than  to  sanction  changes  of  which  he  approved. 

But  Mardonios  was  not  destined  to  achieve  the  greater 
task  for  which  he  had  been  despatched  from  Sousa. 
Discomfi  ^e  work  °f  conquest  was  indeed  carried 

tureofMar-  bey ond  the  bounds  reached  by  Megabazos 
Thnrl°cSein  (p.  76).  But  when,  having  left  Akanthos 

492  B.  c.  (?)  tjje  fleet  was  coasting  along  the,  peninsula 
of  Akte,  a  fearful  storm  dashed  his  ships  on  the  iron- 
bound  coast  of  Mount  Athos  (p.  32),  while  many  thou 
sands  of  his  men  were  killed  either  by  the  force  of  the 
waves  beating  against  the  rocks  or  by  the  sharks  which 
abounded  in  this  part  of  the  sea.  On  land  his  army  was 
attacked  by  a  native  tribe,  who  caused  a  great  slaughter, 
but  who  nevertheless  were  compelled  to  submit  to  the  Per 
sian  king.  Still  the  disaster  which  had  befallen  his  fleet 
made  it  impossible  to  advance  further  south,  and  Mar 
donios,  accordingly,  returned  home,  where  during  the 
reign  of  Dareios  he  is  heard  of  no  more. 

The  failure  of  Mardonios  seems  to  have  made  Dareios 


CH.  vi.]  Invasion  of  Datis  and  Artaphernes.          115 

more  than  ever  resolved  to  ascertain  how  far  he  might 
count  on  the  acquiescence  of  the  Greeks  in 

.  I  _  .  .  Mission  of 

the  extension  of  his  empire.  In  the  step  the  envoys 
taken  by  the  king  we  may  fairly  discern  the  to  the  Greek 
influence  of  H4ppias,  who  left  nothing  un-  Clties- 
done  to  fan  the  flame  which  he  had  kindled  (p.  93).  The 
way  would  be  in  great  measure  cleared  for  the  complete 
subjugation  of  Hellas  if  the  king  could,  without  the 
trouble  of  fighting,  learn  how  many  of  the  insular  and 
continental  Greeks  would  be  willing  to  enroll  themselves 
as  his  slaves.  Heralds  were  accordingly  sent,  it  is  said, 
throughout  all  Hellas,  demanding  in  the  king's  name 
the  offering  of  a  little  earth  and  a  little  water.  The  sum 
mons  was  readily  obeyed,  we  are  told,  by  the  men  of  all 
the  islands  visited  by  the  heralds,  and  probably  also  by 
those  continental  cities  which  we  find  afterwards  among 
the  zealous  allies  of  Xerxes.  Among  the  islanders  who 
thus  yielded  up  their  freedom  were  the  Aiginetans,  who 
by  this  conduct  drew  down  upon  themselves  the  wrath 
of  the  Athenians  with  whom  they  were  almost  continu 
ally  at  war.  Their  commerce  in  the  eastern  waters  of 
the  Mediterranean  may  have  made  them  loth  to  run  the 
risks  of  a  struggle  with  such  a  power  as  Persia  ;  but 
hatred  of  Athens  may  with  them,  as  with  the  Thebans, 
have  been  a  motive  not  less  constraining.  Athenian 
envoys  appeared  at  Sparta  with  a  formal  complaint 
against  the  Aiginetans.  They  had  acted  treacherously, 
the  ambassadors  asserted,  not  towards  the  Athenians  or 
towards  any  Greek  city  in  particular  but  against  Hellas  ; 
and  the  charge  shows  not  merely  the  growth  of  a  certain 
collective  Hellenic  life,  but  also  that  Sparta  was  the  re 
cognized  head  of  this  informal  confederacy.  It  is,  more 
over,  urged  on  the  ground,  not  of  inability  on  the  part 
of  the  Athenians  to  punish  the  men  of  Aigina  if  they 


n6  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  vi. 

chose  to  do  so,  but  of  the  duty  of  the  Spartans  to  see 
that  no  member  of  the  Greek  commonwealth  betrayed 
the  interest  of  the  society  of  which  it  formed  a  part.  The 
harmony  here  exhibited  between  the  Athenian  and 
the  Spartans  is  due  probably  to  the  presence  of  a  com 
mon  danger,  which  threatened  the  latter  only  in  a  less 
degree  than  it  pressed  upon  the  former.  A  strange  story 
is  told  that  when  the  heralds  appeared  at  Athens  and  at 
Sparta  they  were  in  the  former  city  thrown  into  the 
Barathron,  a  chasm  into  which  the  bodies  of  criminals 
were  hurled,  and  in  the  latter  into  a  well,  having  been 
told  first  to  get  thence  the  earth  and  water  which  they 
wished  to  carry  to  the  king.  The  maltreatment  of 
heralds  was  a  crime  alien  to  the  Greek  character  gener 
ally  ;  in  the  eyes  of  Athenians  and  Spartans  it  was  a 
crime  especially  heinous,  and  the  subsequent  conduct  of 
the  latter  people  is  by  no  means  in  accordance  with  this 
outburst  of  unreasoning  vehemence.  Nor  can  it  well  be 
supposed  that  Dareios  would  send  messengers  to  the 
Spartans  who  had  espoused  the  cause  of  the  Lydian  king 
Kroisos,  had  sent  an  imperious  message  to  Cyrus  himself 
(p.  49),  and  had  been  warned  by  Cyrus  that  they  should 
smart  for  their  presumption.  But  that  any  overtures 
should  be  made  to  the  Athenians,  is  to  the  last  degree 
unlikely.  If  any  such  were  made,  they  would  have 
taken  the  form  of  a  demand  that  they  should  receive 
again  their  old  master  Hippias.  But  in  truth  Artapher- 
nes  had  long  since  taken  their  refusal  to  receive  him  as 
a  virtual  declaration  of  war  (p.  94) ;  and  it  is  hard  to 
think  that  a  summons  designed  to  test  those  with  whom 
the  Persian  king  had  not  come  into  conflict  should  be 
sent  to  men  who  were  his  open  and  avowed  enemies.  It 
is  obvious  that,  if  these  two  great  cities  were  exempted 
from  the  number  of  those  who  were  bidden  to  acknow- 


Cil.  vi.]  Invasion  of  Datis  and  Artaphernes.  117 

ledge  the  supremacy  of  Persia,  they  would  be  as  much 
driven  to  make  common  cause  with  each  other  as  if  they 
had  slain  the  officers  of  Dareios.  On  the  other  hand  the 
zeal  with  which  the  Athenians  in  spite  of  all  discourage 
ments  maintained  the  contest  against  Xerxes  would 
readily  account  for  the  growth  of  a  story  which  seemed 
to  pledge  them  to  such  conduct  from  the  first.  As  soon 
as  it  grew  up,  one  of  the  additions  made  to  the  tale  repre 
sented  Themistokles  as  desiring  that  the  interpreter  who 
came  with  them  should  be  put  to  death,  because  he  had 
profaned  the  Greek  language  by  making  it  the  vehicle 
of  a  summons  to  slavery.  By  another  version  the  pro 
posal  to  slay  the  heralds  was  ascribed  to  Miltiades  who 
had  acquired  a  reputation  for  supposed  service  to  the 
Greek  cause  at  the  bridge  over  the  Danube  (p.  73). 

The  appeal  of  the  Athenians  imposed  on  the  Spartans 
the  necessity  of  asserting  their  jurisdiction  over  the  Aigi- 
netans,  if  they  cared  to  maintain  at  all  the      w    . 
theory   of  their  supremacy  ;    but  probably      twecn  Argos 
even  this  need  would  not  have  stirred  them 
to  action,  if  Argos,  the  old  rival  of  Sparta,  had  not  been 
already  humbled.     This  ancient  city,  which  in  times  pre 
ceding  the  dawn  of  contemporary  history  appears  as  the 
predominant  power    in   Peloponnesos,  and  which  had 
probably  from  the  first  regarded  with  instinctive  jealousy 
the  growth  of  its  southern  neighbors,  was  now  staggering 
under  a  blow  fatal  to  all  hopes  of  her  continued  headship 
in  Hellas.     Two  or  three  years  before  the  ar 
rival  of  the  Persian  heralds  a  war  had  broken 
out  in  which  the  Spartan  king  Kleomenes  had  inflicted 
on  the  Argives  a  defeat  which  left  them  practically   at 
the  mercy  of  their  conquerors.  This  humiliation  of  Argos 
justified  Kleomenes  in  making  an  effort  to  seize  those 
Aiginetans  who  had  been  foremost  in  swearing  obcdi- 


n8  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  vi. 

ence  to  Dareios  ;  but  there  remained  other  hindrances 
in  his  path  which  were  not  so  easily  put  aside.  To  his 
demand  for  the  surrender  of  these  men  the  reply  was 
returned  that  no  attention  could  be  paid  to  the  words 
of  a  Spartan  king,  who  was  acting  illegally,  as  having 
come  without  his  colleague  (p.  22)  Demaratos,  the  future 
companion  and  adviser  of  Xerxes,  in  the  wonderful  epic 
of  the  Persian  War.  The  point  of  law  thus  raised  was 
not  to  be  lightly  disregarded.  Kleomenes  went  back  to 
Sparta,  fully  resolved  to  bring  about  the  downfall  of  the 
man  who  had  thwarted  and  foiled  him  in  his  march  to 
Athens,  (p.  94)  ;  and  he  found  the  means  in  the  stories 
Deposition  of  told  about  his  birth.  Old  scandals  were 
Demaratos.  stirred  afresh,  and  Demaratos,  deposed 
from  his  office  on  the  score  of  illegitimacy,  made  his 
way  into  Asia,  where,  we  are  told,  that  Dareios  assigned 
him  a  territory  with  cities  to  afford  him  a  revenue. 
Some  time  after  his  flight,  the  conspiracy  which  had 
pulled  him  from  his  throne,  was  brought  to  light,  and 
Kleomenes,  to  avoid  a  public  trial  fled  into  Thessaly, 
whence  he  returned  with  an  army  sworn  to  follow  him 
by  the  awful  sanction  of  the  waters  of  the  Styx.  Such 
an  army  the  Spartans  dared  not  face.  Kleomenes  was 
restored  to  his  office  and  its  honors;  but  his  mind  now 
gave  way.  He  insulted  the  citizens  whom  he  met  in  the 
streets,  and  on  being  put  under  restraint,  obtained  a 
knife  from  his  keeper  and  cut  himself  to  pieces. 

Against  tribes  thus  agitated  by  the  turmoil  of  inces- 
,    sant  intrigues,  and  habituated  to  an  almost 

Expedition  of  ... 

Datis  and  complete  political  isolation,  the  Persian  king 
aVatns^NTxos  was  now  preparing  to  discharge  the  prodi- 
and  Eretria.  gious  forces  at  his  command.  He  had  some 
old  wrongs  probably  to  avenge  in  addition  to  the  burn 
ing  of  the  temple  of  Kybebe  in  Sardeis :  but  Hippias, 


CH.  vi.]  Invasion  of  Datis  and  Artaphernes.  119 

the  fallen  despot  of  Athens  was  at  hand  to  urge  him  on 
by  still  more  importunate  pleading.  The  command  of 
the  expedition  he  intrusted,  not  to  the  disgraced  Mardo- 
nios,  but  to  his  brother  Artaphernes,  and  to  a  Median 
named  Datis,  who,  announcing  himself,  it  is  said,  as  the 
representative  of  Medos,  the  son  of  the  Athenian  Aigeus, 
and  of  his  wife,  the  Kolchian  Medeia,  claimed  of  right 
the  style  and  dignity  of  king  of  Athens.  Their  mission 
was  to  enslave  the  men  of  that  city  together  with  the  in 
habitants  of  the  Euboian  Eretria,  and  to  bring  them  into 
their  master's  presence.  For  this  purpose  a  vast  army 
was  gathered  in  Kilikia  (Cilicia) ;  and  the  first  work  of 
this  mighty  host  was  to  punish  the  Naxians,  who  had 
foiled  the  scheme  suggested  by  the  Milesian  Arista- 
goras,  (p.  100).  The  task  was  now  by  comparison  easy. 
The  suppression  of  the  Ionic  revolt  had  struck  terror 
into  the  hearts  of  the  Greeks  generally ;  and  the  Naxians, 
at  the  approach  of  the  Persians,  fled  to  the  mountains. 
Those  who  remained  in  the  town  were  enslaved;  and 
the  city  with  its  temples  was  burnt.  The  Delians  alone 
among  the  islanders  were  otherwise  treated.  These  also 
had  sought  refuge  on  the  heights :  but  Datis  bade  the 
holy  men  return  to  their  homes  without  fear,  as  he  had 
been  strictly  charged  by  his  master  not  to  hurt  the  lands 
of  the  Twin  Gods.  The  first  opposition  to  the  Persian 
force  came  from  the  people  of  Karystos,  the  southern 
most  town  of  Euboia;  but  the  blockade  of  their  city 
and  the  ravaging  of  their  lands  soon  showed  them  the 
hopelessness  of  resistance.  From  Karystos  the  fleet 
sailed  northward  to  Eretria,  which  for  six  days  withstood 
the  assaults  made  upon  it.  On  the  seventh  the  place 
was  lost  by  the  treachery  of  two  of  its  citizens;  the 
temples  were  burnt,  and  the  inhabitants  partially  reduced 
to  slavery. 


1 20  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  vi. 

Thus  far  the  Persians  might  well  have  fancied  that  to 
the  end  of  their  voyage  they  were  to  sail  upon  a  sum 
mer  sea.     Their   enemies  had  given  way  before  them 
like   chaff  before   the  wind;    and    Hippias 

Landing  of 

the  Persians  at  probably  nattered  their  vanity  by  assurances 
that  they  would  encounter  no  more  serious 
resistance  even  at  Athens  or  at  Sparta.  But  meanwhile 
they  must  advance  with  at  least  ordinary  care :  and  his 
knowledge  of  the  land  which  he  had  once  ruled,  might 
now  serve  his  Persian  friends  to  good  purpose.  The  best, 
ground  which  it  contained  for  the  movements  of  cavalry 
was  the  plain  of  Marathon,  bounded  by  the  north-eastern 
Chersonesos  or  promontory  of  Attica  (p.  20) :  and  at 
Marathon  accordingly  the  banished  despot 
of  Athens  landed  with  his  Persian  support 
ers  to  fight  the  battle  which  was  to  determine  the  future 
course  of  the  history  of  his  country.  Nearly  half  a 
century  had  passed  away  since  in  his  early  youth  he 
had  accompanied  his  father,  Peisistratos,  from  the  same 
spot  on  his  march  to  Athens,  (p.  85).  At  that  time 
the  Athenians  had  learnt  no  other  political  lesson  than 
to  submit  to  the  man  who  surrounded  himself  with  a 
hedge  of  mercenary  spears,  or  else  to  keep  themselves 
traitorously  neutral,  while  the  nobles  wasted  their  own 
powers  and  the  strength  of  the  state  in  feuds  and  fac 
tions.  But  those  days  were  happily  now  gone  forever. 
The  indifference,  which  Solon  had  denounced  as  the 
worst  crime  of  which  a  citizen  could  be  guilty,  had  given 
place  to  a  determined  resolution  to  defend  the  laws 
which  gave  to  each  man  the  right  of  free  speech,  free 
voting,  and  free  action,  and  which  filled  him  with  the 
consciousness  that  he  was  working  for  himself,  and  not 
for  masters,  who  looked  on  his  efforts  as  on  the  move 
ments  of  mere  machines.  If  they  had  learnt  to  regard 


490  B.C.]  Invasion  of  Da t 'is  and  Artaphernes.         121 

one  thing  more  than  another  with  aversion  and  dread, 
that  thing  was  the  irresponsible  rule  of  one  man  who 
was  at  once  law-giver  and  judge  ;  and  in  this  conviction, 
which  inspired  them  with  an  energy  and  perseverance 
never  yet  seen  in  any  Hellenic  community,  lay  a 
hindrance  to  his  schemes,  and. to  the  ambition  of  the 
Persian  king  which  Hippias  had  not  taken  into  account. 
During  the  twenty  years  which  had  passed  since  his 
flight  to  Sigeion,  the  spell  of  the  old  despotism  had  been 
broken.  The  substitution  of  geographical  in  place  of 
the  old  religious  tribes,  (p.  90)  had  swept  away  the  ser 
vile  veneration  which  had  once  been  felt  for  the  Eupa- 
trid  houses :  and  every  citizen  had  been  taught  that  he 
was  a  member  of  an  independent  and  self-governed 
society.  This  radical  change  had  not  only  brought 
forward  a  new  class  of  statesmen  from  the  middle,  or 
even  from  the  lower  orders  of  the  state,  but  it  had  roused 
to  a  more  generous  and  disinterested  patriotism,  some 
who  had  grown  up  under  the  influence  of  the  old  tradi 
tion  ;  and  thus  by  a  strange  course  of  things,  the  exiled 
despot  of  Athens,  in  setting  foot  once  more  on  Attic 
ground,  was  confronted  by  the  very  man  whom,  as  an 
apt  pupil  in  his  own  school,  he  had  sent  to  govern  the 
Thrakian  Chersonesos  (p.  87). 

A    still   more    formidable  hindrance  to   the  plans  of 
Hippias  and  Dareios  was  involved  in  the  rise  of  states 
men  at  Athens  like  Themistokles  and  Aris-   Early  career 
teides.     Neither  of  these  men  belonged  to   ™d0f.hjJ3£' 
the  old  Eupatrid  nobility:  and  the  wife  of  teides  and 
Neokles,  the   father  of  Themistokles,  was   SSl* 
even  a  foreigner  from  Karia  or  Thrace.  But 
although  neither  wealthy  nor  by  birth  illustrious,  these 
two  men  were  to  exercise  a  momentous  influence   on 
the  history  not  only  of  Iheir  own  city  but  of  all  western 


122  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  vi. 

civilization.  Singularly  unlike  each  other  in  temper  and 
tone  of  thought,  they  were  to  be  throughout  life  rivals 
in  whom  the  common  danger  of  their  country  would 
nevertheless  suppress  for  a  time  the  feeling  of  habitual 
animosity.  It  would  have  been  happier  for  themselves, 
happier  for  Athens,  if  they  had  been  rivals  also  in  that 
virtue  which  Greek  statesmen  have  commonly  and 
fatally  lacked.  Unfortunately  Themistokles  never  at 
tempted  to  aim  at  that  standard  of  pecuniary  incorrupti 
bility  which  won  for  Aristeides  the  name  of  the  Righteous 
or  the  Just.  The  very  title  implies  the  comparative  cor 
ruption  of  the  leading  citizens.  Of  his  rival  Themis 
tokles  it  would  be  as  absurd  to  draw  a  picture  free  from 
seams  arid  stains  as  it  would  be  to  attempt  the  same 
task  for  Oliver  Cromwell  or  Warren  Hastings.  That 
he  started  on  his  career  with  a  bare  competence  and 
that  he  heaped  together  an  enormous  fortune,  is  a  fact 
which  cannot  be  disputed.  That,  while  he  was  deter 
mined  to  consult  and  to  advance  the  true  interests  of  his 
country,  he  was  resolved  also  that  his  own  greatness 
should  be  secured  through  those  interests,  is  not  less 
certain.  Endowed  with  a  marvelous  power  of  discern 
ing  the  true  relations  of  things  and  with  a  knowledge, 
seemingly  instinctive,  of  the  method  by  which  the  worst 
complications  might  be  unraveled,  he  went  straight  to 
his  mark,  while  yet,  as  long  as  he  wished  it,  he  could 
keep  that  mark  hidden  from  every  one.  With  the  life 
of  such  a  man  popular  fancy  could  not  fail  to  be  busy ; 
and  so  the  belief  grew  up  that  he  knew  every  Athenian 
citizen  by  name.  However  this  may  have  been,  he  was 
enabled  by  his  astonishing  powers  of  apprehension  and 
foresight  to  form  the  truest  judgment  of  existing  things 
and  without  toilsome  calculation  to  forecast  the  future, 
while  yet  no  man  was  ever  more  free  from  that  foolhardy 


490  B.C.]  Invasion  of  Datis  and  Artaphernes.         123 

temper  which  thinks  that  mere  dash  and  bravery  can 
make  up  for  inexperience  and  lack  of  thought.  There 
was  no  haphazard  valor  in  Themistokles.  No  man  ever 
had  a  more  clearly  defined  policy,  and  no  man  could 
enforce  his  policy  with  more  luminous  persuasiveness. 
But  Themistokles  did  not  always  choose  to  do  this ;  and 
at  a  time  when  it  was  impossible  to  organize  into  a  sin 
gle  compact  body  an  army  made  up  of  men  almost 
fatally  deficient  in  power  of  combination,  he  was  com 
pelled  to  take  many  a  step  which,  to  the  free  citizens 
serving  under  him,  might  seem  to  be  but  scantily  justi 
fied  in  law.  He  knew  what  was  good  and  hurtful  for 
them  better  than  they  could  know  it  themselves  ;  and  he 
was  not  the  man  to  allow  technical  or  legal  scruples  to 
deter  him  from  measures  which  must  be  carried  out  at 
once  and  decisively  or  not  at  all.  But  his  genius  was 
not  yet  to  shine  out  in  its  full  lustre.  He  certainly  fought 
at  Marathon  ;  but  there  is  no  adequate  reason  for  think 
ing  that  he  was  the  general  of  his  tribe  in  that  momen 
tous  battle. 

In  the  peril  which  now  threatened  their  city  the 
Athenians  dispatched,  it  is  said,  an  earnest  entreaty  for 
help  to  the  Spartans  by  the  runner  Pheidip-  Preparations 
pides.  By  an  exploit  surpassing  altogether  jf^s*"" 
the  feats  of  Persian  or  Indian  runners,  the  Marathon, 
man  traversed,  we  are  told,  a  distance  of  not  less  than 
150  miles  between  the  morning  of  the  day  on  which  he 
set  out  from  Athens  and  the  evening  of  the  following  day 
when  he  reached  Sparta.  But  his  toil  was  thrown  away, 
In  vain  he  told  the  Spartans  that  the  Euboian  Eretria 
had  fallen  and  that  its  inhabitants  were  enslaved.  They 
must  obey  the  traditions  of  their  fathers,  and  they  would 
not  move  until  the  moon  should  be  full.  Meanwhile  on 
the  Persian  side  Hippias  was  busy  in  drawing  up  his 


124  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  VI. 

allies  in  battle  array  on  the  field  of  Marathon.  He  had 
seen  a  vision  which  seemed  to  portend  the  recovery  of 
his  former  power  ;  but  a  violent  fit  of  coughing  forced 
one  of  his  teeth  from  his  jaw,  and  his  hopes  at  once  gave 
way  to  despondency.  The  accident  was  much  like  that 
which  is  said  to  have  befallen  William  the  Conqueror  as 
he  landed  on  the  shore  of  Pevensey,  and  which  the  Nor 
mans  had  sense  and  readiness  enough  to  interpret  at 
once  as  a  presage  of  victory.  Hippias  could  only  bewail 
among  his  friends  the  fate  which  assigned  to  him  no 
larger  a  portion  of  Attic  soil  than  might  suffice  to  bury  a 
tooth.  On  the  Athenian  side  the  sign  of  coming  success 
was  furnished  by  the  arrival  of  the  Plataians,  with  the 
full  military  force  of  their  city.  These  Boiotians,  wishing 
to  sever  themselves  from  all  connection  with 
Thebes,  had  applied  to  the  Spartan  king 
Kleomenes  for  permission  to  enroll  themselves  as  mem 
bers  of  the  Spartan  confederacy.  Kleomenes  was  then 
on  his  march  through  Boiotia  to  Sparta,  after  his  unsuc 
cessful  attempt  to  effect  the  ruin  of  Kleisthenes  at  Athens 
and  to  destroy  his  constitution.  Irritated  at  his  failure, 
he  was  in  the  mood  which  made  any  opportunity  wel 
come  for  doing  an  ill  turn  to  the  Athenians.  Such  an 
occasion  he  thought  that  he  had  found  in  this  offer  of  the 
Plataians.  If  he  accepted  it  for  his  own  city,  he  might 
involve  Sparta  in  quarrels  or  even  in  wars  with  Thebes ; 
the  same  result  might  follow  for  Athens  if  the  alliance 
were  made  with  her,  and  thus  by  recommending  the 
Plataians  to  apply  to  her,  he  should  be  placing  a  thorn 
in  the  side  of  the  Athenians,  as  he  heartily  wished  to  do- 
His  anticipations  were  only  in  part  justified  by  the  event. 
The  Plataians  followed  his  advice,  and  the  alliance 
with  Athens  was  made.  To  the  latter,  if  it  did  no  good, 
it  did  little  harm ;  but  it  was  destined  to  bring  about  the 


490  B.C.]  Invasion  of  Datis  and  Artaphernes.         125 

ruin  of  Plataia,  against  which  Kleomenes  had  no  special 
grudge. 

For  the  present  all  things  looked  well,  and  the  Platai- 
ans  approached  Marathon  with  an  unselfish  devotion 
which  dared  the  risk  of  bringing  on  themselves  the  ven 
geance  of  the  Persian  king  in  case  of  defeat,  and  which 
must  have  convinced  the  Athenians  that  , 

The  Plataians 

there  was  that  in  Hellas  for  which  it  was  and  theAthe- 
worth  while  to  fight  stoutly.  From  this  time 
forth  the  zeal  which  they  now  displayed  cemented  the 
friendship  which  had  already  existed  between  the  two 
cities  for  nearly  twenty  years ;  and  in  the  solemn  quin 
quennial  sacrifices  at  Athens  the  herald  invoked  the 
blessing  of  heaven  on  Athenians  and  Plataians  alike. 

Probably  not  more  than  two  days  had  passed  from  the 
moment  when  Militades  and  his  colleagues  left  Athens 
to  the  hour  when  they  returned  from  Mara-   Rea]  des.  ns 
thon,  winners  of  a  victory  for  which  they   ofHippiasand 

.  .      .  _          .         .  ,  the  Persians. 

could  scarcely  have  dared  to  hope.  There 
had  been  a  delay  of  many  days  before  they  set  out  on 
their  march  ;  but  the  promptitude  of  their  movements, 
when  once  they  left  the  city,  disconcerted  the  plans  not 
only  of  their  open  enemies  but  of  traitors  within  their 
walls,  for  by  this  name  only  can  the  partisans  of  Hippias 
rightly  be  described.  The  banished  tyrant  had  devised 
a  scheme  which  did  credit  to  his  military  sagacity.  The 
Persian  fleet  was  drawn  up  by  the  shore,  and  the  tents 
of  the  invaders  lined  the  edge  of  the  Marathonian  plain 
which  by  the  lower  road  between  Hymettos  and  Penteli- 
kos  lay  at  a  distance  of  about  twenty-five  miles  from 
Athens.  To  all  appearance  it  seemed  that  the  Persian 
commanders  meant  to  fight  there  the  decisive  battle,  and 
there  in  fact  it  was  fought :  but  such  was  not  their  real 
intention.  The  landing  on  Marathon  was  a  feint  to 


126  The  Persian  Wars;  [CH.  vi. 

draw  off  the  Athenian  land  force  from  the  city,  while  the 
real  attack  should  be  made  from  the  Phaleric  Plain  by 
troops  hastily  landed  from  the  Persian  ships  ;  and  it  had 
been  agreed  between  Hippias  and  his  partisans  that  this 
movement  should  be  made  so  soon  as  a  white  shield, 
raised  probably  on  the  heights  of  Pentelikos,  should 
give  warning  that  the  Athenian  army  was  fairly  on  its 
way  to  Marathon.  If  the  raising  of  this  signal  should 
precede  the  departure  of  the  army,  the  purpose  of  raising 
it  would  be  frustrated  ;  for  the  Athenian  leaders  would  in 
this  case  refuse  to  leave  the  city  exposed  to  unknown 
dangers.  If  again  it  were  delayed  long  after  their  de 
parture,  the  raising  of  it  would  go  for  nothing.  It  was  of 
the  utmost  consequence  that  the  tidings  should  be  con 
veyed  to  the  Persian  generals  before  the  Athenians 
should  themselves  be  able  to  see  the  sign,  and  that  thus 
the  Persian  ships  should  have  the  start  of  many  hours,  or 
rather  of  two  days,  in  their  voyage  to  the  Athenian  har 
bor.  A  bolder  or  more  sagacious  plan  for  furthering  the 
interests  of  Hippias,  and  Dareios  could  scarcely  have 
been  formed ;  and  although  the  details  of  this  scheme 
might  remain  unknown  to  the  Athenian  generals,  they 
could  not  but-be  aware  that  within  the  walls  of  the  city 
the  cause  of  Hippias  was  favored  by  a  minority  by  no 
means  insignificant.  The  consciousness  of  the  intrigues 
going  on  around  them  could  not  fail  to  produce  hesita 
tion  in  their  councils  and  uncertainty  in  their  action. 
There  were  traditions  which  transferred  this  hesitation  to 
the  field  of  Marathon  at  the  cost  of  rendering  almost  the 
whole  narrative  inexplicable  ;  but  there  was  also  another 
version  which  ascribed  the  delay  to  a  time  preceding  the  • 
departure  of  the  army  from  the  gates  of  Athens.  The 
story  told  by  Herodotus  represents  Miltiades,  who  with 
four  others  wished  for  immediate  battle,  as  appealing  to 


490  B»  c.  ]  Invasion  of  Datis  and  Artaphernes.         127 

the  military  archon  (p.  82)  or  polemarch  Kallimachos  to 
give  his  casting  vote  against  the  five  generals  who  wished 
to  postpone  it.  The  appeal  was  made  in  stirring  lan 
guage  ;  but  although  Kallimachos  decided  to  fight  at 
once,  nothing  it  seems,  came  from  his  resolution.  The 
four  generals  who  had  all  along  agreed  with  Miltiades 
handed  over  to  him  the  presidency  which  came  to  each 
in  his  daily  turn :  still  Miltiades,  we  are  told,  would  not 
fight  until  his  own  presidency  came  in  its  ordinary  course. 
Unless  we  hold  that  the  Athenian  generals  would  deprive 
the  city  of  its  main  military  force  before  they  had  made 
up  their  minds  for  immediate  battle,  and  that  they  pre 
ferred  idleness  on  the  field  of  Marathon  while  their  ene 
mies  might  be  occupied  in  attacking  the  city  which  they 
had  deserted,  we  can  scarcely  resist  the  conclusion  that 
the  scene  of  this  inaction  was  not  Marathon  but  Athens. 
If  the  purpose  of  the  signal  was,  as  it  is  expressly  said 
to  have  been,  to  inform  Hippias  that  the  Athenian  army 
was  on  its  march,  or  in  immediate  preparation  for  it,  the 
token  was  superfluous  when  that  army  had  already  de 
filed  into  the  plain  in  sight  of  the  Persian  leaders ;  and 
it  is  least  of  all  likely  that  the  latter  would,  while  Miltiades 
and  his  army  lay  inactive  before  them,  delay  to  carry  out 
the  plans  of  Hippias  and  his  party,  when  the  very  thing 
which  they  wanted  was  that  which  had  actually  hap 
pened. 

At  length  Miltiades  and  his  colleagues  set  forth  at  the 
head  of  their  men.     The  manifest  caution  and  wariness 
of  the  generals  had  probably  tended  greatly 
to  disconcert  the  partisans  of  Hippias  ;  and      theAthe- 
the   divisions    thus    introduced    into    their      Marathon 
councils  must  have  delayed  the  raising  of  the 
signal  for  some  hours  after  the  army  had  set  out  on  its 
march.    When  at  length  the  white  shield  flashed  in  the 


128  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  vi. 

clear  air  from  the  summit  of  Pentelikos,  the  token  came, 
as  Herodotus  tells  us  too  late.  Indeed  the  historian 
candidly  confesses  that  of  this  mysterious  transaction 
he  knows  nothing  beyond  the  fact  that  the  shield  was 
raised  and  that  it  was  raised  to  no  purpose.  The  Per 
sians  were  already  in  their  ships,  not  in  readiness  for 
sailing  around  cape  Sounion  to  Phaleron,  but  hurrying 
from  the  field  on  which  they  had  undergone  a  terrible 
defeat.  Thus  we  have  before  us  a  picture  in  which, 
after  a  long  time  of  uncertainty  and  fear  the  Athenian 
generals  determine  on  vigorous  action,  and  hastening  to 
Marathon  engage  the  enemy  with  a  speed  and  enthusi 
asm  which  defeats  not  merely  the  Persians  but  the 
schemes  of  the  Athenian  oligarchs.  Doubt  and  hesita 
tion  are  left  behind  them  as  they  quit  the  gates  of  the 
city  and  their  encampment  on  the  field  of  Marathon 
preceded  probably  by  one  night  only  the  battle  which 
decided  the  fate  of  the  expedition. 

The  geography  of  Marathon  is  simple  enough.  To  the 
east  of  the  broad  plain  run  the  headlands  of  Rham- 
The  plain  of  nous  »  to  the  nortn  an^  northwest  the  ridges 
Marathon.  of  Parmes,  Pentelikos  and  Hymettos.  At 
either  end  of  the  plain  is  a  marsh,  the  northern  one  being 
still  at  all  seasons  of  the  year  impassable,  while  the 
smaller  one  to  the  south  is  almost  dried  up  during  the 
summer  heats.  Something  has  been  said  of  the  vines 
and  olives  of  Marathon  :  but  the  utter  bareness  of  the 
plain  at  the  present  day  may  lead  us  to  suppose  that 
these  trees  were  on  the  slopes  which  descended  to  the 
plain  rather  than  on  the  plain  itself. 

On  the  level  surface  between  the  hills  which  gird  it  in 
and  the  firm  sandy  beach  on  which  the  Persians  were 
Victory  of  drawn  up,  stood,  in  the  simple  story  of  He- 
rSn^6"  rodotus,  the  Athenian  army.  The  polemarch 


490  B.C.]  Invasion  of  Datis  and  Artaphernes.         129 

Kallimachos  headed  the  right  wing :  the  Plataians 
were  posted  on  the  left.  But  as  with  their  scantier 
numbers  it  was  needful  to  present  a  front  equal  to 
that  of  the  Persian  host,  the  middle  part  of  the  Greek 
army  was  only  a  few  men  deep  and  was  consequently 
very  weak,  while  the  wings  were  comparatively  strong. 
At  length  the  orders  were  all  given,  and  the  Athenians, 
beginning  the  onset,  went  running  towards  the  bar 
barians,  the  space  between  the  two  armies  being  not  less 
than  a  mile.  The  Persians,  when  they  saw  them  coming 
made  ready  to  receive  them,  at  the  same  time  thinking 
the  Athenians  mad,  because,  being  so  few  in  number, 
they  came  on  furiously  without  either  bows  or  horses. 
Coming  to  close  quarters,  they  engaged  in  a  conflict, 
both  long  and  furious,  of  which  none  could  foresee  the 
issue.  Victorious  in  the  centre,  the  Persians  and  Sakians 
broke  the  Athenian  lines  and  drove  them  back  upon  the 
plain  ;  but  the  Athenians  and  the  Plataians  had  the  best 
on  both  the  wings.  Wisely  refusing  to  go  in  chase  of  the 
barbarians  who  had  been  opposed  to  them,  these  closed 
on  the  enemy  which  had  broken  their  centre,  put  them 
to  flight  after  a  hard  struggle,  and  drove  them  with  great 
slaughter  to  the  sea,  where  they  tried  to  set  the  ships  of 
the  Persians  on  fire.  Seven  ships  were  thus  taken  :  with 
the  rest  the  barbarians  beat  out  to  sea,  and  taking  up  the 
Eretrian  captives  whom  they  had  left  on  an  islet  bearing 
the  name  Aigilia,  sailed  round  Sounion,  hoping  still  to 
succeed  in  carrying  out  the  plan  arranged  between  Hip- 
pias  and  his  partisans.  But  they  had  to  deal  with  an 
enemy  whose  vigor  and  discipline  far  surpassed  their 
own.  Hastening  back  with  all  speed  from  Marathon, 
the  Athenians  reached  the  city  first ;  and  the  barbarians 
thus  foiled  lay  for  a  while  with  their  fleet  off  Phaleron, 
and  then  sailed  back  to  Asia. 


130  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  vi. 

So  ended  the  first  great  conflict  of  Persians  with  Greeks 

who  had  not  yet  passed  under  the  yoke  of  a  foreign 

master.      During  their  revolt  the  Asiatic 

Importance  of       T       .  ,       ,      ,  ,  .. 

the  battle  of  lonians  had  shown  some  valor  and  made 
some  self-sacrifices  ;  but  there  can  be  little 
doubt  that  the  yoke  of  the  Lydian  kings,  light  as  it  was, 
tended  to  weaken  the  political  union  of  cities  fatally  dis 
posed  by  all  their  ancient  associations  and  traditions  to 
mutual  jealousy,  suspicion,  and  even  hatred.  In  the  west 
the  headship  of  Sparta  had  done  something  towards 
kindling  a  sentiment  which  may  be  regarded  as  in  some 
faint  degree  national ;  and  the  constitutional  changes  of 
Solon  and  Kleisthenes  had  done  more  to  create  at  Athens 
feelings  to  which  the  idea  of  irresponsible  power  exer 
cised  by  an  instrument  of  the  Persian  king  was  alto 
gether  revolting.  The  conduct  of  the  Athenians  at 
Marathon  was  the  natural  result  of  this  political  educa 
tion,  and  it  decided  the  issue  not  only  of  the  present 
enterprise  of  Dareios  but  the  subsequent  invasion  of 
Xerxes. 

In  this  memorable  conflict  the  polemarch  Kallimachos 

fell  fighting  bravely  ;  and  here  too  the  great  tragic  poet 

^Eschylos  won  renown  as  a  warrior,  while  his 

Popular  tradi-  ,          __  .  .    .          -  .. 

tions  of  the  brother  Kynegeiros  was  slain  after  perform 
ing  prodigies  of  valor.  Nor  was  the  number 
of  combatants  confined  to  men  then  living  in  the  flesh. 
The  old  heroes  of  the  land  rose  to  mingle  in  the  fray ; 
and  every  night  from  that  time  forth  might  be  heard  the 
neighing  of  phantom  horses  and  the  clashing  of  swords 
and  spears.  Thus  were  prolonged  the  echoes  of  the 
old  mysterious  battle ;  and  the  peasants  would  have  it 
that  the  man  who  went  to  listen  from  mere  motives 
of  prying  curiosity  would  get  no  good  to  himself,  while 
the  Daimones  or  presiding  deities  of  the  place  bore  no 


490  B.C.]  Invasion  of  Datis  and  Artaphernes.         131 

grudge  against  the  wayfarer  who  might  find  himself  ac 
cidentally  belated  in  the  field. 

The  sequel  of  the  popular  tradition,  running  in  the 
same  simple  vein,  tells  us  how  Datis  and  Artaphernes, 
sailing  away  to  Asia,  led  their  Eretrian 
slaves  up  to  Sousa,  where  Dareios,  though  offcign"65 
he  had  been  very  wroth  with  them  because  of  Dareios- 
they  had,  as  he  said,  begun  the  wrong,  did  them  no 
harm,  but  made  them  dwell  in  the  Kissian  land  in  his 
own  region  which  is  called  Arderikka.  There,  Hero 
dotus  adds,  they  were  living  down  to  his  own  time, 
speaking  still  their  old  language  :  and  their  descendants 
helped  in  their  measure  to  further  the  work  of  Alexander 
the  Great  when  he  swept  like  a  whirlwind  over  the 
empire  of  the  Persian  kings.  As  to  the  Spartans,  they 
set  out  in  haste  when  the  moon  was  full,  but  they  were 
too  late  for  the  battle  although  they  reached  Attica,  it  is 
said,  on  the  third  day  after  they  left  Sparta.  Still, 
wishing  to  look  upon  the  Medes,  they  went  to  Marathon 
and  saw  them,  and  having  praised  the  Athenians  for  all 
that  they  had  done,  went  home  again.  For  the  Persian 
monarch  the  tidings  had  a  more  poignant  sting.  The 
capture  of  Sardeis  had  made  him  bitter  enough  against 
the  Athenians  ;  but  the  story  of  the  battle  of  Marathon 
kindled  in  him  a  fiercer  wrath  and  a  more  vehement 
desire  to  march  against  Hellas.  Sending  his  heralds 
straightway  to  all  the  cities,  he  bade  them  make  ready 
an  army,  and  to  furnish  much  more  than  they  had  done 
before,  both  ships  and  horses  and  men.  While  the 
heralds  were  going  about,  all  Asia  was  shaken,  as  the 
historian  phrases  it,  for  three  years  ;  but  in  the  fourth 
year  the  Egyptians,  who  had  been  made  slaves  by 
Kambyses,  rebelled  against  the  Persians,  and  then  the 
king  sought  only  the  more  earnestly  to  go  both  against 


132  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  vi. 

the  Egyptians  and  against  the  Greeks.  So  naming  his 
son  Xerxes  to  be  king  over  the  Persians  after  himself, 
he  made  ready  for  the  march.  But  in  the  year  after  the 
revolt  of  Egypt  Dareios  himself  died ;  nor  was  he  suf 
fered  to  punish  the  Athenians,  or  the  Egyptians  who  had 
rebelled  against  him. 

But    if  all  these   traditions   commended  themselves 
equally  to  the  faith  of  Herodotus,  there  were 

Charges 

others  which  he  was  by  no  means  so  willing  brought  at 
to  receive.  Rumor  laid  on  the  Alkmaionids  gainst  the  ' 
the  guilt  of  raising  the  white  shield  which  Alkmaionidai. 
was  to  bring  the  Persians  round  Sounion  to  Phaleron, 
while  Miltiades  was  leading  the  Athenian  army  to  the 
plain  of  Marathon.  The  charge  attests  the  strength  of 
the  popular  superstition  which  regarded  this  great  family 
as  lying  under  a  permanent  curse  and  taint  for  their 
share  in  the  suppression  of  the  conspiracy  of  Kylon  (p. 
92)  ;  but  Herodotus  dismisses  it  with  emphatic  scorn. 
Whatever  may  have  been  the  merit  or  the  fault  of  those 
who  had  to  deal  with  Kylon,  to  the  Alkmaionidai,  he  in 
sists,  the  Athenians  practically  owed  their  freedom  and 
their  very  existence.  By  means  certainly  not  the  most 
scrupulous  they  had  brought  about  the  expulsion  of  the 
Peisistratidai,  while  to  Kleisthenes  they  were  indebted 
for  the  political  reforms  without  which  that  change  in 
the  Athenian  character  would  never  have  been  effected 
which  raised  an  unexpected  and  insuperable  barrier  to 
the  schemes  and  hopes  of  Hippias.  As  to  Harmodios 
and  Aristogeiton  the  historian  treats  their  miserable  con 
spiracy  with  contempt.  They  had  succeeded  only  in 
exasperating  the  surviving  kinsmen  of  Hipparchos, 
whereas  the  Alkmaionidai  had,  throughout,  shown  not 
the  spirit  which  acts  only  when  stirred  by  a  personal 
affront,  but  the  patriotism  which  renders  all  attempts  at 


49°  B.C.]  Invasion  of  Datis  and  Artaphernes.         133 

corruption  or  intimidation  impracticable,  and  which 
Herodotus  quaintly  compares  to  that  of  Kallias,  who  was 
bold  enough  to  buy  at  auction  the  property  which  Hippias 
left  behind  him  when  he  went  into  exile. 

For  Miltiades  the  battle— in  which   he  had  won   an 
imperishable  name— laid  open  a  path  which  led  to  ter 
rible  disaster.   His  reputation,  already  great      Expcdition 
since  his  reduction  of  Lemnos  (p.  76)  was      of  Miltiades 

f       to  Faros. 

immeasurably  enhanced  by  the  victory  of 
Marathon.  Never  before  had  any  one  man  so  fixed  on 
himself  the  eyes  of  all  Athenian  citizens  ;  and  the  con 
fidence  thus  inspired  in  them  he  sought  to  turn  to  account 
in  an  enterprise  which,  he  insisted,  would  make  them 
rich  for  ever.  He  would  say  nothing  more.  It  was  not 
for  them  to  ask  whither  he  meant  to  lead  them :  their 
business  was  only  to  furnish  ships  and  men.  These  they 
therefore  gave ;  and  Miltiades,  sailing  to  Paros,  an  island 
lying  a  few  miles  to  the  west  of  Naxos  (p.  99),  laid  siege 
to  the  city,  demanding  the  payment  of  100  talents,  under 
the  threat  that  he  would  destroy  the  place  in  case  of  re 
fusal.  The  alleged  motive  for  attacking  the  Parians  was 
their  treachery  in  furnishing  a  ship  for  the  Persian  fleet 
at  Marathon;  but  in  the  belief  of  Herodotus  Miltiades 
was  actuated  by  private  grudge  against  a  Parian  who  had 
slandered  him  to  the  Persian  general  Hy-  ^ 

darnes.  The  matter  might  seem  to  be  one 
about  which  Miltiades  could  not  feel  strongly,  or  which 
after  his  achievement  at  Marathon  he  might  regard  even 
with  some  pride  and  satisfaction.  But  like  the  men  of 
Andros  when  Themistokles  came  to  them  on  a  like 
errand  ten  years  later,  the  Parians  had  not  the  means 
of  payment,  and  they  put  him  off  under  various  pre 
tences,  until  by  working  diligently  at  night  they  had  so 
strengthened  their  walls  as  to  be  able  to  set  him  at  de- 


1 34  The  Persian  War$.  [CH.  vi. 

fiance.  The  siege  therefore  went  on  to  no  purpose ;  and 
after  a  blockade  of  twenty-six  days  Miltiades  was  obliged 
to  return  to  Athens  with  his  fleet,  having  utterly  failed 
of  attaining  his  object,  and  with  his  thigh,  or,  as  some 
said,  his  knee  severely  strained.  The  Parians,  Herodotus 
adds,  accounted  for  this  wound  by  the  tale  that  Miltiades, 
perplexed  at  the  long  continuance  of  the  siege,  entered 
into  treaty  with  the  priestess  Timo,  who  promised  him 
victory  if  he  would  follow  her  counsels ;  that  in  order  to 
confer  with  her  he  went  to  the  hill  in  front  of  the  town, 
and  being  unable  to  open  the  gate  leaped  the  hedge  of 
the  goddess  Demeter ;  and  that  on  reaching  the  doors  of 
the  temple  he  lost  his  presence  of  mind,  and  rushing 
back  in  terror  hurt  his  thigh  as  he  jumped  from  the  stone 
fence.  The  Parians  wished  to  requite  Timo  by  putting 
her  to  death  ;  but  asking  first  the  sanction  of  the  Delphian 
god,  they  received  for  answer  that  Timo  was  but  a  ser 
vant  in  the  hands  of  the  Fate  which  was  dragging 
Miltiades  to  his  doom.  The  Parians,  therefore,  let  the 
priestess  go :  the  Athenians  were  less  merciful  to  Miltiades. 
No  sooner  had  he  reached  Athens  than  the  indigna 
tion  of  the  people  who  professed  to  have  been  deceived 
Trial  and  ^^  c^eatec^  by  him  found  utterance  in  a 

death  of  capital  charge  brought  against  him  by  Xan- 

thippos,  the  father  of  the  great  Perikles. 
Miltiades  was  carried  on  a  bed  into  the  presence  of  his 
judges,  before  whom,  as  the  gangrene  of  his  wound 
prevented  him  from  speaking,  his  friends  made  for  him 
the  best  defence,  or  rather  perhaps  offered  the  best  ex 
cuses,  that  they  could.  The  charge  of  misleading  the 
people  was  one  that  could  not  be  rebutted  directly,  and 
before  a  court  of  democratic  citizens  they  had  not  the 
courage  to  say  that  in  being  misled  the  people  were  the 
greater  offenders.  But  if  an  adverse  verdict  could  not 


490  B.C.]  Invasion  of  Datis  and  Artaphernes.          135 

be  avoided,  the  penalty  might  by  Athenian  practice  be 
mitigated ;  and  it  was  urged  that  a  fine  of  fifty  talents, 
which  would  perhaps  suffice  to  meet  the  expenses  of  the 
expedition,  might  be  an  adequate  punishment  for  the 
great  general  but  for  whom  Athens  might  now  have  been 
the  seat  of  a  Persian  satrapy.  This  penalty  was  chosen 
in  place  of  that  of  death  ;  but  his  son  Kimon  would  have 
been  a  richer  man,  if,  like  Sokrates  ninety  years  later, 
Miltiades  had  maintained  that  the  proper  recompense 
for  his  services  to  the  state  would  be  a  public  mainte 
nance  during  life  in  the  Prytaneion  (p.  7).  As  in  the 
case  of  Sokrates,  the  judges  would  in  all  likelihood  have 
sentenced  him  to  die ;  and  the  death  which  the  mortifi 
cation  of  his  thigh  or  knee  brought  on  him  a  few  hours 
or  a  few  days  later  would  have  left  Kimon  free  from  the 
heavy  burden  which  the  Athenians  suffered  him  to  dis 
charge.  Miltiades  died  in  disgrace,  and  the  citizens 
whom  he  wished  to  enrich  recovered  from  his  family 
half  the  sum  which  he  had  striven  to  extort  from  the 
Parians.  But  there  seems  to  be  no  warrant  for  think 
ing  that  they  subjected  hjm  to  the  superfluous  indignity 
of  imprisonment ;  and  the  words  of  the  geographer  and 
antiquary  Pausanias  might  almost  justify  the  belief  that 
his  ashes  were  laid  in  the  tomb  raised  to  his  memory  at 
Marathon. 

Much  has  been   said  about  the  strange  end  of  this 
illustrious  man :  but  in  the  arguments  urged  on  either 
side   the   charge   of  fraud    and    deception      r0nduct  of 
brought  against  the  general  has  been  almost      the  Athe- 
thrust  into  the  background  by  that  of  fickle-      case  of  Mil- 
ness  and  levity  advanced  against  the  people 
which  condemned  him.     Such  a  charge  will  always  be 
welcomed  by  those  to  whom  any  form  of  democratical 
government  seems  repulsive.     Our  natural  tendency  to 


136  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  vi. 

sympathize  with  the  individual  against  an  aggregate  of 
citizens  is  so  strong  that  we  are  disposed  to  forget  that 
the  most  distinguished  services  can  confer  no  title  to 
break  the  law.  A  leader  who  has  won  for  himself  a  wide  • 
fame  for  his  wisdom  and  his  success  in  war  cannot  on 
the  ground  of  his  reputation  claim  the  privilege  of  break 
ing  his  trust  with  impunity.  On  the  other  hand,  fickle 
ness  and  ingratitude,  in  the  meaning  commonly  attached 
to  these  words,  are  not  to  be  reckoned  among  the  special 
sins  of  democracy,  and  least  of  all,  of  such  a  democracy 
as  that  of  Athens.  A  democratical  society  is  precisely  a 
society  in  which  personal  influence,  when  once  gained, 
is  least  easily  shaken  ;  and  confidence,  once  bestowed,  is 
continued  even  in  the  teeth  of  evidence  which  proves  in 
capacity  or  demerit.  But  because  in  a  democracy  a 
change  of  opinion,  once  admitted,  must  be  expressed 
freely  and  candidly,  the  expression  of  that  change  is  apt 
to  be  vehement  and  angry  ;  and  the  language  of  indig 
nation,  when  this  feeling  is  roused,  may  be  interpreted 
as  the  result  of  ingratitude  when  the  offender  happens  to 
be  a  man  eminent  for  former  services.  Nor  can  it  be 
said  that  the  ingratitude  and  injustice  of  democracies 
are  more  frequent  or  more  mischievous  than  the  mis 
doings  of  any  other  form  of  government.  Still  in  spite 
of  all  that  may  be  urged  on  the  other  side,  we  cannot 
fail  to  discern  in  the  Athenian  people  a  disposition  to 
shrink  from  responsibility  not  altogether  honorable,  and 
a  reluctance  to  take  to  themselves  blame  for  results  to 
which  they  had  deliberately  contributed.  When  the 
Syracusan  expedition  had  ended  in  utter  ruin  (6.0.413), 
they  accused  the  orators  who  had  urged  them  to  under 
take  it.  When,  seven  years  later  (B.C.  406),  they  had 
condemned  to  death  by  a  single  vote  the  generals  who 
had  won  the  victory  of  Argennoussai,  they  decreed  that 


49  o  B  .  c.  ]  Invasion  of  Datis  and  A  rtaphernes.         137 

the  men  who  had  entrapped  them  into  passing  the  sen 
tence  should  be  brought  to  trial.  Yet  in  both  these 
instances  they  were  finding  fault  for  the  result  of  their 
own  verdict  or  of  undertakings  to  which  they  had  given 
their  well-considered  and  solemn  sanction.  The  case  is 
altered  when  a  leader,  however  illustrious,  comes  forward 
with  enthusiastic  hopes  and  seeks  to  lead  his  country 
men  blindfold  into  schemes  of  which  he  will  not  reveal 
the  nature  and  of  which  it  is  manifestly  impossible  that 
he  could  guarantee  the  issue.  Such  cases  leave  no  room 
for  doubt.  No  state  or  people  can  under  any  circum 
stances  be  justified  in  engaging  the  strength  of  the  coun 
try  in  enterprises  with  the  details  of  which  they  have  not 
been  made  acquainted.  If  their  admiration  for  lofty  senti 
ment  or  heroic  courage  tempt  them  to  give  their  sanction 
to  such  a  scheme,  the  responsibility  is  shifted  from  him 
who  gives  to  those  who  adopt  the  counsel, — to  this  ex 
tent  at  least,  that  they  cannot,  in  the  event  of  failure,  visit 
him  in  any  fairness  with  penal  consequences.  Dismissal 
from  all  civil  posts,  and  the  humiliation  which  must  fol 
low  the  resentment  or  the  contempt  of  his  countrymen, 
may  not  be  for  such  a  man  too  severe  a  punishment ; 
but  a  more  rigorous  sentence  clearly  requires  purer  hands 
on  the  part  of  the  men  who  must  be  his  judges.  Nor  is 
there  much  force  in  the  plea  that  Athenian  polity  was 
then  only  in  the  days  of  its  infancy,  and  that  peculiar 
caution  was  needed  to  guard  against  a  disposition  too 
favorable  to  the  re-establishment  of  a  tyranny.  It  is 
almost  impossible  that  this  could  have  been  the  feeling 
of  the  time  ;  nor  is  the  imputation  flattering  to  men  who 
have  lived  for  twenty  years  under  the  Solonian  constitu 
tion  as  extended  and  reformed  by  Kleisthenes.  It  may 
be  true  that  the  leading  Greeks  could  not  bear  pros 
perity  without  mental  deprivation,  and  that  owing  to  this 


138  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  vi. 

tendency  the  successful  leader  was  apt  to  become  one 
of  the  most  dangerous  men  in  the  community ;  but  this 
fact  cannot  divest  a  people  of  responsibility  for  their 
own  resolutions.  Miltiades  may  have  been  corrupted 
by  his  glory ;  but  ordinary  shame  should  have  withheld 
the  hands  of  the  Athenians  from  one  whose  folly  they  had 
not  checked  and  whose  honesty  they  had  not  paused  to 
question.  But  we  are  bound  to  note  further  that  the 
alleged  ignorance  of  the  Athenians  was  rather  a  veil 
thrown  over  a  line  of  action  which,  as  being  unsuccess 
ful,  they  were  disposed  to  regard  as  discreditable,  and 
that  in  the  scheme  itself  they  were  the  accomplices 
rather  than  the  dupes  of  Miltiades.  In  this  instance 
the  raid  against  the  islanders  failed  altogether;  and 
the  unsuccessful  general  was  crushed.  A  like  attempt 
on  the  part  of  Themistokles  ten  years  later  was  crowned 
with  a  larger  measure  of  success,  and  was  regarded 
as  the  earnest  of  a  wide  empire  for  Athens  in  time 
to  come.  The  root  of  the  evil,  as  shown  whether  in 
their  rash  confidence  or  in  their  anger  against  the  un 
successful  leader,  lay  readily  at  the  very  foundations  of 
Athenian  polity,  and  perhaps  at  the  foundations  of  all  sys 
tems  of  government,  ancient  or  modern,  so  far  as  the 
world  has  yet  gone.  The  main  objection  brought 
against  monarchical  states,  and  still  more  against  oli 
garchies,  is  that  in  these  the  machinery  of  government  is 
employed  chiefly  or  exclusively  for  the  benefit  of  the 
rulers, — in  other  words,  that  government  is  regarded  by 
these  rulers  as  a  privilege  rather  than  as  a  responsibility, 
and  is  used  as  such.  But  this  fault  is  by  no  means  con 
fined  to  despotic  or  aristocratic  systems  :  the  same  result 
is  seen  even  where  political  power  is  granted  to  the 
whole  people.  The  corruption  goes  on  although  all  may 
vote,  because  enormous  majorities  are  anxious  to  ad- 


490  B.C.]  Invasion  of  Datis  and  Artapherncs.         139 

vance  their  own  interest  without  regard  to  the  interest  of 
their  neighbors.  But  at  Athens  political  power  was  at 
no  time  granted  to  all  the  people,  if  this  term  is  to  be 
taken  in  the  sense  now  generally  attached  to  it.  The 
great  body  of  resident  foreigners,  known  as  the  Metoikoi, 
was  excluded,  while  the  slaves  were  of  course  never 
thought  of :  and  thus  every  political  change,  every  mili 
tary  enterprise,  was  considered  solely  with  reference  to 
the  benefit  which  might  accrue  to  the  Demos, — in  other 
words,  to  the  governing  class,  and  not  to  the  great  aggre 
gate  of  all  the  inhabitants  of  Attica.  It  might  thus  be 
said  that  incompetence  and  corruption  are  necessary  re 
sults  of  democracy ;  and  they  certainly  are  so  in  the 
sense  which  would  make  them  likewise  the  result  of  all 
other  forms  of  government.  Really  unselfish  rule  can 
not  be  found  except  where  power  is  regarded  not  at  all 
as  a  privilege  but  wholly  as  a  responsibility  ;  and  except 
in  a  few  isolated  statesmen  this  idea  has  never  been 
found  to  act  as  a  constraining  motive.  Among  the  first 
results  of  such  an  idea  would  be  the  growth  of  a  convic 
tion  that  no  enterprise  shall  be  undertaken  which  may 
not  after  a  close  scrutiny  seem  likely  to  promote  the  in 
terest  of  every  class  in  the  land  without  exception.  The 
blind  eagerness  with  which  (to  put  the  matter  in  the  best 
light)  they  are  represented  as  following  Miltiades,  proves 
only  that  the  greed  of  a  supposed  self-interest  had  not 
yet  been  counteracted  by  an  unselfish  regard  to  the 
general  good  of  the  country.  The  Athenians  sinned, 
not  so  much  by  placing  an  undue  trust  in  Miltiades  as 
by  neglecting  the  duty  of  examining  the  plans  on  which  it 
was  necessary  to  stake  the  credit  and  power  of  the  State. 


I  B  R  A  K  Y 

VKicsiTY  0 

<  AL1FOKNIA. 


I'M  VKicsiTY  01 


140  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  vn. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

THE  INVASION  AND   FLIGHT  OF  XERXES. 

WE  now  approach  the  history  of  the  great  struggle  be 
tween   Xerxes  and  the  Western  Greeks, — a  history  the 
general  features   of  which  stand  out  with 
General  sufficient  clearness,  but  which,  as  related  by 

character  of 

the  narra-  Herodotus,  is  also  one  of  the  most  splendid 
toVth<Texple-g  of  epic  poems.  From  the  beginning  to  the 
Xer^e^  en<*  °^  *^s  narrative  we  can  trace  an  ethical 

or  religious  purpose  overlying  or  even  put 
ting  out  of  sight  political  causes  and  motives,  and  sub 
stituting  appeals  to  exploits  done  in  the  mythical  ages 
for  less  fictitious  and  more  substantial  services.  Nation 
al  struggles  which  are  beyond  doubt  historical  are  en 
livened  by  imaginary  combats  of  well-chosen  cham 
pions  ;  and  in  the  sequence  of  events  every  step  and 
every  turn  is  ushered  in  by  tokens  and  wonders  or  by 
the  visible  intervention  of  gods  and  heroes.  In  not  a  few 
narratives  the  credulous  spirit  of  the  age  breaks  out  into 
wild  exaggerations  and  absolute  fictions,  which  yet  exhi 
bit  pictures  of  marvelous  power  and  beauty.  The  his 
torian  must  give  these  pictures  as  he  finds  them,  while  he 
traces  to  the  best  of  his  power  the  threads,  often  faint 
and  broken,  which  show  the  real  course  of  events  in  this 
most  momentous  war. 

According  to  the  account  given  by  Herodotus,  Xerxes 
had  at  first  no  wish  to  carry  out  his  father's  design 
Preparations  against  the  Western  Greeks,  (p.  104).  During 
Son  of  Eu-a~  two  years  his  preparations  tended  not  to  the 
^P6-  invasion  of  Europe  but  to  the  re-conquest 


484     B.C.]  The  Invasion  and  Flight  of  'Xerxes.      141 

of  Egypt.  At  the  end  of  that  time  he  marched  into  that 
devoted  land,  and  having  riveted  more 
tightly  the  fetters  which  had  been  forged  for 
it  by  Kambyses,  left  it  under  the  rule  of  his  brother 
Achaimenes.  But  before  he  set  out  on  this  Egyptian 
journey,  Mardonios,  of  whom  during  the  reign  of  Dareios 
we  lose  sight  after  his  failure  in  Makedonia- (p.  112),  had 
urged  upon  him  the  paramount  duty  of  chastising  Athens 
and  thus  of  getting  a  footing  on  a  continent  which,  for 
its  beauty,  its  fertility,  and  vast  resources,  ought  to  be  the 
possession  of  the  Great  King  alone.  The  motive  of 
Mardonios,  we  are  told,  was  the  wish  to  be  himself  vice 
roy  of  Europe  ;  but  there  were  not  wanting  others  to 
bear  out  his  words.  The  Thessalian  chieftains  (p.  20), 
who  belonged  to  the  family  of  the  Aleuadai  offered  their 
aid  against  their  kinsfolk ;  and  the  Peisistratidai  were 
still  at  hand  to  plead  their  cause  with  eager  importunity. 
Hippias  himself  may  have  fallen,  (although  the  fact 
cannot  be  stated  with  any  certainty),  on  the  field  of 
Marathon  ;  but  his  children,  backed  by  a  retailer  of  po 
pular  prophecies,  prevailed  on  Xerxes  to  summon  a 
council  of  his  nobles.  In  this  assembly  the  King,  we  are 
told,  reminded  his  hearers  that  the  Persian  power  could 
only  stand  so  long  as  it  remained  aggressive  ;  he  insisted 
that  no  European  tribes  or  nations  could,  for  strength  of 
will,  or  keenness  of  mind,  or  readiness  in  resource,  be 
compared  with  the  Greeks  ;  and  he  argued  that  if  these 
could  be  conquered,  nothing  could  stay  his  triumphant 
progress  until  he  had  made  his  empire  commensurate 
with  the  bounds  of  the  Ether  itself.  The  decisiveness  of 
this  speech  seems  to  leave  little  room  for  discussion  ;  but 
Mardonios  is  said  to  have  regarded  it  as  an  invitation  to 
the  chiefs  to  express  their  independent  opinion.  He  ac 
cordingly  takes  it  up  as  an  admission  of  faint-hearted- 


142  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  vii. 

ness  on  the  part  of  Xerxes.  There  was  really  no  need 
for  diffidence.  Nowhere  could  a  people  be  found  who 
invited  others  to  attack  them  so  sedulously  as  the  Greeks. 
Without  any  principle  of  union,  they  seemed  to  have  no 
other  object  in  life  than  to  fight  out  their  quarrels  in  the 
most  fertile  spots  of  their  several  territories ;  and  the 
sight  of  the  Persian  fleet  would  at  once  be  followed  by 
their  submission.  The  deep  silence  which  followed  the 
speech  of  Mardonios  was  at  length  broken  by  Artabanos, 
a  brother  of  Dareios  and  uncle  of  Xerxes,  who  urged  the 
need  of  careful  circumspection.  Every  forest,  he  said, 
was  eloquent  with  its  warnings.  Everywhere  the  tree 
which  would  not  bend  to  the  blast  was  snapped  or  up 
rooted,  while  the  pliant  sapling  escaped.  No  sooner 
had  Artabanos  sat  down  than  Xerxes  declared  that  Ar 
tabanos  should  be  punished  for  his  timidity  by  being 
kept  at  Sousa  with  the  women  and  children.  His  lan 
guage  was,  however,  more  resolute  than  his  mind. 
During  the  night  which  followed  the  council,  the  dream- 
god  came  as  he  had  come  to  Agamemnon  in  the  Iliad, 
and  standing  over  his  couch,  warned  him  that  it  would 
be  at  his  peril  if  he  gave  up  the  enterprise  on  which  he 
had  set  his  heart.  But  just  as  in  the  Iliad  Agamemnon 
obeys  the  words  of  Zeus  by  giving  a  command  in  direct 
opposition  to  it,  so  Xerxes  tells  his  nobles  that  they  may 
remain  quietly  at  home  since  the  idea  of  invading  Greece 
has  been  definitely  abandoned.  Again  the  dream-god 
warns  the  king  that,  if  he  resists,  his  glory  shall  pass 
away ;  and  Xerxes  in  his  perplexity  begs  Artabanos  to 
put  on  his  crown,  and  don  the  royal  robes,  and  lie  down 
on  his  couch,  since,  if  the  dream-god  be  worth  notice  at 
all,  he  would  come  to  the  occupant  of  the  throne,  who 
ever  he  might  be.  The  old  man  lies  down,  assuring  the 
king  that  dreams  can  generally  be  traced  to  matters 


481  B.C.]      The  Invasion  and  Flight  of  Xerxes.      143 

which  have  occupied  the  mind  previous  to  sleep  ;  he 
starts  up  resolved  to  make  up  for  his  former  advice  by 
twofold  zeal  in  carrying  out  the  king's  will.  The  dream- 
god  had^drawn  near  to  him  with  hot  irons,  manifestly 
for  the  purpose  of  searing  out  his  eyes  ;  and  this  threaten 
ing  movement  probably  prevented  him  from  applying 
to  his  own  dream  the  theory  by  which  he  had  accounted 
for  that  of  Xerxes. 

The  demoniac  impulse  (so  Herodotus  phrases  it)  had 
now  driven  Xerxqs  to  the  point  from  which  there  was  no 
retreating.  The  whole  strength  of  the  empire  Progress  of 
was  to  be  lavished  on  one  supreme  effort,  *0eursxaestofrom 
and  that  empire  extended  now  from  the  Sardeis. 
eastern  limits  which  it  had  reached  under  Cyrus,  to  the 
cataracts  of  the  Nile  and  the  shores  and  islands  of  the 
Egean  Sea.  The  campaigns  of  Megabazos  and  Mardo- 
nios  had  accomplished  the  subjugation  of  many  Thra- 
kian  and  Makedonian  tribes  ;  throughout  Thessaly  the 
chiefs  were  full  of  zeal  in  the  cause  of  the  Great  King ; 
and  in  Hellas  itself  there  were  some  states  not  less  eager 
to  submit  themselves  to  him,  The  Expedition  of  Datis 
which  had  ended  in  the  disaster  of  Marathon,  was 
strictly  a  maritime  invasion.  It  was  the  design  of 
Xerxes  to  overwhelm  the  Greeks  by  vast  masses  poured 
into  their  country  by  land,  while  a  fleet  hugely  larger 
than  that  of  Datis  should  support  them  by  sea.  For  the 
passage  of  the  former  across  the  Eosporos  and  the 
Strymon  wooden  bridges  were  constructed  ;  to  save  the 
latter  from  the  catastrophe  which  befell  the  ships  of  Mar- 
donios  (p.  112)  orders  were  given,  it  is  said,  to  convert 
Athos  (p.  32)  into  an  island  which  might  enable  the  fleet 
to  avoid  its  terrible  rocks.  At  length  the  host  set  out 
from  Sousa  in  a  stream  which  gathered  volume  as  it 
went  along.  The  several  nations  met  at  Kritalla  in 


144  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  vii. 

Kappadokia,  and  having  crossed  the  Halys,  marched  to 
Kelainai,  where  Pythios,  who  had  bestowed  on  Dareios 
a  golden  plane  tree  and  a  golden  vine,  welcomed  the 
Persians  with  a  magnificence  which  excited  the  aston 
ishment  of  Xerxes.  In  the  rivalry  of  munificence 
Xerxes  was  not  to  be  outdone,  and  Pythios  left  his  pres 
ence  a  proud  and  happy  man :  but  when  in  the  follow 
ing  spring,  Xerxes  set  out  from  Sardeis,  an  eclipse  of  the 
sun  so  frightened  the  wealthy  Phrygian,  that  he  besought 
the  king  to  let  him  keep  one  of  his  five  sons  at  home. 
The  answer  was  a  stern  rebuke  for  the  presumption 
which  demanded  exemption  from  military  service  for 
the  slave  of  a  king  who  was  taking  the  trouble  to  go 
all  the  way  to  Hellas  himself.  His  own  life  and  that 
of  his  four  sons  he  should  have  for  the  sake  of  his 
former  munificence :  but  the  limbs  of  .the  child  whom 
he  wished  to  keep,  should  be  hung  up  on  each  side  of 
the  road  along  which  the  army  must  pass. 

On  reaching  Sardeis,  Xerxes  had  sent  heralds  to  all 

the   Greek  cities  except  Athens  and  Sparta;    and  the 

reasons   which   forbid   us   to   suppose   that 

The  bridges  j       <-          t_ 

across  the         those  exceptions  were   now  made  for  the 

Hellespont.          ^^  ^mQ  haye    been    alrea(Jy  noted    (see    p. 

113).  But  before  this  host  was  to  cross  into  Europe,  a 
stream  of  blood  was  to  flow  on  the  shores  of  the  Helles 
pont.  In  making  their  bridges  of  boats,  the  Phenicians 
had  used  hempen  ropes,  while  the  Egyptians  employed 
ropes  made  from  the  fibre  of  papyrus.  A  severe  storm 
shattered  the  work  of  both.  Xerxes  ordered  the  engi 
neers  of  the  bridges  to  be  beheaded,  and  passed  sen 
tence  that  the  Hellespont,  having  received  three  hun 
dred  lashes  of  the  scourge,  should  be  branded  by  men 
who  were  bidden  to  inform  it  that  whatever  it  might 
choose  to  do,  the  king  was  determined  to  cross  over  it. 


481  B.C.]     The  Invasion  and  Flight  of  Xerxes.      145 

His  commands  were  obeyed ;  but  Xerxes  took  the  fur 
ther  precaution  of  having  the  new  bridges  constructed 
with  greater  strength  and  care.  It  is,  however,  of  far 
more  importance  to  note  that  in  the  belief  of  the  West 
ern  Greeks,  Xerxes  was  the  first  who  attempted  to 
accomplish  this  task,  and  that  thus  the  bridge  attributed 
to  Dareios,  (p.  73)  seems  to  fade  away  into  the  impene 
trable  mists  which  shroud  his  doings  in  the  Scythian 
land. 

The  march  of  Xerxes  from  Sardeis  is  presented  to  us 
in  a  series  of  impressive  pictures.  Between  the  cloven 
limbs  of  the  son  of  Pythios  advances  first 

,    \  March  of 

the  baggage  train  with  the  beasts  of  burden,  Xerxes  from 
followed  by  half  the  force  supplied  by  the 
tributary  nations,  all  in  confused  masses.  Separated 
from  these  after  a  definite  interval  by  a  thousand  picked 
Persian  horsemen  and  a  thousand  spear-bearers,  came 
ten  of  the  sacred  horses  from  the  Median  plains  of  Nisa, 
followed  by  the  chariot  of  Ahuromazdao  (Ormuzd)  or 
Zeus,  on  which  no  mortal  might  place  his  foot,  the  reins 
of  the  horses  being  held  by  the  charioteer  who  walked 
by  the  side.  Then  on  a  car  drawn  by  Nisaian  steeds 
came  the  monarch  himself,  followed  by  a  thousand  of 
the  noblest  Persians,  then  by  a  thousand  horsemen  and 
ten  thousand  picked  infantry  with  golden  and  silver 
apples  and  pomegranates  attached  to  the  reverse  end  of 
their  spears,  followed  lastly  by  a  myriad  cavalry,  behind 
whom  after  an  interval  equal  to  that  which  separated  the 
vanguard  from  the  household  troops  came  the  remaining 
half  of  the  disorderly  rabble  of  tributaries.  Keeping  on 
the  left  the  heights  of  Ida,  the  army  journeyed  on  to  the 
Ilian  land.  On  the  lofty  Pergamos  the  king  offered  a 
sumptuous  sacrifice,  and  at  length  on  reaching  Abydos 
he  had  the  delight  of  sitting  on  the  throne  of  white  stones 

L 


146  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  vn. 

which  had  been  raised  for  him  by  his  orders.  Beneath 
him  his  fleet  was  engaged  in  a  mimic  battle,  in  which 
the  Sidonians  were  the  victors.  Surveying  the  hosts 
which  he  had  thus  brought  together,  Xerxes  first  pro 
nounced  himself  the  happiest  of  men  and  then  presently 
wept ;  and  in  answer  to  the  wondering  question  of  Arta- 
banos  confessed  that  the  thought  of  mortality  had  sud 
denly  thrust  itself  upon  him,  and  that  the  tears  found  their 
way  into  his  eyes  because  at  the  end  of  a  hundred  years 
not  one  of*  all  this  great  host  should  remain  alive. 
"Nay,"  said  Artabanos,  "there  are  more  woful  things 
than  this.  The  sorrows  that  come  upon  us  and  the  dis 
eases  that  trouble  us  make  our  short  life  seem  long,  and 
therefore  from  so  much  wretchedness  death  becomes  the 
best  refuge."  "  Let  us  speak  no  more  of  mortal  life," 
said  Xerxes ;  •"  it  is  even  as  thou  sayest.  It  is  well  not 
to  bring  evil  things  to  mind  when  we  have  a  good  work 
in  our  hands.  But  tell  me  this.  If  thou  hadst  not  seen 
the  dream-god  clearly,  wouldst  thou  have  kept  thine  own 
counsel,  or  wouldst  thou  have  changed  ?  Tell  me  the 
truth."  Artabanos  could  not  but  express  the  hope  that 
all  things  might  go  as  the  king  desired  ;  but  he  added 
"  I  am  still  full  of  care  and  anxious,  because  I  see  that 
two  very  mighty  things  are  most  hostile  to  thee."  "  What 
may  those  things  be  ?"  asked  the  king  ;  "  will  the  army 
of  the  Greeks  be  more  in  number  than  mine,  or  will  our 
ships  be  fewer  than  theirs  ?  for  if  it  be  so,  we  will  quickly 
bring  yet  another  host  together."  "  Nay,"  answered 
Artabanos,  "  to  make  the  host  larger  is  to  make  these 
two  things  worse  ;  and  these  are  the  land  and  the  sea. 
The  sea  has  no  harbor  which  in  case  of  storm  can  shelter 
so  many  ships.  The  land  too  is  hostile  ;  and  if  nothing 
resists  thee,  it  becomes  yet  more  hurtful  the  further  that 
we  go,  for  our  men  are  never  satisfied  with  good  fortune, 


48 1  B.C.]     The  Invasion  and  Flight  of  Xerxes.      147 

and  so  the  length  of  the  journey  must  at  the  last  bring 
about  a  famine."  "You  say  well,"  answered  Xerxes: 
"  yet  of  what  use  is  it  to  count  up  all  these  things  ?  If 
we  were  always  to  be  weighing  every  chance,  we  should 
never  do  anything  at  all.  It  is  better  to  be  bold  and  to 
suffer  half  the  evil  than  by  fearing  all  things  to  avoid 
suffering."  But  Artabanos,  still  unconvinced,  besought 
the  king  at  all  events  not  to  employ  the  Asiatic  lonians 
against  their  kinsfolk.  "  If  they  so  serve,"  he  argued, 
"  they  must  be  either  most  unjust  in  enslaving  their  own 
people,  or  most  just  in  setting  them  free.  If  they  are 
unjust,  our  gain  is  little;  if  they  be  just,  they  can  do  us 
great  harm."  But  the  king  would  have  it  that  in  this 
he  was  most  of  all  deceived,  since  to  these  lonians  at 
the  bridge  across  the  Danube  Dareios  owned  not  merely 
his  own  life  but  the  salvation  of  his  empire ;  and  with 
this  assurance  he  dispatched  Artabanos  to  Sousa. 

On  the  next  day,  as  the  sun  burst  into  sight,  Xerxes, 
pouring  a  libation  into  the  sea,  greeted  the  god  with  the 
prayer  that  he  would  suffer  nothing  to  check 
his  course  until  he  should  have  carried  his      the  Heiies- 
conquests  to  the  uttermost  bounds  of  Europe.      pon 
From  the  bridges    rose  the  odor  of  frankincense :  the 
roads  were  strewed  with  myrtle  branches.  With  the  same 
pomp  which  had  marked  his  departure  from  Sardeis 
Xerxes  passed  from  Asia  into   Europe.      But   special 
signs  were  not  wanting  to  show  that  this  seeming  god 
was  marching  to  his  ruin.     A  mare  brought  forth  a  hare, 
— a  manifest  token,  as  Herodotus  believed,  that  the  expe 
dition  begun  with  so  much   confidence  would  end  in 
disaster  and  ignominy. 

Thus,  without  thought  of  coming  woes,  the  fleet  sailed 
westward  from  Abydos,  while  the  land  forces,  marching 
eastwards,  and  passing  on  the  right  hand  the  tomb  of 


148  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  vn. 

the  maiden  who  gave  her  name  to  the  Hellespont,  at 
last  reached  Doriskos.  Here  on  the  wide  plain  through 
The  review  which  the  Hebros  finds  its  way  to  the  sea, 
at  Doriskos.  Xerxes  numbered  his  army  by  bringing  a 
myriad  of  men  into  the  smallest  possible  space  and  round 
this  raising  an  inclosure  into  which  other  myriads  were , 
successively  brought  until  the  infantry  alone  were  found 
to  number  1,700,000  menv  In  such  vast  round  numbers 
has  the  tradition  of  this  mighty  armament  come  down  to 
us.  We  should  have  scarcely  more  reason  to  wonder  if 
we  were  told  that  it  numbered  17,000,000 ;  but  it  is  at  first 
sight  surprising  to  be  told  that  the  number  of  the  Persian 
ships  was  not  500  or  1000,  but  1,207.  Wefindthe  nume 
ration,  however,  not  only  in  Herodotus,  but  in  the  great 
drama  of  the  Persians  by  ^Eschylos  ;  and  the  familiarity 
of  Herodotus  with  that  drama  will  probably  be  not  gene 
rally  questioned.  But  there  is  little  doubt  or  none  that 
^Eschylos  believed  or  asserted  the  number  of  the  Persian 
ships  to  be  not  1,207,  but  precisely,  as  we  should  expect, 
1,000.  He  adds  indeed  that  the  number  of  ships  noted 
for  swift  sailing  amounted  to  207 ;  but  he  certainly  does 
not  say  that  these  207  were  to  be  added  to  the  grand  total 
of  i, ooo.  Even  thus,  however,  the  simple  enumeration 
of  the  total  by  ^schylos  stands  on  a  very  different  foot 
ing  from  the  list  of  factors  which  in  Herodotus  are  made 
to  yield  the  same  result.  With  the  exception  of  the  17 
ships  which  the  Egean  islanders  are  said  to  have  contri 
buted,  not  a  single  uneven  number  is  to  be  found  among 
them.  The  Phenicians  furnish  300,  the  Egyptians  200, 
the  Kilikians  100,  the  cities  along  the  shores  of  the 
Euxine  100,  the  Pamphylians  3!,  the  Lykians  50,  the 
Kyprians  1 50,  the  Karians  70.  But  if  the  grand  total,  as 
given  by  ^schylos,  was  well  known  to  Athenians  gene 
rally,  there  is  nothing  to  surprise  us  in  the  fact  that  some 


480  B.C.]     The  Invasion  and  Flight  of  Xerxes.      149 

one  who  misunderstood  the  lines  in  which  he  sums  up  the 
numbers  made  out  the  several  factors  which  were  to  yield 
the  desired  result,  and  that  Herodotus  accepted  these 
factors  as  historical.  It  is,  however,  quite  possible  that 
a  spurious  or  forged  list  may  contain  factors  which  are 
accurately  given  ;  nor  need  we  hesitate  to  say  that  the 
contingents  of  the  Persian  fleet  which  would  be  best 
known  to  the  Western  Greeks  would  be  those  of  their 
Asiatic  kinsfolk,  together  with  the  ships  furnished  by  the 
islanders.  The  greatest  stress  must  therefore  be  laid  on 
the  fact  that  the  number  of  ships  supplied  by  these 
Eastern  Greeks  together  with  the  islanders  amounts  to 
precisely  the  207  which  yEschylos  gives  as  the  number 
of  the  fast-sailing  ships  in  the  service  of  Xerxes, — the 
lonians  contributing  100  ships,  the  Aiolians  60,  the  Do 
rians  30,  the  islanders  17.  These  ships  would  probably 
be  the  only  vessels  of  which  yEschylos  would  even  pre 
tend  to  have  any  personal  knowledge  ;  and  his  statement 
seems  to  lead  us  to  the  conclusion  that  this  historical  fac 
tor  was  merged  in  the  artificial  total  of  1,000,  while  a 
certain  Hellenic  pride  may  be  traced  in  the  implied  fact 
that  the  Greek  ships  in  the  Persian  fleet  far  surpassed  in 
swiftness  the  vessels  even  of  the  Phenicians.  But  although 
in  these  207  ships  we  have  a  number  undoubtedly  his- 
iorical.it  is  most  remarkable  that  the  1,000  vessels  of 
which  they  formed  a  part  make  up  in  the  drama  of 
^Eschylos  the  Persian  fleet  which  fought  at  Salamis, 
whereas  according  to  Herodotus  this  was  the  number 
which  Xerxes  reviewed  with  his  land  forces  at  Doriskos. 
In  the  interval  the  Persians,  as  Herodotus  affirms,  lost 
647  ships,  and  gained  only  120;  and  thus  we  see  that 
the  grand  total  in  either  case  was  suggested  by  Eastern 
ideas  of  completeness.  When  then  we  are  informed 
that  Xerxes  led  as  far  as  Thermopylai  5, 280,000  men  be- 


150  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  vn. 

sides  a  vast  throng  of  women,  we  take  the  statement 
simply  as  evidence  that  the  Persian  host  left  everywhere 
by  its  size  an  impression  of  irresistible  force.  The  great 
historian  Thucydides  confesses  that  he  could  not  learn  the 
exact  number  of  the  few  thousand  men  engaged  in  the 
battle  of  Mantineia,  of  which  he  was  probably  himself  an 
eye-witness  :  it  would  be  strange  indeed,  therefore,  if  we 
had  a  trustworthy  census  of  the  Persian  hordes  at  Doriskos. 
But  in  truth,  Herodotus,  although  convinced  that  in 
speaking  of  these  millions  he  was  speaking  of  an  histori- 

Conversation        Ca^  ^aCt'  ^^  aR    °^Ject    m  V^ew    °f  a   higher 

of  Xerxes  with   and  more  solemn  kind,  which  he  sets  forth 

Demaratos.          .  ,      «  .  . 

in  a  singularly  characteristic  narrative. 
When  after  the  great  review  Xerxes  sent  for  Demaratos 
and  asked  him  if  he  thought  that  the  Greeks  would  dare 
to  resist  him,  the  Spartan  exile  replied  by  asking  whether 
the  king  wished  to  hear  pleasant  things  or  only  the  truth. 
Receiving  a  pledge  that  no  harm  should  befall  him,  he 
went  on  to  tell  him  that  the  Greeks  owed  the  courage  by 
which  they  kept  off  both  poverty  and  tyranny  to  their 
wisdom  and  to  strength  of  law,  and  that  even  if  no 
count  were  taken  of  the  rest,  that  the  Spartans  would 
fight  him  to  the  last  even  though  they  might  not  be  able 
to  muster  a  thousand  men.  "What?"  said  Xerxes 
laughing,  "  will  a  thousand  men  fight  my  great  army  ? 
Tell  me  now,  thou  wast  once  their  king,  wilt  thou  fight' 
straightway  with  ten  men  ?  Come,  let  us  reason  upon  it. 
How  could  a  myriad,  or  five  myriads,  who  are  all  free, 
and  not  ruled  by  one  man,  withstand  so  great  a  host  ?  Be 
ing  driven  by  the  scourge  they  might  perhaps  go  against 
a  multitude  larger  than  their  own  :  but  now,  left  to  their 
freedom,  they  will  do  none  of  these  things.  Nay,  even 
if  their  numbers  were  equal  to  ours,  I  doubt  if  they  could 
withstand  us,  for  among  my  spear-bearers  are  some  who 


480  B.C.]      The  Invasion  and  Flight  of  Xerxes.      151 

will  fight  three  Greeks  at  once  ;  thus  in  thine  ignorance 
thou  speakest  foolishly."  In  plain-spoken  and  simple 
style  Demaratos  expressed  his  consciousness  that  the 
truth  was  not  likely  to  be  palatable,  and  reminded 
him  how  little  he  was  likely  to  exaggerate  the  virtues  of 
men  who  had  robbed  him  of  his  honors  and  dignity,  and 
driven  him  to  a  strange  land.  "I  say  not  indeed  that  I 
am  able  to  fight  with  ten  men  or  with  two,  nor  of  my  own 
will  would  I  fight  with  one.  So,  too,  the  Spartans  one  by 
one  are  much  like  other  men  ;  but  taken  together  they 
are  the  strongest  of  all  men,  for,  though  they  are 
free,  they  are  not  without  a  lord.  Law  is  their  master 
whom  they  fear  much  more  than  thy  people  fear  thee. 
Whatever  law  commands  that  they  do  ;  and  it  commands 
always  the  same  thing,  charging  them  never  to  fly  from 
any  enemy,  but  to  remain  in  their  ranks  and  to  conquer 
or  die."  The  value  of  this  conversation  lies  wholly  in 
the  truth  of  the  lesson  which  it  teaches  ;  and  this  lesson 
enforces  the  contrast  between  the  principle  of  fear  and 
the  principle  of  voluntary  obedience.  It  is  profoundly 
true  that  brute  force  driven  by  the  lash  cannot  be  trusted 
in  a  conflict  with  minds  moved  by  a  deep  moral  impulse. 
The  tyranny  of  few  men  has  equaled  that  of  Napoleon 
Bonaparte;  but  Bonaparte  knew  perfectly  well  that 
mere  numbers  and  weapons  were  of  little  use,  unless 
his  soldiers  could  be  stirred  by  a  fierce  enthusiasm.  Not 
a  little  of  his  power  lay  in  his  ingenious  use  of  claptrap 
to  stir  up  this  enthusiasm  ;  and  the  point  of  the  conver 
sation  between  Xerxes  and  Demaratos  is  that  to  such  a 
height  even  as  this — the  standard  of  mere  deception — 
it  was  impossible  for  a  Persian  despot  to  rise.  Nay, 
Cyrus,  if  not  Dareios,  might  have  reminded  Xerxes  that 
the  foundations  of  the  Persian  empire  were  not  laid  by 
men  driven  to  battle  by  the  scourge.  He  was  making  the 


152  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  VH. 

confusion  which  Eastern  kings  are  apt  to  make,  between 
the  force  of  hardy  warriors  urged  on  by  the  impulse  of 
conquest,  and  the  force  of  multitudes,  whose  object  is  to 
do  as  little  work,  and  to  do  it  as  badly,  as  they  can. 

Of  the  land  march  of  the  Persians  from  Doriskos  it  is 

almost  enough  to  say  that  the  army  passed  through  the 

several    places    which   lay  naturally   in   its 

thePersian        Path-     With  little    annoyance,  except  from 


n  some   clans   of  Thrakian  mountaineers,  it 

Iherme. 

reached  the  city  of  Eion,  on  the  Strymon, 
then  governed  by  the  Persian  Boges  whom  Megabazos 
(p.  76)  had  probably  left  in  charge  of  it.  The  Strymon 
was  bridged  over  for  their  passage  :  but  Xerxes  could 
not  leave  the  spot  called  Ennea  Hodoi  (the  Nine  Roads), 
the  site  of  the  future  Amphipolis  (p.  34)  without  burying 
alive  for  luck's  sake  nine  boys  and  nine  girls  taken  from 
the  people  of  the  country.  At  length,  after  journeying 
on  through  the  lands  watered  by  the  Echedoros,  the 
army  halted  on  the  ground  stretching  from  Therme 
to  the  banks  of  the  Haliakmon,  from  ThermS,  as 
he  looked  westwards  and  southwards,  the  eyes  of  Xerxes 
rested  on  that  magnificent  chain  of  mountains  which 
rises  to  a  head  in  the  crests  of  Olympos  and  Ossa,  and, 
leaving  between  these  two  hills  the  defile  through  which 
the  Peneios  flows  out  into  the  sea,  stretches  under  the 
name  of  Pelion  along  the  coast  which  was  soon  to  make 
him  feel  the  wrath  of  the  invisible  gods.  Here  gazing  in 
wonder  at  the  mighty  walls  of  rock  which  rose  on  either 
side,  he  is  said  to  have  asked  whether  it  were  possible 
to  treat  the  Peneios  as  Cyrus  had  treated  the  Gyndes. 
Among  the  tribes  who  stooped  to  give  him  earth  and 
water,  the  Aleaud  (p.  28)  chieftains  of  Thessaly  had  been 
the  most  prominent  and  zealous.  From  these  the  ques 
tion  of  Xerxes  drew  out  the  fact  that  they  lived  in  a  mere 


480  B.C.]     The  Invasion  and  Flight  of  Xerxes.      153 

basin  where  the  stoppage  of  the  one  outlet  of  its  streams 
would  make  the  whole  land  sea,  and  destroy  every  soul 
within  its  mountain  barriers.  Xerxes  was  not  slow,  we 
are  told,  in  appreciating  the  true  meaning  of  Thessalian 
ardor.  People  who  live  in  a  country  which  can  be  taken 
without  trouble  do  wisely,  he  said,  in  allying  themselves 
betimes  with  the  invader. 

Returning  from  the  pass  of  Tempe,  Xerxes  was  obliged 
to  remain  for  some  time  at  Therme  while  his  pioneers 
were  cutting  a  path  across  the  densely  wood 
ed  hills  ;  and  from  Therme  eleven  days  after  the  Persian 
his  own  departure  with  the  land  army  for  Magnc  Un 
Gonnos,  the  fleet  sailed  in  a  single  day  to  coast' 
the  Magnesian  coast  under  Pelion,  there  to  feel  in  a  few 
hours  the  wrath  of  the  wind-god  Boreas.  Thus  far  the 
enterprise  had  been  carried  on,  and  it  is  said,  with  un 
broken  good  fortune  ;  but  we  shall  see  presently  in  the 
narrative  of  his  retreat  signs  which  seem  to  show  that 
the  statement  is,  to  say  the  least,  questionable. 

In  Western  Greece  the  course  of  events  had  been  for 
some  time  determining  the  parts  which  Athens  and 
Sparta  were  severally  to  play  in  the  coming  Development 
struggle.  The  Ions:  and  uninteresting  feud  of  *e  Athe- 

man  navy. 

or  war  between  Athens  and  Aigma  had  at 
least  one  good  result  in  fixing  the  attention  of  the  Athe 
nians  rather  on  their  fleet  than  on  their  army.  The 
quarrel  was  concerned  with  the  old  strife  between  the 
oligarchic  nobles  and  the  Demos  or  people,  of  whom 
nearly  700  were  murdered  by  the  former,  who  in  their 
turn  were  defeated  by  an  Athenian  force.  By  sea  the 
Aiginetan  oligarchs  were  more  fortunate.  The  Athenian 
fleet,  being  surprised  in  a  state  of  disorder,  lost  four  ships 
with  their  crew.  This  rebuff  could  not  fail  to  bring 
home  to  the  Athenians  the  lesson  which,  from  the  very 


154  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  vn. 

beginning  of  his  career,  Themistokles  had  been  straining 
every  nerve  to  teach  them.  The  'change  of  policy  on 
which,  in  order  to  develop  the  Athenian  navy,  he  was 
led  to  insist,  embittered  the  antagonism  which  had 
Ostracism  of  already  placed  a  gulf  between  himself  and 
Aristeides.  Aristcides ;  and  the  political  opposition  of 
these  two  men  involved  so  much  danger  to  the  state, 
that  Aristeides  himself,  it  is  said,  confessed  that,  if  the 
Athenians  were  wise,  they  would  put  an  end  to  their 
rivalry  by  throwing  both  into  the  Barathon  (p.  114). 
The  Demos,  so  far  taking  the  same  view,  sent  him  into 
exile  by  a  vote  of  ostracism  (p.  91).  This  vote  affirmed 
the  adoption  of  the  new  policy  in  preference  to  the  old 
conservative  theory  which  regarded  the  navy  as  the 
seed-bed  of  novelty  and  change ;  and  Themistokles 
would  not  fail  to  strengthen  this  resolution  by  dwelling 
on  the  certainty  of  fresh  effort  on  the  part  of  the  Persian 
king  to  carry  out  the  design  on  which,  as  they  knew,  his 
father  Dareios  had  set  his  heart,  and  by  assuring  them 
not  only  that  the  power  of  the  Persian  empire  was  to  be 
directed  chiefly  against  themselves,  but  that  it  was  as 
necessary  to  be  prepared  against  the  formidable  Phenician 
fleet  as  against  any  armies  which  might  assail  them  by 
land.  It  was  a  happy  thing  both  for  Themistokles  and 
for  Athens  that  the  proposed  expedition  of 
wealth^  Dareios  was  delayed  first  by  the  revolt  of 

Athens.  Egypt,  then  by  his  death,  and  lastly  by  the 

long  time  which  Xerxes  allowed  to  pass  before  he  left 
Sousa.  Meanwhile  the  internal  resources  of  Athens 
were  being  enormously  increased  by  the  proceeds  of  the 
silver  mines  of  Laureion.  During  the  military  despotism 
of  the  Peisistratidai  the  wealth  of  these  mines  had  been 
used  scantily  or  not  at  all :  but  the  impulse  given  to 
enterprise  by  the  constitutional  reforms  of  Kleisthenes 


480  B.C.]     The  Invasion  and  Flight  of  Xerxes.      155 

had  already  been  rewarded  by  a  harvest  of  silver  suffi 
cient  to  furnish  ten  drachmas  for  every  Athenian  citizen. 
This  petty  personal  profit  Themistokles  induced  them  to 
forego ;  and  by  his  advice  this  sum  of  perhaps  300,000 
drachmas  was  devoted  to  the  building  of  200  ships  to  be 
employed  nominally  in  that  war  with  Aigina  which  in 
the  forcible  words  of  Herodotus  was  nothing  less  than 
the  salvation  of  Greece. 

It  can  scarcely  be  said  that  the  patriotic  resolution  of 
the  Athenians  was  shared  by  the  other  Greek  states  ; 
some  among  them,  it  is  true,  began  to  see  that  they 
were  not  enacting  wisely  by  wasting  their 
years  in  perpetual  warfare  or  feud  ;  and  in  a 
congress  held  at  the  isthmus  of  Corinth  they  J^"" th' 
admitted  the  paramount  need  of  making  up 
existing  quarrels  in  presence  of  a  common  danger.  But 
although  the  men  of  Aigina  were  thus  constrained  to  lay 
aside  for  a  time  their  quarrel  with  the  Athenians,  the 
Hellenic  character  was  not  changed.  Of  all  the  Greek 
cities  the  greater  number  were  taking  the  part  of  the 
Persians,  or,  as  it  was  phrased,  Medizing,  while  those 
who  refused  to  submit  dreaded  the  very  thought  of  a 
conflict  with  the  Phenician  fleet.  In  this  season  of 
supreme  depression  the  great  impulse  to  hope  and  vigor 
ous  action  came  from  Athens.  It  is  the  emphatic  judg 
ment  of  Herodotus  (p.  3)  that  if  the  Athenians  had 
Medized  it  would  have  been  impossible  to  withstand  the 
king  by  sea,  while  the  Spartans  would  have  been  left  to 
carry  on  an  unavailing  contest  by  land.  Hence  the 
Athenians  are  with  him  pre-eminently  the  saviours  of 
Hellas  ;  and  his  assertion  has  all  the  more  value,  because 
he  declares  that  it  was  forced  from  him  by  a  strong  con 
viction  of  its  truth,  although  he  knew  that  in  many 
quarters  it  would  give  great  offence. 


156  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  vn. 

For  the  present  the  general  aspect  of  things  was 
gloomy  enough.  The  three  men  sent  by  the  congress 

at  Corinth  to  spy  out  the  army  of  Xerxes  at 
tionofSe"  Sardeis  had  returned  with  a  report  which 
Sadeian  we  might  suppose  would  be  superfluous. 

All  Asia,  it  is  said,  had  for  years  resounded 
with  the  din  of  preparation  ;  and  the  inhabitants  of  the 
Greek  towns  along  the  line  of  march  could  furnish  accu 
rate  accounts  of  the  quantities  of  corn  laid  up  in  their 
magazines.  The  three  spies  were  caught,  but  Xerxes 
had  them  led  round  his  camp  and  sent  away  unhurt ; 
and  their  story  came  in  to  heighten  the  superstitious 
terrors  inspired  by  signs  and  omens  of  approaching  dis 
aster.  On  entering  the  shrine  at  Delphoi,  the  Athe 
nian  messengers  were  greeted  with  a  pitiless  response. 

O  wretched  people,  why  sit  ye  still  ?  Leave  your  homes  and  your 
strongholds,  and  flee  away. 

Head  and  body,  feet  and  hands,  nothing  is  sound,  but  all  is 
wretched ; 

For  fire  and  water,  hastening  hither  on  a  Syrian  chariot,  will  pre 
sently  make  it  low. 

Other  strong  places  shall  they  destroy,  not  yours  only, 

And  many  temples  of  the  undying  gods  shall  they  give  to  the  flame. 

Down  their  walls  the  big  drops  are  streaming,  as  they  tremble  for 
fear; 

But  go  ye  from  my  holy  place,  and  brace  up  your  hearts  for  the 
evil. 

Dismayed  by  these  fearful  warnings,  the  messengers 
received  a  glimmer  of  comfort  from  a  Delphian  who 
bade  them  take  olive-branches  and  try  the  god  once 
more.  To  their  prayer  for  a  more  merciful  answer  they 
added  that,  if  it  were  not  given,  they  would  stay  there 
till  they  died.  Their  entreaty  was  rewarded  with  these 
mysterious  utterances. 


480  B.C.]      The  Invasion  and  Flight  of  Xerxes.       157 

Pallas  cannot  prevail  with  Zeus  who  lives  on  Olympos,  though  she 
has  besought  him  with  many  prayers, 

And  his  word  which  I  now  tell  you  is  firmly  fixed  as  a  rock. 

For  thus  saith  Zeus  that,  when  all  else  within  the  land  of  Kekrops 
is  wasted,  the  wooden  wall  alone  shall  not  be  taken ;  and 
this  shall  help  you  and  your  children. 

But  wait  not  until  the  horsemen  come  and  the  footmen ;  turn  your 
backs  upon  them  now,  and  one  day  ye  shall  meet  them. 

And  thou,  divine  Salamis,  shalt  destroy  those  that  are  born  of  wo 
men,  when  the  seed-time  comes  or  the  harvest. 

These  words  the  messengers  on  their  return  to  Athens 
read  before  the  people.  The  very  ease  with  which  jthcy 
were  made  to  coincide  with  the  policy  of  Themistokles 
points  to  the  influence  which  called  them  forth.  The 
mind  of  the  great  statesman  had  been  long  made  up 
that  Athens  should  become  a  maritime  power;  and  his 
whole  career  supplies  evidence  that  he  would  adopt  with 
out  scruple  whatever  measures  might  be  needed  to  carry 
out  his  purpose.  Thus,  when  the  answer  was  read  out,  he 
could  at  once  come  forward  and  say,  "  Athenians,  the 
soothsayers,  who  bid  you  leave  your  country  and  seek 
another  elsewhere,  are  wrong  ;  and  so  are  the  old  men 
who  bid  you  stay  at  home  and  guard  the  Akropolis,  as 
though  the  god  were  speaking  of  this  when  he  speaks  of 
the  wooden  wall,  because  long  ago  there  was  a  thorn 
hedge  around  it.  This  will  not  help  you  :  and  they  are 
all  leading  you  astray  when  they  say  that  you  must  be 
beaten  in  a  sea-fight  at  Salamis,  and  that  this  is  meant 
by  the  words  in  which  Salamis  is  called  the  destroyer  of 
the  children  of  women.  The  words  do  not  mean  this.  If 
they  had  been  spoken  of  us,  the  priestess  would  certain 
ly  have  said  "  Salamis  the  wretched,"  not  "  Salamis  the 
divine."  They  are  spoken  not  of  us,  but  of  our  enemies. 
Arm  then  for  the  fight  at  sea,  for  the  fleet  is  your  wooden 


158  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  vn. 

wall."  When  we  remember  the  means  by  which  the  re 
sponses  were  produced  which  bade  Kleomenes  drive  the 
Peisistratidai  from  Athens  (p.  87),  we  can  scarcely  sup 
pose  that  Themistokles  would  fail  to  make  use  of  an  in 
strument  so  well  fitted  to  further  his  designs.  That  to  the 
grounds  of  encouragement  thus  obtained  from  Delphoi 
he  added  the  expression  of  his  own  conviction  that 
Athens  must  conquer  if  she  confined  herself  to  her  own 
proper  path,  is  certain  from  the  results  which  he  brought 
about.  It  was  only  the  mental  condition  of  his  time 
which  threw  into  the  background  arguments  better  suited 
for  k  later  generation. 

But,  although,  by  adopting  the  policy  of  Themistokles, 

Athens  insured  her  ultimate  supremacy,  the  time  was 

not  yet  come  for  its  general  recognition.     The   allies 

assembled  in   the   congress   at  the  Corinthian  isthmus 

declared  bluntly  that  they  would  rather  with- 

Neutrahty  or  '  ' 

indifference  of    draw   from   the  confederacy,   than    submit 
to    any  rule   except   that    of  Sparta;    and 


ya 

Greek's111'™  w^  genume  patriotism  the  Athenians  at 
once  waived  a  claim  on  which  they  might 
fairly  have  insisted.  They  alone  were  ready  to  see 
their  families  exiled,  their  lands  ravaged,  and  their  city 
burnt,  rather  than  suffer  the  ill-cemented  mass  of  Hel 
lenic  society  to  fall  utterly  to  pieces.  From  Argos  and 
from  Boiotia  generally  they  had  nothing  to  hope.  The 
Argives,  sprung  from  the  hero  Perseus,  professed  to  re 
gard  the  Persians  as  their  kinsfolk,  and  insisted  on  re 
maining  neutralinthe  contest,  while  the  Boiotian  chiefs, 
keeping  down  a  discontented  population  committed  them 
selves  to  an  anti-Hellenic  policy  and  clung  to  it  with  a 
desperate  zeal.  The  Korkyraians  met  the  messengers  from 
the  congress  with  assurances  of  ready  help  ;  but  the  sixty 
ships  which  they  sent  were  under  officers  who  were 


480  B.C.]     The  Invasion  and  Flight  of  Xerxes.      159 

charged  to  linger  on  their  voyage.  They  acted  from 
the  belief  that  the  Greeks  must  inevitably  be  over 
whelmed,  and  in  this  case  they  were  to  claim  credit  with 
Xerxes  for  not  exerting  against  him  a  force  which  might 
have  turned  the  scale  the  other  way.  If  the  Greeks 
should  be  the  victors,  they  were  to  express  their  regret 
that  adverse  winds  had  baffled  all  their  efforts  to  double 
the  southern  promontories  of  the  Poloponnesos.  The 
messengers  sent  to  Gelon,  the  despot  of  Syracuse,  met  with 
not  much  better  success.  To  their  warning  that  if  he  failed 
to  help  his  eastern  kinsfolk  he  would  leave  the  way  open 
for  the  absorption  of  Sicily  into  the  Persian  empire,  he 
replied  by  an  indignant  condemnation  of  their  selfish 
ness  in  refusing  to  help  him  when  he  was  hard  pressed  by 
the  Carthaginians.  Still  he  promised  to  send  them  a  vast 
force  and  to  meet  practically  the  whole  expenses  of  the 
war,  if  they  would  recognize  him  as  chief  and  leader 
of  the  Greeks  against  the  barbarians.  This  was  more 
than  the  Spartan  envoy  could  endure.  "  In  very  deed," 
he  cried,  "would  Agamemnon  mourn,  if  he  were  to  hear 
that  the  Spartans  had  been  robbed  of  their  honor 
by  the  Syracusans.  Dream  not  that  we  shall  ever  yield 
it  to  you."  But  Gelon  was  not  to  be  put  down  by  high  words. 
"  Spartan  friend,"  he  answered,  "  abuse  commonly  makes 
a  man  angry  ;  but  I  will  not  repay  insults  in  kind.  So  far 
will  I  yield,  that  if  ye  rule  by  sea  I  will  rule  by  land,  and  if 
ye  rule  by  land  then  I  must  rule  on  the  sea."  But  here 
the  Athenian  envoy  broke  in  with  a  protest  that,  although 
his  countrymen  were  ready  to  follow  Spartan  leadership 
on  land,  they  would  give  place  to  none  on  the  sea ;  and 
Gelon  closed  the  debate  by  telling  them  that  they  seemed 
likely  to  have  many  leaders  but  few  to  be  led,  and  by 
bidding  them  go  back  and  tell  the  Greeks  that  the 
spring  time  had  been  taken  out  of  the  year.  But 


160  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  vn. 

Herodotus,  while  he  seems  to  give  credit  to  this  story, 
candidly  admits  that  there  were  other  versions  of  the 
tale,  and  that  the  genuine  Sicilian  tradition  represented 
Gelon  as  prevented  from  aiding  the  Greeks  not  by 
Spartan  claims  to  supremacy,  but  by  the  attack  of  a 
Carthaginian  army  under  Hamilkar,  equal  in  number 
to  the  unwieldy  force  of  the  Persian  king.  As  therefore 
he  could  not  help  them  with  men,  this  version  speaks 
of  him  sending  in  their  stead  a  sum  of  money  for  their 
use  to  Delphoi. 

Amidst  all  these  discouragements  the  Greeks  who 
were  not  disposed  to  Medize  fully  felt  the  paramount 
Abandon-  need  of  guarding  the  entrances  into  the 
paTs'o0/'116  country,  and  thus  of  placing  all  possible 
lempe.  hindrances  in  the  invader's  path.  The  first 

and  apparently  the  most  important  of  those  passes  was 
that  of  Tempe;  and  the  wisdom  of  guarding  this  defile 
seemed  to  be  proved  by  the  eagerness  with  which  this 
measure  was  urged  by  the  Thessalian  people.  Along 
this  pass  for  five  miles  a  road  is  carried,  nowhere  more 
than  twenty  and  in  some  parts  not  more  than  thirteen, 
feet  in  width  ;  and  when  it  was  occupied  by  Themistokles 
with  a  force  of  10,000  hoplites  or  heavy -armed  soldiers, 
it  might  have  been  thought  that  the  progress  of  the  bar 
barians  was  effectually  barred.  But  they  were  soon 
reminded  that  a  way  lay  open  to  the  west  by  the  Perrhai- 
bian  town  of  Gonnos,  and  that  they  might  thus  be  them 
selves  taken  in  the  rear  and  starved  into  submission. 
They  were  compelled  therefore  to  abandon  the  pass ; 
and  the  Thessalians,  now  left,  as  they  had  warned 
Themistokles  that  in  this  case  they  must  be  left,  to  the 
absolute  dictation  of  their  chiefs,  became,  perhaps  from 
a  natural  feeling  of  irritation  at  the  conduct  of  their  allies, 
zealous  partisans  of  the  Persian  king.  But  the  resolution 


ft 


480  B.C.]     The  Invasion  and  Flight  of  Xerxes.      161 

to  retreat  from  Tempe  was  accompanied  by  a  determina 
tion  to  fall  back  on  Thermopylai,  while  the  fleet  should 
take  up  its  station  off  Artemision  or  the  northernmost 
coast  of  Euboia,  facing  the  Malian  gulf. 

The  accumulation  of  mud  at  the  mouth  of  the  Sper- 
cheios  has  so  changed  the  form  of  the  Malian  gulf  since 
the  time  of  Herodotus,  that  some  of  the  most 
material  features  in  his  description  no  longer  JfThermo- 
apply  to  this  memorable  pass.  The  mouth  gjjj^  the 
of  the  Spercheios  which  then  flowed  into  the  under  Leo- 
sea  about  five  miles  to  the  west  of  the  pass  is 
now  shifted  to  a  distance  nearly  four  miles  to  the  east  of 
it.  We  look  therefore  in  vain  for  the  narrow  space  where 
the  ridge  of  Oita,  bearing  here  the  name  Anopaia,  came 
down  above  the  town  of  Anthela  so  close  to  the  water  as 
to  leave  room  for  nothing  more  than  a  cart-track.  Between 
this  point  (at  a  distance  of  perhaps  a  mile  and  a  half  to 
the  east)  and  the  first  Lokrian  hamlet  Alpenoi,  another 
spur  of  the  mountain,  locked  in  the  wider  space  within 
which  the  army  of  Leonidas  took  up  its  post,  but  which, 
for  all  practical  purposes  was  as  narrow  as  the  passes  at 
cither  extremity  known  as  the  Gates  or  Hot  Gates,  Pylai 
or  Thermopylai.  This  narrow  road  was  hemmed  in  by 
the  precipitous  mountain  on  the  one  side  and  on  the 
other  by  the  marshes  produced  by  the  hot  springs  which, 
under  the  name  of  Chytroi,  or  the  Pans,  formed  a  resort 
for  bathers.  To  render  the  passage  still  more  difficult 
than  nature  had  made  it,  the  Phokians  had  led  the 
mineral  waters  almost  over  the  whole  of  it  and  had  also 
built  across  it  near  the  western  entrance  a  wall  with 
strong  gates.  Much  of  this  work  had  fallen  from  age  ; 
but  it  was  now  repaired,  and  behind  it  the  Greek  army 
determined  to  await  the  attack  of  the  invaders.  Here, 
about  the  summer  solstice,  was  assembled  a  force  not 
If 


1 62  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  vii. 

exceeding,  it  would  seem,  at  the  utmost  8,000  or  10,000 
men  under  the  Spartan  Leonidas,  who,  having  to  his 
surprise  succeeded  to  the  kingly  office,  had,  as  Spartan 
custom  permitted,  married  Gorgo  (p.  102)  the  daughter 
of  his  brother  Kleomenes.  Three  hundred  picked 
hoplites,  or  heavy-armed  citizens,  attended  him  on  this 
his  first  and  last  expedition  as  king,  and  with  these 
were  ranged  the  contingents  from  the  Arkadian  Tegea, 
Mantineia,  and  Orchomenos,  from  Corinth,  Phlious,  and 
Mykenai,  from  the  Phokians  and  the  Lokrians  of  Opous, 
together  with  700  Thespians  and  lastly  500  Thebans 
taken  as  hostages  for  the  fidelity  of  their  city  to  the 
Greek  cause. 

The  narrative  of  the  events  which  took  place  in  this 
formidable  pass  has  been  distorted  partly  by  the  varia- 
Imponance  tions  which  the  oral  tradition  of  nearly  half 
flict^Ther-  a  century  is  sure  to  introduce  into  any 
mopylai.  story,  but  much  more  from  the  desire  to 

glorify  or  stigmatize  the  citizens  of  particular  towns.  In 
some  respects  the  true  account  has  been  so  far  over 
laid  as  to  be  beyond  recovery  ;  but  significant  indica 
tions  remain  to  show  that  the  conflict  in  Thermopylai  was 
more  equal  and  the  defeat  of  the  Greeks  far  more  serious 
than  the  story  told  by  Herodotus  would  lead  us  to  ima 
gine.  The  great  object  of  the  narrators  was  to  extol  the 
heroism  of  Leonidas  and  his  Spartan  followers,  just  as  at 
Salamis  the  chief  credit  of  the  victory  was  given  to  the 
Athenians ;  and  this  heroism  would  be  brought  out  into 
the  clearest  light  by  representing  these  three  hundred  as 
sustaining  not  without  some  success  the  onset  of  three 
millions.  But  the  wild  exaggeration  of  the  Persian 
numbers  is  made  manifest  by  the  fact  that  the  Greeks 
regarded  a  force  of  8,000  or  10,000  men  as  sufficient  to 
maintain  the  pass  until  the  main  body  of  their  troops 


480  B.C.]      The  Invasion  and  Flight  of  Xerxes.      163 

could  be  brought  up  ;  nor  can  we  take  the  statement 
that  one  Athenian  citizen  was  present  there  as  anything 
more  than  a  sign  that  there  were  many  more.  They  had 
dispatched  Themistokles  with  a  large  force  to  occupy  the 
pass  of  Tempe  ;  and  it  is  to  the  last  degree  unlikely 
that  they  would  make  no  effort  to  defend  the  still  more 
important  pass  at  Thermopylai,  or  that  the  allies  should 
fail  to  reproach  them  if  they  refused  to  discharge  this 
duty. 

While  the  Spartans  were  here  awaiting  the  approach 
of  their  enemies  by  land,  the  Persian  fleet  underwent  a 
terrible  disaster  on  the  narrow  strip  of  Mag-       vzm*  e  of 
nesian  coast  (p.  18),  which  it  reached  on       the  Persian 
the  eleventh   day  after  the   departure    of       sto^m  off  the 


Xerxes  from  Therme  (p.  151).  Here,  be- 
neath  the  everlasting  hills,  the  Divine  Ne 
mesis,  or  Retributive  Justice,  was  to  lay  its  hand  on  the 
overweening  power  of  Xerxes,  as  it  had  been  laid  on  that 
of  Kroisos  (p.  48),  Cyrus  (p.  54),  Kambyses  (p.  61),  and 
Polykrates  (p.  68).  Bidden  by  the  Delphian  oracle  to 
pray  to  the  winds  as  their  best  allies,  the  Athenians  in 
voked  the  aid  of  their  kinsman  Boreas  (the  northern 
blast)  who  had  married  Oreithyia,  the  daughter  of  their 
king  Erechtheus,  and  after  the  great  storm  they  raised  a 
temple  in  his  honor  on  the  banks  of  the  river  Ilissos. 
Fearing  no  danger,  the  Persian  commanders  moored  on 
the  beach  those  ships  which  came  first,  while  the  rest  lay 
beyond  them  at  anchor,  ranged  in  rows  eight  deep  facing 
the  sea.  At  daybreak  the  air  was  clear,  and  the  sea 
still  :  but  the  breeze,  called  in  these  regions  the  wind  of 
the  Hellespont,  soon  rose,  and  gathered  to  a  storm. 
Those  who  had  time  drew  their  ships  up  on  the  shore  ; 
but  all  the  vessels  which  were  out  at  sea  were  torn  from 
their  anchors  and  dashed  upon  the  Ovens  of  Pelion  and 


1 64  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  vn. 

all  along  the  beach  as  far  as  Kasthanaia.  For  four  days 
the  storm  raged  furiously.  The  shore  was  strewn  with 
costly,  treasures  of  Eastern  art  and  luxury;  and  the 
goblets  of  silver  and  gold  gathered  by  the  fortunate 
owner  of  this  bleak  domain  made  him  a  man  of  enormous 
wealth.  Meanwhile  the  Greeks,  who  on  the  approach 
of  the  Persian  fleet  had  retreated  to  the  Euripos,  heard 
on  the  second  day  of  the  storm  how  the  Persians  were 
faring  at  sea,  and,  plucking  up  courage,  sailed  back 
through  the  comparatively  smooth  waters  of  the  Euboian 
sea  to  Artemision.  Their  enemies,  however,  were  not  so 
much  crippled  as  the  Greeks  had  hoped  to  find  them. 
When  the  storm  abated,  their  ships,  drawn  down  from 
the  shore,  sailed  to  Aphetai,  at  the  entrance  of  the 
Pagasaian  gulf  (p.  18)  and  took  up  their  position  pre 
cisely  opposite  to  the  Greek  fleet  at  Artemision.  Some 
hours  later,  a  Persian  squadron,  mistaking  the  Greek  fleet 
for  their  own,  sailed  straight  into  the  trap  and  were  cap 
tured.  From  the  prisoners,  among  whom  was  the  satrap 
Sandokes,  the  Greeks  obtained  useful  information  of  the 
movements  and  plans  of  the  Persian  king. 

Xerxes,    in   the   meanwhile,   had   advanced    through 
Thessaly,  and  encamped  in  the  Malian  Trachis,  distant 
a  few  miles  only  from  the  ground  occupied  by  the  de 
fenders  of  the  pass.     Here,  as  we  are  told 

The  struggle         .          - 

in  Thermo-  in  the  exquisitely  beautiful  narrative  of 
Herodotus,  the  Persian  king  sent  a  horse 
man  on  to  see  what  the  Greeks  might  be  doing.  To  the 
west  of  the  old  Phokian  wall,  the  messenger  saw  the 
Spartans  with  their  arms  piled,  while  some  were  wrestling 
and  others  combing  their  hair.  His  report  seemed  to 
convict  them  of  mere  folly ;  but  Demaratos  assured  him 
that  the  combing  of  hair  was  a  sign  that  the  Spartans 
were  preparing  to  face  a  mortal  danger.  "  How  can  so 


480  B.C.]      The  Invasion  and  Flight  of  Xerxes.      165 

few  men  ever  fight  with  my  great  army  ? "  asked  the 
king  ;  and  for  four  days  he  waited,  thinking  that  they 
must  run  away.  At  last  he  ordered  his  army  to  advance ; 
but  their  efforts  were  vain.  Troop  after  troop  was  hurled 
back,  until  the  Immortals  were  bidden  to  carry  the  pass. 
But  their  spears  were  shorter  than  those  of  the  Greeks  ; 
linen  tunics  were  of  little  use  in  an  encounter  with  iron 
clad  men  ;  and  mere  numbers  were  a  hindrance  in  the 
narrow  pass.  Pretending  to  fly,  the  Spartans  drew  the 
barbarians  on,  and  then,  turning  round,  cut  them  down 
•without  mercy.  Thrice  the  king  leaped  from  his  throne 
in  terror  during  that  terrible  fight :  but  on  the  following 
day  he  renewed  the  onset,  thinking  that  the  enemy  must 
be  too  tired  to  fight.  The  Greeks  were  all  drawn  out  in 
battle  array,  except  the  Phokians,  who  had  been  detached 
to  guard  the  path  which  led  over  the  ridge  Anopaia. 
The  scenes  of  the  day  before  were  repeated,  and  Xerxes 
was  well-nigh  at  his  wits'  end  when  a  Malian  named 
Ephialtes  told  him  of  this  mountain  pathway.  Having 
received  the  king's  orders,  Hydarnes  set  out  from  the 
camp  as  the  daylight  died  away;  and  all  night  long 
with  his  men  he  followed  the  path,  the  mountains  of 
Oita  rising  on  the  right  hand  and  the  hills  of  Trachis 
on  the  left.  The  day  was  dawning  with  the  deep  stillness 
which  marks  the  early  morning  in  Greece,  when  they 
reached  the  peak  where  the  thousand  Phokians  were  on 
guard.  These  knew  nothing  of  the  approach  of  the 
enemy  while  they  were  climbing  the  hill  which  was 
covered  with  oak-trees  ;  but  they  knew  what  had  hap 
pened  as  soon  as  the  Persians  drew  near  to  the  summit. 
Not  a  breath  of  wind  was  stirring,  and  they  heard  the 
trampling  of  their  feet  as  they  trod  on  the  fallen  leaves. 
The  barbarians  were  on  them  before  they  could  well  put 
on  their  arms.  Dismayed  at  first,  for  he  had  not  ex- 


1 66  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  vn. 

pected  any  resistance,  Hydarnes  drew  out  his  men  for 
battle  ;  and  the  Phokians,  covered  with  a  shower  of 
arrows,  fell  back  from  the  path  to  the  highest  ground, 
and  then  made  ready  to  fight  and  die.  But  the  Persians 
had  come  with  no  notion  of  attacking  them,  and  without 
taking  further  notice  they  hastened  down  the  mountain. 
In  the  Greek  camp  the  tidings  that  Hydarnes  was  at 
hand  were  received  with  mingled  feelings.  Among  the 
Spartans  they  excited  no  surprise,  for  the  soothsayer 
Megistias  had  told  them  the  day  before  that  on  the  mor 
row  they  must  die.  In  some  of  the  allies  they  created 
an  unreasoning  terror  ;  and  Leonidas,  wishing  that  the 
Spartans  might  have  all  the  glory,  resolved  on  sending 
all  away.  The  Thebans  and  Thespians  alone  remained, 
the  former  because  Leonidas  insisted  on  keeping  them 
as  pledges  for  their  countrymen,  the  latter  because  they 
would  not  save  their  lives  by  treachery  to  the  cause  to 
which  they  had  devoted  themselves.  When  the  sun 
rose,  Xerxes  poured  out  wine  to  the.  god,  and  by  the 
bidding  of  Ephialtes,  tarried  till  the  time  of  the  filling  of 
the  market  (about  9  A.M.).  The  battle,  which  began 
when  the  signal  was  given  for  onset,  was  marked  by 
fearful  slaughter  on  the  side  of  the  barbarians,  who  were 
driven  on  with  scourges  and  blows.  Many  fell  into  the 
sea  and  were  drowned  ;  many  more  were  trampled  down 
alive  by  one  another.  At  length,  overborne  by  sheer 
weight  of  numbers,  Leonidas  with  other  Spartans  fell, 
fighting  nobly  ;  and  a  desperate  conflict  was  maintained 
over  his  body,  until  Hydarnes  came  up  with  his  men. 
Finding  themselves  thus  taken  in  the  rear,  the  Greeks 
went  back  into  the  narrow  part  within  the  wall,  and  here, 
after  performing  prodigies  of  valor,  the  Thespians  and 
Spartans  were  all  cut  down,  the  bravest  of  the  latter 
being,  it  was  said,  Dienekes,  who  hearing  from  a  Tra- 


480  B.  c.  ]       The  Invasion  and  Flight  of  Xerxes.      167 

chian,  just  before  the  battle  that  when  the  Persians  shot 
their  arrows  the  sun  was  darkened  by  them,  answered 
merrily,  "  Our  friend  from  Trachis  brings  us  good  news  : 
we  shall  fight  in  the  shade."  All  were  buried  where  they 
fell :  and  in  after  days  the  inscription  over  the  allies  re 
corded  that  4,000  Peloponnesians  fought  here  with  300 
myriads.  Over  the  Spartans  was  another  writing,  which 
said :  * 

Tell  the  Spartans,  at  their  bidding, 
Stranger  here  in  death  we  lie. 

Two  only  of  the  300  Spartans  who  came  with  Leonidas 
were  lying  sick  at  Alpenoi.  The  one,  Eurytos,  calling 
for  his  arms,  bade  his  guide  lead  him  into  the  battle  (for 
his  eyes  were  diseased),  and  plunging  into  the  fight  was 
there  slain.  The  other,  Aristodemos,  went  back  to 
Sparta  and  was  avoided  by  all  as  the  dastard.  But  he 
got  back  his  good  name  when  he  flung  away  his  life  at 
Plataia.  As  to  the  Thebans,  they  took  the  first  oppor 
tunity  of  hastening  to  the  king  with  a  story  which  Hero 
dotus  calls  the  truest  of  all  tales,  saying  that  they  were 
the  first  to  give  earth  and  water,  and  that  they  had  gone 
into  the  fight  sorely  against  their  will.  The  issue  of  the 
battle  set  Xerxes  pondering.  Summoning  Demaratos, 
he  asked  how  many  Spartans  might  be  left  and  received 
for  answer  that  there  might  be  about  8,000.  To  the 
question  how  these  men  were  to  be  conquered  Demaratos 
replied  that  there  was  but  one  way,  and  thfs  was  to 
send  a  detachment  of  the  fleet  to  occupy  the  island  of  Ky- 
thera,  off  the  southernmost  promontory  of  Poloponnesos. 
This  suggestion  was  received  with  vehement  outcries  by 
some  of  the  Persian  generals.  Four  hundred  ships  had 
already  been  shattered  by  the  storm  on  the  Magnesian 
coast :  if  the  fleet  were  further  divided,  as  it  would  be 


r  68  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  vn. 

by  this  proposal,  the  Greeks  would  at  once  be  a  match 
for  them.  The  advice  of  the  exiled  Spartan  king  was  re 
jected,  and  Xerxes  applied  himself  to  the  task  of  turning 
to  good  purpose  his  victory  at  Thermopylai.  His  order 
to  behead  and  crucify  the  body  of  Leonidas  was  followed 
by  a  proclamation  inviting  all  who  might  choose  to  do 
so  to  visit  the  battle-ground  and  see  how  the  great  king 
treated  his  enemies.  The  trick  was  transparent  even  to 
Eastern  minds.  In  one  heap  were  gathered  the  bodies 
of  4,000  Greeks,  in  another  lay  those  of  1,000  Persians. 
One  more  incident  points  the  great  moral  of  the  story  of 
Thermopylai.  Some  Arkadian  deserters,  on  being  asked 
by  Xerxes  what  the  Greeks  were  doing,  answered  that 
they  were  keeping  the  feast  at  Olympia,  and  looking  on 
the  contests  of  wrestlers  and  horsemen.  A  further  ques 
tion  brought  out  the  fact  that  the  victors  were  rewarded 
with  a  simple  olive  wreath.  "  Ah !  Mardonios,"  ex 
claimed  Tritantaithmes,  with  emotion  which  Xerxes  as 
cribed,  to  cowardice,  "  what  men  are  these  against  whom 
you  have  brought  us  here  to  fight,  who  strive  not  for 
money  but  for  glory  ?" 

Beautiful  as  this  story  of  the  battle  may  be,  it  is  easy 
to  see  that  it  is  not  an  accurate  narrative  of  the  events  as 
Value  of  the  they  occurred.  With  a  force  numbering  not 
histor° of1  much  more  than  8,000  men,  Leonidas  is  said 
the  struggle.  to  have  kept  in  check  the  whole  Persian 
army  for  ten  or  twelve  days,  and  to  have  inflicted  on 
them  very  serious  loss.  Nothing  can  show  more  clearly 
that  he  might  have  held  his  ground  successfully,  had  he 
chosen  to  place  an  effectual  guard  on  the  ridge  of 
Anopaia,  and  to  keep  under  his  own  standard  all  who 
were  not  needed  for  that  duty.  The  conduct  of  the 
Phokians  destroyed,  we  are  told,  all  chances  of  ultimate 
success,  but  it  still  left  open  the  possibility  of  retreat, 


480  B.C.]      The  Invasion  and  Flight  of  Xerxes.      169 

and  more  than  4,000  troops  were  accordingly  dismissed 
and  got  away  safely.  This,  so  far  as  we  can  see,  seems 
impossible.  Within  an  hour  from  the  time  of  his  leav 
ing  the  Phokians  at  the  top  of  the  hill,  Hydarnes,  with 
his  men  must  have  reached  the  Eastern  Gates  through 
which  these  4,000  would  have  to  pass ;  and  it  is  absurd 
to  suppose  that,  within  a  few  minutes  of  the  time  when 
they  learnt  that  the  Persians  were  at  hand,  so  large  a 
force  could  have  made  its  way  along  a  narrow  strip  of 
ground,  in  some  parts  scarcely  wider  than  a  cart-track. 
It  is  clear  that  if  under  such  circumstances  the  retreat 
was  effected  at  all,  it  must  have  been  accomplished  by 
sheer  hard  fighting ;  but  the  narrative  speaks  of  a 
peaceable  and  even  of  a  leisurely  departure.  Nor  can  we 
well  avoid  the  conclusion  that  Leonidas  would  have 
taken  a  wiser  course  had  he  sent  these  4,000  along  with 
the  Phokians  to  guard  Anopaia,  with  orders  that  they 
were  to  hold  it  at  all  hazards.  Nor  is  the  story  told 
of  the  Thebans  in  his  camp  less  perplexing.  Their 
behaviour  cannot  be  explained  on  the  theory  that  they 
were  citizens  of  the  anti-Persian  party,  and  that  after 
the  fall  of  Leonidas,  they  were  glad  to  take  credit  for  a 
Medism  which  they  did  not  feel.  Distinctly  contradict 
ing  any  such  supposition,  Herodotus  maintains  that  their 
profession  of  Medism  was  the  truest  of  all  pleas ;  nor 
would  the  Thessalians  have  vouched  for  the  credit  of 
men  of  whose  Hellenic  sympathies  they  must  on  this 
theory  have  been  perfectly  aware.  But  if  they  were 
thus 'kept  in  the  Greek  camp  wholly  against  their  will,  it 
is  strange  indeed  that  they  should  forego  all  opportunities 
of  aiding  the  cause  of  Xerxes,  whether  by  openly  joining 
Hydarnes  or  passively  hindering  the  operations  of 
Leonidas.  When  further,  we  see  that  the  special  object 
of  the  whole  narrative  is  to  glorify  the  Spartans,  we  are 


1 70  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  vn. 

justified  in  inferring  that  the  care  taken  by  the  com 
manders  of  the  Athenian  fleet  to  obtain  early  tidings 
from  the  army  of  Thermopylai,  indicates  the  presence 
of  an  Athenian  force  within  the  pass,  and  that  the  re 
sistance  to  Xerxes  was  on  a  far  larger  scale  than  Hero 
dotus  has  represented.  A  compulsory,  and  still  more  a 
disastrous,  retreat  of  the  allies  might  be  veiled  under  the 
decent  plea  that  they  were  dismissed  by  the  Spartan 
chief;  and  if  they  were  conscious  of  faint-heartedness, 
they  would  not  care  to  hinder  the  growth  of  a  story 
which  covered  their  remissness  in  the  Hellenic  cause, 
while  it  enhanced  the  renown  of  Leonidas  and  his  Three 
Hundred. 

Of  the  disaster  which  befell  the  Persian  fleet  on  the 
Magnesian  coast,  the  Greeks  on  board  their  ships  at  the 
The  Greek  Euripos  heard  on  the  second  day  after  the 
fleet  at  Ar-  beginning  of  the  storm ;  and  no  sooner  had 

temision. 

they  received  the  tidings  than  they  set  off 
with  all  speed  for  Artemision.  The  storm  lasted  four 
days,  and  the  Greek  fleet  had  thus  been  stationed  on  the 
northern  shore  of  Euboia  for  eight-and-forty  hours  before 
the  Persian  ships  became  visible  as  they  sailed  to 
Aphetai.  Here  the  confederate  fleet  awaited  their  arrival, 
the  whole  number  being  271  ships,  of  which  Athens 
furnished  not  less  than  127,  or  it  may  rather  be  said  147, 
'if  we  take  into  account  the  20  Athenian  vessels  manned 
by  the  Chalkidians.  The  supreme  command  of  the  force 
was  in  the  hands  of  the  Spartan  Eurybiades.  The  other 
cities  had  insisted  on  this  arrangement  as  an  indispensa 
ble  condition  of  the  alliance  ;  and,  to  their  lasting  credit, 
the  Athenians,  yielding  at  once,  waited  patiently  until 
the  turn  of  events  opened  the  way  to  the  most  brilliant 
maritime  dominion  of  the  ancient  world. 

Reaching  Aphetai  late  in  the  afternoon  of  the  fourth 


480  B.C.]      The  Invasion  and  Flight  of  Xerxes.       1 7 1 

day  after  the  beginning  of  the  storm,  the  Persians  saw 
the  scanty  Greek  fleet  awaiting  their  arrival 
off  Artemision.     Their  first  impulse  was  to        ^/Pel-s'iL 
attack    them   immediately :    they  were   re-       ships  at 

.        .          .      ,         .  .   .       ,  Aphetai. 

strained  only  by  the  wish  that  not  a  single 
Greek  vessel  should  escape.  A  Persian  squadron  was 
accordingly  sent,  the  same  afternoon,  round  the  east 
coast  of  Euboia  to  take  the  enemy  in  the  rear.  Before 
the  evening  closed,  or,  at  the  latest,  early  the  next  morn 
ing,  a  deserter  from  the  Persian  fleet  brought  to  the 
Greeks  the  news  of  the  measures  taken  to  place  them 
between  two  fires,  and  it  is  expressly  stated  that  until  the 
Persian  fleet  became  visible  off  Aphetai  they  had  no  in 
tention  of  retreating.  But  a  little  room,  therefore,  is  left 
for  the  story  which  tells  us  that  on  seeing  the. Persian 
fleet,  which  they  had  specially  come  up  to  attack,  the 
Greeks  resolved  at  once  to  fall  back  on  Chalkis,  and 
were  prevented  from  so  doing  only  by  Themistokles, 
who  bribed  Eurybiades  with  five  talents  and  the  Corin 
thian  leader  Adeimantos  with  three,  to  remain  where 
they  were  until  the  Euboians  should  have  removed  their 
families  from  the  island.  These  eight  talents  formed 
part  of  the  sum  of  thirty  talents  which  the  Euboians,  it  is 
said,  bestowed  on  Themistokles  to  secure  his  aid  for  this 
purpose;  and  we  must  note  here  four  points, — (i)  that 
Themistokles  retained  for  himself  the  huge  sum  of 
twenty-two  talents ;  (2)  that  although  they  must  in  an 
hour  or  two  have  learnt  that  their  bribe  was  a  useless 
waste  of  money  the  Euboians  never  sought  to  recover 
the  whole  or  any  portion  of  it ;  (3)  that  if  they  had  asked 
redress  from  the  Athenians,  the  latter  would  readily 
have  given  it ;  and  (4)  that  although  twice  or  thrice 
afterwards  it  was  a  matter  of  vital  moment  that  Themis 
tokles  should  overcome  the  opposition  of  his  colleagues, 


172  TJie  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  vn. 

there  is  not  even  a  hint  that  he  ever  attempted  to  bribe 
them  again. 

The  debate  which  followed  the  receipt  of  the  news  that 
the  Persian  squadron  had  been  sent  round  Euboia,  ended 
in  the  resolution  to  sail  down  the  strait  under 
cover  of  darkness,  for  the  purpose  of  en- 
gaomg tne  squadron  separately  ;  but  finding, 
as  the  day  wore  on,  that  the  Persian  fleet 
remained  motionless,  they  determined  to  use  the  remain 
ing  hours  of  light  in  attacking  the  enemy,  and  thus  gain 
ing  some  experience  in  their  way  of  fighting.  As  the 
Greeks  drew  near,  the  Persians,  as  at  Marathon,  (p.  127), 
thought  them  mad,  so  it  is  said,  and  surrounded  them 
with  their  more  numerous  and  faster-sailing  ships,  to  the 
dismay  of  the  lonians  serving  under  Xerxes,  who  looked 
on  their  kinsfolk  as  on  victims  ready  for  the  slaughter. 
But  on  a  given  signal,  the  Greeks  drew  their  ships  into 
a  circle  with  their  sterns  inwards  and  their  prows  ready 
for  the  charge.  On  the  second  signal  a  conflict  ensued, 
in  which  the  Greeks  took  thirty  ships ;  and  the  desertion 
of  a  Lemnian  vessel  from  the  Persians  showed  the  dis 
position  of  the  Asiatic  Greeks  towards  their  western  kins 
folk. 

During  the  following  night  the  storm  again  burst  forth 
with  terrific  lightning  and  deluges  of  rain.  The  wrecks 
Second  bat-  anc^ tne  dead  bodies  were  borne  by  the  waves 
tie  off  Arte-  to  Aphetai :  but  the  full  stress  of  the  tempest 
fell  on  the  Persian  squadron  coasting  round 
Euboia  for  the  purpose  of  cutting  off  the  retreat  of  the 
Greeks.  Almost  all  were  dashed  against  the  rocks ;  and 
thus  again,  the  historian  adds,  the  divine  Nemesis  worked 
to  bring  their  numbers  more  nearly  to  a  par  with  those 
of  their  enemies.  The  morning  brought  no  cheering 
sight  to  the  barbarians  at  Aphetai.  while  the  Greeks, 


480  B.C.]     The  Invasion  and  Flight  of  Xerxes.      173 

elated  at  the  tidings  that  the  Persian  ships  of  Euboia 
were  destroyed,  were  further  strengthened  by  a  rein 
forcement  of  fifty-three  Athenian  ships.  The  allies  at 
tempted  nothing  more  than  an  attack  on  the  knot  of 
ships  which  they  captured,  and  then  came  back  to  their 
stations  ;  but  even  this  was  presumption  not  to  be  en 
dured,  and  the  Persian  leaders,  seriously  fearing  the 
wrath  of  the  king,  resolved  on  fighting.  The  battle  was 
fiercely  contested.  The  Persians  with  their  ships  drawn 
out  crescent-wise,  sought  to  surround  and  overwhelm  the 
confederate  fleet,  and  they  failed,  we  are  told,  more  from 
the  unwieldy  numbers  of  their  vessels  than  from  any 
lack  of  spirit  in  their  crews.  Although  the  Greeks  were 
on  the  whole,  the  victors,  the  Spartans  and  their  allies 
were  so  weakened,  that  retreat  once  more 

,      ,  .  Victory  and 

appeared  the  only  course  open  to  them.  retreat  of  the 
The  Euboian  money,  we  might  suppose, 
might  now  have  been  used  with  advantage;  but  we  are 
not  told  that  Themistokles  offered  again  to  bribe  them, 
and  all  efforts  were  useless  when  a  scout  came  with  the 
tidings  that  Leonidas  was  slain,  and  that  Xerxes  was 
master  of  the  pass  which  formed  the  gate  of  Southern 
Hellas.  The  Greek  fleet  at  once  began  to  retreat,  the 
Corinthians  leading  the  way,  and  the  Athenians  follow 
ing  last  in  order. 

It  is  from  this  point  that  the  courage  of  the  Athenians 
rises  to  that  patriotic  devotion  which  drew  forth  the 
enthusiastic  eulogies  of  Herodotus :  and  it  ek 

rises  just  in  proportion  as  the  spirit  of  their         fleet  at 
allies  gives  way.     The  one  thought  of  the 
latter  was  now  fixed  on  the  defence  of  the  Peloponnesos 
alone.     They  had  convinced  themselves  that  no  Persian 
fleet  would  visit  the  shores  of  Argolis  and  Lakonia ;  and 
their  natural  conclusion  was  that  if  they  guarded  the 


174  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  vn. 

Corinthian  isthmus,  they  needed  to  do  nothing  more. 
Against  this  plan  Themistokles  made  an  indignant  pro 
test;  and  although  we  are  not  told  that  the  Euboian 
money  was  employed  to  second  his  remonstrances,  he 
persuaded  them  to  make  a  stand  at  Salamis  until  the 
Athenians  should  have  removed  their  households  from 
Attica.  Here  then  the  fleet  remained,  while  the  Pelo— 
ponnesians  were  working  night  and  day  in  order  to 
fortify  the  isthmus.  Stones,  bricks,  pieces 

Building  of  J 

the  Isthmian  of  wood,  mats  full  of  sand,  brought  by 
myriads  of  laborers,  soon  raised  the  wall  to 
the  needful  height ;  but  the  completion  of  the  barrier 
added  little,  it  seems,  to  the  confidence  of  its  builders, 
and  none  to  that  of  the  Peloponnesian  seamen  at  Sala 
mis.  We  have,  in  fact,  reached  the  time  of  the  greatest 
depression  on  the  part  of  the  Greeks  ;  and  this  depression 
marks  the  moment  at  which  the  enterprise  of  Xerxes  had 
been  brought  most  nearly  to  a  successful  issue.  The 
story  of  Thermopylai  seems  to  indicate  throughout  that 
Depression  the  Persian  host  was  not  so  large,  and  the 
of  the  allies.  Greek  army  not  so  small,  as  they  are  repre 
sented  ;  and  the  inaction  set  down  to  the  score  of  the 
Karneian  and  Olympian  festivals  may  be  nothing  more 
than  an  excuse  invented  at  a  later  time  to  cover  the  fail 
ure  of  really  strenuous  efforts.  To  the  average  Greek 
the  glory  of  the  struggle  lay  in  the  defeat  of  millions  by 
thousands  ;  to  us  the  splendor  of  achievement  is  vastly 
enhanced,  if  the  power  of  Xerxes  lay  not  so  much  in  his 
numbers  as  in  the  strength  and  spirit  of  his  genuine 
Persian  soldiers.  The  tales  which  represent  his  progress 
as  that  of  a  rolling  snowball  have  their  origin  in  the 
vulgar  exaggeration  of  Eastern  nations  ;  and  a  pardona 
ble  feeling  of  vanity  led  the  Greeks  to  regard  these  ex 
aggerations  as  heightening  thelustre  of  their  own  exploits. 


480  B.C.]       The  Invasion  and  Fliglit  of  Xerxes.      1 75 

The  real  strength  of  the  army  of  Xerxes  lay  beyond 
doubt  in  the  men  whom  Cyrus  had  led  from  conquest 
to  conquest,  and  whose  vigor  and  courage  remain  un 
subdued  after  the  lapse  of  five-and-twenty  centuries  ;  nor 
can  we  rightly  appreciate  the  character  of  the  struggle 
and  its  issue  until  we  see  that  the  Greeks  were  fighting 
against  men  little,  if  at  all,  inferior  to  themselves  in  any 
except  the  one  point  that  the  Eastern  Aryan  fought 
to  establish  the  rule  of  one  despotic  will,  while  his  Western 
brother  strove  to  set  up  the  dominion  of  an  equal  law. 

Western  freedom  was,  in  truth,  in  far  greater  danger 
than  it  would  have  been  but  for  this  genuine  element  of 
strength  in  the  Persian  forces.  There  was 

Migration  of 

now  no  time  for  dilatory  counsels.  Imme-  thcAthe- 
diately  after  the  arrival  of  the  fleet  from  Ar-  ^Afei£. 
temision,  a  proclamation  was  issued,  warn-  andSalamis. 
ing  all  Athenians  to  remove  their  families  from  the  coun 
try  in  all  possible  haste.  How  far  this  order  may  have 
been  obeyed,  we  cannot  say  :  but  from  all  those  parts  of 
the  country  which  lay  in  the  immediate  path  of  the  invader, 
the  inhabitants  beyond  doubt  fled  in  haste,  most  of  them 
to  Troizen  in  the  Argolic  peninsula,  some  to  Aigina,  and 
some  to  Salamis. 

Meanwhile,  to  the  north  of  Attica,  Xerxes  had  over 
come  almost  all  real  resistance.     With  the  exception  of 
Thespiai  and  Plataia  (p.    122)  all  the  Boio- 
tian  cities  had  submitted  to  him,  while  the       xfrxe""  °f 
Thessalians  professed  a  zeal  in  his  cause 
which  Herodotus  ascribed  wholly  to  their  hatred  of  the 
Phokians'  way  of  revenging  old  affronts,  the 
Thessalians   led  the  Persians  through  the      ?hok?sing°f 
narrow  little  strip  of  Dorian  land,  and  then 
let  them  loose  on  Phokis.     The  Phokian  towns  were  all 
burnt ;  and  Abai,  the  shrine  and  oracle  of  Apollo,  was 


176  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  vn. 

despoiled  of  its  magnificent  treasures.  A  little  further 
on,  the  forces  were  divided.  The  larger  portion  went 
on  through  Boiotia  under  orders  to  join 
DelpChoipn  Xerxes.  The"  rest  marched,  it  is  said,  to 
wards  Delphoi,  which  they  hoped  to  treat 
as  they  had  treated  Abai.  The  tidings  of  their  approach 
so  dismayed  the  Delphians,  that  they  asked  the  god 
whether  they  should  bury  his  holy  treasures,  or  carry 
them  away.  "  Move  them  not,"  answered  the  god,  "  I 
am  able  to  guard  them."  Then,  taking  thought  for 
themselves,  the  people  fled,  until  there  remained 
only  sixty  *,en  with  the  prophet  Akeratos.  As  the  Per 
sian  host  came  into  sight,  the  sacred  arms,  which  hung 
in  the  holy  place,  and  which  it  was  not  lawful  for  man 
to  touch,  were  seen  lying  in  front  of  the  temple  ;  and  as 
the  enemy  drew  nearer,  the  lightnings  burst  from  heaven, 
and  two  cliffs  torn  from  the  peaks  of  Parnassos  dashed 
down  with  a  thundering  sound,  crushing  great  multi 
tudes,  while  fierce  cries  and  shoutings  were  heard  from 
the  chapel  of  Athene.  In  utter  dismay  the  barbarians 
fled  ;  and  the  Delphians,  hurrying  down  from  the  moun 
tain,  slew  without  mercy  all  whom  they  overtook.  The 
fugitives  who  escaped  into  Boiotia  told  how  two  hoplites, 
higher  in  stature  than  mortal  man,  had  chased  them  with 
fearful  slaughter  from  Delphoi.  The  rocks  which  fell 
from  Parnassos  Herodotus  believed  that  he  saw  lying  in 
the  sacred  ground  of  Athene. 

This  inroad  on   Delphoi    marks  in  the    narrative   of 
Herodotus  the  turning  point  in  the  enterprise  of  Xerxes. 
It  is  the  most  daring  provocation  of  divine 
Safin?0 to         wrath  by  the  barbarian   despot ;  and  while 
oneDdphoi         'lt  is  followcci  immediately  by  his  own  hu 
miliation,  it  insures    also  the   destruction  of 
the  army  which  he  was  to  leave  behind  him  with   Mar- 


480  B.C.]       The  Invasion  and  Flight  of  Xerxes.     177 

donios.  But  we  shall  presently  find  Mardonios  denying 
that  any  such  enterprise  had  been  attempted,  while  the 
narrative  of  Plutarch  represents  the  Delphian  temple  not 
only  as  having  been  taken  by  the  Persians,  but  as  un 
dergoing  the  fate  of  the  shrine  at  Abai.  This  tradition 
seems  to  be  set  aside  by  the  statement  of  Herodotus, 
that  he  had  himself  seen  in  the  Delphian  treasury  the 
splendid  gifts  which  bore  the  names  of  Gyges  and  of 
Kroisos  ;  but  it  is  certain  that  the  story  of  the  enterprise 
of  Xerxes  is  repeated  precisely  in  the  story  of  the  attempt 
made  on  Delphoi  by  Bran  (Brennus)  and  his  Gauls  just 
two  centuries  later  ;  and  the  identity  of  the  incidents  in 
each  seems  to  show  that  the  form  given  to  the  narrative 
was  demanded  by  the  religious  sentiment  of  the  people. 
In  Boiotia  Xerxes  was  still  moving  on  upon  the  path 
which,  as  he  fancied,  was  to  lead  him  to  his  final  triumph. 
Four  months  had  passed  since  his  army 

J         Occupation 

crossed  over  the  Hellespont,  when  the  ty-  of  Athens  by 
rant  set  his  foot  on  Attic  soil  and  found  the 
land  desolate.  The  city  was  abandoned,  and  on  the 
Akropolis  there  remained  only  a  few  poor  people  and 
the  guardians  of  the  temples,  who,  to  carry  out  the  letter 
of  the  oracle  (p.  1 54),  had  blocked  with  a  wooden  palisade 
the  only  side  which  was  supposed  to  lie  open  to  attack. 
Once  more  the  Peisistratidai  stood  in  their  old  home,  and 
regarded  themselves  as  practically  repossessed  of  their 
ancient  tyranny  :  but  the  offers  which  they  made  to  the 
occupants  of  the  Akropolis  were  rejected  with  contempt. 
In  vain  the  Persians  discharged  against  them  arrows 
bearing  lighted  tow  ;  and  Xerxes,  thus  foiled,  gave  him 
self  up  to  one  of  his  fits  of  furious  passion.  But  a  fissure 
in  the  rock  on  the  northern  side  enabled  some  Persians 
to  scramble  up  to  the  summit.  Of  the  defenders,  a  few 
threw  themselves  over  the  precipice,  the  rest  took  refuge 

N 


1 78  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  vn. 

in  the  temple  of  the  goddess.  Hurrying  thither,  the  bar 
barians  cut  down  every  one  of  the  suppliants ;  and 
Xerxes,  now  lord  of  Athens,  forthwith  sent  a  horseman 
to  Sousa  with  the  news.  The  streets  of  that  royal  city 
rang  with  shouts  of  joy  when  the  tidings  became 
known,  and  were  strewn  with  myrtle  branches.  The 
fears  of  Artabanos  were  falsified,  and  the  harems  of  the 
king  and  his  nobles  could  now  wait  patiently  the  coming 
of  the  Spartan  and  Athenian  maidens  whom  Atossa  had 
wished  to  make  her  slaves  (p.  71). 

In  revenge  for  the  burning  of  the  temple  at  Sardeis 
(p.  103)  the  temples  on  the  Akropolis  were  set  on  fire  ; 
but  the  Athenian  exiles  who  had  returned 

.  ,         .  Resolution 

with  him  from  Sousa  were  commanded  by  ofthePelo- 
Xerxes  to  make  their  peace  with  Athene.  to'mreat'to 
Two  days  only  had  passed  since  the  rock  the  isthmus- 
was  taken :  but  in  the  meantime  the  scorched  stem  of 
her  sacred  olive  tree  was  seen,  it  is  said  by  these  exiles, 
when  they  came  to  offer  sacrifice,  to  have  thrown  up  a 
shoot  of  a  cubit's  height.  If  the  Peisistratidai  chose  to 
see  in  this  marvel  a  sign  of  the  greeting  with  which  Athene 
welcomed  them  home,  the  Athenians  drew  from  it  a  dif 
ferent  lesson.  Some  encouragement  they  assuredly 
needed.  The  confederate  fleet  had  been  stationed  at 
Salamis  rather  to  cover  the  migration  of  the  Athenians, 
than  with  any  purpose  of  making  it  a  naval  station ;  and 
the  news  of  the  taking  of  Athens  determined  the  allies 
to  retreat  to  the  isthmus,  where  in  case  of  defeat  by  sea 
they  could  fall  back  on  the  help  of  the  land-force.  One 
man  alone  felt  that  this  decision  must  be  fatal.  Thessaly, 
Boiotia,  and  Attica  had  been  allowed  to  fall  successively 
into  the  enemy's  hand,  under  the  plea  that  prudence  de 
manded  a  retreat  to  the  south  or  the  west.  What  pledge 
could  the  Athenians  have  that  the  occupation  of  the 


480  B.C.]       The  Invasion  and  Flight  of  Xerxes.     179 

isthmus  would  be  followed  by  greater  harmony  of  coun 
sels  or  greater  resolution  of  purpose  ?  Convinced  that 
the  abandonment  of  Salamis  would  be  a  virtual  confes 
sion  that  common  action  could  no  more 

Opposition 

be  looked  for,  Themistokles  resolved  ofThemis- 
that  by  fair  means  or  by  foul  he  would 
not  allow  this  further  retreat  to  be  carried  out. 
Having  prevailed  on  Eurybiades  to  summon  a  second 
council,  he  was  hastening,  it  is  said,  to  address  the  as 
sembly  without  waiting  for  the  formal  opening  of  the  de 
bate,  when  the  Corinthian  Adeimantos  reminded  him 
sharply  that  they  who  in  the  games  rise  before  the  signal 
are  beaten.  "  Yes,"  said  Themistokles  gently  ;  "  but  those 
who  do  not  rise  when  the  signal  is  given  are  not  crowned." 
Then  turning,  to  Eurybiades,  he  warned  him  that  at  the 
isthmus  they  would  have  to  fight  in  the  open  sea,  to  the 
great  disadvantage  of  their  fewer  and  heavier  ships, 
while  a  combat  in  the  closed  waters  of  Salamis  would 
probably  end  in  victory.  At  this  point  Adeimantos,  again 
breaking  in  upon  his  speech,  told  him  rudely,  that,  as 
since  the  fall  of  Athens  he  had  no  country,  he  could  have 
no  vote  in  the  council,  and  that  thus  Eurybiades  was  de 
barred  from  even  taking  his  opinion.  The  speech  was  a 
strange  one  to  come  from  a  man  who  had  taken  a  bribe 
from  the  speaker ;  nor  is  it  easy  to  see  why,  with  more 
than  twenty  Euboian  talents  still  in  his  possession,  The 
mistokles  had  not  again  tried  the  effect  of  gold  on  the  Corin 
thian  leader  before  the  council  began.  Telling  Adeimantos 
quietly  that  he  had  a  better  city  than  Corinth,  so  long  as 
the  Athenians  had  200  ships, Themistokles  contented  him 
self  with  warning  Eurybiades  plainly  that,  if  the  allies 
abandoned  Salamis,  their  ships  would  convey  the  Athe 
nians  and  their  families  to  Italy,  where  they  would  find 
a  home  in  their  own  city  of  Siris.  The  Spartan  leader 


i$o  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  vii. 

saw  at  once  that  without  the  Athenians  the  Pelopon- 
nesians  would  be  at  the  mercy  of  the  enemy,  and  gave 
orders  for  remaining.  But  the  formal  obedience  of  the 
allies  could  not  kill  their  fears ;  and  when  on  the  follow 
ing  day,  after  an  earthquake  by  sea  and  land,  they  saw 
the  Persian  fleet  manifestly  preparing  for  battle,  their  dis 
content  broke  out  into  murmurs  which  made  it  clear  that 
Messa  e  of  Eurybiades  must  give  way.  Without  losing 
Themistokles  a  moment,  Themistokles  left  the  council,  and 
sent  Sikinnos,  his  slave,  and  the  tutor  of 
his  children,  in  a  boat  to  the  Persian  fleet,  bidding  him 
tell  the  king  that  Themistokles  desired  the  victory  not  of 
the  Greeks  but  of  the  Persians,  that  the  Greeks  were  on 
the  point  of  running  away,  and  that  in  their  present  state 
of  dismay  they  could  be  taken  and  crushed  with  little 
trouble.  The  Persians  at  once  landed  a  large  force  on 
the  island  of  Psyttaleia,  precisely  opposite  to  the  harbor 
of  Peiraieus,  for  the  purpose  of  saving  the  wrecks  of  ships, 
and  slaying  such  of  the  enemy  as  might  be  driven  thither. 
Towards  midnight  a  portion  of  their  fleet  began  to  move 
along  the  Attic  coast  until  the  line  extended  to  the  north 
eastern  promontory  of  Salamis,  thus  making  it  impossi 
ble  for  the  Greeks  to  retreat  to  the  isthmus  without  fight 
ing.  The  leaders  of  the  latter  were  spending  the  night 
in  fierce  discussion,  when  Themistokles,  summoned  from 
the  council,  found  his  banished  rival  Aristeides  waiting 
to  tell  him  that  they  were  now  surrounded  beyond  all  pos 
sibility  of  escape.  In  few  words  Themistokles  informed 
him  that  the  arrangement  had  been  brought  about  by 
himself.  The  arrival  of  a  Tenian  ship,  deserting  from 
the  Persian  fleet,  confirmed  the  news  to  which,  as  it 
came  from  the  lips  even  of  Aristeides,  they  were  disposed 
to  give  little  credit.  Once  more  they  made  ready  to 
fight ;  and  as  the  day  dawned,  Themistokles  addressed 


K! 

"  ,  •'.?     ^ XT* 


BATTLE 

OF 
PLATAIAI 


StoJi'a 

I'     I  >V--«<  I'usitum    in 1  Persians 

11  i-vcund  I'usitiim  ft~]  Athenians 
\III  Third  Position   r  L»kca»iiuoniaoj 

Various 
Greek  Allies 


BATTLE  OF  SALAMIS 


Hwueli  $  Strutl#r»,K.  I' 


L 


II  It  J 

tt*»*», 


480  B.  c.  ]       The  Invasion  and  Flight  of  Xerxes.     1 8 1 

not  the  chiefs,  but  the  crews,  laying  before  them  all  the 
lofty  and  mean  motives  by  which  men  may  be  stimulated 
to  action,  and,  beseeching  them  to  choose  the  higher, 
sent  them  to  their  ships. 

Early  in  the  morning  the  Persian  king  took  his  seat  on 
the  great  throne  raised  for  him  on  a  spur  of  Mount  Aiga- 
leos,  to  see  how  his  slaves  fought  on  his  be 
half.  The  day  was  yet  young  when  the  of^aia^6 
Greeks  put  out  to  sea  and  the  barbarians 
advanced  to  meet  them.  According  to  the  Aiginetan 
tradition  a  trireme  sent  to  their  island,  to  beseech  the 
aid  of  the  hero  Aiakos  and  his  children,  began  the  con 
flict  after  some  hesitation,  the  form  of  a  woman  having 
been  seen  which  cried  out  with  a  voice  heard  by  all  the 
Greeks,  "  Good  men,  how  long  will  ye  back  water  ?"  In 
the  battle  the  Athenians  found  themselves  opposed  to 
the  Phenicians,  who  had  the  wing  towards  Eleusis  and 
the  west,  while  the  lonians  towards  the  east  and  the 
Peiraieus  faced  the  Peloponnesians.  Beyond  this  gene 
ral  arrangement  and  the  issue  of  the  fight,  the  historian 
himself  admits  that  of  this  memorable  battle  he  knew 
practically  nothing.  The  issue  in  his  belief  was  deter 
mined  by  the  discipline  and  order  of  the  Greeks;  but  it 
may  have  depended  in  part  on  the  fact  that  the  Persian 
seamen  had  been  working  all  night,  while  the  Athenians 
and  their  allies  went  on  board  their  ships  in  the  morn 
ing  fresh  from  sleep,  and  stirred  by  the  vehement  elo 
quence  of  Themistokles.  But  it  is  especially  noted  that 
the  Persian  forces  fought  far  more  bravely  at  Salamis 
than  at  Artemision,  and  that  few  of  the  lonians  in  the 
service  of  Xerxes  hung  back  from  the  fight,— a  fact 
which  would  seem  to  show  that  the  desertion  of  the 
Spartans  and  Athenians  (p.  103)  in  the  revolt  of  Arista- 
goras  still  rankled  in  their  minds.  On  the  other  hand, 


1 82  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  vn. 

there  was  a  tradition  that  in  the  course  of  the  battle  the 
Phenicians  charged  the  lonians  with  destroying  the  Phe- 
nician  ships  and  betraying  their  crews.  Happily  for  the 
accused  an  exploit  performed  by  the  Greeks  of  a  Samo- 
thrakian  vessel  in  the  service  of  Xerxes  gave  instant 
and  conclusive  proof  of  their  fidelity,  and  Xerxes  in  a 
towering  rage  gave  command  that  the  heads  of  the  Phe 
nicians  should  be  struck  off.  If  the  charge  was  really 
made,  the  character  of  the  Phenician  seamen  may  fairly 
be  taken  as  proof  that  it  was  not  altogether  groundless. 
So  strangely  contradictory  are  the  traditions  related  of 
the  same  event;  but  in  some  instances  the  inconsistency 
explains  itself.  According  to  the  Athenians,  Adeiman- 
tos,  the  Dauntless  (such  is  the  meaning  of  his  name), 
fled  in  terror  at  the  very  beginning  of  the  fight,  followed 
by  his  countrymen,  and  they  were  already  well  on  their 
way  when  a  boat,  which  no  one  was  known  to  have  sent, 
met  them,  and  the  men  in  it  cried  out,  "  So,  Adeimantos, 
thou  hast  basely  forsaken  the  Greeks  who  are  now  con 
quering  their  enemies  as  much  as  they  had  ever  hoped 
to  do."  Adeimantos  would  not  believe;  but  when  the 
men  said  that  they  would  go  back  with  him  and  die  if 
they  should  be  found  to  have  spoken  falsely,  he  turned 
his  ship  and  reached  the  scene  of  action  when  the  issue 
of  the  fight  was  already  decided.  This  story  the  Corin 
thians  met  with  the  stout  assertion  that  they  were  among 
the  foremost  in  the  battle  ;  and  it  is  added  that  their  re 
joinder  was  borne  out  by  all  the  rest  of  the  Greeks.  Of 
the  two  tales  both  may  be  false,  one  only  can  be  true. 

But,  as  at  Marathon,  whatever  may  have  been  the 
incidents  of  the  battle,  the  issue  was  clear  enough.  The 
Determina-  Persian  fleet  was  ruined.  Among  the  slain 
XeJxlfsto  was  tne  Persian  admiral,  a  brother  of 

retreat.  Xerxes :  on  the  Greek  side  the  loss  was 


480  B.C.]     The  Invasion  and  Flight  of  Xerxes.      183 

small.  The  Persians,  we  are  told,  were,  for  the  most 
part,  unable  to  swim,  and  the  greatest  slaughter  was 
owing  to  the  confusion  which  followed  the  first  attempts 
at  flight.  In  the  midst  of  this  fearful  disorder  Aristeides 
landed  a  large  body  of  hoplites  on  the  islet  of  Psyttaleia 
and  slaughtered  every  one  of  its  occupants.  The  Greeks 
drew  up  their  disabled  ships  on  the  shore  of  Salamis,  and 
made  ready  for  another  fight,  thinking  that  the  king 
would  order  his  remaining  ships  to  advance  against  them. 
But  their  fears  were  not  to  be  realized.  Xerxes  had 
ascended  his  throne  in  the  morning  with  the  conviction 
that  under  his  eye  his  seamen  would  be  invincible :  their 
defeat  made  him  jump  to  the  conclusion  that  they  were 
absolutely  worthless ;  and  if  it  be  true,  as  one  story  ran, 
that  during  the  night  which  followed  the  battle  the 
Phenicians,  dreading  his  wrath,  sailed  away  to  Asia,  he 
had  sufficient  reason  for  discouragement.  Without  these 
hardy  mariners  the  idea  of  carrying  on  the  war  by  sea 
became  absurd  ;  and  for  the  ships  which  yet  remained  to 
him  he  had  a  more  pressing  and  immediate  task  in 
guarding  the  bridge  across  the  Hellespont.  The  safety 
of  this  bridge  he  professed  to  regard  as  the  condition  of 
his  own  return  home :  and  although  he  ordered  that  a 
mole  should  be  carried  from  Attica  to  Salamis,  Mardo- 
nios  was  not  to  be  tricked  by  commands  Engagement 
which  deceived  others.  He  knew  that  the  ^^^h 
messenger  had  set  out  with  the  tidings  the  conquest 

_  of  Greece. 

which,  handed  on  from  one  horseman  to 
another  until  they  reached  the  gates  of  Sousa,  were  to 
turn  the  shouts  and  songs  of  triumph  to  cries  of  grief  for 
the  king,  and  of  indignation  against  himself  as  the 
stirrer-up  of  the  mischief.  But  if  he  thus  knew  that  ex 
cept  as  a  conqueror  he  could  never  hope  to  see  Persia 
again,  he  may  well  have  thought  that  his  own  chances 


1 84  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  vn. 

of  success  would  be  vastly  increased  by  the  departure  of 
a  craven  monarch  who  flung  up  his  hands  in  despair 
while  he  yet  had  ample  means  for  retrieving  his  disasters. 
He  knew  well  with  what  materials  Cyrus  had  achieved 
his  conquests  ;  and  with  a  proud  satisfaction  he  insisted 
that  the  Persians  had  everywhere  maintained  their  old 
reputation,  and  that  if  they  had  failed,  their  failure  was 
to  be  set  down  to  the  rabble  which  had  hindered  and 
clogged  their  efforts.  He  had  therefore  no  hesitation  in 
pledging  himself  to  achieve  the  conquest  of  'Hellas,  if 
Xerxes  would  leave  him  behind  with  300,000  men. 

Such  a  -proposal  would  come  as  a  godsend  to  a 
tyrant  quaking  in  abject  terror;  but  we  are  told  by 
Herodotus  that  he  submitted  it  to  the  only  woman  who 
had  accompanied  him  as  the  sovereign  of  a  dependent 
city — Artemisia  the  queen  of  Halikarnassos,  the  birth 
place  of  the  historian  Herodotus.  Her  conclusion  agreed 
Artemisia,  with  his  own.  'His  safe  return  to  Sousa  was 
§aliknar°f  t^ie  one  matter  °f  paramount  importance ; 

nassos.  an(j  if  Mardonios   and  his  men  were  all 

killed,  it  would  be  but  the  loss  of  a  horde  of  useless  slaves. 
Whatever  may  have  been  her  advice,  there  can  be  not  the 
least  doubt  that  she  never  gave  this  reason  for  it.  Xerxes 
knew  well,  as  she  must  have  known  herself,  that  in 
leaving  with  Mardonios  his  native  Persian  troops,  he  was 
leaving  behind  him  the  hardy  soldiers  on  whom  the  very 
foundations  of  his  empire  rested  ;  and  the  tale  throws 
doubt  on  the  narrative  of  some  other  scenes  in  which  she 
appears  as  an  actor.  If  in  the  council  which  preceded 
the  battle  of  Salarms  she  raised  her  voice  against  all 
active  operations  by  sea,  she  was  opposing  herself  to  the 
temper  of  the  king  as  strongly  as  after  the  fight  she  en 
couraged  him  in  his  determination  to  retreat.  If  she 
rested  her  advice  on  the  opinion  that  the  Egyptians  and 


480  B.C.]     The  Invasion  and  Flight  of  Xerxes.       185 

Pamphylians  were,  like  the  rest  of  his  seamen,  evil  ser 
vants  of  a  good  man,  her  words  were  not  merely  dis 
paraging,  but  even  insulting  to  those  who  heard  them, 
and  at  the  time  actually  unjust.  Another  tradition  is  even 
more  perplexing,  which  relates  that  during  the  battle 
of  Salamis  her  ship  was  chased  by  an  Athenian  captain 
who  was  anxious  to  get  the  prize  of  10,000  drachmas 
promised  to  the  man  who  should  take  her  alive, — Lso 
great,  we  are  told,  being  the  irritation  of  the  Greeks  that 
a  woman  should  come  against  Athens ;  that  Artemisia, 
having  before  her  only  ships  of  her  own  side,  ran  into  a 
Kalyndian  vessel  and  sank  it ;  that  thereupon  her  pursuer, 
thinking  that  her  ship  was  a  Greek  one,  or  that  she  was 
deserting  from  the  Persians,  turned  away  to  chase  others ; 
and  that  Xerxes,  hearing  that  Artemisia  had  sunk  a 
Greek  ship,  cried  out,  "  My  men  are  women  and  the 
women  men."  It  is  enough  to  remark  on  this  strange 
tale  that  the  whole  Kalyndian  crew  are  not  reported  to 
have  perished,  while  we  are  distinctly  told  that  other 
friendly  ships  were  checking  her  flight,  and  we  cannot 
suppose  that  all  were  deceived  by  her  manoeuvre,  or 
that  none  would  have  the  courage  or  the  indignation  to 
denounce  it. 

In  fact,  from  the  moment  of  the  defeat  at  Salamis  to 
the  hour  when  Xerxes  entered  Sardeis,  the  popular  tra 
dition  runs  riot  in  fictions  all  tending  to  glo- 

1  he  pursuit 

rify  the  Greeks,  and  to  show  the  utter  hu-       of  the  Per- 

..  r      ,  sian  fleet  by 

miliation  and  miserable  cowardice  of  the  the  Greeks 
Persian  king.  The  general  course  of  events 
is  clear  enough ;  nor  is  it  a  specially  diffi 
cult  task  to  disentangle  such  incidents  as  are  historical. 
The  discovery  of  the  flight  of  the  Persian  fleet  was  fol 
lowed  by  immediate  pursuit ;  but  the  Greeks  sailed  as 
far  as  Andros  without  seeing  even  the  hindermost  of  the 


1 86  The.  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  vn. 

retreating  ships.  At  Andros  a  council  was  called,  and 
an  order  was  given  for  abandoning  the  chase.  The  tra 
dition  of  a  later  day  averred  that  Themistokles  vehe 
mently  urged  the  allies  to  sail  straight  to  the  Hellespont 
and  destroy  the  bridge  by  which  Xerxes  was  to  cross 
into  Asia,  and  that  he  was  dissuaded  only  when  Eurybi- 
ades  pointed  out  the  folly  of  trying  to  keep  the  Persian 
king  in  a  country  where  despair  might  make  him  formi 
dable,  whereas  out  of  Europe  he  could  do  no  mischief. 
The  same  or  another  tale  also  related  that,  being  thus 
baulked  in  his  plans,  Themistokles  resolved  on  winning 
the  good-will  of  the  tyrant  by  sending  Sikinnos,  as  the 
bearer  of  a  second  message,  to  tell  him  that  after  great 
efforts  he  had  succeeded  in  diverting  the  Greeks  from  their 
determination  to  hurry  to  the  Hellespont  and  there  de 
stroy  the  bridge.  The  story  has  a  direct  bearing  on  the 
disastrous  sequel  of  his  history  ;  but  apart  from  such  con 
siderations,  the  degree  of  faith  which  Xerxes  would  be 
likely  to  put  in  this  second  message  may  be  measured 
by  the  caution  of  the  child  who  has  learnt  to  dread  the 
fire  by  being  burnt.  Xerxes  had  already  acted  on  one 
message  from  Themistokles,  and  the  result  had  been  the 
ruin  of  his  fleet.  Any  second  message  he  would  assured 
ly  interpret  by  contraries,  for  the  memory  of  the  first 
deadly  wrong  would  be  fixed  in  his  mind  with  a  strength 
which  no  lapse  of  time  could  weaken.  Still  more  parti 
cularly  must  we  mark  that  the  idea  of  cutting  off  the  re 
treat  of  Xerxes  is  one  which  could  not  even  have  en 
tered  the  mind  of  Themistokles,  so  long  as  Mardonios 
with  thirty  myriads  of  men  remained  on  the  soil  of  Atti 
ca  to  carry  out  the  work  which  his  master  had  aban 
doned.  To  divert  the  strength  of  Athens  for  the  sake  of 
intercepting  a  miserable  fugitive,  and  so  to  leave  the 
allies  powerless  against  an  overwhelming  foe,  would  be 


480  B.C.]      The  Invasion  and  Flight  of  Xerxes.      187 

an  act  of  mere  madness :  and  as  no  charge  of  folly  has 
been  so  much  as  urged  against  Themistokles,  it  follows 
that  no  such  plan  was  proposed  by  him,  and  therefore 
that  it  could  not  be  rejected  by  Eurybiades. 

A  few  days  later  Mardonios  chose  out  on  the  plains 
of  Thessaly  the  forces  with  which  he  had  resolved  to 
conquer  or  to  die.  But  before  he  parted  from 
his  master,  a  messenger  came  from  Sparta,  <5fhXerxeSat 
it  is  said,  to  bid  the  king  of  the  Medes  stand 
his  trial  for  the  murder  of  Leonidas,  and  make  atone 
ment  for  that  crime.  "  The  atonement  shall  be  made  by 
Mardonios,"  answered  Xerxes  with  a  laugh,  pointing  to 
the  general  by  his  side.  Thus  was  the  victim  marked 
out  for  the  sacrifice.  The  great  king  had  been  told  that 
he  was  a  criminal,  and  that  the  price  of  his  crime  must 
be  paid  ;  and  the  summons  of  the  Spartan  is  therefore 
followed  by  a  plunge  into  utter  misery.  For  five  and 
forty  days,  we  are  told,  the  army  of  Xerxes  struggled 
onwards  over  their  road  to  the  Hellespont,  thousands 
upon  thousands  falling  as  they  went  from  hunger,  thirst, 
disease,  and  cold.  A  few  might  live  on  the  harvests  of 
the  lands  through  which  they  passed;  the  rest  were 
driven  to  feed  on  grass  or  the  leaves  and  bark  of  trees, 
and  disease  followed  in  the  track  of  famine.  Eight 
months  after  he  had  crossed  the  Hellespont  into  Europe, 
Xerxes  reached  the  bridge,  only  to  find  it  shattered  and 
made  useless  by  storms.  Boats  conveyed  across  the  strait 
the  lord  of  Asia,  with  the  scanty  remnant  of  his  guards 
and  followers,  whose  numbers  were  now  still  more 
thinned  by  the  sudden  change  from  starvation  to  plenty. 
Such  is  the  tale  which  Herodotus  gives  as  the  t»ue  ac 
count  of  his  retreat ;  but  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that  he 
selected  it  from  a  number  of  traditions  which  he  emphati 
cally  rejects  as  false.  Among  the  latter  was  the  story 


1 88  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  vn. 

that  from  Eion  at  the  mouth  of  the  Strymon,  he  sailed 
for  Asia  in  a  ship,  and  being  overtaken  by  a  heavy  storm 
was  told  by  the  pilot  that  there  was  no  hope  of  safety 
unless  the  vessel  could  be  eased  of  the  crowd  within  it ; 
that  Xerxes,  turning  to  his  Persians,  told  them  the  state 
of  the  case;  that  the  latter,  having  done  obeisance, 
leaped  into  the  sea ;  and  that  Xerxes,  on  landing,  gave 
the  pilot  a  golden  crown  for  saving  his  life,  and  then  cut 
off  his  head  for  losing  the  lives  of  his  men.  This  story 
Herodotus  pronounces  incredible,  inasmuch  as  Xerxes 
would  assuredly  have  saved  his  Persians,  and  thrown 
overboard  a  corresponding  number  of  Phenicians.  In 
short,  he  rejects  the  whole  story  of  his  embarkation  at 
Eion  ;  nor  can  he  have  failed  to  reject,  if  he  ever  heard, 
the  marvelous  tale  of  the  crossing  of  the  Strymon  as 
related  by  ^schylos  in  his  drama  of  the  Persians.  A 
frost  unusual  for  the  season  of  the  year  had  frozen  firmly 
the  surface  of  a  swiftly  flowing  river ;  and  on  this  sur 
face  the  army  crossed  safely,  until  the  heat  of  the  sun 
thawed  the  ice,  and  thousands  were  plunged  into  the 
water.  The  formation,  in  a  single  night,  of  ice  capable 
of  bearing  large  multitudes  in  the  latitude  and  climate 
of  the  mouth  of  the  Strymon  is  an  impossibility.  The 
story  rests  on  the  supposition  that  the  Persians  were 
hurrying  away  in  mad  haste  from  an  enemy  close  in  the 
rear ;  but  there  was,  in  fact,  no  pursuit ;  and  for  many 
years  Eion  remained  a  Persian  fortress.  We  have  then 
the  very  significant  fact,  that  there  were  traditions  re 
lating  to  this  time,  to  which  Herodotus  gave  no  credit 
whatever ;  we  are  bound,  therefore,  to  see  whether  his 
own  siory  has  the  merit  of  likelihood.  When  Xerxes 
formed  his  plans  for  the  invasion  of  Europe,  his  prepara 
tions  were  made  not  merely  for  the  outward  march  of 
his  vast  multitudes,  but  for  their  homeward  journey,  with 


480  B.C.]     The  Invasion  and  Flight  of  Xerxes.      189 

their  numbers  swollen  by  crowds  of  Greek  slaves.  Vast 
magazines  were  filled  with  the  harvests  of  years,  while 
on  the  westward  march  the  inhabitants  were  also  com 
pelled  to  contribute  to  the  maintenance  of  his  followers. 
In  the  story  of  the  retreat  not  a  word  is  said  of  these 
huge  stores,  or  of  any  exactions  from  the  natives.  But 
Xerxes  took  with  him  no  prisoners,  and  he  had  left 
300,000  men  with  Mardonios.  The  task  of  maintaining 
those  who  attended  him  would  therefore  be  all  the  more 
easy  ;  but  in  point  of  fact,  his  army  is  represented  as 
subsisting  by  plunder,  or  as  dying  by  famine  in  a  land 
where  not  an  arm  was  raised  against  them  for  all  this  rob 
bery  and  pillage,  and  where  Xerxes  could  with  con 
fidence  intrust  his  sick  to  the  kindly  feeling  of  the  people. 
Still  more  significant  is  the  narrative  of  the  , 

Operations  of 

operations  ot  Artabazos,  who  accompanied  Artabazos  in 
the  king  to  the  Hellespont  with  60,000  men.  C 
No  sooner  has  this  general  dismissed  his  master,  than 
he  appears  as  a  man  well  able  to  hold  his  ground  against 
all  efforts  of  his  enemies  without  calling  on  his  troops  to 
undergo  any  special  privations.  Instead  of  hearing  now 
of  men  plucking  grass  and  roots,  and  then  lying  down 
to  die,  we  find  him  deliberately  resolving  to  remain 
where  he  was  until  the  return  of  spring  should  allow 
Mardonios  to  move  his  army  in  Boiotia.  Whatever  may 
have  been  the  sufferings  of  Xerxes,  his  own  position  was 
not  without  difficulty.  The  tidings  of  the  victory  of 
Salamis  and  of  the  hasty  retreat  of  the  Persian  ships,  in 
duced  some  of  the  Greek  colonies  to  revolt  after  the 
king  had  passed  them  on  his  journey  to  the  Hellespont. 
Artabazos  determined  to  punish  them.  The 
siege  and  capture  of  Olynthos  (p.  33)  was 
followed  by  a  blockade  of  Potidaia.  His 
plans  were  here  foiled  by  an  accident 


190  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  vn. 

which  caused  him  serious  loss  ;  but  even  this  disaster 
scarcely  affected  the  efficiency  of  his  troops.  In  short, 
the  history  of  Artabazos  conclusively  proves  that  the 
followers  of  Xerxes  in  his  retreat  were  not  reduced  to 
the  hard  lot  of  an  Arabian  caravan  in  lack  of  food  and 
water. 

By  the  non-Medizing  Greeks  the  winter  was  spent  in 

attempts  to  recruit  their  finances  by  voluntary  or  forced 

contributions  from  Hellenic  cities.     At  An- 

Jtxactions  of 

the  Greek          dros  Themistokles  told  the  people  that  they 

allies  at  An-  ,  ,         .    ,  .       , 

dros  and  must  pay,  because  the  Athenians  had  come 

under  the  guidance  of  two  very  mighty 
deities,  Necessity  and  Faith  (Peitho,  the  power  which 
produces  obedience  and  trust).  The  Andrians  refused, 
under  the  plea  that  they  likewise  had  two  deities,  Poverty 
and  Helplessness,  which  would  not  leave  their  islands. 
They  added  that  the  power  of  Athens  could  never  exceed 
their  own  impotence  :  and  the  failure  of  the  siege  verified 
their  prediction.  But  while  the  blockade  was  still  going 
on,  Themistokles  by  threatening  the  other  islands  with 
summary  measures  in  case  of  refusal,  collected,  we  are 
told,  large  sums  of  money  without  the  knowledge  of  the 
other-  leaders,-  and  kept  them  for  his  own  use.  It  is 
enough  to  say  that,  though  he  and  his  agents  might  keep 
the  secret,  there  was  nothing  to  stop  the  mouths  of  his 
victims,  nor  was  Athens  so  popular  with  her  allies  as  to 
make  them  deaf  to  charges  which  accused  Themistokles  of 
crippling  their  resources  for  his  own  personal  advantage. 

The  work  of  a  memorable  year  was  now  ended.     It 
only  remained  to  dedicate  the  thank-offerings   due  to 
the  gods,  and  to  distribute  the  rewards  and 
paid  to  honors  which  the  conduct  of  the  confederates 

kies bythe  might  deserve.  Three  Persian  ships  were 
Spartans.  consecrated,  one  at  Salamis,  a  second  at 


479  B-c-]     Battles  of  Plataia  and  Mykale.  191 

Sounion,  and  the  third  at  the  isthmus  ;  and  the  first- 
fruits  of  victory  sent  to  Delphoi  furnished  materials  for 
a  statue,  twelve  cubits  in  height,  bearing  in  its  hand  the 
beak  of  a  Persian  war-ship.  The  question  of  personal 
merit  was  decided  at  the  isthmus,  it  is  said,  by  the 
written  votes  of  the  generals,  each  of  whom  claimed  the 
first  place  for  himself,  while  most  of  them,  if  not  all, 
assigned  the  second  to  Themistokles.  The  vanity  which 
thus  deprived  the  Athenian  general  of  his  formal  pre 
eminence  had  no  effect  on  the  Spartans,  who  paid  him 
honors  such  as  they  had  never  bestowed  on  any  before. 
Eurybiades,  as  commander-in-chief,  received  a  silver 
crown.  The  same  prize  was  given  to  Themistokles  for 
his  unparalleled  wisdom  and  dexterity;  and  the  most 
beautiful  chariot  in  Sparta,  the  gift  of  the  citizens,  con 
veyed  him  from  that  city,  three  hundred  chosen  Spartiatai 
escorting  him  to  the  boundaries  of  Tegea. 

.  '•"<«.., 


y/H/* 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

THE  BATTLES  OF  PLATAIA  AND  MYKALE, 

FORMATION  OF  THE  ATHENIAN  CONFEDERACY. 

THE  efforts  of  Mardonios  to  fulfil  the  promise  which  he 
had  made  to  Xerxes  ended  in  terrible  disasters.  If  the 
Greeks  could  be  brought  to  unite  ui  a  firm  resistance,  it 
was  impossible  that  they  could  end  otherwise ;  and  the 
people  of  two  cities  at  least,  Athens  and 
Sparta,  were  now  fully  alive  to  the  need  of 


vigorous   action.     That    Mardonios   on  his       fresp 
side  saw  not  less  clearly  the  hindrances  in  the       °f the  Athe- 
way  of  his  success,  and  that  he  did  his  best 


192  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  vm. 

to  remove  them  is  clear  from  the  whole  course  of  the 
narrative.  The  fact  that  the  decisive  struggle  between 
the  two  fleets  would,  if  the  decision  had  rested  with  the 
Athenians,  have  taken  place  at  Artemision,  not  at 
Salamis,  had  taught  him  that  the  real  obstacle  in  his  path 
was  Athens ;  and  the  conviction  led  him  to  take  a  step 
which,  after  all  that  had  passed  since  the  departure  of 
Hippias  for  Sigeion  (p.  87),  must  have  involved  a  painful 
self-sacrifice.  It  was  true  that  the  desire  of  vengeance 
against  Athens  was  one  of  the  most  powerful  motives 
which  had  urged  Xerxes  to  the  invasion  of  Europe  ;  but  it 
was  no  time  now  to  follow  the  dictates  of  blind  passion, 
and  the  Macedonian  chief  Alexandros  was  sent  to  tell  the 
Athenians  that  the  king  was  willing  not  merely  to  forgive 
all  their  sins  against  him,  if  they  would  become,  not  his 
servants,  but  his  friends,  but  to  bestow  on  them,  in  ad 
dition  to  their  own  land,  any  territory  which  they  might 
choose,  and  lastly,  to  rebuild  all  the  temples  which  his 
followers  had  burnt. 

The  tidings  of  this  change  in  Persian  policy  awakened 
at  Sparta  the  liveliest  alarm,  which  was  kept  up,  it  is 
Alarm  of  the  said,  by  a  popular  prophecy  that  the  Dorians 
Spartans.  were  to  be  driven  from  the  Peloponnesos  by 
the  combined  armies  of  the  Athenians  and  the  Medes. 
Envoys,  hurriedly  sent,  assured  the  Athenians  that 
Sparta  would  maintain  their  families  as  long  as  the  war 
should  last,  if  only  they  would  hold  out  stoutly  against 
Mardonios.  Their  fears  were  thrown  away.  The  Mace 
donian  prince  was  bidden  to  tell  Mardonios  that  the 
Athenians  would  never  make  peace  with  Xerxes  so  long 
as  the  sun  should  keep  the  same  path  in  the  heavens. 
The  Spartans  were  at  the  same  time  rebuked  for  their 
ignorance  of  the  Athenian  mind.  "  Not  all  the  gold 
throughout  all  the  world,"  they  said,  "would  tempt  us  to 


479  B-c-]     Battles  of  Plataia  and  Mykalc.  193 

take  the  part  of  the  Medes  and  help  to  enslave  Hellas. 
We  could  not  do  so  even  if  we  would.  The  whole  € 
Hellenic  race  is  of  the  same  blood  and  speech  with  us : 
we  share  in  common  the  temples  of  our  gods  :  we  have 
the  same  sacrifices,  and  the  same  way  of  life :  and  these 
the  Athenians  can  never  betray.  For  your  good-will  to 
us  we  thank  you ;  but  we  will  struggle  on  as  well  as  we 
can  without  giving  you  trouble.  All  that  we  pray  you  is 
to  send  out  your  army  with  all  speed,  for  Mardonios  will 
soon  be  in  our  land  when  he  learns  that  we  will  not  do 
as  he  would  have  us,  and  we  ought  to  stop  him  before 
he  can  cross  our  border."  The  incidents  which  follow 
are  scarcely  consistent  with  this  beautiful  picture.  The 
reply  of  the  Athenians  spurred  the  Peloponnesians  to  fresh 
efforts  for  completion  of  the  wall  at  the  isthmus.  With 
its  completion  the  old  indifference  or  remissness  came 
back,  and  Kleombrotos,  frightened  by  an  eclipse  of  the 
sun,  retreated  with  his  army  to  Sparta.  On  his  death, 
which  happened  almost  immediately,  his  son  Pausanias 
was  appointed  general,  as  well  as  guardian  of  his  cousin, 
the  young  son  of  Leonidas. 

For  Mardonios  the  aspect  of  things  was  more  pro 
mising  than  it  had  ever  been  for  Xerxes.,  He  was  at 
the  head  of  a  manageable  army  ;  his  Greek  Second  oc- 
allies  seemed  full  of  zeal  for  his  cause  :  and  ITensb/ 
his  wisdom  was  shown  in  the  steadiness  of  *«  Persians, 
purpose  which  made  him  as  intent  on  winning  over  the 
Athenians  as  Xerxes  had  been  on  punishing  them.  There 
was  yet  the  chance  that  they  might  give  way  when  they 
saw  their  soil  again  trodden  by  invading  enemies,  while 
hjs  care  in  protecting  their  city  must  justify  their  placing 
full  trust  in  his  good  faith.  To  carry  out  this  plan  he 
crossed  the  frontiers  of  Attica.  Once  more  the  Athenians 
conveyed  their  families  to  Salamis  ;  and  ten  months 

N 


194  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  vm. 

after  the  capture  of  the  Akropolis  by  Xerxes,  Mardonios 
entered  a  silent  and  desolate  city.  Another  envoy  sent  to 
the  Athenians  was  summarily  dismissed,  while  one  of  the 
senators,  who  proposed  that  his  message  should  be  sub 
mitted  to  the  people,  was  stoned  to  death,  it  is  said, 
with  his  whole  family.  But  another  version  not  merely 
changed  the  name  of  the  citizen,  but  transferred  the  in 
cident  to  the  time  when  Themistokles  urged  the  first 
migration  to  Salamis  (p.  173).  This  horrible  story  is, 
however,  sufficiently  disproved  by  the  fact  that  almost 
immediately  afterwards  the  Athenians  sent  to  the 
Spartans  to  tell  them  that,  unless  they  received  instant 
aid,  they  must  devise  some  means  of  escape  from  their 
present  troubles.  In  fact,  far  from  repeating  the  impas 
sioned  declaration  that  the  sun  should  sooner  fall  from 
heaven  than  Athens  would  submit  to  the  enemy,  the 
Athenian,  Plataian,  and  Megarian  ambassadors  content 
themselves  with  the  cautious  statement  that  they  desire 
heartily  the  welfare  of  Hellas,  and  that  they  will  make 
no  paction  with  the  Persians,  if  they  can  avoid  it. 

The  reproaches  of  the  Athenians,  we  are  told,  fell  for 
the  present  on  deaf  ears.  The  Spartans  were  keeping 
Departure  -  festival  and  would  not  stir  ;  and  now  that 
tanthaermyar"  the  Isthmian  wall  had  all  but  received  its 
for  Attica.  coping  stones  and  battlements,  they  could 
afford  to  put  off  the  Athenian  envoys  from  day  to  day. 
Ten  days  had  thus  passed  when  Chileos  of  Tegea  warned 
them  that  their  wall  would  be  of  little  use  if  the  Athe 
nians,  accepting  the  offer  of  Mardonios,  should  send  their 
fleet  to  co-operate  with  his  land  army.  As  if  this  possibility 
had  never  struck  them  before,  the  Spartans  on  that  ve/y 
night,  it  is  said,  sent  out  Pausanias  with  5,000  heavy- 
armed  citizens,  each  attended  by  seven  Helots, — 40,000 
in  all ;  and  when  on  the  following  morning  the  envoys 


479  B-c-]     Battles  of  Plataia  and  Mykale.  195 

said  that,  having  thus  far  waited  in  vain,  the  Athenians 
must  make  the  best  terms  that  they  could  with  the  Per 
sians,  the  Ephors  replied,  "They  are  gone  and  are  al 
ready  in  the  Oresteion  on  their  march  to  meet  the 
strangers."  "  Who  are  gone,  and  who  are  the  strangers  ?" 
asked  the  Athenians,  amazed  at  these  mysterious  tidings. 
"  Our  Spartans  have  gone  with  their  Helots,"  they  an 
swered,  "40,000  in  all,  and  the  strangers  are  the  Per 
sians."  Greatly  wondering,  the  envoys  hastened  away, 
accompanied  by  5,000  picked  hoplites  from  the  Perioikoi. 
If  the  story  in  this  its  popular  form  is  somewhat  per 
plexing,  it  is  nevertheless  substantially  true,  and  the 
explanation  of  the  mystery  is  found  in  the 
statement  of  Herodotus  that  the  Argives 
were  under  a  promise  to  Mardonios  to  pre- 
vent  by  force,  if  force  should  be  needed,  the 
departure  of  any  Spartan  army  from  the  Peloponnesos. 
Feeling  that  with  the  submission  or  the  independent 
alliance  of  Athens  his  task  would  be  practically  ended, 
Mardonios  clearly  understood  that  the  Athenians  would 
be  best  won  over  if  the  pressure  'put  upon  them  should 
stop  short  of  the  devastation  of  their  country  and  the 
burning  of  their  houses.  But  there  must  be  pillage  and 
plunder,  if  Attica  became  a  battle-field.  Hence  it  was 
of  the  utmost  importance  to  him  that  no  Peloponnesian 
force  should  be  allowed  to  advance  beyond  the  isthmus  ; 
and  the  pledge  given  by  the  Argives  seemed  to  assure 
him  that  from  this  quarter  there  was  no  danger  to  be 
feared.  On  becoming  acquainted  with  this  recent  cove 
nant,  the  Spartan  Ephors  were  driven  to  secrecy  on  their 
side  in  any  military  plans  which  they  might  form  ;  and 
when  owing  to  this  secrecy  their  plans  succeeded  and 
the  Argives  sent  word  to  Athens  to  say  that  they  had 
failed  to  prevent  the  departure  of  the  Spartans,  Mardoni- 


196  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  vin. 

os  felt  that  his  own  schemes  had  likewise 
AuSJand  become  hopeless.  At  once  the  whole  land 
burning  of  was  abandoned  to  his  soldiers.  Athens  was 

Athens. 

set  on  fire ;  and  any  walls  or  buildings 
which  had  escaped  the  ravages  of  the  first  invasion  were 
thrown  down.  Nor  could  Mardonios  afford  to  fight  in  a 
country  ill-suited  for  cavalry,  and  from  which,  if  defeated, 
he  would  have  to  lead  his  army  through  narrow  and 
dangerous  passes.  The  order  for  retreat  was  therefore 
given,  and  Mardonios,  having  entered  first  the  Megarian 
territory,  the  westernmost  point  reached  by  a  Persian 
army,  soon  found  himself  again  on  the  plain  of  Thebes. 
reat  Of  Here  he  was  obliged  to  do  some  mischief  to 
Mardonios  his  zealous  friends.  All  their  good-will 

into  Boiotia.  .  .    .  ,  .  ... 

would  be  to  him  a  poor  compensation  in 
case  of  defeat;  and  the  necessary  safeguard  could  be 
obtained  only  by  making  the  surrounding  land  a  desert. 
Thus  beneath  the  northern  slopes  of  Kithairon  his  hosts 
might  in  case  of  need  find  shelter  in  a  camp  ten  furlongs 
square,  which,  with  its  ramparts  and  stockade  might,  as 
he  hoped,  bid  defiance  to  all  attacks  of  the  enemy. 

It  is  at  this  point  Herodotus  introduces  a  well-known 
and  beautiful  story  which  tells  how  a  blindness  sent  by 
The  feast  of  trie  gods  was  over  the  eyes  of  Mardonios 
Attaginos.  while  others  foresaw  the  ruin  that  was 
coming.  *The  tale  is  the  more  noteworthy  as  the  historian 
asserts  that  he  heard  it  from  Thersandros,  a  guest  at  the 
splendid  banquet  which  Attaginos  gave  to  the  Persian 
leaders  before  the  battle  of  Plataia.  At  this  great  feast, 
while  all  others  were  growing  noisy  in  their  merriment, 
the  Persian  who  shared  the  couch  of  Thersandros  ex 
pressed  his  assurance  that,  of  their  fellow-guests  and  of 
the  enemy  encamped  outside,  but  few  would  in  a  little  while 
remain  alive.  Touched  by  the  grief  and  tears  of  the  Persian, 


479  B-C0     Battles  of  Plataia  and  My  kale.  197 

Thersandros  said  that  Mardonios  should  be  told  of  this  ;  but 
his  companion  answered  only  by  asserting  the  impossibility 
of  avoiding  destiny, — the  Kismet  of  the  modern  Mussul 
man.  "  Of  all  the  pains  which  man  may  suffer,"  he  added, 
"  the  most  hateful  and  wretched  is  this,  to  see  the  evils 
that  are  coming  and  yet  be  unable  to  overcome  them." 
Whatever  may  be  the  pathos  of  the  story,  it  has  mani 
festly  neither  force  nor  meaning,  if  viewed  in  reference 
to  the  duty  of  Mardonios.  To  listen  to  vague  presenti 
ments  of  coming  evil  and  in  obedience  to  such  presenti 
ments  to  break  up  an  army  of  vast  strength  and  fully 
supplied  with  the  materials  of  war,  would  in  a  general  be 
an  unpardonable  offence.  If  the  Persian  who  conversed 
with  Thersandros  had  any  reasons  or  arguments  to  ad 
dress  to  his  chief,  Mardonios  would  certainly  be  bound 
to  hear  and  weigh  them ;  but  it  is  of  the  very  essence  of 
the  story  that  he  had  none,  and  it  would  be  the  duty  of 
Mardonios  to  disregard  presages  and  tears  which  to  him 
must  appear  to  have  no  other  source  than  a  diseased 
and  unmanly  mind. 

When  from  Eleusis  the  Spartans  and  their  Pelopon- 
nesian   allies,    having  been    joined   by   the  Athenians 
who    had     crossed    over     from     Salamis, 
marched  towards   the   northern  slopes   of      ^Hesht°-fthe 
Kithairon,  their  appearance  as  they  came  in      w?rds  Pla- 
sight  of  the  Persians   who  were  encamped 
near  the  northern  bank  of  the  Asopos,  created  little  ex 
citement  or  alarm  among  their  enemies.     The  Persian 
troops  were  in  excellent  condition,  and,  with  the  single 
exception  of  the  .Phokians,  full  of  zeal.     But  whatever 
may  have  been  the  number  of  the  Greeks  at  the  first, 
they  were  daily  rendered  more  formidable  by  the  arrival 
of  fresh  forces  ;  and  Mardonios  saw  that  no  time  w.is  to 
be  lost  in  dislodging  them  from  their  vantage  ground. 


198  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  vm. 

On  this  errand  the  whole  Persian  cavalry  was  dispatched 
under    Masistios,    a    leader  noted   for  his 
peer?ian°f  U        bravery.     Hard  pressed  by  his  attacks,  the 
MasStios  Megarians  sent  a  message  to  Pausanias  to 

say  that  without  speedy  support  they  must 
give  way.  But  even  the  Spartans,  it  would  seem,  held 
back,  although  the  Persian  horsemen  rode  up  and  re 
viled  them  as  women.  At  length  3,000  Athenians  ad 
vanced  to  the  aid  of  the  Megarians,  and  presently  the 
horse  of  Masistios,  wounded  by  an  arrow,  reared  and 
threw  its  rider.  Masistios  was  already  slain  before  his 
men,  who  had  fallen  back  to  make  ready  for  another 
charge,  were  aware  of  what  had  happened.  The  fierce 
conflict  which  followed  ended  in  the  victory  of  the  Athe 
nians  ;  and  a  piercing  wail  of  grief  from  the  Persians 
rent  the  air,  while  the  body  of  the  fallen  general, 
stretched  on  a  chariot,  was  carried  along  the  ranks  of 
the  Greeks,  who  crowded  to  see  his  grand  and  beautiful 
form. 

The    Greeks    now   resolved  to  move   from  Erythrai 
nearer  to  Plataia,  as  a  better  position  both  for  encamp 
ing  and  for  watering.     Their  road  led  them 
Inaction  of        ^v   Hvsiai   to   ground  stretching  from  the 

both  armies.  *          : 

fountain  or  spring  of  Gargaphia  to  the  shrine 
of  the  hero  Androkrates  and  broken  by  low  hills  rising 
from  the  plain.  But  although  the  two  armies  were  thus 
brought  near  to  each  other,  the  final  conflict  was  delayed 
by  the  omens  which  were  interpreted  by  the  soothsayers 
on  either  side  as  unfavorable  to  the  aggressor ;  and 
Mardonios  could  do  nothing  more  than  dispatch  his  caval 
ry  to  the  pass  of  the  Oak  Heads  (Dryoskephalai)  where 
500  beasts  laden  with  corn  were  cut  off  with  the  men  who 
had  brought  them  from  the  Peloponnesos.  At  last  the  Per 
sian  leader,  thoroughly  wearied  out,  and  fearing  that  his 


479  B  * c  •  ]     Battles  of  Plataia  a  nd  My  kale.  199 

men  might  be  cowed  with  superstitious  terror,  summoned 
his  officers,  it  is  said,  and  asked  them  whether  there  was 
any  oracle  which  foretold  the  destruction  of  the  Persians 
on  Greek  soil.  All  were  silent,  and  he  went  on  :  "  Since 
you  either  know  nothing  or  dare  not  say  what  you  do 
know,  I  will  tell  you  myself.  There  is  an  oracle  which 
says  that  Persians  coming  to  Hellas  shall  plunder  the 
temple  of  Delphoi  and  then  be  utterly  destroyed.  But 
we  are  not  going  against  this  temple,  nor  shall  we  at 
tempt  to  plunder  it ;  so  that  this  cannot  be  our  ruin.  All 
therefore  who  have  any  good-will  to  the  Persians  may  be 
glad,  for,  so  far  as  the  oracles  are  concerned,  we  shall  be 
the  conquerors.  We  shall  fight  to-morrow."  By  these 
words,  in  the  belief  of  the  historian,  the  victim  was  de 
voting  himself  to  the  sacrifice.  If  they  were  uttered, 
the  narrative  of  the  attack  on  Delphoi  (p.  174)  must  be 
set  aside  as  wholly  untrustworthy. 

From  this  point  the  narrative  of  Herodotus  breaks 
into  a  series  of  vivid  pictures,  the  first  of  which  repre 
sents  the  Macedonian  Alexandros  as  riding  in 

_    ,  Athenian 

the  dead  of  night  to  the  outposts  of  the  Athe-      traditions 
nians  and  asking  to  speak  with  the  leaders,      StpSpim. 
to  whom,  after  telling  them  of  the  resolution      b°tntiefor 
of  Mardonios,  he  reveals  his   own   name. 
The  confession  can  scarcely  have  been  needed.     Aris- 
teides  at  least  must  have  remembered  the  man  who  but 
a  little  while  ago  had  come  to  them  as  the  envoy  of 
Mardonios,  and  who  then  as  earnestly  besought  them  to 
submit  to  Xerxes  as  now  he  prayed  them  to  hold  out. 
Nor  was  his  warning,  though  kindly,  indispensable.   The 
Greeks  had  been  watching  intently  for  ten  days  every 
movement  in  the  enemy's  camp;  and  the  preparation 
for  battle  would  be  no  sooner  begun  than  they  would  see 
it      In  the  second  picture  the  Spartan  Pausanias  is  de- 


2oo  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  vin. 

scribed  as  requesting  to  chajige  places  with  the  Athenian 
forces  on  the  ground  that  the  latter  had  encountered 
Persians  at  Marathon,  whereas  no  Spartan  had  ever  yet 
been  engaged  with  them,  and  therefore  knew  nothing  of 
their  mode  of  fighting.  The  change  was  effected ;  but 
Mardonios,  seeing  what  was  done,  likewise  altered  the 
disposition  of  his  troops,  and  thus  drove  Pausanias  to 
lead  his  men  back  again  to  the  right  wing.  This  tale  is 
the  manifest  invention  of  the  later  time.  Spartans  had 
fought  with  Persians  at  Artemision,  at  Salamis,  and 
Thermopylai ;  and  the  heroism  of  Leonidas  and  his  men 
had  thrice  made  Xerxes  leap  from  his  throne  in  dismay. 
The  purpose  of  the  story  is  manifestly  to  glorify  Athens. 
If  Pausanias  could  be  made  to  admit  the  superiority  of 
the  Athenian  forces,  this  glorification  would  be  secured ; 
and  it  was  most  necessary  to  give  to  the  story  a  shape 
which  would  not  call  forth  a  protest  from  the  Spartans, 
as  it  must  have  done  if  the  changed  -arrangement  had 
been  described  as  the  real  arrangement  of  the  battle. 
As  it  now  stands,  probably  few  Spartans  ever  heard  the 
tale;  and  as  it  left  untouched  the  only  fact  of  importance 
to  them  (their  position,  namely,  on  the  right  wing),  they 
would  not  much  care  to  notice  it.  Hence  it  became  ne 
cessary  to  speak  of  the  change  as  having  been  made 
before  daybreak ;  and  as  it  was  ascribed  to  the  tidings 
that  Mardonios  meant  to  fight  on  the  morrow,  a  bearer 
must  be  provided  for  the  news,  and  for  this  purpose  it 
became  necessary,  lastly,  to  invent  the  night  ride  of 
Alexandras. 

On    the   morrow  of  the    eleventh   day  the  battle  of 
Plataia  may  be  said  practically  to  have  begun.     During 
the  preceding  day  the  Greek  army,  which  for 
some  unexplained  reason  seems  to  have  been 
without  any  horsemen  at  all,  was  severely 


4  7  9  B  • c-  ]     Battles  of  Plataia  and  My  kale.  2  o  i 

pressed  by  the  charges  of  the  Persian  cavalry  ;  and  early 
in  the  day  it  became  clear  that  a  change  of  position  was  in 
dispensably  necessary.  The  Asopos  in  front  of  the  Greeks 
had  all  along  been  useless  to  them  for  watering,  as  it 
was  within  range  of  the  Persian  bowmen  ;  they  were 
obliged  therefore  to  obtain  their  supplies  from  Gargaphia, 
distant  about  two  and  a  half  miles  from  Plataia.  This 
spring  was.  now  choked  and  fouled  by  the  trampling  of 
Persian  horses;  but  about  half  way  between  Gargaphia 
and  Plataia  was  a  spot  called  the  Island,  as  lying  between 
two  channels  into  which  for  a  short  space  the  little  stream 
of  Oeroe  is  divided  in  its  descent  from  Kithairon.  Here 
they  would  have  not  only  an  abundant  supply  of  water, 
for  the  Persian  cavalry  could  not  reach  the  channel  in 
their  rear,  but  they  would  be  protected  from  their  at 
tacks  by  the  stream  in  front.  To  this  spot  therefore  the 
generals  resolved  to  transfer  the  army  during  the  coming 
night ;  but  from  confusion  or  fear  the  Peloponnesian  al 
lies,  when  the  time  for  retreat  came,  fell  back  not  on 
the  Island  but  on  Plataia  itself,  and  thus  made  it  neces 
sary  that  the  Spartans  should  follow  them.  To  the  exe 
cution  of  this  plan  an  unexpected  hindrance  was  of 
fered  by  the  obstinacy  of  the  Spartan  captain  Amompha- 
retos,  who,  taking  up  a  huge  stone  with  both  hands, 
declared  that  thus  he  gave  his  vote  against  the  dastardly 
proposals  to  turn  their  backs  upon  the  enemy.  In  this 
dispute  the  hours  of  the  night  were  wasted  ;  and  the  sky 
was  already  lit  with  the  dawn  when  Pausanias,  wearied 
out  with  his  folly,  gave  the  order  for  retreat.  The  Spartans 
fell  back,  keeping  as  near  as  they  could  to  the  heights 
of  Kithairon  :  the  Athenians  moved  along  the  plain. 
Amompharetos  soon  followed  with  his  company  ;  but  their 
retreat  had  now  become  known  in  the  Persian  camp,  and 
the  Persian  cavalry  at  once  hastened  to  harass  them.  As 


202  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  vm. 

for    Mardonios,  the  hand  of  the  gods  was  heavy  upon 
him.  Bidding  Thorak  of  Larissa  mark  the  cowardly  flight 
of  the  Greeks  whom  he  had  upheld  as  brave  and  hon 
orable  men,  he  added  that  in  him  this  opinion  might  be 
pardoned,  but  that  he  could  not  forgive  the  fear  which 
Artabazos  had  shown  of  the  Spartans  and  that  the  King 
should  assuredly  hear  of  it.     If  this  threat  was  reported 
to  Artabazos  or  heard  by  him,  his  conduct  later  on  in  the 
day  is  easily  explained.     Prudence  and  caution  were  now 
thrown  to   the    winds.     Hurriedly  crossing  the  Asopos, 
Mardonios  hastened  with  his  Persians   to  the  higher 
ground  where  the  Spartan  troops  might  be  seen  winding 
along  the    hill-side.     Without    order  or  discipline,   the 
Persians  rushed  after  him,  as  though  they  had  nothing 
now  to  do  beyond  the  butchering  of  unresisting  fugitives. 
Sorely  pressed,  Pausanias  sent  to  beg  instant  succor  from 
the  Athenians  on  the  lower  ground  ;  but  the  attack  of  the 
Greeks  in  the  Persian  army  who  now  flung  themselves 
on  the  Athenians  rendered  this  impossible.  To  the  Spar 
tans  and  Tegeans  it  was  a  moment  of  supreme  distress, 
since  even  now  the  sacrifices  forbade  any  action  except 
in  the  way  of  self-defence,  and  their  merely  passive  re 
sistance  enabled  the  Persians  to  make  a  rampart  of  their 
wicker-work  shields,  from  behind  which  they  shot  their 
arrows  with  deadly  effect.     At  last  Pausanias,  looking  in 
agony  towards  the  temple  of  Here,  besought  the  queen  of 
heaven  not  to  abandon  them  utterly.     Scarcely  had  his 
prayer  been  uttered,  when  the  sacrifices  were  reported  to 
be  favorable,  and  the  charge  of  the  Tegeans  was  followed 
by  the  onslaught  of  the  Spartans.  After  a  fierce  fight  the 
hedge  of  shields  was  thrown  down,  and  the  defeat  of  the 
barbarian  host  virtually  insured.     The  Persians  fought 
with  heroism.     Coming  to  close  quarters,  they  seized  the 
spears  of  their  enemies,  and  broke  off  their  heads ;  but 


479  B-C.]     Battles  of  Plataia  and  My  kale.  203 

they  wore  no  body  armor,  and  they  had  no  discipline. 
Rushing  forward  singly  or  in  groups,  they  were  borne 
down  in  the  crush  and  killed.  At  length  Mardonios  was 
slain,  and  the  issue  became  no  longer  doubtful.  The 
linen  tunics  of  Persian  soldiers  were  of  no  avail  against 
brazen-coated  hoplites.  Hurrying  back  to  their  fortified 
camp,  the  Persians  took  refuge  behind  the  wooden  walls, 
to  which  they  trusted  for  keeping  out  the  enemy.  They 
were  soon  to  be  fatally  disappointed.  To 

Storming  of 

the  Spartans,  notoriously  incompetent  in  all  the  Persian 
siege  operations,  they  opposed  an  effectual 
resistance  :  but  Athenian  skill  and  resolution  effected  a 
breach  after  a  terrible  struggle.  Headed  by  the  Tegeans 
the  allies  burst  like  a  deluge  into  the  encampment ;  and 
the  Persians,  losing  all  heart,  sought  wildly  to  hide  them 
selves  like  deer  flying  from  lions.  Then  followed  a  car 
nage  so  fearful  that  of  260,000  men  not  3,000,  it  is  said, 
remained  alive,  while  all  the  Greeks  together  lost  little 
more  than  150.  No  trust,  it  is  manifest,  can  be  placed  in 
the  figures  on  either  side.  The  history  of  the  days  pre 
ceding  the  last  decisive  conflict  furnishes  sufficient  evi 
dence  of  heavy  losses  daily  incurred  by  the  Greeks, 
while  the  latter  would  be  tempted  to  adopt  for  their  own 
glorification  the  exaggerations  dear  to  Oriental  vanity. 

So  ended  fitly  the  work  begun  at  Marathon.     Of  the 
Greek  cities  represented  in  the  battle  each  had  its  own 
hero.     But  while  the  Athenians  boasted  of 
Sophanes    of    Dekeleia,    who     caught    his    T.hf  gathf.rini 

of  the  spoil. 

enemies  with  a  brazen  anchor  and  then 
smote  them  down,  the  Spartans  refused  to  pay  any 
honor  to  Aristodemos,  who,  having  had  the  ill-luck  to  be 
absent  from  the  conflict  at  Thermopylai,  fought  like  one 
who  did  not  care  to  leave  the  field  alive.  The  most 
prominent  figure  in  these  scenes  immediately  following 


204  The  Persian.  Wars.  [CH.  vm. 

the  battle  is  the  Spartan  leader  Pausanias,  who  replies 
to  one  who  urged  him  to  crucify  the  body  of  Mardonios 
in  requital  of  the  insult  offered  to  the  body  of  Leonidas, 
that  the  suggestion  better  befitted  a  savage  than  a  Greek, 
and  that  Leonidas  had  been  amply  avenged  in  the  death 
of  the  myriads  whose  bodies  cumbered  the  plain.  The 
victory  had  made  them  masters  of  vast  wealth.  The 
brazen  manger  at  which  the  horse  of  Mardonios  had 
been  fed  was  dedicated  by  the  Tegeans  in  the  temple  of 
Athene  Alea.  The  rest  of  the  spoil,  tents  and  couches 
blazing  with  gold  and  silver,  golden  goblets  and  drink 
ing  vessels,  were  all  brought  into  a  common  stock  ;  but 
the  Helots  contrived  to  hide  a  rich  collection  of  rings, 
bracelets,  and  jewels  of  gold,  which  the  Aiginetans,  it  is 
said,  were  willing  to  buy  from  them  as  brass,  thus  laying 
the  foundation  of  the  great  wealth  for  which  they  were 
afterwards  conspicuous.  The  dazzling  furniture  which 
Xerxes  left  with  Mardonios  suggested  to  Pausanias,  we 
are  told,  the  contrast  of  a  banquet  prepared  after  Persian 
fashion  to  be  placed  alongside  of  a  simple  Lakonian 
meal  on  another  table.  The  obvious  moral,  which  Pau 
sanias  bade  his  colleagues  take  to  heart,  was  the  folly  of 
the  man  who,  faring  thus  sumptuously  himself,  came  to 
rob  the  Greeks  of  their  sorry  food. 

The  sacrifice  of  thanksgiving  for  the  great  victory  was 

offered  by  Pausanias  to  Zeus  the  Deliverer  (Eleutherios) 

in  the  Agora  of  the    Plataians,  who  were  now  formally 

freed  from  all  connection  with  the  Boiotian 

Privileges  .  . 

granted  to  the  confederacy,  while  their  territory  was  de 
clared  inviolable,  the  allies  being  pledged 
to  combine  to  prevent  any  invasion  of  that  territory  by 
others.  At  the  same  time  they  decreed  the  maintenance 
of  a  definite  force  for  carrying  on  the  war,  and  the  as 
sembling  of  an  annual  congress  at  Plataia, — so  far  were 


479  B-c-]     Battles  of  Plat ai a  and  My  kale.  205 

they  from  venturing  to  think  that  the  power  of  Persia 
was  broken,  even  for  purposes  of  aggression. 

The  threats  uttered  by  Mardonios  against  Artabazos 
may  have  had  something  to  do  with  the 
issue  of  the  fight.  At  least  it  seems  to  have 
deprived  him  of  the  active  help  of  the  very 
large  force  under  the  command  of  that  officer.  These 
troops  received  strict  orders  to  look  to  him  only,  and  to 
follow  his  movements  with  the  utmost  promptness,  and 
no  sooner  had  the  battle  begun  than,  inviting  his  men 
verbally  to  follow  him  into  it,  he  led  them  from  the  field. 
On  the  first  symptoms  of  defeat  shown  by  the  troops  of 
Mardonios,  he  put  spurs  to  his  horse  and  hurried  away 
with  all  speed  through  Phokis  into  Thessaly,  where  the 
chiefs,  entertaining  him  at  a  banquet,  prayed  for  news 
of  the  great  army  in  Boiotia.  Fearing  the  consequences 
if  the  true  state  of  the  case  should  become  known  to  the 
people,  he  answered  that  he  had  been  dispatched  on  an 
urgent  errand  into  Thrace,  and  begged  them  to  welcome 
Mardonios,  who  would  soon  follow  him,  with  their  usual 
hospitality.  In  his  onward  march  through  Makedonia 
and  Thrace  he  lost  many  men  ;  but  he  succeeded  in 
bringing  the  bulk  of  his  troops  safely  to  Byzantion,  where 
he  crossed  over  with  them  into  Asia,  and  so  well  did  he 
justify  his  acts  to  his  master  as  to  obtain  from  him  the 
satrapy  of  Daskyleion. 

Eleven  days  after  the  battle  the  allies  appeared  be 
fore  the  walls  of  Thebes,  and  demanded  the  surrender 
of  the  citizens  who  were  responsible  for  the 
Medism  of  the  country.     The  refusal  of  the  Thfbe°f 

Thebans  was  followed  by  a  blockade  and 
by  the  systematic  devastation  of  the  land.     On  the  ninth 
day  the  men  demanded  by  Pausanias  offered  to  surren 
der  themselves,  if  the  Spartans  could  not  be  prevailed 


206  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  viu. 

on  to  accept  money  as  the  atonement  for  a  policy  which 
had  received  the  sanction  of  all  the  citizens.     The  pro 
posal  was  made  to  no  purpose.     Attaginos,  (p.  91)  one 
of  the  inculpated  Thebans,  made  his  escaoe  • 

Punishment  *•       ' 

of  the  The-        and  Pausamas   refused  to  punish  his  inno 
cent  children  who  were  given  up  to  him. 
The  rest  of  the  surrendered  citizens  he  took  with  him  to 
the  Corinthian  isthmus,  and  there  put  them  all  to  death. 
The  knowledge  that  tfie  Persian  fleet  had  been  serious 
ly  crippled  at  Salamis,  had  led  Themistokles,  it  is  said, 
(p.  184)  to  urge  on  his  countrymen  the  duty 
theyG?eekf         of  immediate  pursuit  to  the  Hellespont.     If 
Samo?  ke  could  not  give  expression  to  such  a  de 

sire  while  Mardonios  remained  with  a  vast 
army  almost  on  the  borders  of  Attica,  the  case  was  al 
tered  when  after  the  second  occupation  and  burning  of 
Athens  the  Persian  leader  had  withdrawn  into  Boiotia, 
and  been  followed  by  a  Greek  force  fully  capable  of  co 
ping  with  him.  The  Asiatic  lonians  were  still  praying 
for  help  against  the  barbarians,  and  the  Western  Greeks 
were  now  free  to  send  their  ships  to  their  aid.  At  Samos 
the  commander-in-chief,  Leotychides,  received  some 
Ionian  envoys  who  assured  him  that  the  spirit  of  the  Per 
sian  troops  was  broken  ;  that  the  mere  sight  of  their 
western  kinsfolk  would  rouse  the  Asiatic  Greeks  ;  that 
the  Persian  fleet  was  scarcely  seaworthy,  and  at  best  was 
no  match  for  that  of  the  Greeks,  and  finally  that  they 
would  surrender  themselves  as  hostages  for  the  truth  of 
their  report.  Leotychides  asked  the  speaker  his  name. 
"  I  am  called  Hegesistratos  (the  leader  of  armies)  "  was 
the  reply.  "  I  accept  the  omen  of  your  name,"  cried  the 
Spartan,  "and  I  ask  only  for  your  pledge  that  the  Sa- 
mians  will  deal  truly  by  us."  The  promise  was  eager 
ly  given,  and  the  allied  fleet,  sailing  to  Samos,  took  up 


479  B-c-]     Battles  of  Plataia  and  My  kale.  207 

its  position  off  the  southern  point  of  the  island.  Decli 
ning  the  challenge  thus  given,  the  Persian  admiral  deter 
mined  to  disembark  his  men  and  join  Tigranes,  who 
with  a  large  army  had  been  keeping  guard  in  Ionia  dur 
ing  the  winter.  Sailing  therefore  to  the  Retreat  of  the 
mainland,  barely  ten  miles  distant,  he  drew  Person  fleet 
up  his  ships  on  the  shore  beneath  the  heights 
of  Mykale,  and  behind  a  rampart  of  stones  strengthened 
by  stout  stakes  made  ready  to  sustain  a  siege  and,  as  he 
felt  sure,  to  win  a  victory.  The  retreat  naturally  raised 
the  hopes  and  the  courage  of  their  enemies :  and  with 
their  gangways  ready  for  landing  the  men,  the  Greeks 
sailed  towards  Mykale.  As  he  approached  the  shore, 
which  was  lined  with  Persian  troops,  Leotychides  or 
dered  a  loud-voiced  herald  to  pray  the  lonians  in  the 
coming  fight  to  strike  boldly,  not  for  their  oppressors 
but  for  their  own  freedom.  Probably  the  suspicions  of 
the  Persian  leaders  had  already  been  fully  excited.  By 
their  orders  the  Samians  were  accordingly  disarmed, 
while,  to  get  them  out  of  the  way,  the  Milesians  were 
sent  to  guard  the  paths  leading  to  the  heights  of  Mykale. 
Having  taken  these  precautions,  the  Per 
sians  awaited  the  attack  of  the  Greeks  be- 
hind  the  hedge  of  wicker  shields  which  for 
a  time  sheltered  the  troops  of  Mardonios  at  Plataia.  The 
Athenians  were  now  advancing  along  the  most  level 
ground  nearer  the  sea  :  the  Spartans  with  more  difficulty 
were  making  their  way  on  the  slopes  of  the  mountain. 
Here,  as  at  Plataia,  the  Persians  fought  with  a  bravery 
worthy  of  the  warriors  of  Cyrus  ;  but  in  both  places  they 
had  to  face  orderly  and  disciplined  ranks,  and  here  the 
Athenians  were  spurred  to  redoubled  efforts  by  their 
eagerness  to  decide  the  day  before  the  Spartans  could 
come  up  and  share  the  fight.  After  a  desperate  struggle 


208  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  vm. 

the  shield  wall  was  broken,  and  the  Athenians  burst  in ; 
but  the  Persians  still  fought  on,  until  they  were  borne  back 
to  the  wall  of  wood  and  stone  which  sheltered  the  ships 
of  the  fleet.  Behind  this  last  rampart  they  again  made 
a  stand;  but  Athenian  determination  and  discipline 
burst  this  barrier  also,  and  the  main  body  of  the  barba 
rians  fled  in  dismay.  Still  the  Persians  maintained  the 
conflict,  and  in  small  knots  strove  to  stem  the  iron 
torrent  which  was  bursting  through  the  breached  wall. 
But  the  Spartans  had  now  joined  in  the  fight.  The  dis 
armed  Samians,  probably  seizing  the  weapons  of  the 
dead,  fell  on  the  Persians,  who,  it  is  said,  had  intended 
in  case  of  defeat  to  entrench  themselves  on  the  heights. 
The  position  would  have  been  perilous  or  desperate  for 
men  who  could  obtain  no  supplies  while  their  enemies 
held  the  land  beneath  them  ;  but  to  such  straits  they 
were  never  to  be  put.  The  Milesians,  to  whom  they  had 
trusted  for  guidance,  led  them  by  paths  which  brought 
them  down  among  their  enemies,  and  at  last,  turning 
fiercely  upon  them,  massacred  them  without  mercy.  So 
ended  a  battle  fought,  it  is  said,  on  the  very  day  which 
saw  the  destruction  of  Mardonios  and  his  people  at 
Plataia.  The  story  went  that,  when  the  Greeks  were 
making  ready  for  the  fight,  there  passed  instantaneously 
through  the  whole  army  a  Rumor  (Pheme,  the  Latin 
famd]  that  at  that  very  moment  their  kinsmen  were 
winning  a  victory  in  Boiotia,  while  a  herald's  staff  lying 
on  the  sea  beach  attested  the  truth  of  the  impression. 
The  battle  at  Plataia  had  been  fought  early  in  the  morn 
ing  ;  that  of  Mykale  did  not  begin  till  the  afternoon,  and 
there  was  thus  time  for  the  voyage  of  the  staff  from  the 
Boiotian  shore  to  the  strand  on  which  they  stood.  The 
faith  which  fed  on  such  marvels  delighted  to  think  that 
Gelon  was  smiting  the  Carthaginians  at  Himera  at  the 


479  B-c-]     Battles  of  Plataia  and  My  kale.  209 

very  time  when  Xerxes  from  his  throne  on   Geraneia 
witnessed  the  ruin  of  his  hopes  in  the  gulf  of  Salamis. 

The  Persian  ships  were  all  burnt.  With  the  booty, 
which  included  some  hoards  of  money,  the  allies  sailed 
to  Samos ;  and  here  arose  the  grave  ques 
tion  which  determined  the  future  course  of  the'persian 
Athenian  history.  The  Asiatic  lonians  were  shlps> 
again  in  revolt  against  their  Persian  conquerors  :  how 
were  the  Western  Greeks  to  defend  them?  To  the 
Peloponnesian  leaders  the  task  seemed  altogether  be 
yond  their  powers;  and  the  remedy  which  they  pro 
posed  was  the  transference  of  the  Asiatic  Hellenes  to 
the  lands  which  the  Medizing  states  of  Thessaly  and 
Boiotia  had  forfeited.  With  this  plan  the  Athenians 
would  have  nothing  to  do.  They  could  not  bear  to 
abandon  Ionia  to  barbarians,  and  they  denied  the  right 
of  their  allies  to  settle  the  affairs  of  Athenian  colonists. 
Their  protest  furnished  just  the  excuse  which 
the  Spartans  wanted  for  withdrawing  from  -  the  Spartans 
all  interference  in  the  matter.  The  Athe-  fr0mfo5her 
nians  were  left  to  guard  their  kinsfolk,  as  concern  in 

the  war. 

best  they  might,  against  the    aggression  or 
vengeance  of  the  Persians  ;  and  the  oath  of  faithful  and 
permanent  alliance  immediately  sworn  by  the  Samians, 
Chians,  Lesbians,  and  other  islanders,  laid  the  founda 
tion  of  the  maritime  empire  of  Athens. 

From  Samos  the  fleet  departed  on  the  special  errand 
which  had  brought  it  eastwards ;  but  on   reaching  the 
Hellespont   they  learned   that  winds   and   storms   had 
shattered  the  bridges  which  they  had  come 
to  destroy,  and  had  rendered  them  useless      the  Heiies- 
before  the  Persian  king  presented  himself 
on  its  western  shore.     To  Leotychides  it  seemed  plain 
that  here  he  had  nothing  more  to  do.     In  the  eyes  of  the 

p 


2io  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  vin. 

Athenians  the  case  had  quite  another  aspect.  Through 
out  the  Chersonese  Persian  conquest  had  thrust  the 
Athenian  occupants  out  of  their  possessions.  Their 
heirs  would  now  be  anxious  to  recover  them  ;  nor  could 
the  Athenians  fail  to  see  the  vast  importance  of  making 
themselves  masters  of  the  highway  of  trade  between 
Western  Hellas  and  the  corn-growing  lands  of  the  Dan 
ube  and  the  Euxine.  Schemes  such  as  these  could  not 
be  realized,  so  long  as  Sestos  remained  in  the  hands  of 

a  Persian  garrison  ;  and  the  Athenians,  we 
sStos°f  are  t0^'  were  furtner  stirred  by  a  feeling  of 

personal  hatred  for  the  satrap  Artayktes. 
When  Xerxes  passed  from  Asia  into  Europe,  Artayktes 
had  requested  from  him  as  a  gift  the  house  of  a  man  who 
had  been  killed,  he  said,  in  invading  Persian  territory. 
This  man 'was  the  hero  Protesilaos  who  had  been  the 
first  to  land  on  the  soil  of  Asia  when  the  Achaians  came 
to  avenge  the  wrongs  and  woes  of  Helen  ;  and  his  house 
was  the  shrme  surrounded  by  its  sacred  Close  or  Teme- 
nos,  which  the  satrap  denied.  For  this  crime  he  found 
himself  blockaded  at  Sestos.  He  had  made  no  prepara 
tion  for  a  siege  :  but  he  held  out  so  stoutly  that  the 
Athenian  leaders  were  able  to  keep  their  men  quiet  only 
by  telling  them  that  they  would  not  give  up  their  task 
until  they  should  have  received  from  Athens  the  order 
to  do  so.  The  end,  however,  was  near.  The  people 
were  fast  dying  off  from  famine,  when  Artayktes  made 
his  escape  by  night  with  the  Persian  garrison  ;  but  they 
had  not  gone  far  when  they  were  intercepted  by  the 
Athenians,  and  defeated  after  a  hard  fight.  Artayktes, 
taken  back  to  Sestos,  offered  to  atone  for  his  sin  against 
Protesilaos  by  devoting  a  hundred  talents  at  his  shrine, 
and  to  pay  a  further  sum  of  two  hundred  talents  for  his 
ransom.  But  the  men  of  Elaious  to  whom  the  shrine 


479  B-c-]     Battles  of  Plataia  and  My  kale.  211 

belonged  would  be  satisfied  with  nothing  less  than  his 
death  ;  and  Artayktes,  given  up  by  the  Athenian  leaders 
probably  against  their  will,  was  led  out  to  the  western 
end  of  the  shattered  bridge,  or  to  the  hill  above  the  city 
of  Madytos.  Here  his  son  was  stoned  to 

•  Death  of  the 

death  before  his  eyes  ;  and  Artayktes,  hung  satrap 

on  some  wooden  planks  nailed  together, 
was  left  to  die  of  hunger,  looking  down  on  the  scenes  of 
his  former  pleasures.  Protesilaos  was  indeed  amply  re 
venged  :  and  the  Athenian  fleet  sailed  home  loaded  with 
treasure,  and  with  the  huge  cables  of  the  broken  bridges, 
to  be  dedicated  in  the  temples  as  memorials  of  the 
struggle  thus  gloriously  ended. 

There  remained  yet,  however,  some  more  work  to  be 
done,  before  it  could  be   said  that  the  barbarians  had 
been  fairly  driven  back  into  Asia.     Sestos 
had  fallen;   but  Byzantion   and   Doriskos,    IK^0* 
with  Eion  on  the  Strymon  (p.  153)  and  many 
other  places  on  the  northern  shores  of  the 
Egean,  were  still  held  by  Persian  garrisons  when,  in  the 
year  after  the  battle  of  Plataia,  Pausanias,  as 
commander  of  the  confederate  fleet,  sailed 
with  twenty  Peloponnesian  and  thirty  Athenian  ships  to 
Kypros   (Cyprus),   and  thence,  having  recovered    the 
greater  part  of  the  island,  to  Byzantion.     The  resistance 
here  seems  to  have  been  as  obstinate  as  at  Sestos ;  but 
the  place  was  at  length  reduced,  and  Sparta  stood  for  the 
moment  at  the  head  of  a  triumphant  con 
federacy.     But,  to  do  her  justice,  her  present   Byzanti'on.  ° 
position  had  been  rather  thrust  upon  her 
than  deliberately  sought,  and  she  had  no  statesmanlike 
Themistokles,  capable  of  seizing  on  a  golden  opportunity 
while  in  her  own  generals  she  found  her  greatest  enemies. 
The  treachery  of  Pausanias  alienated  utterly  the  Asiatic 


212  The  Persian  Wars.  [CH.  vm. 

Greeks,  and  these,  apart  from  the  alienation  thus  caused, 

had  been  brought  to  see  clearly  that  they 

rfth«*Athe-       must  look  for  real  protection,  not  to  Sparta, 

nianCon-          but  to  Athens.     The  work  thus  imposed  on 

federacy. 

Athens  carried  her  immediately  to  imperial 
dominion  ;  but  the  events  which  led  to  this  result  belong 
to  the  history  of  her  empire,  not  to  that  of  the  moment 
ous  struggle  which  had  been  practically  brought  to  an 
end  with  the  fall  of  Sestos  and  Byzantion.  Persian 
tribute-gatherers  probably  no  longer  plied 
their  task  in  the  cities  of  the  Asiatic  Greeks, 
struseje  .  and  the  Persian  fleets  certainly  no  longer 

with  Persia. 

exacted  tribute  in  the  waters  of  the  Egean. 
Here  and  there  an  isolated  fortress  might  still  remain  in 
Persian  hands  ;  but  the  conquest  of  Europe  was  no  longer 
a  vision  which  could  cheat  the  fancy  of  the  lord  of  Asia. 
The  will  and  energy  of  Athens,  aided  by  the  rugged 
discipline  of  Sparta,  had  foiled  the  great  enterprise 
through  which  the  barbarian  despot  sought  to  repress  in 
the  deadly  bonds  of  Persian  thraldom  the  intellect  and 
freedom  of  the  world. 


INDEX. 


ABA 

ABAI,  176 
Abydos,  34,  145 
Achaia,  20 
Achaimenes,  141 
Adeimantos,   corruption  of,    171 

Themistokles,  179 
Adoption,  6 
Adrastos  and  Atys,  44 
./Egina  [Aigina]  153 
-(tginetans  [Aiginctans]  15,  153 
^"olus  [AiolosJ  17 
yEschylos,  130,  148 
Africa,  Greek  colonies  in,  16 
Agbatana,  the  Median,  2,  39, 40 
Agora,  105 
Ahuromazd&o,  145 
Aiakfes,  109 
Aiakos,  58 
Aigaleos,  181 
Aigeus,  119 
Aigina,  153 
Aiginetans,  115,  153 
Aigiplanktos,  19 
Aiolos,  17 
Aitolians.  20,  30 
Akarnanians,  19,  30 
Akerafs,  176 
Akrokorinthos,  19 
Akie,  32 
Alalia,  63 
Aleuadiai,  20,  152 
Alexander  the  Great,  131 
Alexandros  the  Macedonian,  192 
Alkmaionidai,  81,  132 
Alyattes,  38 
Amasis,  60,  68 
Ammon,  Amoun,  61 
Amompharetos,  201 
Ampc,  in 
Amphi polls,  27,  34 


and 


ASS 

Ancestors,  worship  of,  6 

Androkrates,  198 

Andros,  133,  185,  190 

Anopaia,    169 ;      march    of    Hydarnes 

over,  1 68,  169 
Aphetai,  170, 171 
Apis,  64 
Apries,  60 
Arados,  63 
Araxes,  53 

Archons  at  Athens,  84 
Archon  Polemarchos,  127 
Areiopagos,  council  of,  83,  85 
Argives,    neutral   in    the    Persian  war, 

158,  195 
Argos,  21,  117 
Ariabignes,  182 
Aristagoras  of  Ryme,  74 
Aristagoras   of    Miletos,  100;  and    the 

Naxian    exiles,  101 ;     mission    of,    to 

Sparta,  102;  at  Athens,  105;  death  of,io8 
Aristides,    121 ;    ostracism   of,    154 ;    at 

Salamis,  180 
Aristodemos,  24  ;  Aristodemos  at  Ther- 

mopylai,  179;  at  Plataia,  203 
Aristogeiton,  87,  132 
Aristabanos,  142,  146 
Artabazos,  189,  202 
Artaphernes,  73,  94,  100,  131,  118 
Artayktes,  210 
Artemisia,  184 
Artemision,  170,  172 
Aryan,  society,  foundation  of,  5  ;  civi'i- 

sation,    tendencies    of   early,   7,    77  ; 

conviction  of  immortality,  6  . 

Ashdod,  [AzotosJ,  59 
Asia  Minor,  geography  of,  33 
Asopos,  197 
Assemblies,  primary  and  representative, 

12 

2I3 


2I4 


Index. 


Assyrians,  12,  36 

Astyages   36 

Athenian  constitution,  slow  growth  of 
the,  as  drawn  out  by  Solon,  80;  re 
formed  by  Kleisthenes,  90,  03 

Athenian  dislike  of  responsibility,  136, 
138 

Athenian.  Thetes  or  Hektemorioi,  81  ; 
tribes  setup  by  Kleisthenes,  90,  130; 
navy,  formation  of  the,  153, 154;  citi 
zens,  number  of,  102  ;  embassy  to  Ge- 
lon  of  Syracuse,  159  ;  to  Artaphernes, 

94,  101 ;    maritime  empire,  foundation 
of  the,  212 

Athenians,  4;  their  original  houses  and 
clans,  78;  their  original  tribes,  91; 
misery  of  the,  in  the  time  of  Solon, 
80 ;  warlike  activity  of  the,  after  the 
reforms  of  Kleisthenes,  94,  154;  rela 
tions  of  the,  with  the  Persian  king, 

95,  102,  100 ;  send  twenty  ships  to  aid 
Aristagoras,  100,  101 ;  alleged  ingrati 
tude  of  the,  136;  emphatic   praise  of, 
by  Herodotus,  3,  155,    173;    devotion 
of  the,  to  the  Hellenic  cause,  3, 130; 
victorious  at  Marathon,  128  ;  absence 
of  the,   fn.m   Thermopylai,  163 ;  mi 
gration  of  the,  to  Salamis,  175  ;  reject 
the  proposals  of  alliance  from  Mardo- 
nios,  191  ;  fictions   invented  to  glorify 
the,  200 ;    position   of  the,  after  the 
battle  of  Mykale,  207 

Athens,  6;  early  insignificance  of,  27; 
results  of  despotism  at,  79 ;  first  em 
bassy  from,  to  the  Persian  king,  99  ; 
second  embassy  from,  to  the  Persian 
king.  100  ;  treatment  of  the  Persian 
heralds  at,  116;  occupied  by  Xerxes, 
177;  burning  of,  by  Mardonios,  196; 
empire  of,  9,  207 

Athos,  32  ;  canal  under,  143 

Atossa,  71 

Attaginos,  196,  206 

Attica,  boroughs  of,  9  ;  geography  of,  19, 
21 

Atys,44 

Azotos,  59 


BABYLON,   2  ;     agriculture   of  50  ; 
city  of,  57  ;  siege  of,  by  Cyrus,  52  ; 
revolt  of,  against  Dareios,  67 
B.irathron,  116 
Barbarians,  12,  29 
Barke,  60 
Basi'etis,  78 

Behistnn,  inscription  of,  66,  73 
Berytos,  63 
B  >ges,  152 


Boiotarchs,  22 

Boiotia,  20 

Boiotians,  22 

Boreas,  163 

Boundaries,  household,  5,  78 

Bouto,  65 

Bran, 177 

Branchidai,  in 

Brennus,  177 

Byblos,  63 

Byzantion,  32,  106,  in,  205 


f*AMBUNIAN  [Kambounian]  Car- 
V_x     mel,  63 

Carthage,  62,  159 

Catenae  [KelainaiJ  143 

Chalkidike,  32 

Chalkis,  27,  32 

Chaonians,  30 

Chaos,  15 

Chersonesos,  the  Thrakian,  87 

Chileos  of  Tegea,  194 

Cilicians  [Kilikians)  35 

Cithaeron  [Kitharionj  19 

Citizenship,  ancient  ideas  of,  7 

City,  the,  9 

Clan,  the,  6 

Coincident  events,  alleged,  210 


Colonies,  Greek,  35 
Corcyra  [Korkyra]  27 


Corfu,  29 

Corinth,  isthmus  of,  19,  179 ;  city  of,  27, 
29 

Corinthians,  opposition  of  the,  to  the 
restoration  of  Hippias,  97 ;  their  re 
fusal  to  interfere  in  the  affairs  of 
Athens,  97 

Croesus  FKroisos]  33 

Crete  [Krete]  20 

Cybele  [Kybfebe]  105 

Cyprus  (Kypros)  106 

Cyrus,  2,  36,  42  ;  the  mule,  48 


DATMONES,  130 
Danube,  75 
Dareios,  66;  his  expedition  to   Scythia, 

70  ;  his  death,  132 
Datis,  the  Median,  73  ;  king  of  Athens, 

119  ;  defeat  of,  at  Marathon,  129 
Deiokes,  37 
Delian,  confederacy,  formation   of  the, 

212  ;  hymns,  13 
Delos,  13  ;  Datis   and   Artaphernes  at, 

119 

Delphian  priestess  (Pythia).9o 
Delphoi,  rebuilding  of  the  temple  of,  174; 

attack  on,  by  Xerxes,  199 


Index. 


215 


Demagogue,  the  oligarchic,  80 
Demaratos,  95, 118, 151,  164 
Democracy,     impulse     given     to     the 

growth  of,  by  the  Greek  despots,  77  ; 

movements  of    the   Solonian   reforms 

towards,  84 
Demoi,  9,  91 
Demokedes,  70 
Despots,  12 
Dienekes,  166 

Dionysios  of  Phokaia,  106,  no 
Dorians,  32 
Doris,  71 

Doriskos,  149,  152 
Doros,  17 
Dream-god,  142 
Dryoskephalai,  198 

EGYPT,  22  ;  astronomical  science  of, 
54 ;    invasion  of,    by  Kambyses, 
53  ,  by  Xerxes,  141 
Egyptians,  civilization  of  the,  56 
Eion.  188 

Ekbatano  (Egbatana) 
Ekklesia,  93 
Elbruz,  40 
Eleusis,  15 

Ennea  Hodoi,  32, 152 
F.peiros,  20 
Epeirotai,  30 
Ephesos,  34 
Ephialtes,  166 
Ephors,  24 
Erebos,  15 
Erectheus,  163 
Eret  ia,  26,  32,  119 
Ethiopians,  67 
Euboia,  20 
Eupatridai,  3,  82 
Euphrates,  32 
Fur  jtas,  22 
Eurybiades,  169,  180 
Eurysthenes,  22 
Earytos,  166 
Euxine,  17 
Exile,  severity  of  the  punishment  of,  9 

FAMILY,  the  Aryan,  5 
Fars  and  Farsistan,  39 
Festivals,  Greek,  12 
Four  Hundred,  the,  89 

f~*  ADES,  63 

\J     Games,  GreeK,  13 
Gargaphia,  201 
Ge  on,  159,  208 
Gene,  7 

Geography  of  Continental    Greece,  18  ; 
of  Asia  Minor,  33  ;  of  Persia,  39 


Geraneia,  19 

Ge-ousia,  24 

Gomates,  66,  69 

Gorgo,  103,  162 

Graci,  17 

Grsecia  Magna  (Megalfe  Hellas)  17 

Granikos,  33 

Greece,  geography  of  continental,  17 

Greek  philosophy,  15  ;  national  charac 
ter,  10 ;  trade  in  Egypt,  59 

Greeks,  17;  religious  associations 
among  the,  13;  Asiatic,  33,  34,  no; 
tribute  assessed  on  the  Asiatic,  by 
Dareios,  56,  172  ;  siege  of  Andros  by 
the,  190  (Hellenes) 

Gyges,  48 

Gyndes,  52 

HALYS,  35 
Hamilkar,  160 

Harmodios,  86,  132 

Harpagos,  36 

Hegesistratos,  206 

Hekataios,  in 

Hektcmorioi,  81 

Helikon,  19 

Hellas,  not  a  definite  geographical  term, 
16 ;  continuous  or  continental,  17  ; 
Sporadike,  18 

Hellen,  17 

Hellenes,  earliest  political  characteris- 
rics  of  the,  5  ;  effect  of  maritime  com 
merce  on  the,  20  ;  growth  of  a  common 
sentiment  among  the,  10;  religious 
associations  among  the,  16 ;  centrifu 
gal  tendencies  of  the,  4 ;  never 
formed  a  nation,  4  ;  and  barbarians, 
n 

Hellespont,  18,  141 

Helots,  25 

Herakles,  23 

Hermos,  34 

Herodotus,  3,  48,96,  109,  102,  113,  132, 
134,  140,  147, 150,  155,  164 

Hipparchos,  86 

Hippias,  86  ;  expulsion  of,  from  Athens, 
89  ;  intrigues  of,  with  the  Persian 
court,  72,  96,110,  116;  invited  from 
Sigeion  to  a  Spartan  Congress,  96; 
his  return  to  Sigeion,  99;  at  Mara 
thon,  118,  121,  124,  141 

Histiaios,  74,  76,  125,  107 

Homoioi,24 

House,  the  primitive  Aryan,  7 

Hydarnes,  128,  passage  of,  overAno- 
paia,  166,  169 

Hyperakrioi,  81 
Hypomeiones,  25 

Hystaspes,  66 


216 


Index. 


IDA,  33    - 
Illynans,  30 

Immortality,  ideas  of,  as  affecting  the 
ancient  Aryan  family  life,  5 

Ion, 17 

Ionia,  32  ;  first  conquest  of,  42  ;  second 
conquest  of,  49 :  revolt  of,  against 
Dareios,  107  ;  third  conquest  of,  no 

lonians,  32,  42,  74,  130 

Iran, 2 

Istros,  74 

Italy,  Greek  colonies  in,  16, 27 


J 


OSIAH,  60 


KADYTIS,  60 
Kaikos,  34 

Kallias,  133 

Kallimachos,  127 

Kambounian  mountains,  16, 18 

Kambyses,  66 

Karians,  47,  107 

Karystos,  119 

Karaiystros,  33 

Kelain,  143 

Kilikians,  35 

Kimon,  135 

Kings  and  despots,  77 

Kirkesion,  60 

Kitharion,  19 

Kleisthenes,  the  Athenian,  90,  94 

Kleombrotos,  193 

Kleomenes,  king  of  Sparta,  88, 93,  95, 124 

Koes  of  Mytilene,  73,  76,  108 

Korkyra,  28, 158 

Krete,  20 

Kretalla,  143 

Kroisos,  35,  39 ;  and  Solon,  44 ;  drama 

of  the  life  of,  47  et  seq. 
Kroton,  28 
Krypteia,  25 
Ktesias,  48 
Kyaxares,  38,  39 
Kybebfe,  105 
Kylon,  curse  of,  93,  132 
Kynegeiros,  130 
Kypros,  106 
Kypselos,  97 
Kyrenfe,  60 
Kythera,  20,  167 

LABRONDA,  193 
Labynetos,  38 
Lade,  battle  of,  108 
Lakrynes,  49 
Language,  Greek,  10-11 
Laureion,  154 

Law,  voluntary  obedience  to,  2 
Lebanon,  63 
Lemnos,  32,  77 


Leonidas,  162,  169 
Leotychides,  206 
Lokroi,  20 
Lydia,  2 
Lygdamis,  31 
Lykians,  35,  49 
Lykourgos  the  Athenian,  84 

MAGIANS,  67 
Magna  Grscia  (Megale  Hellas) 
Magnesia,  20,  170 
Maiandros,  34 
Makedonia,  30 
Malian,  19 
Malian  Gulf,  19 
Mandrokles,  70 

Marathon,  19,  86;  debates  in  the 
Athenian  camp  at,  127 ;  story  of  the 
battle  of,  125-130 

Mardonios,  113,  114,  141.  l83»  i89  '•  pro 
posals  of  alliance  from,  to  the  Athe 
nians,  191 ;  reoccupation  of  Athens 
by,  192  ;  paction  of, -with  the  Argives, 
195 ;  retreat  of,  iuto  Boiotia,  196 ; 
death  of,  203 
Magdolon,  60 

Marriage,  ancient  ideas  of,  7 
Masistios,  198 
Meander  (Maiandros) 
Medes,  2,  45,  67 
Medeia,  119 
Median  tribes,  36 
Megabazos,  76 
Megabyzos,  66 
Megakles,  84 
Megale  Hellas,  17,  28 
Megara,  27 
Megistias,  166 
Megiddo,  57 
Mercenaries,  12, 76,  82 
Messene,  22 
Messogis,  34 
Metapontion,  28 
Metoikoi,  139 
Miletos,  no 
Milon,  70 

Miltiades,  73,  88,  117  ;  at  the  bridge  on 
the   Istros,     77;     flight    of,  from  the 
Chersonesos,  112  ;    at   Marathon,  120 
et  seq. ;  at  Faros,  133  ;  trial  and  con 
demnation  of,  134 
Minos,  58 
Molossians,  30 
Monarchy,  growth  of,  79 
Mutilation  of  the  human  body,  12 
Mykalfe,  35  ;  battle  of,  199 
Mykenai,  162 
Mykonos,  76 
TVJABOPOLASSAR,  38 
J.N      Naukratis,  60,  60 


Index. 


217 


Naxos,  119 

Nebucadnezzar,  38-60 
Necessity,  doctrine  of,  47 
Neith,  ii 
Nemea,  13 
Nemesis,  163, 172 
Nekos,  59 
Night, 


JNigm,  I5 

Nile,  valley  of  the,  54 
Nine  Roads  (Enn&e  H 
Nineveh,  2,  37,  59 


odot) 


OASIS,  61 
Oinos,  26 
Oita,  19 

Oligarchs,  Thessalian,  21  ;  Boiotian,  22 
Oligarchy,  origin.of,  78 ;  a  step   in   the 

direction  of  freedom,  80 
Oloros,  88 
Olympia,  13 

Olympos,  Thessalian,  18;  Mysian,  38 
Olynthos,  32, 189 
Oracles,  45,  156     * 
Oreithyia,  163 

Oriental  history,  character  of,  i 
Ormuzd,  145 
Oroites,  68 
Ossa,  18 

Ostracism,  91,  92 
Otanes,  66 
Othrys,  19 

PAGASAIAN  Gulf,  19 
Paktolos,  32 

Paktyas,  49 

Pallcnc,  32 

Paraloi,  84 

Parnassos,  19 

Parnon,  20 

Paros,  133 

Pasargadia,  40 

Patria  Potestas,  9 

Pausanias,  192,  199,  200,  203 

Pediaioi,  84 

Peisistratidai,  80  ;  expulsion  of  the  from 
Athens,  3,  89  ;  intrigues  of  the,  72,  90, 
100, 141  ;  at  Athens  with  Xerxes,  178 

Peisistratos,  84,  85 

Pelion,  19 

Peloponnesos,  20 

Penrios,  18 

Penestai,  21 

People,  rise  of  the,  9 

Pergamos,  43 

Periandros,  97 

Perikles,  134 

Perioikoi,  25 

Persephone,  15 

Persia,  geography  of,  39  ;  under  Dareios, 
69 


Persian,  tribes,  37  ;  heralds,  treatment 
of,  at  Athens  and  Sparta,  115 

Persian  War,  causes  of  the,  2,  72,  115, 
loo,  115,  161 

Persians,  characteristics  of  the,  2  ;  con 
spiracy  of  the  Seven, 67 ;  bravery  of 
the,  in  the  Persian  War,  183  ;  defeat 
of  the,  at  Marathon,  129;  at  Salarnis, 
183 ;  at  Piataia,  194 ;  and  at  Mykale, 
207 

Pharaoh,  58 

Pheidippides,  123 

Pheme,  209 

Phenic;an  Tripolis,  63 

Phenicians,  63,  145,  183 

Philosophy,  Greek,  14 

Phokaia,  34 

Phokians  on  Anopaia,  166 

Phokis,  19,  175 

Phraortes,  38 

Phratria,  7 

Phyle,  7 

Physical  Science,  Greek,  13 

Pindos,  19 

Piataia,  125 ;  allian2e  of,  with  Athens,. 
1 19  ;  battle  of,  jae  2.  cr*> 

Plataians,  124,  200 

Plebeians,  8 

Polemarchos,  125 

Polis,9 

Polykrates,  68,  70 

Potidaia,  32, 189 

Prexaspes,  65 

Primary  assemblies,  10 

Primogeniture,  6 

Probouleutic  Council,  83,  92 

Prokles,  23 

Propontis,  34 

Protesilaos,  211 

Prytaneion,  7,  135 

Psammis,  59 

Psammenitos,  59,  60 

Psammitichos,  59 

Psyttaleia,  180,  183 

Pythagoras  of  Miletos,  108 

Pythia,  bribing  of  the,  88,  96, 157 

Pythius,  145 

Pytho.  13 

R AMESES,  75 
Rhadamanthys,  58 
Rhamnous,  19 
Religion,  character  of  Ancient  Aryan, 

7,8 

Representative  assemblies,  10 
Rhodes,  34 
Rhone,  17 

Rivers,  diversions  of,  53,  152 
Romans,  18 
Rome,  17 


218 


Index. 


SALAMIS,  157;  battle  of,  181 
Samos,  206 

Sardeis,  34,  47,  105 

Sardinia,  17 

Saronic  Gulf,  21 

Scythia,  71 

Seischatheia,  82 

Semiramis,  54 

Senate  at  Athens,  84 

Sesostris,  75 

Sestjs,  3,  32,  210 

Seven  Persians,  the,  67 

Sicily,  Greet  colonies  in,  17,  27 

Sidon,  63 

Sigeion,  88 

Sikinnos,  180, 186 

Sinope, 17 

Siris,  28 

Sithonia,  32 

Smerdis,  brother  of  Kambyses,  65  ;  the 
Magian,  66 

Smyrna,  34 

Solon,  3  ;  and  Kroisos,  44  ;  reforms  of, 
as  described  by  himself,  80 ;  actual 
measures  of,  73  ;  timocracy  of,  82  ; 
travels  of,  85  ;  death  of,  85  ;  oligarch 
ical  elements  in  the  constitution  of, 
84,  86,  89  ;  imprecation  of,  120 

S  >phanes,  203 

Sosikles,  97 

Sounion,  191 

Sousa,  70 

Spain,  17 

Sparta,  unwalled,  14,  26;  early  great 
ness  of,  22, 102 

Spartan  opposition  to  Athens,  4  ;  con 
stitution,  23  ;  Homoioi,  24;  Hypo- 
meiones,  24  ;  military  system,  25 

Spartan  kings,  23 

Spartans,  23,  42,  68,  178 

Spartiatia,  24 

Spercheois,  30,  161 

State,  growth  of  the,  7 

Strymon,  27 

Styx,  113 

Sybaris,  28 

Syennesis,  38 

Syloson,  66 

Syrian  kings,  48 

TAGOS,  21 
Tainaros,  20 
Tamos,  34 
Tanais,  17,  71 
Taras,  28,  71 
Tarentum  (Taras)  28 
Taxiorchos,  26 
Taygetos,  20 
Tempe,  18,  163 


Thtbans  at  Thermopylai,  167 

Thebes,  21,  204 

Themistokles,  117  ;  genius  of,  123; 
policy  of,  154  et  seq. ;  at  Tempe,  i6j  ; 
and  the  Euboians,  177;  first  message 
of,  to  Xerzes,  186;  not  the  adviser  of 
a  pursuit  of  Xerxes,  187;  honors 
paid  to,  at  Sparta,  190 

Therme,  152 

Thermopylai,  19  ;  geography  of,  163  ; 
Greek  contingent  at,  164,  170;  al 
leged  absence  of  the  Athenians  Irom, 
164 

Thesandros,  196 

Theseus,  10 

Thesprotians,  30 

Thessalians,  21,  162 

Thessaly,  geography  of,  19 

Thetes,  81 

Thorax  of  Larissa,  202 

Thornax,  21 

Thourioi,  28 

Thrakians,  21,  30,  31 

Thucydides,  14,  87,  150 

Thyrea,  22 

Tigranes,  807 

Timo,  134 

Timocracy  of  Solon,  87 

Tmolos,  34 

Torone,  32 

Trapezous,  17 

Tribe,  origin  of  the,  7 

Tribes,  Attic,  in  the  time  of  Solon,  121 
Kleisthenean,  90,  121 

Tritantaichmes,  168 

Tymphrestos,  19 

Tyre,  63 

Tyrants,  the  Greek,  79 


V 

w 


ILLAGE  communities,  5 


KITE  Shield,  raising  of  the,  126 


VANTHIPPOS,  134 

,/V  Xerxes,  accession  of,  to  the  Per 
sian  throne,  132 ;  council  of,  141  ; 
canal  of,  across  the  Peninsula  of 
Athos,  144 ;  march  of,  from  Sardeis, 
145  ;  number  of  the  fleet  of,  148  ;  at 
Athens,  177;  at  Salamis,  187;  flight 
of,  176 

^AGROS,  40 
*L*     Zarex,  22 
Zeus  145 
Zopyros,  68 
Zoroaster,  67 


An  Important  Historical  Series. 

EPOCHS  OF  MODERN  HISTORY. 

EDITED   BY 

EDWARD  E.  MORRIS,  M.A.,  and  J.  SURTEES  PHILLPOTTS,  B.C.L 


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THE  FOLLOWING   VOL  UMES  ARE  NO  W  READ  Y  : 

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of  "The  Oxford  Reformers— Colet,  Erasmus,  More,"  with  an  appendix  by  Prof. 
GF.O.  P.  FISHER,  of  Yale  College.  Author  of  "  HISTORY  OF  THE  REF 
ORMATION." 

THE  CRUSADES.  By  Rev.  G.  W.  Cox,  M.A.,  Author  of  the  "  History  of 
Greece." 

THE  THIRTY  YEARS'  WAR,  1618-1648.     By  SAMUEL  RAWSON  GARDINER. 

THE  HOUSES  OF  LANCASTER  AND  YORK:  with  the  CONQUEST  and 
LOSS  of  FRANCE.  By  JAMES  GAIRDNER  of  the  Public  Record  Office. 

THE  FRENCH  REVOLUTION  AND  FIRST  EMPIRE:  an  Historical  Sketch. 
By  WILLIAM  O'CONNOR  MORRIS,  with  an  appendix  by  Hon.  ANDREW  D. 
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EPOCHS  SELECTED. 


THE  AGE  OF  ELIZABETH.     By  the  Rev.  M.  CREIGHTON,  M.A. 

THE  FRENCH  REVOLUTION  AND  FIRST  EMPIRE:  an  Historical  Sketch. 
By  WILLIAM  O'CONNOR  MORRIS,  with  an  appendix  by  Hon.  ANDREW  D. 
WHITE,  President  of  Cornell  University. 

THE  HOUSES  OF  LANCASTER  AND  YORK;  with  the  CONQUEST  and 
LOSS  of  FRANCE.  By  JAMES  GAIRDNER  of  the  Public  Record  Office. 

THE  THIRTY  YEARS'  WAR,  1618-1648.     By  SAMUEL  RAWSON  GARDINER. 

THE  CRUSADES.  By  Rev.  G.  W.  Cox,  M.A.;  Author  of  the  "History  of 
Greece." 

THE  ERA  OF  THE  PROTESTANT  REVOLUTION.  By  F.  SEEBOHM,  Author 
of  "The  Oxford  Reformers,"  with  an  appendix  by  Prof.  GEO.  P.  FISHER,  of 
Yale  College. 

*#*  To  be  followed  at  frequent  intervals  by  the  following  Works  in  continua 
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THE  BEGINNING  OF  THE  MIDDLE  AGES;  CHARLES  the  GREAT  and 
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EUROPE  in  the  NINTH  CENTURY.  By  the  Very  Rev.  R.  W.  CHURCH, 
M.A.,  Dean  of  St.  Paul's. 

THE  NORMAN  KINGS  AND  THE  FEUDAL  SYSTEM.     By  the  Rev.  A.  H. 

JOHNSON,  M.A. 

THE  EARLY  PLANTAGENETS  and  their  relation  to  the  HISTORY  of 
EUROPE  •  the  foundation  and  growth  of  CONSTITUTIONAL  GOVERN 
MENT.  By  the  Rev.  WILLIAM  STUBBS,  M.A.,  &c.,  Regius  Professor  of 
Modern  History  in  the  University  of  Oxford. 

EDWARD  III.     By  the  Rev.  W.  WARBURTON,  M.A. 

THE  PURITAN  REVOLUTION.  By  SAMUEL  RAWSON  GARDINER,  Author  of 
"  The  Thirty  Years'  War."  (Shortly.) 

THE  FALL  OF  THE  STUARTS;  and  WESTERN  EUROPE  from  !678  to 
1697.  By  the  Rev.  EDWARD  HALE,  M.A.,  Assistant-Master  at  Eton..  (Shortly.) 

THE  AGE  OF  ANNE.     By  EDWARD  E.   MORRIS,   M.A.,  Editor  of  the  Series. 

FREDERICK  THE  GREAT  and  the  SEVEN  YEARS'  WAR.  By  F.  W.  LONG- 
MAN,  of  Balliol  College,  ©xford. 


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ANOTHER  GREAT  HISTORICAL  WORK. 


Ijfistorg  of 

By  Prof,  Dr,  ERNST  CnRTIUS, 

Translated  by  ADOLPHUS  WILLIAM  WARD,  M.A,,  Fellow  of  St,  Peter'? 
College,  Cambridge,  Prof,  of  History  in  Owen's  College,  Manchester. 

Complete  in  five  vols,,  crown  8vof  at  $2.5O  per  volume. 

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Curtius'  History  of  Greece  is  similar  in  plan  and  purpose  to  Mommsen's  Histfry  of 
Rjntf,  with  which  it  deserves  to  rank  in  every  respect  as  one  of  the  great  masterpieces  of 
historical  literature.  Avoiding  the  minute  details  which  overburden  other  similar  works, 
it  groups  together  in  a  very  picturesque  manner  all  the  important  events  in  the  history  of 
this  kingdom,  which  has  exercised  such  a  wonderful  influence  upon  the  world's  civilization. 
The  narrative  of  Prof.  Curtius'  work  is  flowing  and  animated,  and  the  generalizations, 
although  bold,  are  philosophical  and  sound. 


CRITICAL  NOTICES. 

"  Professor  Curtius'  eminent  scholarship  is  a  sufficent  guarantee  for  the  trustworthiness  of 
his  history,  while  the  skill  with  which  he  groups  his  facts,  and  his  effective  mode  of  narrating 
them,  combine  to  render  it  no  less  readable  than  sound.  Professor  Curtius  everywhere  main 
tains  the  true  dignity  and  impartiality  of  history,  and  it  is  evident  his  sympathies  are  on 
the  side  of  justice,  humanity,  and  progress." — London  Athenceum. 

"We  can  not  express  our  opinion  of  Dr.  Curtius'  book  better  than  by  saying  that  it  may 
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"As  nn  introduction  to  the  study  of  Grecian  history,  no  previous  work  is  comparable  to 
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statement  it  is  not  inferior  to  the  elaborate  productions  which  enrich  the  literature  of  the 
age."1— N.  Y.  Daily  Tribune. 

"The  History  of  Greece  is  treated  by  Dr.  Curtius  so  broadly  and  freely  in  the  spirit  of 
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branches  of  study  for  all  who  desire  something  more  than  a  knowledge  of  isolated  facts  for 
their  education.  This  translation  ought  to  become  a  regular  part  pt  the  accepted  course 
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life  of  our  country." — N.  Y.  Evening  Pott. 

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